Introduction
When Montgomery County, Maryland, added LGBTQ-inclusive books and gender lessons to its elementary English curriculum without notifying parents or offering an opt-out, a group of Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox families felt their rights had been trampled. Mahmoud v. Taylor, before the Supreme Court, asks whether forcing young children to participate in lessons that conflict with their families’ religious convictions burdens the Free Exercise Clause and infringes parents’ fundamental authority over their children’s moral and spiritual upbringing.
Case Background
In 2024, Montgomery County Public Schools approved new elementary-level English materials featuring LGBTQ themes. Parents learned of the change only after lessons began, and there was no means to excuse their children. Rather than seek a ban on the curriculum, these families sued for notice and an opt-out option, arguing that the school board’s policy compels participation in teachings that violate their religious beliefs and usurps their right to direct their children’s education.
Constitutional Questions
Mahmoud v. Taylor centers on two overlapping rights. First, under the Free Exercise Clause, government actions that impose a “substantial burden” on sincere religious exercise demand strict scrutiny (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). The parents contend that mandatory participation in objectionable lessons, without advance notice or choice, forces their children to act against their faith. Second, substantive due process and parental-rights decisions (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)) recognize that parents have a fundamental right to direct their children’s moral and educational upbringing. The Court must decide whether Montgomery County’s policy violates one or both of these constitutional guarantees.
Balancing Inclusion and Religious Freedom
Supporters of the policy argue that teaching respect for diverse identities advances a valid secular purpose—promoting empathy and reducing bullying. Yet, under Sherbert and successor decisions, the government must show a compelling interest achieved by the least restrictive means when a policy substantially burdens religion. The absence of notice or opt-outs raises questions about whether Montgomery County has met that demanding standard.
The Lemon Test and Parental Entanglement
Applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework (403 U.S. 602 (1971)) highlights further concerns.
Secular Purpose: Promoting inclusion is a legitimate, nonreligious goal.
Primary Effect: However, compelling undisclosed participation in lessons on gender and sexuality may advance particular moral views.
Excessive Entanglement: If schools must negotiate numerous individual opt-outs and assess the sincerity of varied beliefs, they risk becoming entangled in religious adjudication.
Conclusion
A ruling for the parents would require school districts nationwide to adopt clear notice policies and opt-out options, restoring parental control while allowing inclusive education. If the Court sides with Montgomery County, it would reinforce the Smith era’s emphasis on generally applicable rules over individual accommodations (Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981)), potentially limiting the reach of free exercise protections in elementary education. As Mahmoud v. Taylor unfolds, its decision will shape how public schools can honor both diversity and deeply held convictions.
Sources
Bernal, Meredith. “Why Mahmoud v. Taylor Is Allowing Religious Liberties Back in Schools,” April 28, 2025.
Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2025).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).