The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale

Logo for The Arizona Satanic Temple

The city of Scottsdale, Arizona has a tradition to open their city council meetings with invocations delivered by local faith leaders. In February of 2016, Michelle Shortt, head of the Arizona chapter of the Satanic Temple, asked to deliver the invocation at an upcoming meeting of the city council. After being scheduled, the Temple was then contacted by city administrators with knowledge that they would not be permitted to give such an invocation. Scottsdale stated that only institutions with a “substantial connection” to the city were allowed to deliver such prayers. The city did not have a written policy regarding invocations at city council meetings.

The Satanic Temple argued that the city’s decision to exclude a single religious group was not due to their facially neutral reasoning, but instead because of public outcry, and political statements by the mayor. The Temple claims that “one church coordinated a 15,207 email assault in the span of a couple of hours” to city administrators. Further, the mayor publicly stated, “In Scottsdale we’ve decided to keep our traditional invocations and we’ve decided to send this Satanist sideshow elsewhere.”

Flag of the City of Scottsdale

Scottsdale argued that the mayor, and others who made public or private statements against the Satanic Temple, did not have decision making authority over who could and could not deliver the invocations. Therefore, the city argued, compounding with the fact that the city administrator who had ultimate authority over the invocation list made no disparaging remarks to the Temple, there is no evidence of discrimination.

After a January 2020 bench trial, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ruled in favor of the city. On March 18, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments for the case. Counsel for the Temple emphasized the fact that the City seemingly moved goalposts over their criteria for acceptable groups to deliver the invocation. The original policy, the Temple argued, was to have a “substantial connection” to the community, then changing to say that there must be at least three adherents who are residents of, and a physical location in, Scottsdale, to qualify to deliver the invocation. The Temple further emphasized that multiple groups outside of Scottsdale have delivered invocations before. The city responded to the latter argument that there was a single invocation delivered by an out-of-town group, a nearby private school of which several Scottsdale children attended. Scottsdale also emphasized that some of the Temple’s evidence was not accepted by the trial court, and could not therefore be considered in this case.

I disagree with the District Court’s ruling, and believe that the Satanic Temple should be allowed to deliver an invocation in Scottsdale. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, an incredibly analogous case, the Supreme Court ruled that sectarian prayers may be delivered before public meetings only if the opportunity is extended to all religious sects who ask. Further, in that case, Kagan’s dissent emphasized that the failure to include all religions could constitute a preference for one religion over another. Additionally, the seemingly changing requirements of what sects may deliver invocations is reminiscent of the City of Hialeah’s logic when outlawing a core tenet of the Santeria religion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. The facially neutral nature of the city’s rule (all invocateurs must be from Scottsdale groups) ignores the effects that such a decision can have on minority religions. Further, the provision is blind to the fact that there have been several groups from outside Scottsdale to deliver the invocation. In essence, such a law may not even be neutral.

In essence, cities deciding which religions have a "substantial" enough connection to the local community opens the door to a variety of Constitutional issues. Scottsdale cannot truly decide which religions are palatable enough, which are local enough, which are important enough. When that benefit is extended to some to give a sectarian address at a public meeting, it must be extended to all.