Free Exercise: A Right or Reward?

Alfonza Greenhill, a practicing Sufi Muslim, is a prisoner held in isolation at a Richmond jail who claims that his First Amendment right of free exercise has been violated. He argues that the Red Onion State Prison is withholding him from observing his faith’s weekly mandatory jummah prayer services both in-person or through live television. The prison officials have stated that if Greenhill improves his behavior, he will be able to observe the service via television. Greenhill’s attorney states that using the ability to participate in religious services to motivate and correct Greenhill’s behavior is a blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause arguing that the Free Exercise of religion is a constitutional right and cannot be conditional with his behavior. Greenhill first sued the prison officers in 2016 but before he was presented to trial, the lawsuit was revoked by the U.S. District Judge in Roanoke. He then appealed his case to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Virginia Department of Corrections has responded to the appeal by stating that Greenhill cannot attend prayer service only because his behavior has him placed in “administrative segregation”. The judge agreed that the restrictions were reflective of the Department of Corrections’ compelling interest in security, stating “only religious rationing could compel compliant behavior”. The main question posed in the case is if Greenhill has the absolute right to observe jummah prayer services via television even though his violent behavior has placed him in administrative segregation, where television is an earned privilege. Within confinement, Greenhill has been classified as the most restrictive status. However, prisoners are provided the opportunity to earn less grave assignments by participating in the Step-Down Program, which motivates corrected behavior through a reward system. In 2014, Greenhill was reclassified and rewarded certain privileges, including television. However, he has since been classified to the most grave status. Prison officials contend that if Greenhill is presented with television access, which is considered a reward to high-security prisoners, the purpose of the program will be defeated and he will not be incentivized to improve his behavior. He filed this lawsuit stating that the actions of the prison breached the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which prohibits jails from placing religious restrictions on prisoners without a compelling interest. Greenhill’s attorneys argue that the prison does not hold a valid compelling interest in security as a justification for preventing Greenhill from observing service.

I foresee O’Lone v. The Estate of Shabazz (1987) being applied as precedent because both cases involve the free exercise rights of prisoners and debate the question of to what extent do prisoners hold the same constitutional rights as non-prisoners. O’Lone established the antecedent that while prisoners do retain constitutional protection, prisons are entitled to place limitations on them if necessary. Furthermore, O’Lone settled that the court should defer to prison officials on their operations, and are typically ruled as valid as long as there is a penological objective. Because of the verdict of O’Lone, I believe that the Court will rule that the prison did not encroach Greenhill’s First Amendment protections. In my personal opinion, I disagree with the expected outcome of the court. Although I agree with the notion that certain rights should be curtailed within a prison, given a compelling interest, I do not believe that in this instance the prison’s restrictive access to provide television service is justified with a penological objective. For instance, I agree that Greenhill should not be able to attend in-person prayer sessions considering his status in solitary confinement because his removal raises security concerns. Yet, I do not believe the withholding of a televised prayer holds the same concern. The prison argues that providing television access to Greenhill will not incentivize him to correct his behavior. However, this is not a sufficient claim because it is based on speculation. Greenhill, if presented with this privilege, will only have access to the religious program and not other television programs. Therefore, he is not enjoying the privilege. I believe the prison’s policy is an infringement on his Free Exercise rights because the prison through their justification of the Step-Down program acts as if the right to practice religion is a reward and not a constitutional right. Although Greenhill is considered a maximum security inmate, I do not agree with the argument that his inability to watch the jummah is a precautionary measure against violent behavior. I do not see the correlation between acts of violence and disobedience with the ability to observe the prayer service. As Greenhill’s attorneys contend, I also believe that exposure to religious content would promote better behavior. As stated before, I believe the prison’s justification is based on false speculation; therefore, I believe that Greenhill should be able to observe the jummah through television because he is constitutionally protected under the Free Exercise Clause.