Religious Exemption for High School Athletes

For Seventh-day Adventists, a Protestant-Catholic denomination, Sabbath is celebrated on Saturdays, as worship takes place from Friday sundown to Saturday sundown.  This is the case for Joseph and Joelle Chung, tennis players who attend William F. West High School in Chehalis, Washington.  They both are on their high school tennis team and were hoping to play in the state championship tournament this past school year.  Joelle, a senior, was disqualified from the state championship tournament because she does not compete on Saturdays, her day of Sabbath, which is when the final match would have taken place.  After not receiving the religious exemption that they had asked for, the Chung Family sued the Washington Insterscholatic Activites Association (WIAA) in August. Joelle had gone undefeated her whole senior year and probably would have won the tournament. She wanted to fight for this religious exemption to allow her brother, a sophomore, the opportunity to be able to play in future championship matches.

Joelle and Joseph Chung, Seventh-day Adventists

The WIAA denied Joelle’s request for religious accommodation last season because the rules were that if she could not commit to playing the whole tournament then she would not be allowed to compete at all, even though the only conflict was not until the final day of competition.  She would have played every match until it affected her Sabbath, and then would have dropped out if necessary.   They usually allow players who get sick or injured during the tournament to drop out, but they did not give this same option to anyone with a religious interference. Asking for a compromise, the Chung family asked if they would move the state championships to a weekday or allow Joelle to play in all of the qualifying tournaments and then have an alternate play in the championship, which is what they allow for others who drop out mid-tournament. The WIAA said it wouldn't be fair for the people who she had eliminated along the way.  This seemed unfair to them because the Association had recently allowed volleyball and golf matches in the same school to be moved based on the religious beliefs of those who observe Saturday as their day of Sabbath.

Joelle said, “As a senior, it was hard to give everything I had to support my team all season, only to be forced to sit out after the entire season simply because of my faith.  I will never get the chance to play for a state championship again, but hopefully, this case will protect other Seventh-day Adventists like my brother from having to choose between sports and their faith."  The lawyer defending the Chung family believed that the rules of the WIAA discriminate against religious minorities and students whose faith honor keeping the Sabbath.

Shortly after this article was written, the WIAA agreed to add religious observance to its reasons for missing games without being penalized.  The Chung family won their case celebrating this step to creating religious equality in all situations like theirs.

Joelle Chung practicing tennis 

I agree with the ruling because this case does discriminate against religion, specifically those who celebrate their Sabbath on Saturdays.  Not allowing Joelle or her brother the right to a religious exemption from participating in a match on Saturday goes against their free exercise of religion.  There are usually no high school sports played on Sundays, and since that allows for anyone who celebrates their Sabbath on Sundays to be exempt, then that is discriminating against the religious minority.  Also, if this high school gave religious exemptions to other sports players on different teams, then they should also give it to the tennis players who wish to receive it.  Joelle was not getting herself out of anything or using her religious beliefs as an excuse but was being treated unfairly for celebrating her day of Sabbath on a day that is known for many other things to take place.

Being an athlete, I would never want my religious beliefs to interfere with being able to play the sport that I love, especially if I could win a championship for my team and high school.  Joelle stated how much she loved playing tennis and being able to win for her school as a senior would have been an amazing opportunity, so she clearly was being sincere about her religious beliefs and truly do put those beliefs before her hobbies and passions.  This case also does affect any other person’s beliefs and is not hurting anyone in the process.  Even though it seems like a small, irrelevant case, it is a big deal to Joelle and her family.  Having to choose between your religious beliefs and doing that of what you love would be a very hard decision to make.

Who can wear a scarf?

In the case of Allen v. English, Yvonne Allen is a devout Christian woman who covers her hair with a headscarf as a part of her religious practice. In December 2015, Ms. Allen needed to renew her driver's license in Lee County, Alabama. Because her headscarf is a part of her daily dress, she did not plan on taking it off for her picture but was asked several times to take it off although she pled it was for religious reasons. When asked if she was Muslim, she denied and said that she was Christian, to which the county clerk responded, “You are not a Muslim, and Christian women don’t cover their hair.” In tears, Ms. Allen and her friend begged the clerk that she would be disobeying God, but were not believed. Ultimately, she complied and took off her headscarf although it was a part of her faith. 

Her faith was questioned because Ms. Allen is not a Muslim woman, but instead a Christian one who was wearing a headscarf. Although a minority within the Christian faith, there are many women of the Christian faith that hold religious beliefs that do not allow them to show their hair in public. Ms. Allen believes that 1 Corinthians 11, which states “... But I want you to realize that the head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is man, and the head of Christ is God. Every man who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head- it is the same as having her head shaved.” Although this belief is not widely practiced or well-known, Ms. Allen believes that if she does not follow the Bible in wearing a headscarf, she is disobeying God. In being asked to remove her headscarf, she was asked to go against her faith. 

Following the incident, Ms. Allen and her counsel sent various letters to the Lee County Probate Judge and the Director of Public Safety, but they were all dismissed and she received a letter from the ALEA (Alabama Law Enforcement Agency) informing her of the photograph requirements for probate/licenses across the state of Alabama. The photograph requirements stated, “Head coverings are not permitted except for religious reasons…” The ALEA had set these photograph requirements in place in 2004 and ten years later, they were not allowing Christian women to wear head coverings for religious reasons. The photograph requirements should have granted Ms. Allen an exemption because she stated her religious reasons to the clerk, but she was still asked to take it off. 

The issue that is introduced in this case is one of sincerity and testing whether one’s beliefs and practices are sincere within the establishment of religion. Although dissimilar in the facts, a test of sincerity was also presented in the case of United States v. Seeger in which a man was convicted for refusing to join the army. Seeger was denied an exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme being. His argument however, focused on the fact that the state was requiring proof a Supreme being. This is similar to Allen v. English in the manner that her sincerity to wearing a headscarf was dismissed because her faith is not typically known for wearing headscarves. 

Because of all the reasons she submitted to the courts and her protection under Alabama state law, the court ruled in her favor and deemed that Lee County had violated the Ms. Allen's Free Exercise Clause by not allowing her to wear a headscarf in her picture.

I strongly believe that Ms. Allen’s first amendment rights were violated by asking her to remove her headscarf for her ID picture. Ms. Allen fully believed that she was betraying her faith and disobeying God by taking off her headscarf in public, something she only does intimately with people of familial ties. In addition to this, when Ms. Allen asked the clerk if the door could be shut while she took the picture, the clerk denied her this privacy, making her appearance more visible to the public eye, something she very clearly stated she did not want. This is not a picture that was taken once and she could avoid forever, this is a drivers license that she must carry around with her for proof of identification, where she will be reminded of the incident and that she disobeyed her God.

Can a Christian wear a Headscarf?

Allen v. English is a case that evaluates an individual's rights being violated, mainly the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  Yvonne Allen is a devout Christian women living in Auburn, Alabama.  As part of her religious belief, Yvonne Allen covers her hair with a headscarf citing verses in the Bible such as 1 Corinthians 11 which commands her to show submission to God by covering her hair in public, and to remove her headscarf is to be disobedient to God.  In 2015, Allen went to the Lee County driver license office to renew her expired license.  As she was preparing to take her picture, the clerk told Allen that she had to remover her covering and glasses to take her picture.  Yvonne Allen proceeded to explain to the clerk that she does not uncover her hair for religious reasons.  The clerk asked her if she was Muslim, Allen responded no and claimed she was a Christian, and the clerk told her, “No, then you uncover your hair.  Only Muslim women have the right to cover their hair in their driver license photos.”  Allen was hurt by this encounter and asked to talk to the clerk’s supervisor, Chief Clerk Becky Frayer.  Frayer confirmed that the religious accommodation was only offered to Muslims and Yvonne Allen was not eligible because she was a Christian.  Because Allen was leaving for Florida for vacation soon and had other responsibilities that required the use of her car such as taking her kids to school and going to work, she had no choice but to remove her headscarf and take the picture.  Now that her license shows her head uncovered, she must uncover her headscarf every time she must show her license, like at a bank or at the store when needed.

In February of 2004, the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency created a policy allowing driver license applicants to wear certain head coverings in their photos for religious or medical reasons.  As long as the face is identifiable and the individual presents religious or medical reason for covering, there should be no problem with the wearing of a headscarf.  However, the drivers license office claimed the head covering was only applicable for the Muslim faith, and Christians do not qualify.

The Establishment Clause written in the First Amendment prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”  Not only can the government not establish a religion, but this clause also forbids government from favoring one religion over the other.  In this particular case, the defendants’ policy of restricting accommodations for religious headgear for only those who identify as Muslim over those of non-Muslim faith shows a direct violation of the Establishment Clause and Yvonne Allen’s rights.  Allen believes her headscarf is important to her religion, and she is protected by the First Amendment to that belief.  She is also protected by the Alabama state law.  Because of the resounding evidence in favor of Allen, the federal court found that the Lee County’s policy violates the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  Yvonne Allen was given a settlement and a new license with her head covered.

I believe the court made the right decision by deeming the actions by the drivers license office in Auburn unconstitutional because it is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause where they seem to favor the Muslim religion over non-Muslim.  It also violates the Free Exercise Clause by discriminating against Allen’s religious views, Christianity.  By the drivers license office claiming the head covering was only a Muslim tradition, they were enforcing their own beliefs at their business, a belief that was false none the less.  Much of Christian scripture talks about the covering of a woman’s head, and although this tradition has diminished over time, there are still those who practice and believe this to hold true.  Yvonne Allen is entitled to her own beliefs the same as the workers at the drivers license office.

Baptisms on the Fifty Yard Line?

A photo tweeted out by an assistant coach of the Clemson football team went viral in the fall of 2012 and started a constitutional battle against college football programs across the country that continues to this day. Star receiver DeAndre Hopkins was submerged in a trough on the 50-yard-line of the Clemson football field. Hopkins was not enjoying a post-practice cold tub, but rather taking part in a sacred religious ceremony, fully dressed in his Clemson gear, surrounded by his Head Coach, Dabo Swinney and the all of his teammates.
  

Clemson Head Coach Dabo Swinney

This month, Sports Illustrated revisited this issue investigating further into Clemson football and the religious culture that coach Dabo Swinney has created. Swinney is a devout Christian and in addition to post-practice baptisms, Swinney has team church cays, Friday chapel services and team prayers. Swinney has staffed the program with those equally as religious as him and has brought on a former player as the team chaplain. These chaplains, employees of public universities, are being funded by public tax money. It is important to note although only 54% of college students consider themselves Christian, 100% of chaplains at college football programs are Christian ministers.

Following the release of the photo of Hopkins’ baptism, the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), a non-profit that promotes the separation of church and state, became involved. In 2014, Patrick Eliot, a FFRF attorney, opened an investigation of the Clemson football program. Eliot sent a letter asking Clemson to stop team prayers, Bible studies and organized church trips stating that the First Amendment prohibited the school, as a public institution from “supporting, promoting or endorsing religion.” Five years later there has been no change in the religious culture of Clemson Football. Clemson football is creating a culture that pushes Christianity onto its athletes and violates the establishment clause of the 1^st Amendment. FFRF filed a report, “Pray to Play,” arguing the extent of this issue beyond just Clemson and the unconstitutionality of the issue at hand.

University of Tennessee- Prayer Circle 

FRRF is willing to sue Clemson but without a “victim” or plaintiff they are unable to take this issue to court.  I argue that this very issue begins my case for the unconstitutionality of these programs. No current Clemson player is going to come out against their coach due to the unique and I argue, coercive relationship between athletes and their coaches. These coaches have immense power over their athletes, deciding on playing time, scholarships, and for many with hopes of the NFL, their future career.

NFL player, Arian Foster, recently came out as an atheist and spoke on this coercive dynamic of the coach-athlete relationship and his time at the University of Tennessee. Foster explained that, “the separation of church and football- not to mention church and public education is blurred at the University of Tennessee.: Foster claimed he was denied the ability to be excused from coach-imposed Sunday church services and his request labeled him as a “conceited outcast.”

The highly regimented and disciplined nature of college football teams are comparable to the military. This brings me to cite a 2003 case involving the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) which establishes the unconstitutional precedent of this issue at hand. In the case, two VMI cadets, objected to the college’s mandatory prayer ceremony prior to dinner each night. The Fourth Circuit court of Appeals in Richmond ruled that this school-orchestrated prayer violated the First Amendment, which prohibits government from establishing religion. The U.S. Supreme Court, turned down the request to review a federal appeals court decision, reaffirming the principle that public state institutions cannot endorse particular religious beliefs.

Ole Miss Pre-Game Prayer

This debate brings up the issues of direct vs. indirect aid and neutrality in the debate surrounding the establishment cause. In Everson v. Board of Education the court defined the “minimum meaning” of establishment which states that no tax in any amount can be levied to support religious activities. Public Universities employing Christian ministers and funding their salary using state-taxes is direct aid of religion. Additionally, other religious chaplains are not employed or represented in these programs which lacks neutrality and insists the government is aiding one religion over another. Adopting a separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause, I do not belief religious practices should be conducted at a secular University.

Additionally, the establishment of Christianity in these football programs fails the three-pronged test used to determine the establishment of religion in Lemon v. Kurtzman. First off, there is no secular legislative purpose of encouraging Christianity in football. Secondly, it both advances and inhibits religion, inhibiting other religious practices while encouraging Christianity. The third test regarding the entanglement of government and religion, also fails. I believe there is an inappropriate entanglement caused by the public funding of chaplains and coaches that are promoting and endorsing a specific religion. 

I know it seems like just football, but the implications of this issue are crucial in understanding the intersections of religion and law. These programs should be facing unconstitutional charges or else the current interpretations of the establishment clause would be irrelevant. Allowing an establishment of religion in public Universities blurs the wall of separation of church and state that Jefferson and Madison insisted on.

School Dress Codes and Religious Liberty

            When Cesar Gonzales was an infant, he contracted meningitis. His parents made a pact with God that if Cesar got better and lived, they would keep a strand of his hair growing forever as a sign of faith and gratitude. Cesar did in fact get better, and, as promised, kept a strand of his hair growing out. When Cesar’s parents had another son, Diego, they made the same promise to God.

            From kindergarten through sixth grade, they were permitted to keep their hair long, despite a dress code that requires boys to have short hair, because they respected his religious promise. They could participate in any and all extra-curricular activities.

            In August 2017, when the Gonzales brothers were going into seventh grade, they were told they would not be allowed to keep their strand of hair uncut. The boys were banned from all extra-curricular sports and clubs. The Texas Association of School Boards instructs school districts they “must accommodate requests for exceptions based on a student or parent’s sincerely held religious belief,” but the district has ignored this recommendation.

            On May 30th, 2018, the Gonzales family sued the Mathis Independent School District, arguing the dress code imposed a burden on the family’s religious practice.

            On September 5th, 2019, the federal court granted the family’s request for a religious accommodation, allowing the Gonzales boys to freely participate in school-related extracurricular activities.

            In 2000, President George Bush signed into law the Texas Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (TRFRA), which bars the government from “substantially” infringing on religious practices.

The question is: Is the school district violating TRFRA, and thus the Free Exercise Clause, by requiring them to cut their hair?

I believe the answer is quite obviously yes, the school district is infringing upon the Gonzales brothers religious practices. TRFRA bars government from substantially infringing upon religious practices, and the school district is doing the most they can, shy of outright banning them from school, to burden the Gonzales brothers by not permitting them to participate in extracurricular activities. This includes Cesar being unable to join the school’s football team or any clubs. Bear in mind, this is a public school and is thus run by the government. If this were a private school, the school could enforce any type of dress code it wants, but public schools do not have that prerogative.

In addition, there is no compelling government interest to prohibit the Gonzales brothers from growing out their hair, and there is in fact a very compelling reason to do so - it is in the boys’ best interests. To not let them participate in extracurricular activities is to deny them a large part of their childhood where personal growth takes place, education outside the classroom, and preparing them for the world ahead - in short, what school is meant to instill in children. To impose these burdens on them is doing the boys s disservice.

Though this act may not be a normal observance of an established religion such as Christianity, growing out their hair is still in the name of religion, which is protected by the first amendment. I expect from the schools point of view they do not want to open a potentially slippery slope where other students can get exemptions claiming religious practice, and that is why they do not want to permit it. To that argument I have three responses.

First, there is a documented track record of the Gonzales brothers growing out their hair. They have both been doing it since kindergarten, so any objective school official would easily rule that they are not fraudulent.

Second, barring a slippery slope, where is the incentive to interfere on the schools part? Is growing out their hair adversely affecting the Gonzales brothers or their peers? I would have a hard time being convinced of that.

Third, even if we were to assume that giving the Gonzales brothers an exemption would result in a slippery slope in which other students would do the same, is that reason good enough for the government to restrict people’s religious liberty? This is the tradeoff we have to make. It is known that when given freedom there are people who will try to take advantage of it, and that is why we have systems to seek out fraudulent claims and stop them. And even if school officials failed at their jobs and did allow fraudulent exemptions to the dress code, that is a small price to pay for respecting citizens’ religious liberty.

Tax Credits for Private School Attendance

The State Legislature in Montana enacted a law in 2015 that included something called the “Tax Credit for Qualified Education Contributions”. This allows taxpayers to contribute to organizations that grant “scholarships” for students attending private schools. The program both encouraged school choice by making private schools more affordable and allowed people to spend their own money how they wanted. The legal issue arose because most of the private schools in Montana are religious schools, so it raised the issue of the use of public funding for religious schools. Kendra Espinoza and other low-income mothers applied for scholarships in order to keep their children placed in the Stillwater Christian School in Kalispell, Montana. Soon after this scholarship program started, the Montana Department of Revenue issued a rule, known as “Rule 1” that stated that no scholarships could be used at religious schools because it could be seen as either indirect or direct public aid towards certain religious programs. In reaction to this rule, Espinoza and others argued that this law that Montana enacted violated their First Amendment rights and their free exercise of religion under both the Montana and U.S. Constitutions. They then filed a lawsuit stating that Rule 1 was unconstitutional. A lower court decided that this program was constitutional without Rule 1, but the Department of Revenue stated that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. Eventually the Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department of Revenue and reversed the lower court’s rulings. 

On December 12, 2018, the Montana Supreme Court reversed a District Court that ruled in favor of petitioner Espinoza because the court believed that this program violated Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution. The constitution states as follows “The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination”.

The question that stems from this case is whether a state law which allows for educational funding but not for religious schools violates the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution? 

I believe that allowing the funding for private schools, including the religious based ones, discriminates against religious minorities who frequently cannot attend religious private schools because of differing religious beliefs. They also usually are unable to afford non religiously affiliated private schools, which often are more expensive. If this program is giving indirect or direct aid and funds to religious schools, there is no clear separation between church and state because the government is helping support private schools within the state of Montana, which are largely religious. As then U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his Locke v. Davey dissent, one way to avoid discrimination in violation of the free exercise clause is not to provide any public funding for private education, religious or not. In addition to this, there could be more of a presence of a certain religious sect in Montana. Therefore, there could be religious bias and preference of certain religions over others.

As the president and CEO of Americans United, a lobbyist group that opposes this program, Rachel Laser said, “Montana taxpayers should never be forced to fund religious education – that’s a fundamental violation of religious freedom. The Montana Supreme Court’s decision protects both church-state separation and public education. It’s a double win”.

This case, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, is scheduled for the Supreme Court’s October 2019-2020 term and I am curious to see whether the Supreme Court will rule in favor of the Montana Department of Revenue and if we will be able to have true separation between church and state.

Gender discrimination claims in a Catholic hospital

On September 19, 2019 a California Appeal Court ruled that a transgender patient seeking a hysterectomy as treatment for their gender dysphoria, at a Catholic hospital, was allowed to sue for refusal of the operation.  In 2016, Evan Minton, informing the hospital of their transgender status, intended on using this surgery to further the transition from female to male.  The hospital refused to proceed with this operation on the grounds that the procedure was only to be used in cases such as uterus cancer, or other such circumstances that would cause such debilitation.  The hospital referred to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ writings on ethical medical practices to make this decision.  The California court stated that these writings indicated that Catholic institutions, such as the Mercy San Juan Medical Center (the hospital in question), should “prohibit direct sterilization and require that bodily and functional integrity be protected and preserved.”  This is why as a Catholic Institution, the hospital holds that there is no necessary medical treatment here, as the patient is just looking to change their bodily appearance.  The hospital, a part of a larger network of medical services, instructed Minton’s physician to use another institution within that network that would have no issue with the reasoning for the hysterectomy.  The same operation was provided to Minton three days after the intended date, with the help of Mercy San Juan Medical Center’s referral and advice.  Still Minton sued Mercy for discriminating health care provision, as well as for causing “great anxiety and grief” as a result of the initial cancellation.  The case was initially dismissed, but is now being pushed up to the Superior Court of San Francisco for further consideration.

This situation presents a two-fold problem.  The first, regarding the free exercise of religion, is that by the states allowance of this patient to sue over their claims of discrimination, they then are imposing on the institutions free practice of religious belief.  This would seem to go against the First Amendment, as the hospital is being prohibited of free exercise.  The hospital is a Catholic Institution, and as such, especially in this case, should not be penalized for practicing their beliefs.  The hospital is not basing their refusal of the operation off of the identity of Minton as a transgender, rather they are looking at the actual  surgery that they would have to perform on an individual.  There is no discrimination here, which is the grounds for this case, and there is an imposition of state power on a religious organization by allowing the patient to sue for such.  The second problem is the issue of provision of health care.  The court ruled that the hospital should only be allowed to practice its religious freedom should it be able to “provide all persons with full and equal medical care at comparable facilities not subject to the same religious restrictions.”  To require this of medical institutions is a difficult argument.  Not all institutions may have the ability to do this.  Additionally for other matters, such as abortion for instance, should there be an emergency situation brought to a Catholic institution that requires immediate care, there would be a dire situation for all parties involved.  While health care is not a civil right, there are serious implications in such situations.

I believe that the Court that approved this appeal is wrong in its ruling on this situation.  They are enacting an unconstitutional intervention in religious beliefs by allowing for such a dispute to be heard.  The patient was in no immediate danger, and Mercy referred the operation to another institution within their network in just three days.  To think that a Catholic institution should be required to provide an unnecessary surgery that is against their beliefs is a clear infringement of free exercise of religion.  Minton seems disillusioned in thinking that their own beliefs should be taken care of by any organization, and is attacking the institution that disagreed with their views.  Minton, and apparently this California Appeal Court, do not realize that there is a difference between adhering to others beliefs and tolerating them.  To argue that the institution is discriminating based on identity is not realistic in my opinion  This is not in any way an institution discriminating by someone’s identity, rather they are looking at a medical procedure with regard to their own values.  While I do think that Minton’s allegations will be dismissed, it does point towards a larger picture for the problems that come with these such scenarios.  Going back to the example of abortion, or considering the actual medical use of a hysterectomy, these things can provide life or death situations.  One example that is relevant in the news is the Ascension health network.  This is a Catholic hospital organization that is pushing for the ability to withhold care even from pressing matters because of their religious affiliations.  I just see these things as being a tricky intersection.  Someone who is in a life or death situation should be provided care, but this brings problems with ethics in religious groups.  While I know nothing about healthcare really, I do not think that these such issues will see easy resolve.  As far as this particular case I do think that the court is breaching the Institutions right to free exercise, and the approval of the appeal was unconstitutional.

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Who Has the Right to Officiate a Wedding?

Last summer, the Center for Inquiry (CFI), a non-profit committed to fostering a secular society, sued the state of Texas in a civil action suit (NO. 3:18-CV-2943-B) arguing that the state should allow secular wedding ceremonies. The Texas state law declares that only members of the clergy and selective government officials are allowed to lawfully solemnize marriage ceremonies. The CFI argued that this law is an establishment of religion and is unfair to secular celebrants. This law has been upheld by U.S. District Judge, Jane Boyle, who argued “the state has an interest in … ensuring the respect, solemnity, and gravity of marriage ceremonies” and that only religious leaders and government officials can be “reasonably expected” to maintain decorum in these ceremonies. Judge Boyle conceded that the Texas statute may provide a “benefit to religious groups and their adherents over nonreligious ones” but said no “constitutional rights are violated” by the law”.

Section 2.202 of the Texas Family Code specifically only authorizes "persons who are officers of a religious organization and authorized by the organization to conduct marriages (e.g., ministers, priests, rabbis) and secular governmental officials (e.g., current and retired state and federal judges)”. The CFI case was brought up against section 2.202 by two member of the CFI, Eric McCutchan and Arthur Bratteng. They were declared “celebrants” by CFI and want to perform secular wedding ceremonies but are lawfully unable to by Texas law. The Plaintiffs further argued that CFI has members in Texas who would like to be married by these CFI officiants but are unable to solely because of this statue.

Although the case was ruled constitutional, the CFI vows it will appeal the decision. CFI argues that this goes against the establishment clause as it unfairly prioritizes the rights of religious institutions over secular ones. Further, CFI claims it is not the government’s job to declare that people must have solemn weddings. Even if that were to be the government’s right to do so, CFI argues it is not accurate to suggest that secular celebrants could not provide that gravity to marriage ceremonies. CFI feels it is an establishment of and preference to religion to delegate this power to religious leaders but not to secular officiants.

There are currently 35 states that have limits on who can perform marriages, but, CFI has successfully changed similar marriage laws in both Indiana and Illinois. In some states, people who are actually participating in the marriage can officiate their own wedding as well as instantaneous internet officiators. CFI argues that internet officiators can easily get, in their opinion, “fake” religious licenses, but non- religious people cannot pick someone meaningful to officiate their ceremonies. Nicholas Little, CFI Vice President and general counsel, powerfully argues “right now, I can go online and take two minutes out of my time and go to the ‘Church of Bacon’ or something and solemnize a marriage in Texas,” Little said. “Do they honestly want people lying and claiming to be religious like this in order to do a ceremony?”. This begs the question of the social consequences of this law.

In my opinion, this case goes against the establishment clause because it unduly prefers religion over non religion given that the alternative to a religious ceremony is not sufficiently equal. The Texas secular community makes up 1/5 of the population, yet, they are forced to succumb to a municipal employee to officiate one of the best days of most couple’s lives. This statue although facially neutral, in reality, is not neutral as it gives benefits to religious institutions over secular ones. It is not just to compare a religious marriage ceremony to a courthouse wedding. I agree that secular citizens deserve the same respect as the religiously affiliated. Additionally, this case appears hypocritical to both the decisions of “McCollum vs. Board of Education” and “Lemon vs. Kurtzman”. In McCollum, the court ruled that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the cooperation between schools and religious institution was an establishment of religion. In Lemon, the court ruled that state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violates the establishment clause because it did not pass the commonly known “lemon test”. The lemon test declares that states may go against the establishment clause only if (1) the primary purpose of the assistance is secular, (2) the assistance must neither promote nor inhibit religion, and (3) there is no excessive entanglement between church and state. I believe that this statue does not pass the lemon test because it provides no assistance to the secular side, promotes religious officiants, and entangles church and state by involving the government in marriage practice officiants. If these two cases were ruled as an establishment of religion, the Texas marriage law should be viewed as one as well.

Overall, if the CFI appeals this case, I believe it will be successful. Although this case claims to be neutral to religion and non-religion, in reality, it is a state sponsored practice that unjustly benefits religious institutions. In the words of Little “what if you want to get married by an Elvis impersonator? that’s not the state’s business!”.

Religious exemption for gender discrimination?

The latest controversy between freedom of religion and discrimination laws have taken place in North Carolina. A 51-year-old sheriff’s deputy named Manuel Torres is filing a lawsuit, claiming that he was fired from the department because he refused to train a female employee alone due to his religious beliefs. This belief is one most commonly called the Billy Graham Rule. Billy Graham was an evangelist figure who proposed those beliefs. The reasoning behind this belief was to prevent temptation on the male part, exhibit integrity, and to be isolated from any instance pertaining to sexual misconduct. Graham himself refused to have alone time, eat, or even travel with a woman who was not his wife. From this, Torres believes that his religious beliefs prohibit him, as a married man, from being alone with a woman for an extended period of time if she is not his wife. Therefore, he believes his refusal to be alone with a female coworker should be accepted as a means of his right to free exercise of religion.

Torres asked his sergeant for religious exemption and was immediately denied. Torres then went to his sergeants’ superiors to obtain exemption and was met with retaliation from his sergeant. In an altercation between two civilians where a gun was present Torres needed backup, of which his sergeant refused to send. After that incident, he was soon fired without explanation. Torres and his legal team suggest that religious discrimination and a violation of Torres’ first amendment rights was the reason in which he was fired, after asking repeatedly for a religious exemption. Torres is also claiming a “loss of income and benefits; loss of quality and enjoyment of life; (and) loss of reputation” in addition to monetary compensation. Although this case has not yet been decided upon, it will be interesting to see the outcome of the court’s decision, and whether they will privilege Torres’ religious obligation supported by the first amendment, or North Carolina’s discrimination law in which Torres potentially violated.

            The first amendment upholds the truth that one has the right to free exercise of religion. Therefore, the question that comes into play is whether or not Torres should have been fired from a public office for upholding his religious beliefs? Torres was willing to do every other aspect of the job besides train with a woman who was not his wife for a long period of time. However, what happens when one’s first amendment right clashes with existing discrimination laws? It is also worth noting that there are reasonable alternatives that could have trained the female employee and simultaneously uphold Torres’ religious obligations. A religious exemption has been used to opt-out a variety of practices. One of the most common is a religious exemption from the draft. There were some religious sects that were granted religious exemptions from joining the draft on the grounds of religious beliefs. Joining the draft as well as discrimination laws are both existing laws that society must adhere to, but why is a religious exemption from joining the draft seen differently than a religious exemption to train a female employee alone?

            Although Manuel Torres and Billy Graham’s ideologies surrounding their religious duties are not the beliefs of the majority, it does not mean that they don’t have the right to free exercise. Some might say that nowhere in the holy text does it say that a married man cannot have any interactions with a woman who is not your wife, but who are we as a society to say what beliefs should and should not be allowed to be exercised. If one feels it is their religious obligation to not interact with a female for a long period of time alone, who is the government and or employer of a public office to try and restrict that right despite it being written in the constitution. If anything, the free exercise clause in the First Amendment was used to protect then current and potential religious minorities against the tyrannical majority. Face value, the non-toleration of “discrimination” based on gender is a good thing that promotes diversity and inclusion in the workplace and is applied across the board for all peoples, both religious and anti-religious. However, despite this same rule being applied to everyone, it does not go against everyone’s rights. It is however hostile to Torres’ religious obligation to stay the utmost faithful to his wife by not interacting with other women for long periods of time, such as training a new female employee. And to that point, this is not just a belief that Torres holds, but a religious obligation. Who are we as a society to say that Torres must choose between making a living, and fulfilling a religious obligation? If that is the case, then we are preferencing everybody BUT Torres. Allowing Torres an exemption from training a female employee on religious grounds, no matter what the moral belief is should be protected by the first amendment free exercise clause.

Same-Sex Marriage and Flowers

Business owners all around the nation have the right to refuse service to anyone that they believe is an endangerment to their customers and to their establishment. Nonetheless, business owners and employees are not allowed to discriminate against people based on certain identities.

The protected classes in the United States are the following: race or color, national origin or citizenship status, religion or creed, sex, age, disability, pregnancy or genetic formation, and veteran status. 

Under the Federal Law, the United States as a whole does not regard members of the LGBTQ+ as a protected class. However, the Washington state has added sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression as a protected class in their individual state.

This is where it becomes complicated in the case of Ingersoll v. Arlene's Flowers of 2013.

Barronelle Stutzman is the owner of Arlene's Flowers, a flower shop that has been running for many years and has assisted in the celebration of numerous weddings and other special ceremonies. 

Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed have been faithful clients of Arlene’s Flowers for nine years. Over the years Ingersoll would order flowers bouquets for his then-boyfriend Freed. Stutzman was aware that Ingersoll was in a gay relationship and that the flowers arrangements were for romantic occasions such as anniversaries and Valentines Day.

On March 1st, 2013 Ingersoll visited Arlene’s Flowers to inquire about buying sticks or twigs for his wedding. However, Stutzman denied Ingersoll of his request before he even asked. Stutzman explained that it would be against her Christian beliefs to support and endorse a same-sex marriage ceremony. Stutzman then kindly recommended other floral shops to him despite her not being able to be his florist.

In the state of Washington, Ingersoll and Freed are a part of the protected class, as they both identify as gay men. The lawsuit of Ingersoll v. Arlene's Flowers, is based on the grounds of discrimination per the Anti-Discrimination laws of the state of Washington.

Stutzman argues that this lawsuit goes against the First Amendment of the United States.

The First Amendment enacts the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Stutzman feels as though she is being sued against her right to practice the beliefs of her religion. It is important to keep in mind that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs, not actions. 

The Supreme Court of Washington of Benton County found Stutzman guilty of discriminating against Ingersoll and Freed. Benton County Supreme Court Justice Alexander Ekstrom declared in his concluding remark that “the Washington State Constitution expressly states that religiously motivated conduct is limited by the police power of the state.” Ingersoll v. Arlene's Flowers,U.S.13, 59 (2013).

The State decided that Stutzman's actions, though based on her religion, cannot be protected for religion is not above the law. 

However, it would be interesting to compare the case of Ingersoll v. Arlene's Flowers with the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette of 1943. In the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, it was decided that the school children in the West Virginia State who identified as Jehovah’s Witnesses did not have to salute the American flag during the Pledge of Allegiance. For it goes against their religious text to pledge allegiance to a flag, a symbol, and image of the state, that is not associated with their God. The children, like Stutzman are not committing an action but they are neglecting to act. As the children fail to salute the American flag, Stutzman fails to give service to the two LGBTQ+ identifying citizens. 

It is worthwhile to think of where we draw the line for citizens to use the Free Exercise Clause. When can we and can’t we use our religious beliefs as a valid argument?

Some may argue that the defining line is business, due to it being a public service that must remain open to every law abiding citizen. Stutzman’s business must abide by the Washington State Consumer Protection Act and the Washington State Law Against Discrimination. 

Nevertheless, not too long ago was another business confronted with a similar situation. 

In the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission of 2018, the owner of the Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack C. Phillips, neglected to make a weddding cake for Charlie Craig and David Mullins, two gay men. Craig and Mullins sued on the same discriminatory basis that Ingersoll and Freed did. Yet, unlike the Ingersoll case, Craig and Mullins did not win their lawsuit. The Colorado Supreme Court decided that Phillip’s actions reflect his belief and that it would be unconstitutional to force him to decorate a cake for two gay men.

In these two cases we see how different state courts prioritize different parts of the constitution. The Washington State Supreme Court enforces that actions based on religious beliefs inherently goes against the original intention of the Free Exercise Clause. Whereas the Colorado State Supreme Court imposes that actions are justified by their religious beliefs. What we should take into consideration is how these cases would’ve been resulted if Stutzman lived in Colorado and Phillips in Washington. Is there unity in the United States if two cases that are very similar in nature end in opposing verdicts?

Well that is what Stutzman is currently fighting for now. After the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Stutzman wants to bring her case to the Supreme Court of the United States, away from the Washington State. 

I believe that Stutzman has a valid argument and case. Even though she did provide a service to Ingersoll in the past, it is not equivalent to supporting his marriage through venue decorations. If Phillips, who also lives in a state where sexual orientation is a protected class, is able to win his case then why can't Stutzman? Does she not live in the same country with the same rights? 

That is the real question.