Tuesday, November 19, 2019

Capitol Hill Landlord Ordered Jewish Tenant To Take Down Scripture

In a recent matter, The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ)simultaneously fought against religious discrimination and protected the First Amendment rights of a woman from Washington, DC. The woman that the ACLJ represented was Jewish and newly returned from a trip to Israel. In keeping Jewish tradition, she fastened a small mezuzah that she had purchased in Israel to the doorpost of her residence. A mezuzah is a piece of parchment in a decorative case that is inscribed with specific Hebrew verses from the Torah. This ancient tradition is based directly off the Bible’s commandments in Deuteronomy 6:9 and Deuteronomy 11:20 stating “Now this is the commandment, the statues, and the ordinances, which the Lord your God commanded to teach you, that ye might do them in the land whither ye go over to possess it – And thou shalt write them upon the door-posts of thy house, and upon thy gates.” In order to fulfill this obligation, Jews place extremely small scriptures from these sections of the Torah into decorative casings and keep them on their doorposts at all times. Shortly after affixing her mezuzah to her doorpost she was informed by her landlord’s agent that she must removed it. In an attempt to push back, she replied that this was apart of her religious practice as a Jew. The Building Management replied to her complaint that they were aware that this was a religious practice, however, they would make no exception and that other Jews have previously been forced to remove their mezuzahs as well. The provisions within the Building Rules, guidelines that the landlord requires all tenants to abide by, state that no door mats or door hangings are permitted. The ACLJ reviewed the matter and took representation on the tenant’s behalf. The ACLJ’s legal team sent a written letter to the landlord that laid out of the facts and the law and addressed the religious discrimination exhibited on the tenant. Despite the Building Rules, under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing Act), barring Jewish tenants from affixing mezuzahs is religious discrimination. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and disability, along with other provisions that inhibit this practice. Upon receiving the letter, the landlord retracted his statements and permitted the use of the mezuza.
Image result for mezuzah
In speculation, what might have happened if the landlord continued this policy? What would the ruling have been in court? This is a problem stemming from the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. Turning toward precedent rulings, I determine that the Court would rule in favor of the tenant and the ACLJ. In the landmark case Cantwell v. Connecticut, the arrest of Newton Cantwell and his sons for proselytizing a Catholic neighborhood with Jehovah Witnesses beliefs was deemed unconstitutional. The reasoning for this was that requiring the Cantwells to receive a solicitation license to practice his religion is a direct burden on his religion. Requiring the woman to not practice her religion due to a certain rule can be seen as a direct burden. In McDaniel v. Paty, a provision in the Tennessee constitution that prohibited ministers from serving in the state legislator was deemed unconstitutional. The Court ruled that making an individual surrender their religious rights in order to be considered for a job is a violation of the First Amendment. Having this provision acts as a direct burden on religion. This is similar to the situation with the tenant and landlord. In that case, instead of losing a potential job, the woman could have lost her home due to her practice of religion. In all instances discussed, a direct burden has been exhibited and has been deemed unconstitutional.

If this case were to go to the Supreme Court, I believe that the tenant and the ACLJ would become victorious. However, there is an oppositional position to my view. Not only did this tenant’s actions violate a building policy, a policy that all tenants must follow, but the policy was facially neutral in the first place. The rule did not require certain religions to stop practicing their religion. The rule only stated that there cannot be doormats or ornaments hanging on doorposts, and all tenants had to abide by this. I do not find this argument compelling. I agree that this policy is facially neutral, however, in practice it is not neutral towards religion. This policy specifically targets the Jewish faith. Only Jews are required to affix mezuzahs to their doorposts as a religious practice. This policy does not affect any other religion besides Judaism, and therefore, it is unconstitutional. In addition, multiple landmark court cases set a precedent for this case that would overshadow this opposing opinion. Continuing, the action exhibited by the landlord violates law. The landlord’s actions violate the Civil Rights Act, probably the most important piece of legislation in United States history. Discrimination based on religion is deemed illegal in this case. So, the reasoning behind the policy, previous court rulings, and cannon law lead me to believe that the Court would rule in favor of the tenant in this case.

10 comments:

  1. I agree with TJ in that if this case reached the Supreme Court, the court would rule in favor of the tenant and the ACLJ. The most compelling argument I found to be that the policy was solely facially neutral. Since only Jews are required to affix mezuzahs to their doorposts as a religious practice, this policy is discriminating against a specific religion making this an unconstitutional policy. Making this tenant surrender their religious rights is a direct burden on this religious.

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  2. I also agree with TJ and Bess in siding with the tenant. A landlord should not be able to discriminate against a tenant based on their religious things in their living area. Like Bess said, since Jews are required to have mezuzahs outside, and not any other religions, then this is not neutral for all religions.

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  3. I agree with TJ and the previous comments that they should rule in favor of the tenant and the ACLJ if this case goes to the Supreme Court. Since Jews are the only religion to require to affix mezuzahs to their doorposts, this is clearly discriminating against one religion. TJ cites multiple cases that set a precedent for this case where there is a direct burden on religion. In this case, it is a woman who could have lost her home for practicing her religion and therefore, I believe that this is unconstitutional.

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  4. I respectfully disagree with TJ. The building is (I assume) privately owned and managed. Home owners' associations all over the country regulate how people decorate their homes (for instance, in most gated communities you can't paint your roof aqua blue). The landlord has every right to tell his occupant to remove the mezuzah. The policy "no door mats or door hangings are permitted" is an objectively neutral policy. There is no religious wording as part of this. The policy's PRIMARY effect is not to inhibit religion (more likely the regulation is for safety and/or for uniformity). I disagree with the policy morally, but it's still totally constitutional.

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  5. I agree with TJ. This is a direct burden on religion and while facially neutral, it does target a minority religion, thereby making the policy of the building unconstitutional. The right of Free Exercise for the Jewish woman should trump the policy of the building. It's important to keep in mind that mezuzah's are rarely larger than several inches and are not offensive in nature in any way.

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  6. I agree with the author that, while the policy is facially neutral, in practice it imposes a burden on minority religions. I think that the woman should be able to put the mezuzah up because it aligns with her religious beliefs. I think that not allowing it to be displayed is an unconstitutional burden on the woman's free exercise.

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  7. I agree with TJ in this case. I do not think that it was a valid argument for the landlord to say that the renter had to take down he mezuzah just because they made other tenants in the past do it. I think the renter was right to fight the landlord on this issue because it was a suppression of her free exercise of religion. The rule was also not neutral for certain religions, such a s Judaism, that call of a mezuzah above the door.

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  8. Due to the direct burden placed upon religion, I believe that if this case went to the Supreme Court it would be ruled as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Since the Free Exercise Clause is meant to protect minority religions, this case clearly shows the duty of the courts to protect this sect's rights. I do not believe that discrimination could be used as the basis of unconstitutionality as the tenants were not unfairly prohibited from buying or renting the property, and thus to win this case I believe the impediment on the free exercise should be the focus.

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  9. I agree that a policy stating there cannot be doormats or ornaments hanging on doorposts is facially neutral. However, it is hostile towards the Jewish religion in practice. It is important to note that some individuals believe that Jewish law requires them to hang a mezuzah in every doorway of the home except the restroom. While Manning's argument about home owners' associations is compelling, there is unlikely to be a religious reason for someone to paint their roof aqua. This aesthetic preference is not protected by the constitution, however, an individual's right to free exercise is. Therefore, hanging the mezuzah should be permitted.

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  10. I agree with TJ in this case. I feel that the practice of preventing Jewish people from hanging the mezuzah is unconstitutional. While the landlord may own the property and have a rule preventing the hanging of ornaments, he has no right to restrict the free exercise of the tenants religion.

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