Does Prior Religious Affiliation Make You ineligible for Public Benefits?

 

In Moody Bible Institute of Chicago v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, the ongoing debate over the role of religion, and Free Exercise thereof, in public education continues. 

The Moody Bible Institute is a not-for-profit, Christian-based higher education institution located in Chicago, Illinois. As put forward in their mission statement, “Moody exists to proclaim the gospel and equip people to be biblically grounded, practically trained, and to engage the world through gospel-centered living.” This mission became a point of concern for the Chicago Board of Education in relation to Moody’s Elementary Education degree program. Through this biblically centered, state-approved program, Moody trains future elementary school teachers by requiring students to spend varied amounts of time participating in classroom observations, practicums, and some form of student teaching. In order to better help students meet these requirements, Moody attempted to join the Chicago Public Schools’ (CPS) student-teaching program but was denied on the grounds that allowing them to use the CPS’s resources would result in an excessive entanglement of church and state. Therefore, Moody was told they must give up their religious hiring policies before they would be able to participate in the CPS’s student-teacher program. With this ultimatum, Moody, along with the help of the Alliance Defending Freedom, filed a lawsuit that would attempt to allow them to maintain their hiring practices and still participate in the government-provided programs. Their primary argument was that, seeing as their hiring policies were in strict accordance with a religious mission, the government could not penalize them without threatening their Free Exercise of Religion. 

                  It is important to note that in the end, this case was settled outside of court before moving to trial, and Moody was permitted to partake in the CPS’s student-teacher program without having to give up their hiring policies. That does not, however, take away from the contribution this case brings to the ongoing debate and deliberation over Supreme Court Free Exercise cases.

This case wrestles with the difficulties of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The Constitutional question that was at hand was whether or not a government entity could deny a generally accessible public service/benefit to a religiously affiliated institution without violating the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause. 

Moody and their student teachers never had the express intention to go out and directly spread the gospel through their student-teacher placements. While Moody’s Elementary Education degree would teach its student-teachers biblically centered doctrines in conjunction with its education requirements, its explicit student-teacher policy required that any student working at a school must comply with the rules, policies, and district regulations of their designated school. In practice, this meant that just like the CPS, Moody was attempting to avoid the excessive entanglement of church and state with their teachers and their placements. Furthermore, because of these internal policies put in place by Moody, the CPS’s discrimination begins to be viewed in a much poorer light.

To provide some legal precedent for this debate, I will briefly explain the Supreme Court cases, Carson v. Makin and Locke v. Davey. In Carson v. Makin, the Supreme Court determined that a religious institution cannot be excluded from partaking in public benefits of the state. If the Moody case had proceeded to trial, any ruling that would deny these benefits would be seen by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional discrimination against the religious institution. While any state benefits or funds that these institutions could utilize have the potential to indirectly support religious instruction, they cannot allow the state to block the allocation of benefits to these institutions. Conversely, in Locke v. Davey, the court ruled that it is permissible to refuse allocation of benefits to deeply religious activities, the most prominent being direct religious instruction. While this case seemingly provides a base for the opposition to stand on in their argument, it is difficult to know whether or not the argument would stand against Moody’s actions. Seeing as Moody was not sending student-teachers to actively facilitate direct religious instruction in their school placements, because they were coming from an institution where they themselves received direct religious instruction, it is reasonable for the CPS to have concerns about establishing one religion over another. 

            I believe that this case allows for a very poignant conversation and reflection about the way in which we as individuals interpret our Free Exercise. While the case never made it to any high court, let alone the Supreme Court, I still believe that 1) this case was handled in such a way that adds a semi-new layer of legal precedence to Free Exercise cases, and 2) had the most optimal outcome in constitutional terms. In this case, I believe that the result of the settlement to allow Moody to partake in the CPS’s program was the correct and most constitutional course of action. The key issue I recognized as I was researching and contextualizing the case was what the Moody students’ intentions were with these programs if allowed to participate? I believe that the Moody students saw a deficit of teachers in the CPS and decided that it was their right to lend their talents and experiences to ensure that every student had equal access to education. In the end, that could only be provided if the teachers themselves were provided equal opportunities to teach whether they had a religiously affiliated background or not. Moody wasn’t pursuing preferential treatment from the CPS, but rather equal treatment.

            

https://adflegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/moody-bible-institute-v-boe-city-of-chicago-2025-11-04-complaint.pdf

https://dailycitizen.focusonthefamily.com/moody-bible-institute-wins-religious-freedom-case-student-teachers/

https://adflegal.org/article/moody-bible-institute-students-free-to-participate-in-chicago-teaching-program/

https://www.moodybible.org/about/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1315

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1088

 

 

Medical Ethics and Religion: The Constitutional Debate in NIFLA v. Treto

When it was originally enacted nearly forty years ago, the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act protected healthcare providers who refused to endorse or participate in abortion by granting them immunity from lawsuits and other disciplinary measures. Thus, if a medical professional declined to include abortion in their practice due to religious reasons, they could not be punished legally for doing so. This Act was beneficial to not only religious healthcare providers, but also established pro-life pregnancy centers. However, in 2016, the state of Illinois altered this longstanding Act to mandate religious healthcare professionals who refuse to participate in abortion practices due to their beliefs to discuss the supposed “benefits” of abortion with and refer patients to abortion providers. Evidently, these mandates are contradictory to the purpose of these providers’ practices, as they are left with what Becket deems “an impossible choice”: Promote messages about abortion that they strongly disagree with, or risk being subject to malpractice suits, stricter state enforcement, and discrimination cases that non-religious providers do not have to face.

Therefore, an ongoing constitutional debate over how to balance religious liberty with medical ethics has transpired in the case of National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Treto. The plaintiff is a religious organization encompassing a large network of pro-life pregnancy centers, whereas the defendant is Mario Treto Jr., the director of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. The Treto case raises a core constitutional issue:

Is the state of Illinois’ requirement that religious healthcare providers must provide information about abortion services a violation of their Free Exercise rights?

In an amicus brief filed in December of 2016, Becket argued that the government cannot force religious groups to promote messages that they do not believe in. Having no choice but to do so, Becket asserts, threatens the reputation of the Church which the healthcare professional belongs to and undermines the integrity of the medical services these individuals provide. Additionally, Becket references minority religions, such as the Orthodox Church in America, who may feel coerced to comply with the Act’s requirements due to their minimal representation in America alongside a limited understanding of the rationale behind their religious beliefs against abortion. Overall, Becket argues that an indirect burden is placed on religious healthcare providers–While they are free to refuse abortion services to their patients, they must defy their religious beliefs to endorse access to these services, which in turn coerces individuals to act against their spiritual values, especially for religious minorities.

Contrastingly, in a 2019 amicus brief in support of Illinois’ adjustments to the Act, several groups including the Illinois Academy of Family Physicians argue that doctors are ethically required to provide patients with complete medical care and treatment information, regardless of if it is in violation of their religious beliefs. If the doctors do not, the brief states, then patients cannot legally provide required informed consent, which is central to medical ethics. The brief also notes how failure to provide all treatment options to patients can result in harm, citing a particular incident where, due to her doctor’s religious beliefs against abortion, Illinois resident Mindy Swank was forced to wait to terminate her pregnancy despite hemorrhaging for several weeks. Additionally, an earlier amicus brief from 2017 upheld similar points while also arguing that in some cases, abortion is medically necessary and thus patients must be kept informed when relevant. In all, these briefs suggest that there is a compelling state interest in ensuring patients are knowledgeable of all medical options available to them.

A prior Supreme Court case providing insight into the Treto case is West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). While contextually different, the decision in this case held that the government cannot force individuals to affirm religious beliefs they do not hold. More recently, in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018), the court struck down a law mandating pregnancy centers to provide information about abortion services, a case strikingly similar to Treto. These precedents suggest that across professional contexts, the government cannot have unlimited regulation over the free exercise of religious beliefs.

In my opinion, Illinois’s requirement that healthcare professionals provide information about abortion services to patients is both reasonable and necessary to protect patient health and uphold the basic medical ethics of informed consent. While religious providers may disagree with abortion on moral grounds, the Act does not force them to perform or endorse the procedure themselves. Rather, it merely requires that patients are given full, accurate medical information to make informed decisions, some of which may be life or death. The state has a compelling interest in preventing delays of harm to patients, as highlighted in cases like Mindy Swank’s where she suffered health risks due to her doctor’s unwillingness to provide her with resources he did not support. Unlike the situations in Barnette and Becerra, the Illinois law does not coerce professionals into affirming a belief they disagree with, it ensures the medical transparency they are ethically obligated to provide. Thus, I would rule in favor of Treto, as the Illinois Act has been modified to be the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling interest of patient protections in medical settings. 

Sources:

https://becketfund.org/case/national-institute-of-family-and-life-advocates-v-treto/

https://www.aclu-il.org/cases/national-institute-family-and-life-advocates-et-al-v-mario-treto-jr-and-ronald-schroeder-et-al/?document=Amici-brief-of-ACOG-et-al-in-opp-to-PI

https://www.aclu-il.org/cases/national-institute-family-and-life-advocates-et-al-v-mario-treto-jr-and-ronald-schroeder-et-al/?document=Amici-brief-of-ACOG-et-al-in-opp-to-MSJ

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/3:2016cv50310/331888/294/#:~:text=Parties%20This%20case%20involves%20two,Defendant%20as%20%E2%80%9Cthe%20State.%E2%80%9D

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/319us624

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140

Limits on Religious Care in Detention Facilities

 Religious organizations commonly provide spiritual care for detainees in immigration detention facilities. In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building has offices for federal agencies, an immigration court, and serves as a detention center for immigrants. It is typically a processing and holding site before moving detainees to another location. The number of detainees has significantly increased in the Whipple Federal buildings due to Operation Metro Surge. This was a large-scale federal immigration enforcement operation started by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in December 2025, where thousands of federal agents were deployed in order to deport undocumented immigrants. Clergy members of religious organizations around Minneapolis were typically allowed access on a case-by-case basis, but since the operation began, access has been consistently denied. 

While the Operation officially ended on February 3rd 2026, access for pastors was still being rejected in the following weeks, leading to clergy members filing a lawsuit against the DHS and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), the Minnesota Conference of the United Church of Christ (UCC), and Father Christopher Collins, an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church, filed the lawsuit together because they had the same claims and all experienced substantial religious burden through the prevention of religious practice. A preliminary injunction has been granted by U.S. District Judge Jerry Blackwell to allow in-person visits to all detainees in the Whipple Federal Building while the case continues. 

The central issue raised by the pastors is that the government's actions impose a significant burden on their ability to freely exercise their religion by preventing them from carrying out essential religious duties. The burden is substantial because the clergy were not only denied access on ordinary days, but also on major religious holidays, when it is most important for them to complete religious services for others. The most prominent example happened this past Ash Wednesday, a holy day in Christianity that marks the start of lent, when Reverend Gonzalez attempted to enter the facility to provide pastoral care and administer ashes for detainees. She notified the officials of her purpose, but was denied access and given no alternatives, even after offering to meet with detainees in small groups. The imposition of ashes on those who practice Christianity is an essential pastoral obligation, and the prevention of this action means she cannot fulfill that obligation until the following year. Similar denials occurred in other instances, including Father Collins being refused on December 12th, which is the date of the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe, a celebration of Mary as a figure in the catholic religion and her appearance in Saint Juan Diego. Taken together, these types of incidents show a pattern of denying access to religious care without exploring reasonable alternatives for the clergy to fulfill their obligations. As a result, the argument is that the restrictions are a substantial and unjustified burden on the free exercise of religion. 

From the perspective of DHS and ICE, the constitutional issue centers around whether restricting access to the facility is justified by a compelling government interest, specifically maintaining safety and order during the time of increased enforcement. Officials have cited safety concerns due to the high number of detainees in the building during Operation Metro Surge, as well as the presence of protests and civil unrest near the facility, which have made visits more difficult. This suggests that the government may claim its actions were necessary to maintain the security of the building. Additionally, existing ICE policies require background checks and advanced notice for clergy visits, and mandate religious services only in facilities that hold detainees for more than 72 hours. Because DHS and ICE claim that the Whipple building is a short-term processing site and holds people for less than 24 hours, they could argue that the requirements do not apply in the same way. However, this claim is complicated by the reports that some detainees are held for longer periods at this location. The government also plans to argue the case is moot, since restrictions have been eased and access allowed more recently for clergy members. This highlights the question of whether the government’s interest in security is enough to justify limited religious access, and if the limits were applied consistently with constitutional protections for religious exercise. 

While free exercise of religion is often limited in detention settings, constitutional protections still apply to both detainees and religious leaders. In this case, the actions of DHS and ICE are unconstitutional because even if safety concerns are legitimate, they failed to use the least restrictive means to address them, or at least investigate the possibility of one. Clergy members were completely denied access to detainees, and no reasonable alternatives were offered. This total denial, rather than a limited restriction, created a substantial burden on their religious obligations. 

The policies listed by ICE seem to conflict with the actions they have taken. They require religious services and coordination in the facilities when individuals are held for more than 72 hours, yet they neglected to adhere to these policies during the duration of the Metro Surge operation. It is important to acknowledge the possibility that detainees could have been there more than 72 hours, knowing that the increasing number of people being held likely caused longer transfer processes. Even in the case that this building adhered to the proper requirements to be considered a temporary holding facility, denying all access violates religious exercise because it is preventing practice for both the religious leaders and the detainees. Overall, I think that restricting access to detention facilities from religious care without exploring less restrictive means violates free exercise of religion. 

Sources: 

https://minnesotareformer.com/2026/02/23/minnesota-clergy-sue-trump-administration-over-ability-to-minister-to-detainees-at-whipple/

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27356421-complaint-26-cv-1576/

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/03/20/clergy-seek-court-order-to-allow-pastoral-access-immigrants-at-minneapolis-ice-facility

Abortion Accessibility in Indiana

 In 2022, a group of plaintiffs including five anonymous women and the group Hoosier Jews for Choice challenged Indiana’s abortion ban using the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as testimony. The ban allows for abortion under circumstances of rape, incest, lethal fetal abnormality, and “death or a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”. The plaintiffs proceeded to raise religious objections to address seeking access to abortion under certain circumstances. One plaintiff, a Jewish woman, argued that she hoped for another child but held religious beliefs that would require termination of her pregnancy if it threatened her physical or mental health. Another plaintiff, unaffiliated with a particular religion, claimed that she held beliefs regarding autonomy and the beginning of life that would also require termination of a pregnancy under specific circumstances. 

The RFRA was passed by Congress in 1993 to further protect religious freedom after various Supreme Court decisions had weakened the Constitution’s  protections. The RFRA states that the government cannot interfere with one’s religious practice unless there is compelling reasoning and no alternatives. The act only applied on a federal level, leading various states, such as Indiana, to pass their respective versions. Since then, 29 states have their own RFRAs. Following the Supreme Court’s decision to ban abortion on a federal level, abortion rights lawyers have used these laws as a means to advance their agenda.

Following the plaintiff’s challenge, a trial court granted a preliminary injunction in December 2022, which exempted the group from the state’s abortion ban. The court additionally specified those who hold similar religious obligations. An appellate court went on to sustain the rulings, but requested that the trial court specify that the injunction's scope only applied to when plaintiffs sought abortions for sincere religious reasons. They also specified that these reasons should not implicate the RFRA. In December 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the appellate court’s affirmance of the injunction. 

A couple weeks ago, the trial court made the injunction permanent, meaning the state cannot deny abortions to plaintiffs with sincerely held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana went on to pursue a class action, meaning the ruling will apply to all state residents. State defendants went on to argue that the Hoosier Jews for Choice did not have standing to use the RFRA for their claims. The Court of Appeals then proceeded to utilize the three part criteria that was established in the US Supreme Court Case Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, to determine whether or not the organization may sue. The criteria states that members have the standing to sue individually, the lawsuit is directly related to the purpose of the organization (HJFC), and individual members don’t need to participate personally. The court ended up affirming the injunction as the group met the criteria. 

The state then argued that the case was currently invalid because the plaintiffs weren’t currently pregnant, which the judge rejected because the law protects when religious freedom is likely to be burdened, not just when it is actively being burdened. The state then argued that the ban didn’t burden women because only doctors face criminal punishment, which the judge also rejected because the women couldn’t access abortions in the first place. The state lastly argued that protecting fetal life is compelling interest, which the judge disagreed with since there are already exceptions (rape or IVF), which undercuts that fetal life must be protected. Indiana’s attorney general appealed.

The case raises the question: should a state be able to use its own religious freedom policy to create abortion access that state law does not allow under most circumstances? It also raises a question regarding the Establishment Clause: does allowing abortion for religious practitioners favor religion over non-religion, since non-religious people are not granted the same right? 

I would argue that the plaintiffs, and citizens in general, should be able to be granted abortion access through religious freedom. When a state creates their respective RFRA, they are voluntarily agreeing to restrain their future authority. Indiana’s RFRA prevents the state from “substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion”, as the federal RFRA does similarly. While determining what qualifies as “substantial” is fairly subjective, one could define it as when government actions proceed mere inconvenience to force an individual to violate their religious beliefs. Even if the doctors are the ones that face punishment, if the plaintiffs can’t act on their sincere religious beliefs in the first place, then who gets punished is somewhat beside the point. The plaintiffs also claimed to have already actively rearranged their personal lives around the abortion ban, making the harm present and not just a potential future burden. Overall, this is a substantial burden on religious practitioners. As for the Establishment clause, I believe that this serves more as an accommodation of religion than an establishment. If the plaintiffs here genuinely believe that their religion is being substantially burdened, then they are not asking for special treatment in their views, but to be treated equally in regards to their religion. Obviously that is very tough to determine and arguments for both sides could be made.

John Woolard v Tony Thurmond

    John Woolard represents the voices of a group of parents whose children attend Blue Ridge Academy and Visions in Education, two charter schools in California, and the independent study programs the schools run. The main difference between charter schools and public schools is what they operate under. Charter schools operate under independent contracts, while public schools work under a school district. They are both funded by taxpayers and are tuition-free, and provide publicly funded material. 

    Woolard and the parents requested that the schools purchase “sectarian” materials for the programs. These programs are overseen by the school but run mostly by parents in homes. The schools rejected the request because of California law, which prohibits public schools, including charter schools, from teaching sectarian or religious material. One example was that Blue Ridge denied the parents' request to purchase Bob Jones University text, which teaches “‘God is great, and God is good; God created me and all things; the Bible is God’s Word, and it is true; and I learn in order to serve God and others”’(Factual Background). Woolard sued Tony Thurmond, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the school system, arguing that they violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses in the First Amendment.

    The parents argue multiple points as to why they should be allowed to include religious material in the program. Woolard argued, “that the charter schools’ independent study programs are really in substance homeschooling, not public education…”(Plaintiffs). They are essentially saying that because the independent study programs are not part of the school's curriculum, the parents should have a say in what is being taught. Because Woolard classified these programs as “private homeschooling”, they argued that the state was not allowed to deny them funding based on religious ideals since the Court cannot deny any “recipients of state grants for private homeschooling based on religious belief”(Court Discussion). They obviously believed that sectarian material should be allowed to be taught. The final argument they had was that forcing parents to use the state-approved material in the programs that didn’t align with their religious values violated the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause. Woolard contended that they were being “categorically excluded” from public benefits because of their religious background.

    There are relevant precedents that are important for deciding the outcome in this case, but the one case that I thought was most important is the following: Employment Division v Smith. 

Employment Division v. Smith was a case focused on the Free Exercise Clause and the idea that laws can burden religion but not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Two Native Americans who were members of a Native American Church and employees of a drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote as part of their religious ceremony. The organization had strict rules against using drugs, and they were fired for misconduct. When the two gentlemen filed for unemployment compensation, they were denied. They sued and argued that the organization had violated their Free Exercise rights. Ultimately, the court held that even with a burden on the men’s religion, the law was neutral and therefore the burden on the religion was not protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 

    The logic in Employment Division v Smith was the same logic that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used when it made the decision on this case. They affirmed the decision. The Court held that even though these schools were charter schools, they were still part of the California free public school system. California is required by law to provide a strictly secular curriculum. They also held that the public school system’s education choices were government speech, which made Woolard and the parents' allegations against Free Exercise unreasonable. They use Supreme Court logic and past decisions, saying that the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent a “state from providing ‘a strictly secular education in its public schools”’(Court Discussion). The Court discusses how the independent study programs were directly intertwined with the school, and the plaintiffs' classification of them as private homeschool programs was unjustified. They are run by state-provided teachers, and each student must agree to a written contract with the school. The Court agrees that most of the independent study programs are taught by the students' parents. However, they are only allowed to do so if they are supervised by a state employee. 

    I agree with the decision that the Ninth Circuit Court came to. There is no justification for the parents claiming a violation of their Free Exercise rights because the law about strictly teaching secular material is neutral to all public and charter schools. They were asking for preferential treatment, not equal. California bans all religious teachings in all public schools, and because the charter schools are paid for by taxpayers, they are part of the public school system. The parents' classification of the study programs as private homeschooling is completely wrong because of the agreements that both the parents and students have, along with the direct relationship between the school and the programs. Another point that I have is that the Court never said that the parents were banned from teaching religion. In their own home and on their own time, they can teach their children all the religious beliefs that they have. They are just not allowed to use public funding to do so.

    Ultimately, the Free Exercise Clause states that the government is not allowed to restrict religious beliefs and practices, and in my opinion, the state hasn't done that. I am confident that if the case makes its way to the Supreme Court, they will come to the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit Decision

Resources: 24-4291.pdf

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith | Oyez

When Does Religious Conversation in a Public School Become Unconstitutional?

    The case of Chaudhry v. Thorsen raises a complex yet relevant question: when does the action of a public-school teacher regarding interaction with a student about religion cross the line into a violation of the First Amendment? The answer, according to the Northern District of Illinois, is that it does not, if the action is voluntary, initiated by the student, and free from any coercion. This case ultimately reinforces a foundational principle of the modern interpretation of the First Amendment: The Constitution prohibits the government from endorsing any religion, but it does not require the complete absence of religion from public life or personal interaction.

            Aliya Chaudhry entered high school as a Muslim who had long been questioning her faith. Before meeting her teacher, Pierre Thorsen, she described herself as always struggling with the core beliefs of Islam imparted by her parents and actively searching for answers. When she later encountered Thorsen in his role of history teacher, whose curriculum included the study of world religions, she chose to propose her questions to him on her own. Their private conversations about religion occurred outside of school hours, were initiated by the student, and were a part of her independent research about different religions. Ultimately, she converted to Christianity (the same religion as Thorsen), which led to her parents firing a lawsuit alleging violations of the Establishment Clause.

            Initially, the parents’ argument seemed persuasive: a public-school teacher influenced one of his students to convert to his religious beliefs. However, constitutional law does not operate on persuasiveness alone. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit religious influence but prohibits government endorsement or coercion of religion.

            Historically, Establishment Clause cases were scrutinized under the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework, but the Supreme Court has slowly shifted away from the Lemon Test. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the Court replaced Lemon with a more nuanced approach grounded in historical practices and a more focused approach on coercion. Under this new framework, the central question is not whether religion is present, but whether the state is pressuring individuals into religious activity.

            Applying this modern standard, the court found no constitutional violation. The interaction between Thorsen and his students was completely voluntary. She was not a captive audience, nor was she required to participate in the religiously influenced conversations. Unlike seen previously, there was no endorsed prayer or display of religious text comparable to cases like Lee v. Weisman. Instead, the record showed a student seeking guidance and a teacher simply responding to her questions with his own personal views. As the district court emphasized, allowing private religious discussion is fundamentally different from state coercion, even if the individual is employed by the state.

            The distinction, in this case, is crucial. In Lee, the Court found unconstitutional coercion where students were effectively pressured to participate in prayer. However, in Kennedy, the Court protected a coach’s private religious expression because it did not compel students to participate. Chaudhry fits well within the latter category. The case emphasizes that the presence of religion is not enough to substantiate a valid lawsuit.

            I think Chaudhry v. Thorsen ultimately gets the constitutional question correct, even if the situation itself feels uncomfortable. The key issue is not whether or not a teacher influenced a student, that happens daily, but whether the teacher (serving as a state actor) coerced the student into religious conversion. The district court makes it clear that that was not the case. The student was already questioning her faith (imposed by her parents) and initiated the religiously charged conversation herself.

            What stands out most to me is how strongly the court emphasized the personal agency of the student (unlike in previous cases). It goes against the idea that exposure to a religion counts as coercion. If influence alone were enough, teachers could not meaningfully discuss religion, which is a fundamental part of world history.

            However, I do think that this case exposes a moral grey area. While the conduct was not unconstitutional, it could be argued that the teacher crossed professional boundaries, especially engaging with a student about religion without an outside religious contact or involving the students’ parents. The court acknowledged this distinction well: an action can be inappropriate without being unconstitutional.

            Overall, the decision made by the court reinforces an important limit within constitutional law. Parents have the fundamental right to raise their children, but that right does not extend to controlling every influence in the child’s life. When a student, especially more developed high-school aged ones, seek out ideas to form her own beliefs, the Constitution protects that process even if the method could be viewed as inappropriate or the outcome difficult.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/3:2020cv50381/392015/310/0.pdf?ts=1773935422

Are Ristrictions on Praying in Visibility of Students a Violation of the 1st and 14th Amendment?

Cardiff junior high teacher Staci Barber alleges that her constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and First Amendments were violated. She also alleged violations of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 

Barber pursued these allegations in court after an incident within the school. As a member of Cardiff's Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Barber and other club members planned to host an event called See You at the Pole or SYATP. At this event, an annual prayer would commence, and students across the country gather voluntarily to pray together before school at the school’s flagpole. Barber and the club had been hosting this event for three years already and invited staff to join her in prayer at 8am on the day of the event. Barber was under the impression that the student group who would be praying would not arrive until after she and her colleagues finished praying. 

After sending those emails, Cardiff Principal Bryan Scott Rounds responded with two emails. The first was to all staff, letting them know that district policy prohibited staff members “from praying with, or in the presence of students”. The second email was directed to Barber and stated that employees strictly cannot pray with or around students, and he also stated that, regardless of the fact that Barber would be praying before the start of school, she would still be on campus and visible to students as an employee. She responded by stating that the invitation was only for staff prior to students arriving, thus not visible to students, and that she and other teachers have done this previously with no students around. Principal Rounds responded by letting Barber know that students are at the gates of school waiting by 8am, and thus their presence while the event is occurring would be a violation of school policies. After receiving said email, Barber proceeded to go through with the event, which resulted in a reprimand from Principal Rounds.

Barber then filed a suit against Katy Independent School District, KISD, and Rounds, “in his individual and official capacity” as a result. In the district court, Rounds asserted qualified immunity regarding federal constitutional claims against him individually. The court granted this motion in regard to her Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and nothing else, but later decided he was not entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Barber’s complaint plausibly alleged that rounds imposed a “categorical ban on visible religious expression” and that another case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, had previously established the unlawfulness of these restrictions under the First Amendment. 

Qualified immunity is granted to government officials and protects them unless their actions in some way violate a clearly established constitutional right that any reasonable official would know. Here, the court has held that Barber's private religious expression outside of her official capacities is protected by the First Amendment's free speech and Free Exercise clause, regardless of whether students observe or not. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the district court in part but also reversed it by stating that Rounds was not entitled to qualified immunity on Barber’s First Amendment claims, but he was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Barber’s Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because she was not able to provide proof that the Rounds personally treated her differently or in a discriminatory context.

The decision presented by the Fifth Circuit is one that I agree with completely. I support the decision because it protects Barber’s First Amendment Right while also recognizing the limits of the claims that can be made against government officials relating to constitutional claims. Barber should not have faced restrictions when participating in SYATP, as it was before school and outside of her official duties. Barber and other members were engaging in private religious expression, which is protected under the First Amendment, thus prohibiting her from praying where students may see is an undue burden on her religious expression. A point I found important was the Supreme Court decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, where it was clearly stated that schools cannot restrict personal religious expression simply because there's a chance that students may observe it. Thus, I believe that the court's decision was correctly determined. 

Lastly, I think that the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Barber’s claim of violations of her Fourteenth Amendment was also correctly determined. I believe that the decision serves as a reminder of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and the implications it has in court.

Barber v Rounds: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Burke v. Mahaniah: Do Catholics Make Good Foster Parents?

Michael and Catherine “Kitty” Burke are a Massachusetts couple looking to adopt children through the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF). The couple first applied in January of 2022. They strongly desired children aged 4-12 years old with the end goal of adoption, not reunification. The couple are devout Roman Catholics who regularly go to mass and work as musicians for their local churches. Their traditional religious beliefs include “...children should not undergo procedures that attempt to change their God-given sex, and they uphold Catholic beliefs about marriage and sexuality.”(Burke Complaint) Despite being praised in primary interviews by the DCF in 2023, the couple was denied a foster care license for one reason: “...would not be affirming to a child who identified as LGBTQIA.”(Burke Complaint) The Burkes filed a lawsuit on the grounds that this decision violated their First Amendment rights of free exercise of religion.

A DCF licensing requirement for applicants is that they must be able to support and respect a foster child’s sexual orientation and gender identity, called the LGBTQ+ Requirements; this was enacted in order to protect the mental well-being of children who would be negatively impacted by a placement that violated such a requirement. In order to be accepted, applicants must comply with the set requirements. Other requirements include the LGBTQIA+ Nondiscrimination Policy, effective June of 2022 and provided March 2023, foster parents “...must be respectful of how individuals ask to be identified and use the terms an individual uses to describe themselves,” “children/youth in care are allowed to express themselves through clothing, accessories, hairstyles, and other means of expression consistent with their identities,” and, “do not make attempts to convince LGBTQIA+ children/youth to reject or modify their sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.” (Defendants Memo) Another policy, the “Licensing of Foster, Pre-Adoptive, and Kinship Families,” stated that DCF had the expectation of foster parents supporting the child’s sexual orientation and gender identity and will be treated with respect regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity. Each policy requirement is applied to every applicant, regardless of religion, and is not open for exceptions.

In addition to the numerous policies for foster children, DCF regulations, and the Massachusetts Foster Parent Bill of Rights have protections for foster parents. One of them includes, “a foster parent shall not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, race, color, creed, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, age or disability.” (Mass.gov) 

The Burkes’ lawsuit relies on a previous case, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. In Fulton, the city of Philadelphia prevented Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of CSS’s policy against licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. Both parties had a shared contract that stated the CSS would not reject prospective foster or adoptive parents based on sexual orientation unless an exception is granted by the Commissioner.  CSS then sued Philadelphia on the grounds that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled the agency to reject same-sex couples because of their sexual orientation, not any qualities related to childcare. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s free exercise of religion by forcing the agency to choose between its stated religious beliefs or certify same-sex couples. Although in a previous case the Court had ruled that generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because exceptions could be granted to the anti-discrimination requirement through the Commissioner. CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodation laws because being certified as a foster parent is not a public service. Therefore, the city of Philadelphia could not bar CSS from enforcing its policy. 

The defense’s case is backed by a licensing requirement established in 2016 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case Magazu v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. This held that, “DCF can lawfully apply a licensing requirement meant to protect children in its custody even where the requirement may, in effect, exclude certain applicants due to their religious beliefs.” (Defendants Memo) Despite the burden on religious beliefs, the court held that DCF had “a sufficiently compelling interest to justify this burden”—“‘protect[ing] children from actual or potential harm.’” (Defendants Memo). 

I fully agree with the DCF’s mission to protect foster children, a vulnerable population, but I also do not want children to stay in foster care if there is a safer option for them. It does not seem that the Burkes are bad people; their religious beliefs do not make them so, but they do make room for potential conflict. A LGBTQIA+ child placed in their care could suffer actual or potential harm. In this case, I am anticipating that the court will rule in favor of the DCF, following the precedent in Magazu. Ultimately, I do believe that, in this case, the compelling interest to protect an extremely vulnerable population in our society justifies the burden that might have been placed on the Burkes. 

https://becketfund.org/case/burke/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-123

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20260316122241/2026-03-13-169-Defendants-Memo-ISO-MSJ.pdf

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20230808154524/Burke-Complaint-and-Exhibits.pdf

https://www.mass.gov/info-details/mass-general-laws-c119-ss-23c

Childs v. Webster

            Shareef Childs, an inmate at Stanley Correctional Institution in Central Wisconsin, is a practicing Muslim and prays five times a day at precise times. The prison chaplains printed and distributed prayer schedules out of courtesy to the inmates, but were not obligated by the state to do so. However, Childs noticed that the prayer schedule was inaccurate and led to prayer times being off by several minutes because of the prison chaplains entering the wrong location into an online tool. While the chaplains corrected the schedule for meal deliveries during Ramadan, they did not distribute the revised prayer schedules to the inmates because of a policy that prohibits the use of government funds to purchase religious items for inmates. Childs eventually received an accurate schedule through a donation, but was unsatisfied that the prison had failed to provide him with a revised prayer schedule. 

After navigating the internal grievance procedures without any success, Childs sued the correction staff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, where he alleged violations of the Religion Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court, in its initial findings, declared that the error in the prayer schedule was not a deliberate or malicious constitutional violation. Additionally, the district court determined that neither RLUIPA nor the Free Exercise Clause required prison officials to purchase religious materials for prisoners with the use of government funds.

On March 4, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary and found that the inmate using their own funds to purchase a prayer schedule does not qualify as a substantial burden under RLUIPA. Furthermore, they found that RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates, which the district court declared in their summary as well. Finally, the court affirmed that the neutral prison policy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Ultimately, the main issue in this case is whether the correction staff at Stanley Correctional Institution is violating the rights of Shareef Childs that are supposed to be protected by RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

Holt v. Hobbs (2015) and O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) relates to Childs v. Webster (2026) because they all deal with the issue of free exercise of religion of those incarcerated in the United States penal system. In Holt, Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, was a Salafi Muslim and asked for temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections’ grooming policy because he believed that growing a beard was necessary to practicing his religion. Holt believed that the grooming policy was a violation of RLUIPA, and his case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled, in a 9-0 majority, that the Arkansas Department of Corrections' policy on beards violates RLUIPA. Part of the majority decision was based on the fact that Holt met the standard for accommodation that was established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. (2014), where the accommodation needed to be based on a sincere religious belief. 

However, in O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), the Court reached a different conclusion. In O’lone, two men, Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen, sued New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison over their workplace policies, which they believed violated their free exercise to religion that is protected under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the prison policies plausibly advanced the intended outcomes of maintaining security, order, and rehabilitation. Additionally, the majority opinion stated that while prisoners do not forfeit their rights after being convicted of a crime, the state is allowed to place necessary limitations on the rights of those incarcerated. In the dissenting opinion, the justices argued that the prison failed to properly demonstrate that the necessary restrictions placed on these inmates were needed to maintain security at the institution. Ultimately, both of these precedents are important because they provide valuable context for how the Supreme Court has decided on the issue of free exercise of religion in prisons. 

From a constitutional standpoint, in Childs v. Webster (2026), I side with the United States Court of Appeals in their decision that the prison's decision not to purchase a revised prayer schedule does not violate RLUIPA or Child’s right to free exercise of religion. First, I believe that the inmate having to use their own funds to purchase a revised prayer schedule for a small fee is a minimal burden. The inmate is able to acquire a prayer schedule by their own means, so I believe the responsibility is on the inmate, not the prison, to obtain the correct prayer schedule; the prison is not restricting their right to free exercise of religion. As previously mentioned, RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates. Based on these facts, I believe the inmate is asking for preferential treatment rather than equal treatment. Additionally, I think O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) is the stronger and more applicable precedent to this case because of the key argument made in the Supreme Court majority opinion, which implies that the state is allowed to impose necessary limitations on the rights of incarcerated individuals. Incarcerated individuals choose to commit crimes and thus pose dangers to society, which provides the justification for the state to intervene and place necessary limitations on their rights in order to rehabilitate them and maintain safety within prisons and society as a whole. I believe courts should defer to prison administrators, like those at Stanley Correctional Institution, when it comes to their decisions about regulating prison life, as long as they provide reasonable explanations for these decisions and are not flagrantly violating the individual rights of prisoners. In the end, I think if this case were to reach the Supreme Court, the justices would reach the same opinion as the recent decision made by the United States Court of Appeals. 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1817/24-1817-2026-03-04.html

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827