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Thus, does the denial of a religious accommodation for exemption from the District Attorney Office’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate violate the constitutional rights of Rachel Spivack under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and discriminate against her religious beliefs?
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects citizens’ right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of “public morals” or a “compelling” governmental interest. Many will argue that in times of crisis, such as the COVID pandemic, there is a compelling state interest to mandate vaccines or other efforts in cases of extraordinary threats to public health. Refer to Jacobson v. Massachusetts for such a precedent, in which the Court held that a law to require residents of Massachusetts to be vaccinated against smallpox was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens. Opinions stand to question the severity of the COVID pandemic and whether or not it warranted such measures – but that is content worthy of a separate blog post! More relevant to the case of Rachel Spivack, the accommodations granted by Krasner to other individuals demonstrate that the District Attorney’s Office vaccine mandate was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest as was the mandate in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. It is also important to note that the aforementioned case did not account for or set a precedent for religious liberties as in later cases. As stated by Lea Patterson, Senior Counsel for the First Liberty Institute, a non-profit legal organization dedicated to defending religious liberty for all Americans, “The District Attorney disregarded the law by treating those like Rachel who requested religious accommodation less favorably than those who requested accommodation for other reasons. As the Supreme Court has already made clear, the government is not free to disregard the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty in times of crisis.”
More pointedly, under the traditional analysis of free exercise, the vaccine mandate enforced by the District Attorney’s Office, in this case, breaches the U.S. Constitution by providing the opportunity for discretionary exemptions, exempting comparable employees to Rachel for medical reasons, and not applying the mandate to other comparable unionized employees, who received religious exemptions. In more plain language, if a government employer offers any exemptions to a mandatory vaccine requirement, then the Constitution may require that it also offer an exemption for religious reasons. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, also prohibits many private and government employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of religion. Title VII entitles an employee to request religious accommodations from an employer’s directives that would violate the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer. I would argue that because of the less invasive measures that an individual such as Rachel Spivack can take to achieve the common good in this situation, the ‘undue hardship’ on the District Attorney’s Office is not extremely dire, considering other unvaccinated individuals remained free to hold their positions in the office.
We toe a fine line in allowing the government power enough to supersede our constitutional liberties, especially with respect to religion. Though I am not arguing against COVID-19 vaccine mandates in general. I believe that the circumstance surrounding the case of Rachel Spivack specifically supports a violation of her right to freely exercise her religion without discrimination. The Supreme Court has upheld laws in the face of a First Amendment challenge when the law was neutrally applied, served a compelling state interest, and was the least restrictive means of achieving the state interest (for example, Bowen v. Roy). It is my belief that the decision of Lawrence Krasner to deny Rachel Spivack a religious accommodation for the COVID-19 vaccine mandate breached her constitutional liberties just as the District Attorney’s Office disproved all three of the Court’s requirements for mandates that can trump the U.S. Constitution. Rachel Spivack’s religious liberties can be automatically assumed on the basis of Krasner allowing other exemptions on differing grounds than religion, proving a lack of neutrality and an inconsistent state interest. Additionally, vaccine mandates prove to be one of the most restrictive means to curb the effects of the COVID pandemic, and since Krasner allowed unvaccinated individuals the liberty to take less restrictive measures and still keep their jobs, it is my opinion that Rachel Spivack is rightfully appealing the decision of her case as her religious liberties were jeopardized under the cloak of crisis.
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8 comments:
I agree with the author. While I believe that in cases such as this and Jacobson v. Massachusetts there should not be religious exemptions, on the basis of public safety and "public morals," the fact that the District Attorney granted exemptions to other comparable employees changes that belief. If there is to be a vaccine mandate, I believe, that there should be no exemptions (except for medical ones). If one person gets an exemption, or in this case ten people, then it seems to be discrimination against Spivack and her religion. The lack of a credible reason as to why the unionized employees received and exemption and not Spivack, changes the circumstances of vaccine mandates and forces me to agree with the author.
Danielle,
Though the general public is, like you said, "exhausted" of the COVID-19 vaccination debate, this case was important to elaborate on. Regardless of the context, the fine line is: religious discrimination and, in some capacity, discrimination in general?
What perplexes me are these things: Krasner took almost seven months to finalize his decision regarding Spivack's religious accommodation and multiple other employees have been exempted from the COVID-19 vaccine, only one of them being for medical reasoning.
In my opinion, Spivack is being denied her religious right of free exercise. Karsner is clearly providing a "lack of neutrality" and is not treating all employees equally. This, at least, should be enough to prove discrimination.
I am excited to learn more about this case. Great post!
Danielle,
Great Post! I agree with your holding.
Rachel Spivack's religious rights were violated by the District Attorney in that she was denied a religious exemption in regards to the vaccine. I think when this fact is placed in conversation with her co-workers who were granted an exemption based on non-religious beliefs, it creates a crucial discrepancy in the case and ultimately reveals the complete violation of the rights of Spivack.
Unlike the ruling in Bowen v. Roy which ensured the neutrality of the law, Krasner did not demonstrate neutrality at face value nor carried the case out in a neutral manner. Clearly, Krasner's opinions on the relation between religious duty and receiving vaccinations is warped, and this is reflected in his unjust ruling.
Danielle,
I agree with your stance that Philadelphia's District Attorney violated Spivack's First Amendment religious protections. Lawrence Krasner's actions create concern because he deemed non-religious circumstances "worthy" of dispensation from the vaccine policy, yet he denied Spivack's request against vaccination for religious reasons. Therefore, while Krasner is violating the free exercise provisions within the First Amendment of the Constitution, he is further neglecting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace. Krasner's actions represent that of disparate treatment toward Spivack, a member of society who seeks to conform with the Orthodox-Jewish belief structure.
Hi Danielle,
Great post! I agree fully with your assessment on the violation of Rachel Spivack's religious liberties to refuse the COVID-19 vaccine. It is quite clear that the District Attorney of Philadelphia - Lawrence Krasner - did not remain consistent on the grounds that he awarded these exemptions throughout his staff. He allowed other staff members to keep their jobs without any clear cutting religious imposition. This within itself, in my opinion, demonstrates a bias to Spivack's Orthodox Jewish religion and a breach of her rights to freely exercise her religion.
I did find the use of Jacobson v. Massachusetts to be a compelling and influential example for precedent. The case outlined that the state's interest is able to supersede the individual right if there is a prominent public health emergency. That is why smallpox - an extremely deadly and contagious disease - was not given any religious exemptions. Although many people died of the COVID-19 virus, the mortality rate of these two illnesses cannot compare. Therefore, the public health emergency rationale does not necessarily strengthen the position of the need for inexcusable mandates.
Thanks for sharing!
Great article Danielle!
I do agree with your holding. You noted in your blog post that if the government employer offers any exemptions to a mandatory vaccine, then exemptions for religious reasons should also be granted. With that statement, denying Rachel's request for a vaccine exemption is a violation of her right to exercise her religion. While her religion is a minority, state officials still need to respect her beliefs. The application process for applying for an exemption leads to cases of discrimination like this one. There is clearly a lack of neutrality in this case that should be addressed.
I completely agree with your statement that Rachel Spivack’s First Amendment right was violated by Philadelphia's District Attorney. I believe one aspect of this case that made it clearer that her rights were violated is that there were other employees who got exempted from the requirement of the Covid 19 vaccine. This makes it clear that Spivack was being discriminated against due to her religion and it was not seen as a probable cause to not get the vaccine. This case draws on a concern that Madison had regarding civil magistrates. Madison believed that it would be impossible for them to rule without having bias and shaping their own opinions. Krasner clearly formed his own opinion when making the decision to deny Spivack’s request. One thing I am unsure of is how they will adjust this system. If they were to choose a new person to determine valid reasons for the excuse of a vaccine, this may occur again or a similar situation.
This is a very interesting and complicated case. I think the issue of vaccine mandates and trying to keep everyone safe is a very hard one. I do after reflection and reading your blog believe that Rachel Spivack's first amendment rights were violated by the Philadelphia's district attorney. The fact that other employees of the same degree where able to become exempt from the vaccine mandate and Racheal was still not allowed. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects citizens’ right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of “public morals” or a “compelling” governmental interest. If this is the case we must use the precedent of Jacobsen vs Massachusetts but like you said in your blog the others were granted exemptions so I don't see why according to the first amendment Racheal is not given a exemption.
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