Wedding Cakes and Constitutional Challenges

California Civil Rights Department V. Cathy’s Creations

In California, there are lingering conflicts between religious freedom and anti-discrimination laws. Cathy’s Creations, Inc, known to California residents as Tastries Bakery, found itself in a complex dispute after refusing to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple. In this case, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Unruh Civil Rights Act interact, creating much debate in the ongoing dispute between the California Civil Rights Department and Cathy’s Creations, Inc. 

In August of 2017, Eileen Rodriguez-Del Rio and Mireya Rodriguez-Del Rio visited Tastries Bakery in Bakersfield, California, hoping to order a custom cake for their wedding, as their search for a cake at other bakeries had been unsuccessful. After being set up with an employer at Tastries Bakery, the same-sex couple met with the bakery owner, Cathy Miller, to discuss details of their cake. Miller then declined their request to order a custom wedding cake because she believed that creating a cake to represent marriage between a same-sex couple would violate her profound Christian beliefs about marriage. Miller mentioned that the bakery does serve LGBTQ customers regularly, but draws a line when it comes to selling ordinary baked goods and designing a cake that is made uniquely to celebrate a same-sex ceremony. Miller then provided a nearby bakery, Gimme Some Sugar, as a referral bakery that could accommodate the same-sex couples' needs (Rio had already attended and was dissatisfied with). The couple then filed a complaint with the California Department of Civil Rights, alleging that the refusal to serve them constituted unlawful discrimination in direct violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act requires businesses open to the public to provide equal service to customers regardless of characteristics such as race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. 

The issue in these cases concerns whether enforcing UCRA against Tasties Bakery would constitute a direct violation of Miller’s constitutional right to free exercise under the First Amendment. Miller argues that designing and creating a custom wedding cake is an expressive act that communicates approval of the specific marriage it is made for. Cathy Miller is a devout Christian and has created Tastries Bakery to reflect that, as “she believes that Tastries is God’s business, and that she and her husband work in service to God” by playing Christian music in the store and adding Bible verses to their business cards. Forcing her to create a cake of this nature would interfere with her religious convictions, as within the bakery's policy that will not make a cake in which a “Request(s) that violate fundamental Christian principals [sic]; wedding cakes must not contradict God’s sacrament of marriage between a man and a woman”. 

However, the CCRD argues that all businesses open to the public at large must comply with the anti-discrimination laws in effect in UCRA. The state contends that allowing a religious exemption in a situation like the one at hand would ultimately undermine civil rights protections, leading to a slippery slope and allowing businesses to refuse service based on pure personal beliefs. CCRD views Tastries Bakery’s refusal to serve the same-sex couple not as a protected religious expression but as a direct discrimination in commerical marketplace. 

When analyzing this case, and where to fall in opinion, we can look back to another case involving wedding services and religious objections similar to California Civil Rights Department V. Cathy’s Creations d/b/a Tastrie. In 2017, Masterpiece Cakeshop V. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court ruled on a VERY similar issue regarding a same-sex couple being refused service at Masterpiece Cakeshop because of the owner, Phillips, religious obligations. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop because the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had shown hostility and made inappropriate comments toward Phillips' beliefs, thereby violating the neutral religious treatment guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court acknowledges that at the time when Phillips refused service to the same-sex couple was in 2012, when same-sex marriage laws were more unsettled before important cases such as United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). However, the court did not rule on whether businesses have constitutional rights to refuse such services based on religious convictions. This case then now rests between two important principles. Should Tastries be exempted from anti-discrimination laws in protection of their First Amendment right, specifically the Free Exercise Clause? Or is the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in public commerce, like UCRA, more compelling in the state's interest? 

In my view of this case, I believe the court will side with California. United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges established the precedent that all states must accept same-sex marriage and provide equal treatment to such. When Masterpiece V. Colorado was decided, the idea of same-sex marriage was not as settled and legalized as it is now in 2026.  UCRA’s anti-discrimination laws, as well as the cases mentioned above, proved enough reason and support to enforce that Tastries Bakery cannot refuse a potential client solely based on their sexual orientation. Although Tastries does provide an alternative bakery option, it is not a minimal burden, especially since the same-sex couple had already consulted and disagreed with the flavors of the cakes provided by Gimme Some Sugar. As for the bakery's defense of expression and artistic creation of the cake being a violation of their religious obligations, the cake design (shown below) is one that has been created many times for wedding cakes with a man and a woman, as it is a popular design for the company. 

If the court were to rule in favor of Tastries Bakery, however, I would not be surprised either. The bakery has gone out of its way to display its deep religious beliefs throughout its store. By playing Christian music, displaying Bible verses, and other religious symbols throughout the store, the Millers have a right to refuse not only to create, but to set up and attend the presence of a same-sex marriage to which the burden on their religious beliefs would be substantial. Tastries has been successful in serving various LGBTQ members at their bakery, so a reasonable person could say this is not a full exemption or a violation of anti-discrimination laws. The Millers are only refusing service for a self-designed wedding cake that directly conflicts with their beliefs. 

Resources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/california-civil-rights-department-v-cathys-creations-dba-tastries

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/644/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-307

 

Loffman v. California Department of Education

 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federally funded program that was created to ensure that students with disabilities receive a free public education that is appropriate for their needs. The funding from this pays for resources that are essential to the student's ability to learn, like assistive technology, staff training, special education programs, etc. Additionally, IDEA pays for students to be placed in private schools when public schools can not meet their needs. California also allows this, but with a restriction. They have a limitation in place that says only nonsectarian private schools can participate in this, meaning religious schools are not allowed to participate in the program. 

In the case of Loffman v. California Department of Education, Orthodox Jewish parents and schools argue that the limitation in California unconstitutionally discriminates against religion. They made the claim that not allowing religious schools to receive IDEA benefits makes families choose between receiving adequate services for their children and their religious obligations. In some cases, it forces families to move to a different state in order to satisfy both needs. They argue that California’s requirement that only nonsectarian private schools can receive special‑education funding violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by directly burdening religious families who want their children placed in religious schools. 

In the federal district court, they dismissed the lawsuit in August of 2023. Their reasoning reflected concerns that have to do with the Establishment Clause and how the government should not fund religious institutions. They said that IDEA was meant to aid public education and that California is not required to aid religious private schools; therefore, this did not qualify as discrimination. The court also said that the plaintiffs must show that they have been actually harmed, meaning they tried to use the program, and California’s rule blocked them. Due to these reasons, the court dismissed the case and denied the plaintiff's request. 

The plaintiffs appealed to the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled in their favor. The appeals court said that the Jewish parents and schools were in danger of being discriminated against due to their religion and ruled that the case should move forward. They pointed to several other cases that set precedent for this issue, including Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson v. Makin. In all of these cases, the Supreme Court protected religious institutions under the Free Exercise Clause and held that governmental public benefit programs can not exclude religion solely due to the fact that they are religious. According to the precedent set, they said that California would violate the Constitution due to its rule because it treats religious schools differently than other secular private schools.

The central question in the case is whether California’s requirement that only nonsectarian private schools can receive special‑education funding violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by directly burdening religious families who want their children placed in religious schools. The major discrepancy between the original district ruling and the Ninth Circuit is the question of if it is okay to treat public funding based on status, if it is constitutional for other private schools to receive public funding but exclude religious schools. In my opinion, when the District Court re-reviews the case, they should consider what the Ninth Circuit said and use their logic. The state of California already allows public funds to be used in private schools, so there is no issue surrounding whether this money should only be used in public schools. Additionally, the rule that only religious schools can not use public funding is not one that is being applied throughout the country with the IDEA program. The precedent set by the previous cases clearly highlights how, once a state makes a decision to include private schools, excluding religious schools is discrimination that violates the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court also made the claim that the plaintiffs have not been harmed yet; however, this is not logical as the group would inevitably be harmed if the current law were applied to them. The case also addresses the tension between protecting religious freedom and maintaining a separation of church and state. I agree with the cases used in precedent that Establishment concerns can not be used to justify excluding religions from neutral public benefit programs when the government makes the program available to other private organizations. Allowing religious groups to participate in a neutral public program is not the same thing as endorsing religion. Not allowing disabled students to benefit from the IDEA program just because they have a religious obligation that they believe in would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9_o_yTnSMs 

https://becketfund.org/case/loffman-v-california-department-of-education/

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20230809213959/2023-08-09-50-Order.pdf

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20241029175056/Loffman-9CA-Opinion.pdf)

More Than A Zoning Permit: The Case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett

The case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett, filed in July of 2025, presents a significant constitutional question regarding whether a zoning ordinance violates the US Constitution’s First Amendment Free Exercise Clause when its land use regulation process gives preferential treatment to like-minded organizations based solely on their religious affiliations. The case is an intersection between local municipal powers and constitutional protections pertaining to religious minorities. 

After the Barlett Muslium Society was denied a special use permit necessary to establish a mosque, the American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee filed a lawsuit against the city of Bartlett, a suburban area south of Memphis, TN. According to multiple news sources, as well as court filed pleadings and exhibits, this particular Muslim group is attempting to acquire land to convert into a worship facility, but utilizing the property for its intended religious purpose is specifically prohibited based upon existing local zoning protocols. Such protocols prohibit the existence of religious institutions until permission has been granted through an application process requiring local governmental review and approval.

The Society claims that many of the comments made towards them during the public hearings were anti-Muslim and islamophobic in nature rather than feedback solely regarding land use issues. The city did deny the application for the mosque’s building permit. According to the Society, the way that the city treated other Christian churches with respect to zoning permit applications was far less resistant and hostile. The ACLU of Tennessee has now filed suit in federal court against the city for violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Federal RLUIPA. According to Azya Thornton in the TBA Law Blog, "mosque officials have met permit requirements, including conducting a traffic study have showed no adverse impact." The city still argues that its decision to deny the Muslim Society's permit request was strictly based on legitimate zoning considerations, such as traffic patterns, compatibility with surrounding uses, and ability to accommodate the demand for additional infrastructure. 

Comparative analysis is critical in considering free exercise violations. In this case, the most compelling method is to compare the experiences of other religious organizations in the area with the permit obtainment process. What I feel is most controversial is how many times across the US there have been outright prejudice against Muslims during public hearings regarding construction of mosques, and whether local officials can truly separate their decisions from any possible prejudice. 

To determine if the Free Exercise Clause has been violated, the key question is whether the city’s decision to deny the mosque a permit was in fact neutral, general application of scrutiny, or whether it was discriminatory against Islam. For example, if the city allowed Christian churches to build under the same zoning regulations, but denied a Muslim house of worship, the unequal treatment would be evidence that the clause was violated. In addition to prohibiting the governmental endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from being “hostile” towards any religion (or lack thereof). Thus, if a municipality were to deny a mosque permit due to anti-Muslim values, not only is that a breach of the free exercise of religion, it violates the principle that the government must act neutrally towards all religions.The other law implicated by this case is RLUIPA, which is a federal statute enacted in 2000 to address the concern that local land use regulation was unnecessarily burdening religious entities. RLUIPA prohibits the land use regulation of religious entities, as such regulations impose a "substantial burden" on citizens’ religious exercise unless the government can demonstrate that it is advancing a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means possible.

The importance of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett stems from the fact that the case deals with religious minorities. Historically, disputes regarding land use for mosques have highlighted community bias against them. The First Amendment’s guarantees become most vital when they are used to protect unwelcome or generally marginalized religions. The true test of religious freedom is when the government seeks to protect the most vulnerable, not just the majority.

I believe this case ultimately illustrates the reality of religious freedom in America. Religious freedom is not only the right to faith, but also the right to assemble and build community structures for one’s faith. If local governments use discretionary zoning powers to prevent religious minorities from establishing places of worship, then any and all constitutional guarantees are meaningless.The courts have an obligation under the Constitution to maintain neutrality and apply appropriate judicial scrutiny. If evidence implies that the Muslim Society was denied a zoning permit on the basis of unequal treatment, the refusal must be nullified under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA. In judging whether the zoning denial is a constitutional infringement, the courts should evaluate the objective evidence carefully. For example, did the conducted traffic studies provide adaquate evidence? Were there conditions on other religious places? Were previous practices followed with respect to permit denials?

Case: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/tennessee/tnwdce/2:2025cv02746/106916

Other Sources: 

https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/07/29/aclu-tennessee-sues-city-of-bartlett-for-blocking-mosque-project/

https://www.tba.org/?pg=LawBlog&blAction=showEntry&blogEntry=128836

Apache Stronghold v. United States

 In 2013, the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act was authorized to convert thousands of acres of Federal Tonto National Forest Land to Resolution Copper. The project plan was to construct and operate a world-class mine to deliver sustainable benefits to the community. While promising significant communal and economic benefits, the destruction of the sacred Oak Flat area is of much concern to the Apache people. The Apache are a group of Native American tribes, indigenous to the southwestern states of the US and Northern Mexico. They are considered Native Americans with distinct culture, language, traditions, and rituals surviving in desert-like areas. Oak Flat is located in Pinal County, roughly 40 miles from Phoenix in the Tonto National Forest. The Land is Sacred to Native Americans from the San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation and many other Arizona tribes. Oak Flat is a sacred site where the Apache Tribe go to worship, pray, and administer religious ceremonies. Apache Stronghold, an organization that represents the Apache Tribe, claimed that the transfer of the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper violated the members’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), and a treaty established between the United States and the Apaches in 1852.

Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to override the Supreme Court decision in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) to provide further protection under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the Oregon state agency denied unemployment benefits to two Native Americans who were released from drug counselling jobs because they tested positive for peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. The two men consumed the drug at a Native American religious ceremony as a religious sacrament during prayer. As part of their religion, peyote is seen as medicine for healing rather than a substance for drug use. Justice Antonin, writing for the majority, decided that “generally applicable religious-neutral criminal laws” do not violate the free exercise rights of individuals. The RFRA mandated that the court use strict scrutiny when examining laws that substantially affect religious freedom. After City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the court decided to overturn the provisions of the RFRA as it applied to the States. On a Federal level, though, the RFRA remains constitutional. Federally, the RFRA “Prohibits any agency, department, or official of the United States or any State from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that the government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: furthers a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Similar to Apache Stronghold v United States, in 1988, the United States Forest Service wanted to pave a roadway that would occupy the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Park in California. They also considered timber harvesting in the area as well. It was well known that the land was historically significant to Native Americans who held religious rituals on the land, and still, the Forest Service decided to pave a roadway. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the court held that incidental effects of government land use, even if they destroy a religious group's ability to practice their religion, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless the government coerces individuals of the group to go against their beliefs. The Apache Stronghold made three claims for their case. The first failed under the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lyng case, as the case details are very similar. The court recognized that the government's actions with public land would interfere with religious privacy and the ability to seek satisfaction as it relates to their religious beliefs, but the government did not coerce anyone into acting contrary to their beliefs. Also similar to Lyng, the transfer of Oak Flat to mining grounds did not discriminate against the Apache Tribe or Stronghold members, nor did it deny them any rights or privileges received by other citizens. The second, regarding the RFRA, was denied as well because the interference with land is not considered a substantial burden to the Tribe. And lastly, claiming the 1852 treaty failed as well. Apache Stronghold claimed that the treaty created an enforceable trust obligation that the interference of land would violate, but the government’s obligation to transfer Oak Flat repealed any opposing treaty obligations. 

This case should be addressed with Lyng as precedent; therefore, the government has the right to convert the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper. Lyng established that although government action may destroy the group's ability to exercise their belief on sacred soil, the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment is not violated unless coercion is involved. Unfortunately, the Apache people will have to relocate and find another place of worship after years of enjoying this sacred land, but they are not protected under the Free Exercise Clause, the Treaty of 1852, nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. This case is much different from what we have seen so far this semester, but looking into Free Exercise rights as it relates to historical sacred land and government enforcement sparked my interest, so I decided to do some research. I am excited to see if the class has any thoughtful responses or comments. Final Question: Does the government's authorization to convert acres of sacred land into a copper mine violate the Free Exercise Clause?

Resources

https://narf.org/apache-oak-flat/#:~:text=The%20process%20would%20destroy%20all,compelled%20to%20join%20the%20brief

https://narf.org/cases/apache-oak-flat/ 

https://www.firstnations.org/stories/apache-stronghold-v-united-states-the-ongoing-battle-to-save-a-sacred-apache-site/ 

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/religious-freedom-restoration-act-of-1993/ 

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/439/

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/03/01/21-15295.pdf

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops v. O’Connell: Can the Court Determine Fraudulent Activity within Peter’s Pence Annual Collection?

    On January 22, 2020, David O’Connell filed a punitive class-action complaint against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) in federal district court. O’Connell filed this complaint claiming that the USCCB committed fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty. O’Connell claims that he donated an unspecified amount of money to Peter’s Pence after hearing a solicitation from the pulpit during a Sunday Mass in the summer of 2018. He does not identify the speaker nor the contents of the message. O’Connell alleges the USCCB led him to believe that his donations to Peter’s Pence would be used only “for emergency assistance” to “the poor” and “victims of war, oppression, natural disaster, or disease throughout the world.” O’Connell points towards a bulletin insert made by the USCCB that states, “By supporting the Peter’s Pence Collection, you assist the charitable works of Pope Francis. Your generosity witnesses to charity and helps the Holy See reach out compassionately to those who are marginalized.” O’Connell seeks to certify a class of all persons in the United States who donated money to Peter’s Pence and requests monetary damages.

    Peter’s Pence is an annual donation to the Pope made by Catholic parishioners worldwide. Donations are collected in local parishes and dioceses and then sent to the central Church. In the United States, all offerings are routed Apostolic Nuncio, the Papal representative at the Apostolic Nunciature in Washington, D.C. These funds are then directed to the Holy See for the Pope's use. Under the Code of Canon Law, Canon 331 and Canon 360, the Pope has supreme authority over the use of the money collected by Peter’s Pence. These funds have been used in a variety of ways other than strictly charitable donations. In 2019, news organizations published stories explaining the uses of the donations collected by Peter’s Pence. These stories claimed funds were used to support the Vatican’s administrative budget, placed in various investments, including Hollywood films and real estate, or used to pay hefty commissions for fund managers, with only ten percent going to the charitable causes featured in USCCB’s promotional materials.    

    The promotional aspects of the Peter’s Pence collections are overseen by the USCCB. The USCCB is a non-profit organization of Catholic Bishops who exercise pastoral functions on behalf of the Catholic Church in the United States. The USCCB is required to act in accordance with Canon Law and the teachings of the Catholic Church. The USCCB operates an Office of National Collections that coordinates many annual collections. The USCCB does not administer, oversee, collect, or distribute the funds collected for universal Church collections such as Peter’s Pence. Their role in Peter’s Pence was strictly to create promotional materials for diocesan use, but ultimately, the choice to use these materials is strictly decided by the Bishop.

    The primary question regarding the First Amendment rights of the Catholic Church is, can the Court or Government determine if the Church fraudulently collected money during the Peter’s Pence annual collection? This case primarily concerns the Church Autonomy Doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court. This doctrine, as interpreted by Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, protects against government interference in “matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.” It also states that secular courts may not interpret religious law or wade into religious disputes. This doctrine does not grant religious institutions a general immunity from secular laws, rather it protects the internal affairs of the Church. Jones v. Wolf states that, “Courts may adjudicate secular disputes involving religious institutions where resolution of the case does not require inquiry into doctrinal disputes.”

    In my opinion, it is not unconstitutional for the court to determine if the USCCB committed fraud with their promotion of the Peter’s Pence collections, but it would be unconstitutional for the Court to regulate or decide how the Church allocates the money after it is collected. My opinion is based mainly on the precedent cases listed above, which show the Church is not granted total immunity from secular laws, but the government cannot interfere with internal Church affairs. Although I believe it is within the court's ability to determine fraudulent activity, I do not believe that there is enough evidence to conclude that the USCCB committed fraud in this case. The USCCB did not say in any of the promotional materials that the money was explicitly for or exclusively being used for emergency assistance; they stated that the money would assist in the charitable work of the Pope, and encouraged parishioners to “learn more” by visiting the Vatican’s Peter’s Pence webpage. I believe that there was enough information displayed to lead parishioners to make an informed decision about donating to the Peter’s Pence collection.

Resources 

• https://becketfund.org/case/usccb-v-oconnell/
• https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20240910142115/OConnell-v.-USCCB-_-Opening-Brief.pdf
• https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/04/23-7173-2112847.pdf
  
• https://www.usccb.org/catholic-giving/opportunities-for-giving/peters-pence
  

Crosspoint Church v. Maine Department of Education

Maine state law provides that any district without a public school option is eligible for tuition reimbursement for its students. This option is only available to designated “approved” private schools that are determined to be in compliance with the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). This antidiscrimination statute prohibits “discrimination on the basis of religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, and other protected characteristics”(AU). Crosspoint Church, also a Christian educational institute of Bangor Christian Schools, refused to sign the MHRA when applying for students’ tuition reimbursement under this statute. Crosspoint then argued that the anti-discrimination act was unconstitutional because it infringed upon their free exercise of religion and free speech rights. Crosspoint Church then sued the Maine Department of Education Commissioner Pender Makin. 

The question then remains: Does Crosspoint have a constitutional right not to sign the MHRA and still be eligible for state-funded tuition reimbursement?

The Maine statute is complicated in itself and has already been challenged by religious schools. Originally, the statute only made tuition eligible for secular institutions. It was only after the Supreme Court Case Carson v. Makin in 2022 that tuition reimbursement was allowed beyond secular schools, including religious schools, in Maine’s School Tuitioning Program. As First Liberty described, this change in legislation was a step toward “religious liberty.” However, Crosspoint argues that the Maine legislature added the MHRA caveat to uphold religious discrimination because it forces Bangor Christian Schools to disregard their religious obligation, when Crosspoint and other schools alike want to “consider in admissions applicants’ alignment with the school’s statement of faith and religious educational mission”(First Liberty). Their argument is accommodationist in that it believes there are to be some exceptions in order to uphold the Constitution’s “free exercise” clause. For this reason, Crosspoint argues that it does have a constitutional right not to sign the MHRA and still be eligible for state-funded tuition reimbursement under Maine’s School Tuitioning Program.

ACLU sees the opposing argument that reflects a more separatist point of view. They see the Christian school’s refusal to sign the MHRA as an attempt to discriminate against people of other faiths, gender identities, and sexual orientations. They make sure to point out that this is asking for much more than the original Carson v. Makin case. It is seeking an exemption from Maine’s School Tuitioning Program requirements, which asks all educational institutions, secular or not, to comply with a statute that actively works against discrimination to uphold government neutrality. For this reason, Crosspoint Church has a choice: it can either comply with the Maine School Tuitioning Program or not, thereby relinquishing its eligibility for state-funded tuition. The separationist perspective emphasizes the word “choice” in the matter. For this reason, the opposition argues that the Church does have a constitutional right not to sign the MHRA but is therefore no longer eligible for Maine’s School Tuitioning Program.

In 2023, the case was first brought to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The following year, the District Court found Maine’s antidiscrimination law to be neutral and generally applicable in its argument that Crosspoint Church is not forced to comply with these anti-discrimination measures to exist; it must comply with these measures in its choice to participate in state-funded tuition. However, Crosspoint appealed to the First Circuit in June and August of 2024. They were then joined by an additional religious institution, St. Dominic Academy v. Makin.

Based on the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Maine, I believe the First Circuit Court will rule similarly. While the original case of Carson v. Makin was designed to oppose discrimination in Maine law against religious institutions, the MHRA's caveat is to uphold the principle of generally applicable anti-discrimination measures. The Supreme Court's hesitance in granting an exemption to Crosspoint Church may set a precedent for future religious institutions seeking other exemptions that could undermine the state's neutrality. 

While I am unsure where I land on the Carson v. Makin case regarding whether the tuition statute should exclude religious institutions from Maine's state-funded program, which provides that any district without a public school option is eligible for tuition reimbursement for students. However, in answering the issue at hand, I believe that Crosspoint has a constitutional right not to sign the MHRA, but I also believe that they are not eligible for Maine’s School Tuitioning Program. It is Crosspoint’s choice not to participate, and it does not infringe on its free exercise and free speech rights, as the church and religious institution have the right to exist and to teach under the protection of the government. The school’s right to choose whether to be eligible is its constitutional right, upheld by the free exercise clause. Exempting from the MHRA and providing state-funded tuition to Crosspoint Church and St. Dominic Academy would set a “slippery slope” precedent that could allow religious institutions to receive special treatment. I remain open-minded and interested in seeing how this is resolved, because I think it could be argued either way.

Citations:

https://www.aclumaine.org/press-releases/crosspoint-st-dominic-briefs-first-circuit/

https://www.aclu.org/cases/carson-v-makin

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-comment-supreme-court-decision-carson-v-makin

https://www.aclumaine.org/app/uploads/drupal/sites/default/files/crosspoint_amicus_brief_as_filed_1.pdf

https://www.aclumaine.org/cases/crosspoint/

https://firstliberty.org/cases/bangor-christian-schools/

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/crosspoint-church-v-makin/

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/carson-v-makin/

Miller v. McDonald: Should Vaccine Exemptions be Granted for Amish Students and Schools?

     All fifty states have laws that require schoolchildren to receive certain vaccinations and most of them permit religious exemptions. New York allowed religious exemptions until 2019, when following a major measles outbreak the policy was changed to only allow medical exemptions. Regardless, three Amish schools did not implement vaccine requirements because school families held sincere beliefs against vaccinations leading New York’s health commissioner to issue financial sanctions against these schools. 

    In response, the schools, an elected representative of state Amish schools, and two parents sued the state claiming that this law violated the Free Exercise Clause and that their case mirrored the parental and Free Exercise rights of the Amish protected in Wisconsin v. Yoder. In district court, the group filed for preliminary injunction and this was dismissed, so they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which upheld this decision.

    The court ruled that the law was facially neutral as it applied to all schoolchildren who did not qualify for a medical exemption, but the plaintiff maintained that the law’s application favors a secular purpose. Nevertheless, the court held that the application is acceptable because medical exemptions only apply to a small group for specific vaccinations while religious exemptions could apply to a much larger group and cover all vaccinations, thus increasing transmission risk which is a compelling state interest. Lastly, the court considered if the plaintiff should be protected under Yoder as the immunization law forces them to either vaccinate their children or not educate them in a group setting which are both central to the exercise of their religion. However, the court disagreed with this, explaining that the burdens posed in this case do not create the same existential threat to Amish life as compulsory school attendance did in Yoder. 

    The plaintiff appealed this to the Supreme Court, arguing in part that the recent Mahmoud v. Taylor decision clarified that the principles of Yoder do not exclusively apply to mandatory attendance and can be applied to other facts. The Supreme Court granted this request and sent the case back to the Appeals Court for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud. A new decision on Miller v. McDonald has not yet been made. 

    The central issue that the Appeals Court will reconsider is: Does a New York State law which mandates schoolchildren to be vaccinated and permits medical, but not religious, exemptions violate the Free Exercise clause?

    In my view, the appeals court should uphold the decision that it previously reached. Like how elements of the Sherbert Test were used in Yoder, that framework can be applied to this case to determine whether a religious exemption should be made. Under this doctrine it must first be considered if the law imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of one’s religion. In my view, this policy does inflict a burden on the Amish community because they do not believe in vaccinating their children and want them to be educated in a group setting; however, I agree with the appeals court that this burden is not substantial as it does not interfere with the day-to-day practice of their religion. There is also a significant compelling state interest for the law because it is meant to protect the general public from diseases that are preventable and this interest was heightened following the measles outbreak that led to the stricter policy. Lastly, there is no other equivalent way to minimize the spread of these diseases aside from attempting to immunize the majority of the population, so this is the least restrictive way to achieve this. 

    It is also important to consider the law’s neutrality. Given that this statute applies to all schoolchildren regardless of their religion, it is facially neutral, but whether its application is neutral is less clear and is the subject of immense debate. Because medical exemptions are being granted, but religious exemptions are not, the policy does not seem to be applied neutrally as exemptions for a secular cause are allowed but exemptions rooted in religion are not. However, as explored above, because this addresses a compelling state interest of immense importance, I still believe that this law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause as it is the least restrictive way to achieve this critical state goal. 

    The Appeals Court will also need to consider the clarification made to Yoder in the Mahmoud decision when reevaluating this case. Nevertheless, in my view, making clear that Yoder is not a fact specific decision does not change that the threat to Amish life posed by compulsory education laws is far more significant than that posed by mandatory vaccination laws which protect the safety of the general public. Therefore, even when considering the Mahmoud decision, I believe that the mandatory vaccination law in the State of New York is constitutional.

References:

• https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-681/24-681-2025-03-03.html 

• https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-133/368571/20250731170404791_25-%20Petition.pdf 

• https://fedsoc.org/events/litigation-update-miller-v-mcdonald 

• https://lawliberty.org/on-the-front-lines-of-religious-freedom/ 

• https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/supreme-court-orders-new-review-of-religious-exemptions-to-school-vaccines/2025/12 

• https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/08/supreme-court-covid-vaccine-mandates/ 

• https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-297