Can Jurors Pray?

    During the trial of former U.S. Congresswoman Corrine Brown on charges of fraud, a male juror, called Juror 13, told his fellow jurors that he believed the “Holy Spirit” informed him that Brown was not guilty. The district judge chose to replace Juror 13 because of his statements, and Brown was then convicted and sentenced to prison. The judge dismissed Juror 13 for “injecting religious beliefs that are inconsistent with the instructions of the court, that this case be decided solely on the law… and the evidence in the case.” He referred to the juror’s invocation of God as allowing an “outside force” to influence his decision in the case. When questioned by the district judge, however, Juror 13 implied his prayers were for "the Holy Spirit to aid him in weighing the evidence of the case," and he did not say that he received a divine order to acquit Brown.  

    Brown’s conviction was reviewed and upheld by a three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision in January 2020. Judge Rosenbaum wrote for the majority, saying that the right to a trial by jury hinges upon the right to a verdict that is based off of evidence, and that cannot be substituted for “some form of divine guidance.” Judge Pryor, however, dissented, arguing that the district court “erroneously” conflated the “divine guidance” the juror believes he received with reliance on “an outside force” and religious beliefs that “render the person unable to perform the duties of a juror.” Pryor argued that if religious jurors have the constitutional right to practice their religion by privately praying for guidance from God, then the court cannot fault them for believing they received a response.

    Brown’s legal team believes the current decision denies the “noble and civic duty to serve as a juror to hundreds of millions of Americans” who seek religious guidance through prayer and could lead to jurors being denied “simply because they believe that God answers prayer.” The issue was reignited on September 24 when the full 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the January ruling and agreed to rehear Brown’s case.

    Although Brown’s case does not directly involve an issue of religion, her conviction relates to the First Amendment issue of free exercise: does a juror have the freedom to seek divine guidance when reviewing a case? Does a juror’s invocation of religious counsel disqualify them from being impartial? I do not believe so. In my opinion, Juror 13 should not have been dismissed. 

    There is little direct precedent to be examined here, but we can look at other ways in which the courts have ruled on religious practices within governmental situations. In the 2014 case Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway, the Supreme Court ruled that opening a local government meeting with a prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause as long as there is no coercion and no religion is advanced or discouraged. Unlike Brown’s case, Galloway was about an establishment of religion, but the court stated that regulating whether prayer occurs or how it is carried out would put the government in the position to “act as supervisors and censors of religious speech,” thus involving the government to a greater degree than the practice of prayer itself. In dismissing Juror 13, the district court acted as a “supervisor” of a juror’s religious behavior and speech.

    I find myself concerned with the broader implications of the dismissal of Juror 13. The juror’s prayers were only seen as an issue because he discussed them and he believed they were answered-- would his prayer have been acceptable if he had not told others about it? Or would it be acceptable if he did not believe that God answered his prayers? Prayer is a personal and intimate practice that is central to many religions, and in punishing a juror for privately praying about a case, the government unconstitutionally limited the individual’s free exercise and created an unenforceable standard. The court cannot reasonably regulate prayer or belief in prayer. In dismissing Juror 13, the court essentially said that jurors may not pray about the case, which places the government in a position of supervising private citizens' religious practices.

    The issue is further complicated by the existing interconnection between our judicial branch and religion. Federal jurors traditionally take an oath stating something to the effect of, “Do each of you solemnly swear that you will well and truly try the case now before this court and render a true verdict, according to the law, evidence, and instructions of this court, so help you God?” This oath, similar to the oath witnesses must take, is seen as an appeal to a “higher truth.” It is inconsistent then, for Juror 13 to be removed from court for doing just as the oath states-- asking their God for help. Regardless of your own religious convictions or your opinions on the case of Corrine Brown, the dismissal of Juror 13 sets a dangerous precedent for what disqualifies a juror and creates unrealistic and unconstitutional standards for the government to evaluate jurors’ private religious convictions.