Montana Supreme Court heard
arguments on April 6th, on which they determined whether Montana
Constitution will allow for public funds to be given to private, religious
education. The ACLU of Montana has filed under “friend of the court” in support
of the defendant, the Department of Revenue. The Department of Revenue is
arguing that tax-credit scholarships for religious schools violate Montana’s
Constitution. The decision for this case is a landmark one for the state of
Montana because of previous rulings by the DOR that tax credits for religious
education scholarships are prohibited. They deem that these credits violate the
state Constitution’s “No-Aid” clause.
Alex Rate who works for ACLU says
that “Montana students and their parents have the right to choose a religious
education, but taxpayers are not and should not be required to fund that
decision. Religious freedom flourishes best when religion is funded privately,
without support from taxpayers and the state.” ACLU Montana makes six points to
defend why aid should not be allowed. They list the same reason Alex Rate said,
as well as it being unconstitutional because of the express ban of public dollars
to religious schools by Article X, Section 6 of Montana’s Constitution. They
additionally say that religious coercion and discrimination could be funded,
the state is indirectly paying for religious education, the state would be
potentially allowed to dictate the curriculum of religious schools and that
Montana’s public schools will be weakened if their already limited funding is
diverted.
This issue is important in finding determining factors and evaluating the Establishment Clause for the future.
Montana’s Constitutional Convention, previously in 1972, rejected allowing
indirect state aid to fund religious education. However, in 1968, Board of Education v.
Allen challenged the New York state’s program that required school boards to
loan textbooks to public and private school students. The amount of Catholic
schools that were attended caused various school board to address this as a violation
of the Establishment Clause. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that
this was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. This was seen as aid to
private and schools, but it served a legitimate secular purpose for promoting
education. The same goes for a case that took place in 1947. Everson v. Board
of Education touched upon New Jersey reimbursing money to parents who sent
their children on buses operated by the public transportation system. 5-4, the
court ruled that it did not violate the Constitution because it did not pay
money to parochial schools directly. These two cases were perennial for cases
that touched upon public funding to parochial schools.
With past precedent, Montana still
denied the indirect aid of state funding to religious education. I understand
where their decision was when they chose to deny indirect aid to private
schools, however I don’t think it is the right decision. I think on
case-by-case it is important to evaluate, but if there is reason for them to
promote the general state of education then it is necessary. This is on display with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. In 2002,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris incorporated the same debate, but this time with an
emphasis on Ohio’s school voucher program.
Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship
program provided people with tuition aid, so they could pick their educational
preference. It was on a financial need basis, and it was the parent’s decision
as to where their children went to school. It just so happened that 96% of the
individuals that took part in this program chose religiously affiliated
schools. Sixty percent of the individuals came from just at or below the
poverty line. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that it did not violate the
Establishment Clause. This is an important interpretation because it again reaffirmed that indirect aid to parochial schools helped advance the states agenda to provide sufficient education to children. Along with these cases, The US Supreme Court dismissed a
lawsuit filed by taxpayers in Arizona who also challenged a state tax credit
program. This resulted in another 5-4 decision too.
These cases provide many backings on the side of
aid to private schools. I believe that allowing individuals to receive a tax
credit does not harm anyone who decides not to aid private schools. Justice Kennedy in the Arizona case said that, “When Arizona taxpayers choose to
contribute, they spend their own money, not money the state has collected from
respondents or from other taxpayers.” This is my standing on this case, as
well because I consistently agree across all the court cases that I presented that the claims that their is a violation are not sufficient enough to cause a violation of the Establishment Clause. Past precedents and more recent ones have helped me to build an argument
in favor of the defendants in this case. The establishment clause should be
deemed to not have been violated during this.
I think that indirect aid to religious schools is constitutional when the aid is going towards secular education, such as textbooks. However, in this case, the scholarships would be funding religious education in general. This use of tax credit will cost public schools in Montana millions of dollars, which is unfair to taxpayers who pay and send their children to public school. Religious schools sponsor ideologies and indoctrination of children not consistent with the government’s purpose or goals, so tax-dollars should not be given to funding the school generally. In order to stay neutral, I think the scholarships should only be given to public school students and it would not be unfair to allow private non-religious schools to benefit as this would be hostile to religion.
ReplyDeleteThe court has set precedent, from Everson v. Board to Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, that indirect aid to religion is permissible. If this scholarship was simply for textbooks, transportation, or playground equipment, then it would be permissible. However, it sounds as though the scholarship is paying for general education, affording children the opportunity to attend a religious school in general. To me, based on precedent, that is a violation of establishment. There might be legitimate constitutional grounds to reverse the "no-aid" policy in the state constitution if a religious group were to seek aid that would not directly aid establishment, but in this case, I do not believe that circumstance exists.
ReplyDeleteI am going to have to disagree with you because I think that the aid here is promoting religion which should be stopped by the establishment clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court voted that since the religious teachers could not be vetted sufficiently to ensure that no religious material was being promoted by tax dollars that their salaries could not be supplemented. The tax credits are being used for both secular and religious material. The government is not able to regulate government funding only going towards secular material if they are allowing religious schools to obtain tax credits. Since there is religious material that is gaining a larger audience from tax dollars, I think that these tax credits should be unconstitutional.
ReplyDeleteI would like to know more about where these public funds go, specifically. But, in general, if the State has a compelling interest to use public funds for private education they should be able to do so. An example being, improving education in an improvised area. Even if the State thinks providing funding to private school will benefit the general welfare, they should be able to do so. As long as, it is not directly furthering the practice of a specific religion, and Minnesota has "sufficiently" funded their public schools.
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