Concerning
religious freedom, what happens when the religious beliefs of an organization
conflict with laws that protect employees from discrimination? Should religious
organizations be permitted to make employment decisions according to their
beliefs, even when those decisions would otherwise violate civil law? The
Fourth Circuit confronted this difficult question in Doe v. Catholic Relief
Services (2026), a case that illustrates the tension between religious
institutional autonomy and the government's authority to enforce employment
protections.
John
Doe, an openly gay man, was hired by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a
Catholic-affiliated nonprofit organization governed by the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops. During the hiring process, Doe disclosed that
he was married to a man and asked whether his husband would qualify for
dependent health insurance. He was told that he would. However, approximately
five months after beginning employment, CRS informed Doe that providing
benefits to his husband conflicted with its religious beliefs. The organization
terminated the coverage and offered an alternative compensation arrangement,
which Doe declined. After working for CRS for several years, Doe eventually
resigned and brought claims under federal and Maryland
employment-discrimination laws.
The
district court ruled in Doe's favor and CRS appealed—arguing that its religious
beliefs and constitutional protections afforded it immunity from liability. On
October 16, 2026, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgments under Title VII and
Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act, while dismissing the Equal Pay Act
appeal. The majority concluded that neither the statutes nor the First
Amendment provided the broad immunity CRS requested.
The
constitutional question is particularly interesting because the First Amendment
protects an individual's right to believe and worship while it simultaneously
protects the independence of religious institutions. In Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (2012), the Supreme Court
recognized the ministerial exception, which prevents government interference
with a religious institution's selection of its ministers. The Court later
clarified in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) that
an employee's actual religious responsibilities, rather than simply their job
title, determine whether the exception applies. Both decisions recognize that
religious organizations must retain authority over the individuals entrusted
with carrying out their religious missions.
However,
the existence of institutional autonomy does not necessarily mean that
religious organizations are exempt from every law governing their employment
practices. The majority relied on the distinction between protected
ecclesiastical matters and ordinary secular disputes. It explained that the
First Amendment protects matters such as religious doctrine, ministerial
employment, church membership, hierarchy, and discipline. But it does not
establish a general immunity from secular laws merely because an organization
invokes religious motivation. The
majority also relied on the Free Exercise framework established in Employment
Division v. Smith (1990). Under Smith, neutral and generally
applicable laws may ordinarily be enforced even when they incidentally burden
religious exercise. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
(1993) and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) clarify that this
protection changes when government selectively burdens religious conduct or
permits comparable secular conduct. In Doe, the majority concluded that
the relevant statutory exemptions did not demonstrate that religious employers
were treated less favorably than comparable secular employers. For example, the
small-business exemptions applied equally to religious and secular
organizations.
I
find the majority's reasoning persuasive because constitutional protections
should have meaningful boundaries. The First Amendment protects religious
institutions' independence in matters of doctrine, religious leadership, and
internal ecclesiastical governance. However, this protection does not create
unrestricted immunity from neutral and generally applicable civil laws—employment
decisions involving nonministerial employees do not automatically constitute
matters of protected ecclesiastical governance. Since Doe's responsibilities
were primarily secular rather than ministerial, CRS's sincere religious beliefs
should not, by themselves, establish a constitutional exemption from generally
applicable employment-discrimination laws. The conclusion does not require
courts to question the sincerity or theological correctness of religious
beliefs. Rather, it distinguishes between protecting religious doctrine and
granting immunity to conduct regulated by civil law. If religious motivation
alone were sufficient to exempt an organization from employment protections,
what meaningful limits would remain? Could an organization invoke its religious
identity to avoid virtually any employment obligation? The majority's approach
recognizes that religious liberty cannot become a blanket exemption from the
legal responsibilities shared by other participants in civil society, avoiding the slippery slope.
Judge
Quattlebaum's dissent raises an important objection; he argues that church
autonomy extends beyond the ministerial exception and protects religious
organizations' authority to make employment decisions reflecting their
theological commitments. His concern is that requiring religious institutions
to comply with laws that conflict with their beliefs can interfere with their
ability to preserve their religious identity. This argument deserves
consideration. Religious organizations should not be forced to surrender their
convictions simply because they operate within a broader legal system.
Nevertheless, institutional autonomy must be distinguished from unrestricted
authority over every employment relationship. Otherwise, the scope of
constitutional protection would depend almost entirely on how broadly an organization
characterizes its religious mission.
Ultimately,
Doe v. Catholic Relief Services demonstrates that religious freedom and
civil equality need not be mutually exclusive. The First Amendment must protect
religious institutions from government interference in their distinctly
religious affairs. But that protection should not automatically extend to every
employment decision made in the name of religion. The challenge is not whether
religious autonomy deserves protection, but is in determining where that
autonomy ends and the government's legitimate authority to protect individuals
under neutral civil law begins.
References
Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, No. 25-1569 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026). Full opinion.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020).
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021).