Capitol Hill Landlord Ordered Jewish Tenant To Take Down Scripture

In a recent matter, The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ)simultaneously fought against religious discrimination and protected the First Amendment rights of a woman from Washington, DC. The woman that the ACLJ represented was Jewish and newly returned from a trip to Israel. In keeping Jewish tradition, she fastened a small mezuzah that she had purchased in Israel to the doorpost of her residence. A mezuzah is a piece of parchment in a decorative case that is inscribed with specific Hebrew verses from the Torah. This ancient tradition is based directly off the Bible’s commandments in Deuteronomy 6:9 and Deuteronomy 11:20 stating “Now this is the commandment, the statues, and the ordinances, which the Lord your God commanded to teach you, that ye might do them in the land whither ye go over to possess it – And thou shalt write them upon the door-posts of thy house, and upon thy gates.” In order to fulfill this obligation, Jews place extremely small scriptures from these sections of the Torah into decorative casings and keep them on their doorposts at all times. Shortly after affixing her mezuzah to her doorpost she was informed by her landlord’s agent that she must removed it. In an attempt to push back, she replied that this was apart of her religious practice as a Jew. The Building Management replied to her complaint that they were aware that this was a religious practice, however, they would make no exception and that other Jews have previously been forced to remove their mezuzahs as well. The provisions within the Building Rules, guidelines that the landlord requires all tenants to abide by, state that no door mats or door hangings are permitted. The ACLJ reviewed the matter and took representation on the tenant’s behalf. The ACLJ’s legal team sent a written letter to the landlord that laid out of the facts and the law and addressed the religious discrimination exhibited on the tenant. Despite the Building Rules, under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing Act), barring Jewish tenants from affixing mezuzahs is religious discrimination. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and disability, along with other provisions that inhibit this practice. Upon receiving the letter, the landlord retracted his statements and permitted the use of the mezuza.

In speculation, what might have happened if the landlord continued this policy? What would the ruling have been in court? This is a problem stemming from the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Turning toward precedent rulings, I determine that the Court would rule in favor of the tenant and the ACLJ. In the landmark case Cantwell v. Connecticut, the arrest of Newton Cantwell and his sons for proselytizing a Catholic neighborhood with Jehovah Witnesses beliefs was deemed unconstitutional. The reasoning for this was that requiring the Cantwells to receive a solicitation license to practice his religion is a direct burden on his religion. Requiring the woman to not practice her religion due to a certain rule can be seen as a direct burden. In McDaniel v. Paty, a provision in the Tennessee constitution that prohibited ministers from serving in the state legislator was deemed unconstitutional. The Court ruled that making an individual surrender their religious rights in order to be considered for a job is a violation of the First Amendment. Having this provision acts as a direct burden on religion. This is similar to the situation with the tenant and landlord. In that case, instead of losing a potential job, the woman could have lost her home due to her practice of religion. In all instances discussed, a direct burden has been exhibited and has been deemed unconstitutional.

If this case were to go to the Supreme Court, I believe that the tenant and the ACLJ would become victorious. However, there is an oppositional position to my view. Not only did this tenant’s actions violate a building policy, a policy that all tenants must follow, but the policy was facially neutral in the first place. The rule did not require certain religions to stop practicing their religion. The rule only stated that there cannot be doormats or ornaments hanging on doorposts, and all tenants had to abide by this. I do not find this argument compelling. I agree that this policy is facially neutral, however, in practice it is not neutral towards religion. This policy specifically targets the Jewish faith. Only Jews are required to affix mezuzahs to their doorposts as a religious practice. This policy does not affect any other religion besides Judaism, and therefore, it is unconstitutional. In addition, multiple landmark court cases set a precedent for this case that would overshadow this opposing opinion. Continuing, the action exhibited by the landlord violates law. The landlord’s actions violate the Civil Rights Act, probably the most important piece of legislation in United States history. Discrimination based on religion is deemed illegal in this case. So, the reasoning behind the policy, previous court rulings, and cannon law lead me to believe that the Court would rule in favor of the tenant in this case.

Ohio House Bill 164: Religion in Public Schools

There should be no doubt that children are heavily influenced by their school environments. For five days a week and about six to seven hours a day, a student is under the academic impact of their teachers and peers. Over the years parents have either supported or protested lessons pertaining to the theory of evolution. While some may believe that the theory is convincing, others strongly feel as though it is insulting to their religion. Ultimately, the task for state legislatures is to decide the balance between religion and non-religion in state academia.

In Ohio, the House of Representatives recently passed House Bill 164 which would be known as the “Student Religious Liberties Act.” If the bill were to be approved by the state senator and governor, the House Bill 164 would “amend sections 3313.601, 3314.03, 3326.11, and 3328.24 and… enact sections 3320.01, 3320.02, and 3320.03” (H.B. 164, 133rd General Assembly, 2019). H.B. 164 would create a significant change in the religious attitudes of public schools. The aim of this legislative bill is to give children the ability to express their religious beliefs and practices in their respective public schools. As stated above the sections 3313.601, 3314.03, and 3326.11 will be edited to permit freedom of religious expression.

Section of 3313.601 has been revised in a form of terminating its last requirement: The board of education may limit the exercise or expression of the pupil's religious beliefs as described in this section to lunch periods or other non-instructional time periods when pupils are free to Associate.” (H.B. 164, 133rd General Assembly, 2019).

With this part of Section 3313.601 erased it would allow children to include religious prayer in the classroom and other places where teacher-to-pupil instruction occurs. The board of education will no longer be permitted to limit the amount of religious expression occurring during school hours.

Included Sections 3320.01, 3320.02, and 3320.03 would have been highly questioned by the Supreme Court justices that ruled in Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) and McCollum v. Board of Education (1971) case. Section 3320.01 makes it so that public schools would allow prayer, religious gatherings, and distribution of written materials or literature of a religious nature. Section 3320.02 would allow the new changes from Section 3320.01 in public schools, STEM schools, and college-preparatory schools. Section 3320.03 would change the grading system of science courses in Ohio. 

Section 3320.03 - “ No school district board of education… shall prohibit a student from engaging in religious expression in the completion of homework, artwork, or other written or oral assignments. Assignment grades and scores shall be calculated using ordinary academic standards of substance and relevance, including any legitimate pedagogical concerns, and shall not penalize or reward a student based on the religious content of a student's work.”

(H.B. 164, 133rd General Assembly, 2019).

What is difficult about this case is that it touches upon the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Establishment Clause. If a student feels that their religious views are being challenged in their science classroom, should they be able to answer exam questions with an explained religious response? Even if this may sound reasonable, the reality of allowing religious answers would create disagreements between public school teachers, parents, and students. If it were to be allowed the next fear would be that the teacher could possibly accept one religious answer over another. Which would then seem as though the teacher is establishing a religion in the classroom and discriminating against a student’s religious belief.

Timothy Ginter, the primary sponsor for House Bill 164, responded to these concerns. Ginter argues that a student who studies a science course must give an answer that is supported by the lessons of their teacher. He believes that the use of religion should not be a “get-out-of-jail-free card” (Mikkelson, 2019).However, this response seems to go against what was stated in Section 3320.03. Ginter argues that a student’s points can still be deducted for their wrong religion-based answers, but Section 3320.03 defends the student’s religious justification.

House Representative Ginter’s response was an aim to debunk the idea that the bill would allow students to give the wrong answer if based on religion. However, his explanation retracts what the bill states. Which then begs to question what the purpose of Section 3320.01 truly is? What should the teacher do with the religious answer? Are they expected to look at the religiously-based student work and ignore it? Speculators of this bill argue that it will require teachers to debate on whether or not the religious answer is correct. This would then open the door for a myriad of concerns.

-->

I am able to wrap my head around the idea of Section 3320.01 and 3320.02. I understand that there are children in public schools who may want to start religious clubs and they should be able to do so. But the religious clubs must include an “open to all” rule and there must be a diversity of religious clubs. If the public school does not provide an abundance of different religious clubs then the school could run the risk of accidentally establishing a religion. I also think that Section 3320.02 is reasonable since college-preparatory schools and STEM schools are also public schools. However, I don’t agree with the striking out of the last sentence of Section 3313.601. Religion can hold a position in public schools through the means of school clubs/electives. But teachers should still be allowed to ask students to leave religion outside of the classroom unless it is a religious class. Everything has its time and place and the school's main purpose is to educate America’s future and not let it get too distracted by religious debates.

Ohio’s House of Representatives has a justified purpose in trying to include religious expression in public schools but the new bill as a whole has its flaws. We must look out for overstepping the free exercise clause to the point where it becomes an establishment of religion in public schools.

References:

Mikkelson, David. “Does Ohio Bill Let Students Give Wrong Answers Based on Religion?” Snopes.com, https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/ohio-school-religion-answers/.

The Ohio Legislature, House Bill 164.          
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA133-HB-16

CA Requiring Church's to Pay for Abortions

California is now requiring church's to pay for abortions through the church's healthcare plans. In 2014, Skyline Wesleyan Church in La Mesa, CA was one of the religious institutions that fell victim to Planned Parenthood's letter to the Department of Managed Health Care that led to them rescinding existing religious accommodations in insurance plans. Pastor of Skyline Wesleyan Church, Lisa Amann, says that directly or indirectly funding abortions would be a violation of her fundamental, Biblically-based beliefs. Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) is bringing this case up the court system to fight for Skyline's right to free speech and free exercise. The dangerous issue at stake is the government's ability to not only censor what privately-funded organizations can say, but mainly what they are forced to publicly endorse with risk of possible punishment if they choose not to. Defenders of the law claim that healthcare providers are treating all health plans neutrally, but it is directly in conflict with certain religious beliefs and provides no religious exemption. This case brings up a case the Supreme Court ruled on just over a year ago and should rely on that precedent.

The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act, known as the “Act” or “FACT Act,” was a revision and extension for the previous Reproductive Privacy Act. The purpose of the Act was to ensure that all women were informed of all health services available to them. However, the Act requires any license-covered facility to “disseminate a notice to all clients, as specified, stating, among other things, that California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services, prenatal care, and abortion, for eligible women.” It would also require that unlicensed facilities disclose that they are not licensed as a medical facility by California. The only difference between "licensed" and "unlicensed" facilities, as the Act defines them, is that a "licensed" facility provides abortions and contraception or contraceptive methods and an "unlicensed" facility does not. The Act also defines exactly how facilities are supposed to advertise their services, including what verbiage is to be used, where in the facility it must be advertised (which is "conspicuously" in the "entrance"), and even what font size is required.

Because of the Act, a pro-Life pregnancy center in 2017 was being forced to advertise abortions, which was contrary to their beliefs. Their goal is to provide all options to women, including abortions, but not making abortion their first and only option. They claimed that having a sign about abortion sitting in their waiting room or outside their doors would take away from what they are trying to do. If women walk into the clinic with this messaging on their minds, the clinic says it could take away from the honest conversations they get to have with women about all their choices. The President, CEO, and General Counsel for Alliance Defending Freedom, Michael P. Farris, said “No one should be forced by the government to express a message that violates their convictions, especially on deeply divisive subjects such as abortion. In this case, the government used its power to force pro-life pregnancy centers to provide free advertising for abortion. The Supreme Court said that the government can’t do that, and that it must respect pro-life beliefs... If we want to have freedom for ourselves, we have to extend it to others.” Farris also said in 2018 that the Act only served as a way to force pro-lifers to become advocates for abortion, a violation of their free speech and free exercise. It is a slippery slope to require pro-life centers to advertise messages that are contrary to their fundamental values because it opens the door for more government control over private institutions. Skyline Wesleyan is now fighting that same slippery slope. For them to indirectly pay for abortions would be asking them to violate their understanding that abortion is murder and to aid in it being performed.

This issue was brought to the Supreme Court in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v Becerra (2018). The question presented in the case was whether or not the requirements of the Act violated the free speech of these institutions. The Court ruled in favor of NIFLA in a 5-4 decision, saying that the Act violated the First Amendment because "professional speech" is not excluded from free speech protections and the licensed notice part of the Act was content-based, a First Amendment violation. Justice Thomas' also called the licensed notice "wildly under-inclusive" when it came actually providing information to women about state-sponsored health services, which was the Act's stated purpose. It essentially only clarified if a facility performed abortions or not, a controversial attack on pro-lifers. The dissenting opinion pushed back, saying that the notice requirements would survive a constitutional scrutiny test and said that failure to produce this information could create an undue burden for women seeking specific services.

I think the Court ruled correctly in NIFLA v Becerra and that they should hold on to that ruling in light of the recent case with Skyline Wesleyan that is working its way up the court system. It is important for healthcare providers to be transparent with what they can and cannot do for their clients. This should also include employer healthcare plans, employers should be upfront about what services they are willing to provide as part of their healthcare plans. Employees do not need to use the healthcare provided by their employer, but they should be fully informed of what that plan includes. If employees do not wish to use the employer's health plan because of religious or secular purposes, they are allowed to do just that since there is no Constitutional guarantee that being religious or nonreligious should be free, as we have spoken about with Sherbert v Verner (1963). Insurance companies should allow religious exemptions in healthcare plans because the plans are optional for employees. Doing this would in no way coerce an employee to act in a certain way, but by not providing religious exemptions to employers choosing employee healthcare plans, especially if part of that plan violates their fundamental religious beliefs, California state laws are forcing church's to act in a secular way and against their moral convictions.

Can Employers Restrict Free Exercise in the Workplace?

On October 18, 2019, a Bengali-American man (whose name has not been made public) filed a discrimination complaint against the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), his place of work, for failing to accommodate his schedule to reflect Friday congregational prayer. As an observant Muslim, the employee voiced his sincerely held belief that he must attend the Jumu’ah congregational prayer each Friday.

The employee has worked as a Motor Vehicle Representative (MVR) at the DMV since January 2019, performing various duties that include providing customer service, processing driver’s license and identification card applications, verifying legal documents, and administering written, oral, and visual tests for obtaining a driver’s license. He is required to work at least 3.75 hours each day, as well as mandatory overtime hours as needed. Upon being hired, the man was scheduled to work from 9:15 a.m. – 1 p.m., and he regularly clocked additional hours from 1 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. Each employee receives a daily 45-minute lunch break and a 15-minute office break during his/her shift. Shortly after being hired, the employee asked the DMV for a religious accommodation to extend his 45-minute lunch break on Fridays to an hour, which the DMV approved. The employee would instead report to work at 8:45 a.m. on Fridays and work until 12:30, at which point he was allowed a 45-minute lunch break and a 15-minute office break to attend congregational prayer; he was expected to return at 1:30 p.m. to work his additional hours. However, the DMV employed a caveat: this accommodation would only be granted for three months. The DMV failed to provide any rationale for this limitation.

The DMV did not report any scheduling or staffing inconveniences during these three months. As the accommodation neared its expiration, the employee requested an extension. He also modified his request; this time, the employee asked for a one-hour break to observe congregational prayer on Fridays from 1:30 p.m. – 2:30 p.m. instead of 12:30 p.m. – 1:30 p.m. Muslims use a lunar calendar to determine prayer times, and so the congregational prayer had shifted by an hour. The DMV denied his request. The DMV representative responded with: “We cannot accommodate your request to leave during the day on Fridays for your religious observance. An essential function of your position is to work certain hours. Altering your schedule poses an undue hardship on the operational needs of the office.” The employee also sent in a request for a schedule accommodation during the month of Ramadan, in which he must fast from sunrise to sunset. This request was also denied.

The employee claims that he was discriminated against on the basis of religion. In response, he filed an affidavit with the Council on American-Islamic Relations - New York, a civil rights group. “Because I am observing my faith at work, my job is at risk,” the employee admitted. “I believe I am being punished and retaliated against because I am observing my religious practice of attending congregational prayer.” Such discrimination violates the New York State Human Rights Law, which “makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee or job seeker” based on several identifiers, including religion.

Although the employee was given an accommodation for three months without any claim of “undue hardship” by the agency, the DMV argued that requests must be considered on a case-by-case basis to avoid the potential for such hardships to occur. After his requests were denied, the DMV changed the employee’s regular hours to 10:45 a.m. – 2:30 p.m. Even though he is no longer granted an accommodation, the employee continues to leave every Friday at 1:30 p.m. to attend his congregational prayer. He sends in a one-hour leave request each week, which is always denied. After leaving for prayer, the employee is not allowed to clock back in for the remainder of the day, so he cannot complete any of his usual overtime hours, which are deemed mandatory. The employee also claims that the manager has threatened him for “taking unauthorized lunch breaks” when clocking out for prayer, even though he has been submitting requests.

The First Amendment begins with, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” Is this refusal to allow a religious accommodation a violation of the employee’s free exercise rights? Since the employee was previously granted a three-month accommodation, I do find this to be a violation of the Free Exercise clause, and I do not find the DMV’s short justification convincing. Since his denial, the employee has been forced to choose between his religion and making a living for himself. He has chosen to continuing practicing his religion, therefore giving up hours of work, which puts him at a financial disadvantage and worsens his relationship with the agency.

As precedent, a 1959 Pennsylvania blue law restricting commerce within the state on Sundays burdened merchants who were Orthodox Jews, for they also had to close their store on Saturdays, their sabbath. Justice Brennan’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown claims that the Orthodox Jew merchants suffered a state-imposed burden since they cannot both compete successfully with other merchants while also practicing their religion. The same issue can be applied here; the employee faces a state-imposed burden on his wages by not being able to work his overtime hours. Although mandatory, it is unclear as to whether these hours must be worked at a set time during the week. If there is no set time, he could choose to work all his overtime hours earlier in the week; however, this would still be burdensome to his schedule.

Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, Seventh-Day Adventist Adell Sherbert filed for unemployment benefits but was denied because she refused to work on Saturdays, her sabbath. Here, the Court claimed that the “appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable.” There exists no compelling state interest to override the DMV employee’s free exercise rights, leading me to believe that the denial is solely religion-based. The three-month accommodation did not create any problems, and it appears to be easy to move staff schedules around, considering this employee’s schedule has been adjusted multiple times. I find it to be a stronger burden on the DMV to not allow the employee to clock back in after attending prayer. I think it would be less burdensome for the DMV to find someone to cover his one-hour break in comparison to the three-hour shift that he is no longer working. The agency has been able to get a one-hour break covered in the past, so I cannot imagine it being different now that the break is pushed back by an hour.

While the employee did agree to the responsibilities and hours of the job, he is only asking for his 15-minute office break to be combined with his lunch break each Friday, which can easily be accommodated for. He still fulfills his 3.75 hours on Fridays, and so he should be allowed to work additional hours and to take his break without any pushback.

This is not the first time a Muslim has been restricted from attending Jumu’ah. In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court ruled such free exercise limitations constitutional when applied to prisoners. While it can be argued that we give up some of our rights as state employees, to what degree can employers restrict their employee’s free exercise rights? This cannot be easily answered, but I do think that employees should be able to freely exercise their religion in the workplace through expression of clothing and through accommodations to leave for prayer and observance of religious holidays. Free exercise should be restricted when it involves overt acts of discrimination toward a person or a group. Overall, the employee’s free exercise to leave for prayer is protected under the First Amendment, and I think that the DMV should extend his accommodation.

Muslim Group Challenges Virginia Prison's Christian-only "God Pod"

Last year on November 21st, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a Muslim civil rights group, filed a federal lawsuit against Riverside Regional Jail in Prince George County Virginia. The suit was filed on the grounds that the jail had violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the constitution by setting up a Christians-only unit dubbed the “God Pod”. According to the reports of inmates, a flyer posted all over the jail described a “Life Learning Program” conducted by Christian Chaplains from the Good News Jail and Prison Ministry, open to inmates of “any faith group”. The aim was to create living quarters that promoted reform and spiritual bonding by separating “soul-searching inmates” from the general population. In order to join the program, inmates were required to submit an application pledging their commitment to living according to the word of the Holy Bible and sit for an interview to be considered for acceptance.  Once selected and placed in this exclusive section of the prison, inmates were given their own cells, less time “locked down”, writing materials and access to luxury amenities like televisions and microwaves.

The lawsuit filed by the CAIR contended that the Christian pod violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits the government from establishing an official religion or unduly favoring one religion over another. This “God Pod” program encouraged inmates at the prison to convert to Christianity in exchange for preferential, religiously based living conditions. This effectively gave Christian inmates and those willing to convert, access to a special and religiously specific program with benefits that inmates who are tenants of other faiths did not have. The lawsuit accuses the prison of unlawfully “signaling a message of condemnation against Islam” and other faith backgrounds at the prison. The prison has allegedly “effectively starved” Muslim inmates by not allowing them to eat before morning prayer when observing the Ramadan fast. Mitchell Young, one of the plaintiffs, outlined that he, like many other Muslim inmates, had been denied access to religious materials, prevented from meeting with religious leaders, and prohibited from studying the Quran in groups.

The CAIR asserts that this provision of special benefits to tenants of one faith while simultaneously denying them to others can be interpreted as an establishment of a “prison religion” and preference of one particular religion over another. The CAIR further demanded an injunction to order the jail to dismantle the pod and to provide Muslim inmates with access to Islamic programming and adequate nutrition during Ramadan.  These demands sought to remedy violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clause, the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, among other statutory and constitutional violations.  As of Court Documents from the case’s hearing on September 20th 2019, a motion towards summary judgement has been filed and signed by U.S District Judge Anthony Trenga. The program was terminated on the advice of counsel after the lawsuit was filed, but I could find no information about movements to address the lawsuit’s other concerns of the provision of necessary meals to Muslim inmates during Ramadan.

The central question of this situation is whether or not it can be considered an unconstitutional establishment of religion when a state prison provides specialized benefits to tenants of one particular faith. This is a question which has come up from time to time in cases before the Supreme Court. In Lee v Weisman it was determined that it was unconstitutional to have a member of the clergy recite prayers at the graduation ceremony of a public school. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy lamented that while the government may accommodate the free exercise of religion, “this does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause” p. 382.  He asserted that at the bare minimum, the Constitution forbade the government from forcing anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. It was further held that there was subtle coercion of students to participate in what was essentially state sponsored religious activity, this therefore was a violation of the establishment clause.

 In this case we can find a lot of similarities between the public school and the state prison. Both are state run institutions whose patrons’ presence is legally compulsory. This makes said patrons’ actions that much more vulnerable to state influence. This state prison has employed a member of a Christian agency to be its sole Chaplain with authority to control religious services and accommodations for all prisoners. This Christian chaplain designed an unparalleled program offering inmates a preferential standard of living in exchange for conversion. I think that is evidence of a substantial amount of coercion into participating in state sponsored, sectarian religious activity. If this case were to make it to the Supreme Court, the same grounds that made Weisman’s  invocation practice unconstitutional should render this “God Pod” program unconstitutional as well.

As an accommodationist,  I would  have been more inclined to support this government aid to religion if the prison had made some sort of effort to ensure that the program catered to members of all religions without requiring conversion. However, in this program’s current existence it affords an elite existence to Christianity among all other religions at the prison. This, in conjunction with the prison’s denial of special services to members of other religions makes it impossible for me to see any evidence of neutrality between religions or between religion and non-religion here. In my opinion, this “God Pod” program was a lucid example of unconstitutional state establishment or support of Christianity alongside hostility towards other religions. I agree with the prison’s decision to end it and I hope they have made movements towards giving Muslim prisoners the support they need during Ramadan.

Demands Against Missouri High School's Football Coaches to Stop Praying with Players

The Cameron High School Football team in Missouri faced complaints about the head Coach, Jeff Wallace, and assistant coach, David Stucky, for holding religious prayer on the fifty yard line before and after the games with their players. The coaches were not only reading and discussing bible verses, they would often bring in outside preachers to lead the prayers. On other occasions, the opponent team would sometimes join the prayer as well. Jeff Speer, a parent of players on the team, stated that it is his children's interest to pray and they were not forced. “If it were a situation where a coach or even another student said, ‘Get over here and pray,’ and that kid didn’t want to be a part of it, I understand,” he said, “but they all want to be a part of it.” (The Blaze).

However, not everyone is a fan of this religious ceremony. A member of the community sent a complaint to The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) who ordered the school to investigate and discontinue this prayer conducted by faculty members. The FFRF is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to defend the constitutional separation between religion and government. The FFRF protested that it was illegal "for public school athletic coaches to lead their teams in prayer or religious worship..." (The Blaze).  This is not FFRF’s first rodeo. They have also demanded that other schools such as Putnam City High School in Oklahoma City, follow the establishment clause by not allowing this high school to have a local pastor lead the football team in prayer before games. After the FFRF created this demand, the football team changed its ritual to now having a ‘moment of silence’ which is lead by the students.

The issue that arises in this article questions if this religious prayer with the students and coaches at the football games violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The FFRF defended the establishment clause of the First Amendment and deemed that there needs to be a separation between church and state. The act of faculty to join in and lead prayers or religious worship is illegal. In addition, the sole fact that this religious warship is being held on government property crosses the line between church and state.

Football games in Missouri is the social center of most communities. Having these prayers being a part of the event itself, many people in the community can be coerced to participate in this religious prayer as well.

To reference Lynch v Donnelly 1984, the precedent set in this case has a clear overlap. First the endorsement test proposed in this case, examines whether the reasonable observer views that government action adds to an endorsement of a religion. The public high school coaches are employed by the government. By them having anything to do with this prayer, created a sense of favor in religious activity. The fact that other schools sometimes participate in this prayer results in the coercion of that particular religion.

In addition, to reference Santa Fe Independent School v. Doe (2000), the court ruled that the school’s policies allowing student led and initiated prayer at football games does in fact violate the Establishment clause. The court's ruling was based upon the certainty that the football game prayers were public speech which was authorized by a public school which is government funded. It can be perceived that the government is endorsing the religious prayers which violates the Establishment Clause. 

In my opinion, I have more of a separationalist approach on this matter, meaning that there should be no bridge between state and religion. First, the school is promoting this event by hosting it on government owned property which associates the government with these prayers. This event however, is not voluntary for everyone. The athletes made a commitment to the team to be there and coaches are getting paid to be there as well making this event not voluntary for them. If the coaches don't show up, they do not get their paycheck and if the athletes don't show up, they do not get to play. There also has to be some type of organization for this event by the coaches even after the FFRF demanded the coaches to stay away. The speech or moment of silence given by the students is not religiously neutral and favors the majority religion in Missouri which is predominantly Prodostant. There is an understanding that this has been a tradition for many years but doesn't justify the fact that it favors religion at a secular event. 

Garcia, Carlos. “Atheist Group Demands Missouri High School's Football Coaches Stop Praying with Players.” TheBlaze, TheBlaze, 8 Nov. 2019, www.theblaze.com/news/atheist-org-demands-missouri-school-stop-football-prayer.

Lack of Religious Freedom for Texas Inmates

In July, a Texas inmate named Bobby Brown challenged the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the second time in the duration of his incarceration -- the first being in the 1970's. In the '70's, Brown, who is Muslim, challenged the Texas Department of Criminal Justice because he believed that the policy surrounding religious gatherings in the prison at that time did not allow Muslim inmates the same treatment that it allowed inmates of other religious groups. At that time, the policy regarding religion in Texas prisons was that chaplains or volunteers had to be present during religious gatherings of groups larger than four inmates. Brown wanted an exception to the policy for Muslim inmates because of the lack of Muslim chaplains or volunteers in the area. He argued that this was a limited the freedom of religion of those practicing Islam in Texas prisons. In response to Brown's complaints, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice issued a decree in 1977 saying that Muslim gatherings could be monitored under "indirect" supervision of a prison employee, rather than direct supervision by a chaplain or volunteer. "Indirect" supervision occurred in the same instances of direct supervision for other religious groups of four or more -- except the gatherings for Muslims were monitored by prison staff through video, windows, or audio devices, rather than the direct presence of a staff member in the gatherings.

Unfortunately for Brown, in 2009 an inmate who was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to try to obtain "indirect" supervision for minority religions in besides Muslims. Though the Texas criminal justice system did not have the funds of personnel to accommodate indirect supervision for all the religious groups represented in the Texas State prison system, the district court ruled in favor of the Jehovah's Witness inmate (William Scott). The court argued that the prison system was violating the Establishment Clause because "the Establishment Clause requires 'denominational neutrality'" and by allowing for some faith groups to meet under indirect supervision, while others had to meet under direct supervision, the system was favoring some religions over others. The court also argued that the First Amendment's "prohibition against preferential treatment is 'absolute'" and that Muslim inmates were being preferred over Jehovah's Witness inmates because the lack of volunteers and/or chaplains for both faiths was comparable, but Muslims were permitted to meet under indirect supervision while Jehovah's Witnesses were not. Because of this lawsuit, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice developed the "Scott Plan", which said that "all religious gatherings of more than four inmates require direct supervision, including worship and study by more than four Muslim inmates." Because of this phrasing, the Scott Plan overrode the policy established in 1977 which allowed Muslim inmates to meet without direct supervision.

Brown's second action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice occurred in July when he took them to court with the same concerns he had in the 1970's. The case went to the Court of Appeals, where they had to decide if the Scott Plan burdened the religious freedom of Texas inmates in a substantial way. In the case, the court focused mainly on the problem with getting volunteers for groups of religious minorities and whether that was truly a problem the state should be blamed for. They went on to ask if "the government must accommodate religions dis-served by a lack of volunteers." Due to the opinions that security during gatherings of inmates held compelling state interest and that state policy did not adversely affect the practice of Islam in prisons (it was the lack of volunteers, not the state policy itself) the Court ruled in favor of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, upholding the Scott Plan and nullifying the 1977 statute. Muslim and other inmates of religious minorities must now wait for chaplains or volunteers representing their faiths in order to worship in groups.

I think that the Scott Plan impairs the religious freedom of inmates practicing minority religions and is therefore unconstitutional. Though, as the Texas Court of Appeals argued in July, the plan may be facially neutral, it disadvantages religious minorities in practice. By requiring groups of inmates to be monitored directly by chaplains or volunteers of a given faith, Texas is allowing inmates of certain religions to have more frequent opportunities to practice their faith than inmates of other religions. My guess would be that, like the state itself, the prisons in Texas are most likely overwhelmingly Christian; and since the religious demographics of the prisons are similar to those of the state, there are likely to be a higher proportion of Christian chaplains/volunteers that come to supervise meetings of Christian inmates than other religions.

Since there is probably a higher proportion of Christian inmates than inmates of other religions in Texas prisons, and assuming that the religious demographics of Texas prisons are similar to those of the state itself, it might be logical that there would be more opportunities for inmates to practice Christianity while in prison. However, just because there are more Christian inmates than inmates of religious minorities, it does not mean that the Christian inmates should have more opportunities to worship that inmates of other faiths. This, though it may be indirect, is a policy that is not neutral between religions. I think that it is not neutral for Christian inmates to be allowed to worship more frequently simply because there are more Christian volunteers. The point of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of religious minorities, and by relying on a volunteer-based direct supervision program to give inmates time and space to practice their religions, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice is impairing the free exercise of minority inmates.