Religion & American Law: May 2026

Friday, May 1, 2026

LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District

LifeWise, Inc. is a religious instructional institution that provides off-site education to students at upwards of 400 public schools. This instruction takes place on two days per week, known as “release time religious instruction,” with each day dedicated to a different age group. LifeWise additionally provides Bibles to its students in order to ensure unanimity and, therefore, “unique teaching and editorial material” in lesson summaries. It was proposed by parents, specifically the Co-Plaintiff Sarah Sweeny, that LifeWise join the Everett Public School District in Washington State. At this point of request, LifeWise included over 60 children at Emerson Elementary within the Everett Public School District in its programming.

However, the Everett Public School District required some caveats to joining. The District is clear that there is no contract or partnership with LifeWise and therefore requires parents or guardians of children attending religious instructions to give permission slips for a student to leave. In 2025, the District expanded this requirement by mandating that a new permission slip or request for release “must be made for each instance separately” and for each individual student being released. This changed from previous years, allowing students to be released in groups of four with one slip and for a longer period of time. LifeWise proposed semester-long or multiple-absence permission slips, but the District rejected them.

Additionally, the School District barred LifeWise from participating in Emerson’s annual Community Resource Fair in May of 2025. The District argues that because this event is sponsored by the public school, and therefore its taxpayers, they “do[es] not allow religious-based organizations of any type to participate in school-sponsored events.” LifeWise seeks to participate in the May 2026 Community Resource Fair and argues that, in the past, the policy has permitted religious organizations to use District facilities, as long as it doesn’t interfere with educational activities.

LifeWise, in its partnership with Emerson, had displayed paper flyers in the school lobby to advertise its religious services. Everett allows this and additionally allows for electronic flyers. Sweeny, a parent and member of LifeWise, used this opportunity. However, in June of 2025, the District barred further flyers from LifeWise from being displayed in the lobby because it was a use of school resources by a non-student to promote religion. Sweeny then offered to distribute an electronic flyer, but was met with further requests to change it before distribution, such as “replacing the photo of the boy praying.” The District explained that it could be viewed as coercive. LifeWise was eventually granted permission to distribute after the suggested changes were made.

Emerson Elementary began receiving complaints from parents whose children were not attending LifeWise religious instruction. These parents explained that children at LifeWise were encouraging their peers to join throughout the school day. LifeWise students would also come back to class with bags of candy, and sometimes other LifeWise items such as religious instructional materials, leading to distractions in the classroom. Subsequently, Emerson Elementary required LifeWise students to keep items received during LifeWise religious instruction in “a sealed envelope in their backpacks during the school day” to minimize the stated distractions.

As a result, Sweeny and LifeWise filed suit on December 18, 2025, against the Everett Public School District and its Superintendent. The plaintiffs filed four claims, two of which were claims in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause: the new RTRI guidelines applied to LifeWise, adopted in September 2025, and the new RTRI guidelines applied to Sweeny. As of now, a federal district judge has granted a preliminary injunction against the Everett Public Schools District. This injunction, granted by U.S. District Judge, allows LifeWise’s participation in community fairs, printed flyers on school grounds, semester-long permission slips for up to four individuals, and for religious materials to be used during free times at school. First Liberty, on behalf of the Co-plaintiffs, explained that the lawsuit arose from its substantial burden and lack of neutrality.

Beyond its discussion of Free Speech, the constitutional issue as it relates to the free exercise clause then remains: Does the District’s new RTRI guidelines neutral or burdensome and therefore a violation of the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment?

The most relevant court precedent to LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District is the 1948 case McCollum v. Board of Education. The issue in question for this case was whether religious classes within public school systems violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The court argued yes because of its use of tax dollars to support religious instruction. An additional case, Zorach v. Clauson, followed this decision in 1952 and challenged a New York program that designated a “release time” for students to participate in religious instruction off campus. The court concluded that this program did not violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause or Free Exercise because it did not use public facilities and was not coercive.

In the consideration of neutrality, First Liberty reported after an initial inquiry to Everett Public School District, a board member replied with “hostility.” Charles Adkins, said board member, openly stated “"I want to make it very, extremely, abundantly clear, that, yes, I do in fact hold animus toward LifeWise Academy," Adkins said. "It is an organization of homophobic bullies who are active and willing participants in the efforts to bring about an authoritarian theocracy," as reported by Fox News. As it appears to LifeWise, this is targeted. As it appears to some school officials, they argue their compelling interest to avoid “authoritarian theocracy” made of “bullies.”

Based on these previously upheld cases, I believe the Supreme Court may uphold Zorach v. Clauson in its conclusion of LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District and rule that the Everett District’s new RTRI guidelines about the distribution of religious materials and the use of religious materials in classrooms violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. If this is the conclusion they reach, which seems likely given their most recent preliminary injunction, I would have to agree. Placing my own opinions aside about LifeWise, I would argue that on a Constitutional basis the District’s updated guidelines violate the Free Exercise Clause because of its lack of neutrality, and substantial burden. While I see how these updates can be facially neutral in its compelling interest of remaining religiously unestablished and a coercive free zone, I think it warrants hesitation. Prohibiting a students’ ability to read religious material in their own freetime at school places a substantial burden on a student who may then believe their religion is something they must keep quiet and hide. That goes the same for keeping their religious materials hidden. This burden outweighs its possible coercive effects to their peers. I would argue, however, that filling out a permission slip once a week for lawful “release time” is not a substantial burden, as permission is required either way. Lastly, the requirement for flyers to be filtered, as well as barred from certain areas on campus, appears to be a slippery slope. It allows for school officials to decide what is coercive or not which is ultimately subject to bias. As it appears to school officials, like the quote from the board member, there is bias and subsequent targeting of LifeWise when it comes to these update RTRI guidelines.

Citations:

https://www.foxnews.com/media/washington-school-district-forces-students-hide-bibles-backpacks-lawsuit-alleges

https://www.foxnews.com/media/judge-orders-washington-school-district-loosen-limits-campus-bible-club-public-school-students.amp

https://firstliberty.org/cases/lifewise-everett-washington/

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2025cv02604/356406/43/

https://www.aol.com/news/judge-orders-washington-school-district-140019601.html

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/343us306

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/333us203

Faith, Speech, and the Classroom: Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education

In recent years, disputes over religion in public education have become increasingly complex, especially as they intersect with questions of identity, speech, and the authority of public institutions. One such controversy is presented in Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education, a case involving a public school teacher who refused, on religious grounds, to use transgender students’ preferred pronouns in the classroom. The teacher argued that complying with the school district’s policy would violate their sincerely held religious beliefs about gender identity. However, the school district required teachers to respect students’ identities as part of maintaining an inclusive learning environment. After disciplinary action was taken, the teacher challenged the policy, claiming it violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The Fourth Circuit ultimately ruled against the teacher, holding that the speech at issue was part of the teacher’s official duties and therefore subject to regulation by the school district.

The case raises a difficult constitutional question: when a public employee’s religious beliefs conflict with workplace requirements, which interest should prevail? The teacher and their supporters argue that the policy compels speech that contradicts deeply held religious convictions, effectively forcing the teacher to affirm a belief they do not hold. The school district maintains that teachers are representatives of the state when acting in their professional capacity and that it has a responsibility to ensure that all students are treated with dignity and respect. From this perspective, regulating how teachers address students is part of the district’s legitimate authority.

Several precedents help clarify the constitutional issues at stake. One of the most relevant is Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, in which the Supreme Court held that a high school football coach’s post-game prayer was protected by the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that the coach was engaging in private religious expression rather than official government speech. At first glance, Kennedy appears to support the teacher’s claim in Polk, since both involve public school employees asserting religious rights. However, the distinction between private and official speech is critical. In Kennedy, the coach’s prayer occurred outside his formal duties, whereas in Polk, the teacher’s use of pronouns takes place directly within classroom instruction. This suggests that the teacher’s speech is more properly understood as government speech, which the state may regulate. Another important precedent is Employment Division v. Smith, which held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. The school district’s policy in Polk can be understood as such a rule: it applies to all teachers and is not targeted at religion. Under Smith, this weighs against the teacher’s claim. At the same time, the case highlights ongoing tensions in Free Exercise doctrine, especially as more recent decisions have sometimes favored stronger protections for religious claims.

The school context also matters. In cases such as Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court emphasized that public schools are environments where authority and coercion are especially significant. Although those cases arise under the Establishment Clause, they highlight that what happens in schools carries particular constitutional weight. In Polk, the teacher speaks with institutional authority, which strengthens the argument that the school district can regulate that speech to protect students.

In my view, the Fourth Circuit reached the correct result, but the case exposes important tensions within First Amendment law. The decision reflects the practical need for public schools to enforce policies that promote inclusion and prevent harm. Requiring teachers to use students’ preferred pronouns can reasonably be seen as part of ensuring equal access to education and maintaining a respectful learning environment. In this sense, the school district’s interest is both legitimate and compelling. At the same time, the case raises concerns about the limits of religious freedom in public employment. The teacher’s objection is grounded in a sincere belief, and the Constitution has long protected religious conscience. By rejecting the claim, the court effectively affirms that individuals working in public institutions may be required to set aside certain beliefs in order to fulfill their roles. This may be necessary in some contexts, but it also risks narrowing the space for religious diversity in public life.

Ultimately, Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education shows the ongoing challenge of balancing individual rights with institutional responsibilities. The case suggests that courts are likely to prioritize the authority of public schools when employee conduct directly affects students, particularly in sensitive areas like identity. At the same time, it leaves open important questions about how far that authority should extend and whether more nuanced accommodations might be possible.

Ban on Demonstrations at Healthcare Facilities & Free Exercise Rights

   Matthew Lipscomb is a pro-life advocate from Detroit, Michigan and these beliefs are rooted in his Christian faith. Specifically, Lipscomb believes that life begins at conception and that every individual was created in God’s image and deserves a chance to live, so he thinks that abortion is wrong as it ends a life. As a result of his religious convictions Lipscomb wanted to share his beliefs with as many people as possible, so he would go to public sidewalks that border an abortion clinic in Michigan to speak with women and other individuals entering the facility. He would also hold whiteboard signs to share his pro-life views and offer those entering the clinic with information about abortion alternatives.
   In October of 2024, the city of Detroit enacted Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” which aimed to minimize demonstrations from taking place outside of all healthcare facilities. Specifically, the policy made it criminal for individuals within 15 feet of the entrance to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket, or demonstrate.” It also made it criminal for those within 100 feet of an entrance to “knowingly approach within eight feet of another person” and prohibited individuals from engaging in protest, education, or counseling without consent from the other person near these facilities. In Lipscomb’s view, this severely restricts his free speech and free exercise rights because it prevents him from sharing what he believes to be God’s message.
   As a result of this, Lipscomb filed suit against the city of Detroit claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutional. He also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The central issue that the court will consider is: Does Detroit Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
   In cases that may inflict a burden on the Free Exercise rights of citizens it is important to consider if there is a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in place. However, this is not directly applicable in this case because the state of Michigan does not have a state-level RFRA policy. Nevertheless, the precedent set in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) should still guide this decision. Specifically, this case held that neutral, generally applicable laws which incidentally burden religious exercise are constitutional. The holding in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) is also relevant because it asserted that policies which directly target a religious practice are not neutral.
   Given these precedents, the city of Detroit would likely argue that this law is neutral and generally applicable because it applies to all people regardless of the message they are sharing. The policy also does not target any particular religious practice or belief; rather, it places a ban on all advocacy regardless of if it is religiously based or offers a pro-life or pro-choice perspective. Furthermore, even though there is no state-level RFRA in place, the city would also likely highlight that there is a compelling state interest for this policy as it makes healthcare facilities more secure. Specifically, there is evidence that protestors outside of abortion clinics sometimes physically block entrances and their presence adds unnecessary levels of anxiety for patients and staff. Therefore, in the city’s view, patients, visitors, and healthcare professionals would be more safely able to access these places because of the ordinance.
   After considering the facts of this case, I would hold the Michigan policy to be constitutional because it is neutral and generally applicable. This is because the ordinance applies to all people regardless of their religious beliefs and importantly regulates behavior outside of all healthcare facilities. This is a critical distinction, because Lipscomb has expressed that the policy is pro-abortion as he feels that it restricts his ability to share his pro-life beliefs; however, because the ordinance applies to all healthcare facilities, not just abortion facilities and does not target any particular religious belief or viewpoint on abortion making the ordinance neutral and generally applicable.
   It is equally as important to note that this policy serves the important purpose of keeping healthcare facilities secure. Specifically, it minimizes the barriers that patients may face when attempting to access healthcare as protests or other demonstrations outside of the facility which they are entering could deter them from accessing the care that they need. Moreover, this would also minimize the number of barriers that providers face when going to work so that important care can be provided to patients. In sum, the ordinance appears to be neutral and generally applicable and it serves an important purpose, so I hold it to be constitutional.

References: