Thursday, October 13, 2022

Belya v. Kapral: Government Intervention in alleged Defamatory and Discriminatory Suspension of a Russian Orthodox Priest

    Father Alexander Belya was a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia (ROCOR) and claimed he was elected as the Vicar Bishop of the Church. When leadership became aware of this new transition, many members expressed concerns about the validity of this claim and some conduct issues regarding Father Alexander and his priestly duties. The Church suspended Father Alexander from his priestly duties pending an investigation. The suspension was due to irregularities regarding his election and many members expressing concerns regarding his ability to succeed in this position. Rather than appeal the suspension through the Church, Father Alexander sued the Church, the head of the Church, and other ranking officials on the grounds of defamation. This meant Father Alexander Belya sued for defamation and wrongful termination in a civil court. The precedents of Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC set the example that the government is not allowed to interfere with the hiring and firing process in religious organizations under the protection of "ministerial exception."

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru dealt with a teacher that filed an age discrimination suit against Our Lady of Guadalupe School. This case was argued before the Supreme Court, and it decided that a "ministerial exception" applied in this case. "Ministerial exception" grants churches and religious institutions the ability to use discriminatory measures when selecting their clergy. A necessary clarification is that the employee must be considered a clergy member or have a ministerial role. A ministerial role is defined as “someone who performs spiritual functions associated with beliefs and practices of religious faiths, and provides motivation, guidance and training in religious life for the people of congregations and parishes, and the wider community.” The teacher was declared to have a "ministerial role" due to the nature of her job as she was teaching catholic messages to children. Therefore the Religious school was allowed to fire her as the court could not interfere with the religious freedoms of the Church. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Church was not given a "ministerial exception" as the nature of the job held by the plaintiff didn't classify as a "ministerial," and discriminatory behavior is unlawful just like any other non-religious organization. In order for a church or congregation to be granted an exception for using discriminative methods in firing and hiring relies solely on the job held by the plaintiff. If the job is considered "ministerial," then the government can play no part in limiting how they select or release members of their clergy.

Despite these precedents, the Civil Court of New York denied ROCOR's appeal for dismissal on the grounds of "ministerial exception" and allowed the case to continue in civil court.

In this case, did the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia have the right to suspend Father Alexander Beyla with no due process under the protection of the First Amendment and "ministerial exception"? I argue they did have the right to suspend Father Alexander Beyla with no due process and under measures that could be considered defamatory and discriminatory under the protection of "ministerial exception." To be protected by the First Amendment freedom of religion and exercise, the job held by the plaintiff must be considered "ministerial." In this instance, Father Alexander Beyla is a priest. According to precedent, the government can't get involved in the releasing of clergy. While it might seem unfair to discriminate in religious institutions, not allowing religious organizations to select members representing their views and ideals violates the freedom of exercise clause and induces excessive entanglement in religion and state. Suppose the government can place limitations on who these religious institutions can select to represent and carry out their religion. In that case, the government is directly playing a role in religion and violating their freedoms. Just like religion can't be intertwined in state matters, the government can't violate religious freedoms or dictate how religious organizations are run. There is also no compelling state interest here. Father Alexander Belya is a priest and therefore stands to represent the values and goals of the Russian Orthodox Church; if he doesn't align with those goals, they have a right to terminate, suspend, and investigate him. He, in other words, is an extension of the religion, and the government deciding that the Church can't terminate him for violating their standards allows the government to dictate who can and can't be clergy members. While the government strives to prevent unfair discrimination in the workplace, denying religious organizations the right to select those who best represent their ideals effectively diminishes their religious beliefs. Therefore, this case should be dismissed, and allowing it to continue infringes on the Russian Orthodox Church's rights to religious freedoms and exercise.

5 comments:

Donzhei Green said...

I found this to be an interesting post. Father Alexander Belya wanted to sue the Russian Orthodox Church for defamation of character; however, because this is a religious affair, the court cannot get involved due to entanglement. I do think the Church is right in being able to suspend Father Beyla; however, I think notifying him that this would happen may have caused him not to sue for defamation and discrimination. Nonetheless, I think it is right for the court not to interfere which makes this such an interesting case. I do wonder, since this is the case, under what specific circumstances can the state interfere with church decisions and actions, omitting serious crimes such as murder. In addition to this, I wonder if some actions are so neutral, such as perhaps filing for defamation of character, that the court is able to get involved to easily address this issue. However, because this is such a church matter, I don't think the court should really have a say necessarily either.

Amanda Kalaydjian said...

I agree with your take on this case. If the government were to interfere in the hiring and firing process of a Church, this would clearly constitute excessive entanglement and I would argue that violates the Establishment Clause as well. While discrimination in the hiring process should never occur, it is not within the governments prerogative to interfere with Church matters, especially considering how this concerns a Priest. There is a case for defamation to be made in my opinion, as there have been clear damages to Father Belya's career. But proving defamation would not necessarily mean that the court need to intervene in the hiring process, rather instead they would need to see how the defamation affected his ability to get that specific role.

Anonymous said...

I agree with your stance on this case. If the government would take a position in defending the plantiff or the religious institution, there would no doubt be excessive government entanglement. Discrimination is a tricky policy considering a previous case of private institutions and there discrimination policies (“Bob Jones University v. United States). However, this case is different due to no government funding that would benefit the church, therefore, the church is allowed to decide how it sees fit to hire/fire employees that best exemplify the organization’s mission or religious purposes. I have previously written about the case involving the ministerial exemption and this case is a perfect example of why government cannot interfere, especially with a church’s hiring process of who is to teach the religion at hand. Who is the government to say who can teach a particular religion when they have clear boundaries in the First Amendment about limiting an establishment of particular religion and limiting the Free Exercise thereof? There would be clear violations of both amendments if the government were to defend the plantiff and not let the church follow through with its indictment of the priest because of the church’s concerns.

Lea Tarzy said...

Well-written post! I agree with your decision and I think you did a great job outlining the relevant points. I believe that there is need for division between Church and State in our country. Giving the judicial branch of the government the power to step in and determine the affairs of a private religious group is definitely a breach of that symbolic 'wall'. Therefore, I completely agree with the outcome of 'Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru' and the precedent set by it. Given the decision of that case, I'm not sure why the Civil Court of New York permitted the case to continue despite the appeal based on ministerial exception. Regardless, I agree with your analysis and decision regarding Father Beyla's case.

Drew H. said...

The Church should be able to fire Father Belya. A church is a private institution, and thus has more flexibility when deciding to fire someone. Also, because of the ministerial protections, the court should dismiss the case because the government does not have the ability to decide a religious institution's hiring and firing practices. Also, besides these two points, it seemed as though the church had good reasons to fire the Father, as he may not have fairly won the election, and many members of the church did not feel as though he would be competent in his new position.