Alfonza Greenhill, a practicing Sufi Muslim, is a prisoner held in isolation at a Richmond jail who claims that his First Amendment right of free exercise has been violated. He argues that the Red Onion State Prison is withholding him from observing his faith’s weekly mandatory jummah prayer services both in-person or through live television. The prison officials have stated that if Greenhill improves his behavior, he will be able to observe the service via television. Greenhill’s attorney states that using the ability to participate in religious services to motivate and correct Greenhill’s behavior is a blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause arguing that the Free Exercise of religion is a constitutional right and cannot be conditional with his behavior. Greenhill first sued the prison officers in 2016 but before he was presented to trial, the lawsuit was revoked by the U.S. District Judge in Roanoke. He then appealed his case to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Virginia Department of Corrections has responded to the appeal by stating that Greenhill cannot attend prayer service only because his behavior has him placed in “administrative segregation”. The judge agreed that the restrictions were reflective of the Department of Corrections’ compelling interest in security, stating “only religious rationing could compel compliant behavior”. The main question posed in the case is if Greenhill has the absolute right to observe jummah prayer services via television even though his violent behavior has placed him in administrative segregation, where television is an earned privilege. Within confinement, Greenhill has been classified as the most restrictive status. However, prisoners are provided the opportunity to earn less grave assignments by participating in the Step-Down Program, which motivates corrected behavior through a reward system. In 2014, Greenhill was reclassified and rewarded certain privileges, including television. However, he has since been classified to the most grave status. Prison officials contend that if Greenhill is presented with television access, which is considered a reward to high-security prisoners, the purpose of the program will be defeated and he will not be incentivized to improve his behavior. He filed this lawsuit stating that the actions of the prison breached the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which prohibits jails from placing religious restrictions on prisoners without a compelling interest. Greenhill’s attorneys argue that the prison does not hold a valid compelling interest in security as a justification for preventing Greenhill from observing service.
I foresee O’Lone v. The Estate of Shabazz (1987) being applied as precedent because both cases involve the free exercise rights of prisoners and debate the question of to what extent do prisoners hold the same constitutional rights as non-prisoners. O’Lone established the antecedent that while prisoners do retain constitutional protection, prisons are entitled to place limitations on them if necessary. Furthermore, O’Lone settled that the court should defer to prison officials on their operations, and are typically ruled as valid as long as there is a penological objective. Because of the verdict of O’Lone, I believe that the Court will rule that the prison did not encroach Greenhill’s First Amendment protections. In my personal opinion, I disagree with the expected outcome of the court. Although I agree with the notion that certain rights should be curtailed within a prison, given a compelling interest, I do not believe that in this instance the prison’s restrictive access to provide television service is justified with a penological objective. For instance, I agree that Greenhill should not be able to attend in-person prayer sessions considering his status in solitary confinement because his removal raises security concerns. Yet, I do not believe the withholding of a televised prayer holds the same concern. The prison argues that providing television access to Greenhill will not incentivize him to correct his behavior. However, this is not a sufficient claim because it is based on speculation. Greenhill, if presented with this privilege, will only have access to the religious program and not other television programs. Therefore, he is not enjoying the privilege. I believe the prison’s policy is an infringement on his Free Exercise rights because the prison through their justification of the Step-Down program acts as if the right to practice religion is a reward and not a constitutional right. Although Greenhill is considered a maximum security inmate, I do not agree with the argument that his inability to watch the jummah is a precautionary measure against violent behavior. I do not see the correlation between acts of violence and disobedience with the ability to observe the prayer service. As Greenhill’s attorneys contend, I also believe that exposure to religious content would promote better behavior. As stated before, I believe the prison’s justification is based on false speculation; therefore, I believe that Greenhill should be able to observe the jummah through television because he is constitutionally protected under the Free Exercise Clause.
10 comments:
I agree with your analysis and unfortunately I too think the court will decide this is unconstitutional. I really like how you stated the prison is acting as if practicing one’s religion is a reward rather than a constitutional right. One of the main issues I have with this case is that there are so many other less restrictive ways to instill better behavior and discipline in prisoners that does not have to violate their free exercise rights to religion. Some ways of doing this include giving prisoners more work if they fail to obey the rules or giving other incentives in place of television when inmates do follow the rules so that it doesn’t have to be taken away from them when they don’t, thus providing a steady outlet for them to practice their religion.
I agree with both your and McKenzie's conclusions about how the case will likely be decided. The precedent of O'lone is very similar to this case and in that case, we know that the Court ruled in favor of the prison. While I do agree that rights are limited when one is in prison, it is clear that they are not using least restrictive means if they intend to provide televised versions of the jummah services once behavior improves. Religion should not be restricted as it is a constitutional right, even if it is not absolute.
I agree with both your analysis and your opinion regarding this case. I appreciated how you made the distinction between how to courts were likely going to decide, such as by referring to the precedent established in O'Lone v The Estate of Shabazz, while still indicating your disapproval of that decision. I agree with your disapproval, specifically in regards to the idea that the Free Exercise Clause is not a reward given to citizens, its a constitutional right. While the right of religion can be limited when someone goes to prison, it is not allowed to be restricted altogether or that is clearly violating the Free Exercise Clause. l also like that you brought up the idea that perhaps actually allowing the prisoners to attend the religious prayers will encourage better behavior among the inmates.
I find this case rather difficult, as it is not so clear as to determine whether prisoners should maintain their 2nd Amendment right, for example. I disagree that Greenhill's rights were violated in this case, however, as the Free Exercise Clause is a negative right. That is to say, the government cannot stop someone from believing in their religion or from expressing religious opinions, but they are not required to provide what is needed to anyone who wants to practice religion. Similarly, the 2nd Amendment does not require the government to issue every citizen a gun.
I strongly agree that when a person does something illegal and is sentenced to prison they forfeit some of their rights. For example, a prisoner no longer has the right to keep and bear arms; which is a right protected by the Second Amendment. The first amendment only grants someone the right to believe whatever he wants; it does not grant the right to practice in anyway he wants. The case of Oregon v. Smith is a perfect example of distinguishing between the right to believe in something and the right to practice that belief.
I agree with Hannah's opinion on this case. I think it is really important that she makes the distinction between a reward and a right. The ability to practice one's religion is not something to dangle over their heads in order to incentivize better behavior. While it is clear Greenhill is a risk to other inmates if he is left in general holding facilities, there are still ways that can allow him to practice his religion privately. Additionally, there is no compelling state interest in not allowing him to practice his religion with the use of a television. He is already in segregated housing, so he would not become more of a threat if giving him this right would cause him to act out more.
I believe that the case that Hannah tackled is one that clearly needed a keen understanding of the various circumstances that involve both Greenhill and the establishment clause and I believe Hannah tackles it nicely. Her point about O’lone v The Estate of Shavazz was an amazing connection to this case and the analysis of how Greenhills case should turn out in conjunction to the case of O’lone was a perfect connection. I furthermore agreed that the jail was violating Greenhills first amendment right, and the portion of her decent which speaks about the false speculation the jail had was spot on.
I think what this case comes down to is whether one's First Amendment rights should be restricted if they are in any type of correctional facility. I do think that everyone should always be entitled to their rights as protected under the First Amendment, but this case involves a "reward"vs. "right.' With that said, I think that despite Greenhill's "bad behavior", he should still be able to freely practice his religion. Whether or not he acts in a violent way or not, his religious rights should still be protected as they are guaranteed to be in the Constitution.
Your idea of a reward vs a right is spot on with my thinking. Additionally, I agree that there’s no valid reason to restrict televised services, the bear minimum of what the prison should provide. The connection to O’lone is spot on. Your argument about better behavior is really interesting, and I think successfully counterbalances arguments about prison safety, although I agree with the commenters above about how this is false speculation. He’s really not a danger or threat, and prayer would not encourage him to become one.
After reading about the information on this case, I do agree with your conclusions on it. I think that Greenhill should have been allowed to watch his religious services on television, especially since the television will only be used for religious services and prayers. I understand why they wouldn't allow him to practice in person with others, but I do think that by not letting him watch on television is infringing on his First Amendment right. With all of this in mind and with the precedent in O'lone, I do think that the Court will rule in favor of the prison and note that they did not infringe upon his First Amendment right.
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