Kariye V. Mayorkas: U.S. Citizens Questioned Upon Re-entry of the United States Based on their Muslim Religious Practice

Upon re-entry to the United States, three Muslim U.S. citizens are questioned about their religious practices. Imam Abdirahman Aden Kariye is a Muslim religious leader from Bloomington, Minnesota. When flying back home from travels abroad, Kariye, amongst others included in the eventual lawsuit, were subject to questions such as "whether they are Muslim, whether they attend a mosque, which mosque they attend, whether they are Sunni or Shi'a, and how often they pray"? (ACLU). They also asked questions about his most recent trip: ‘his “involvement with a charitable organization affiliated with Muslim communities,” ER-86; whether a sports league in which he coaches was “just for Muslim kids,” ER-86–87; the “nature and strength of his religious beliefs and practices,” ER-88; and “whether he had met a particular friend at a mosque” during a recent trip, ER-89.’ This was not an independent event. Officers questioned his faith upwards of five times between 2017 and 2021. This questioning, allegedly, took place in different locations separate from public spaces and with armed officers. However, the plaintiff’s complaint does not challenge the agents themselves; instead, it challenges any policy DHS has that may intentionally target selected Muslims and place said individuals on the terrorism watchlists.

Subsequently, in March of 2022, the ACLU, the ACLU of Minnesota, the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, and Cooley LLP represented three plaintiffs in a lawsuit. The raised legal action was against as listed: Alejandro Mayorkas, who is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s secretary; Troy Miller, who is the acting commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Patrick J. Lechleitner, who is the acting director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Katrina W. Berger, who is the executive associate director of Homeland Security Investigations.

 The issue remains: Does the religious questioning from Border Patrol Officers, under policy enforced by the DHS, violate the plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights, such as equal protection, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and Free Exercise clause?

The ACLU argues that this questioning by the United States Customs and Border Protection and Homeland Security Investigations violates their "First Amendment Rights of religion and association, as well as the RFRA, and protections against unequal treatment on the basis of religion." The complaint was not a single instance; it occurred multiple times when multiple Muslim Americans returned home from travel abroad. Kariye explains that he “normally wears a muslim prayer cap, but no longer does at the airport to avoid being questioned by border officials”(ACLU). In this case, the ACLU highlights three ways the defendant violates the Constitution. It raises questions about discrimination through the singling out of Muslim travelers simply because they were Muslim and the religious targeting that would infringe upon an individual’s free exercise clause. The religious implications become prominent in the questioning when these individuals are forced to disclose their religious beliefs in a coercive setting. The ACLU argues that the indirect burden of this is that it forces Muslim Americans to suppress their religious affiliation in order to not to suffer consequences or further questioning. For instance, Kariye's choosing not to wear a prayer cap to avoid being questioned, as the ACLU considers, may be an instance of coercion. Lastly, the ACLU argues that there is no compelling state interest. According to the complaint, practicing Islam has no connection to the United States re-entry. The plaintiffs, therefore, frame the lawsuit as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), and equal protection principles under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff additionally asks for the “barring the Department of Homeland Security and CBP from questioning them about their faith at ports of entry, and the expungement of records reflecting information that border officers obtained through their unlawful questioning.”

The defendants’ argument is grounded in the fact that there is no government policy targeting Muslims directly. In fact, the DHS and CBP have written policies that actively forbid discrimination on the basis of religion and are upheld by RFRA. Additionally, the defendants argue that in this circumstance, there were secular explanations for the questioning. The Ninth District Court Ruling states that the U.S. Border Patrol stopped the appellants because of watch-list concerns or routine searches that prompted further questioning due to suspicious behavior. Each plaintiff was stopped individually, not collectively. Its individuality aligns with the defendant’s argument that there is no general religiously specific target. Their positions explain that the lawsuit is a wrongful inference of the Border Patrol’s actions. 

In 2023, the suit was brought to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Less than a year later, civil-rights groups, including Muslim Advocates, filed an amicus brief seeking reinstatement of the lawsuit before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which unanimously reopened the case. A final decision on the matter has not been made. 

I find this case somewhat difficult to determine in its constitutionality. In my response to the issue at hand, I do believe that there is a violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights, such as equal protection, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise clause, based on the Border Patrol’s specific religious questioning. It makes sense that the suit is not against the agents themselves, but rather the policies in place by the Department of Homeland Security. What becomes complicated is that the DHS has policies in place that actively work against religious discrimination and suppression. So the claims that the policies actively discriminate against Muslim citizens become difficult to determine, as the circumstances were individual. However, the policy in place is not upheld, and the questioning forces religious discretion and compels compliance with majoritarian norms. An evident example is when  Imam Abdirahman Aden Kariye removed his prayer cap to blend in and avoid being questioned. For this reason, I would argue that it unequivocally burdens a particular religion more than others. The compelling state interest in asking direct, Muslim religion specific questions, does not appear compelling enough. Finally, there has to be a less restrictive way to address security issues. In conclusion, my analysis using the Sherbert test would determine this as a violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court should see the same.

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/muslim-americans-sue-border-and-immigration-officials-over-illegal-religious

https://www.aclu.org/cases/kariye-v-mayorkas#press-releases

https://muslimadvocates.org/court-case/kariye-v-mayorkas/

https://www.aclu.org/news/religious-liberty/customs-and-border-protection-is-singling-out-muslim-travelers-for-invasive-religious-questioning

https://www.aclu.org/cases/kariye-v-mayorkas

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/appeals-court-reinstates-muslim-americans-lawsuit-challenging-discriminatory-questioning-by-u-s-border-officers

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/muslim-americans-urge-ninth-circuit-to-hold-government-accountable-for-illegal-religious-questioning-by-border-officers

A Colorado Christian Counselor Fights Against Conversion Bans: Chiles v. Salazar

In 2019, following a large increase in transgender youth in America and the benefits of gender affirming care through therapy coming forward, Colorado enacted a law about Minor Conversion Therapy, citing that mental health professionals are prohibited from undergoing conversion therapy with clients under the age of 18, except for therapists who are "engaged in the practice of religious ministry.” Conversion therapy is defined as mental health techniques designed to change a client’s gender or sexual expression. Colorado, instead, took a gender affirming approach and required counselors to affirm minor clients’ gender identity. However, some mental health professionals, specifically those who are faith-based, took issue with this law, feeling as though it overstepped by controlling how they engage with clients, making the practice of conversion therapy a "disciplinable offense,” as the law may, “ revoke, or suspend the provider’s license; issue a cease-and-desist order; or even impose an administrative fine up to $5,000 per violation.” Despite this, the MCTL had yet to be enforced against anyone at that point. 

Kaley Chiles, a mental health professional in Colorado, runs her own private practice, and included in that is Christian-based counseling, which is done at the request of the client. She started practicing as a counselor in 2014, before the Minor Conversion Therapy law was established. Chiles has worked with adolescents before, specifically on the topic of gender identity and sexual orientation through talk therapy. She also believes that people "flourish" when they live in accordance with God’s design, and sees her counseling as a way to achieve this. However, Colorado issued a ban on “any practice,” including pure speech, that seeks to “change” an individual’s “gender expression,” “behavior,” or “gender identity.” When the law was put into place, Chiles refrained from engaging with minors in ways that she feared could be interpreted as conversion therapy and felt that the law put a strain on her counseling methods. Chiles filed a pre-emptive lawsuit against several of the state of Colorado officials responsible for putting the law into place in 2022. Chiles sued through the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a federal statute that allows individuals to sue state or local officials whom they believe are violating their constitutional or federal rights. 

Chiles is represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, a nonprofit organization specializing in First Amendment rights and religious liberty. Her main argument is that the MCTL infringes on her freedom of speech and free exercise of religion and forces her to choose between the Christian-based talk therapy she offers and beliefs and the professional license that comes into conflict with it. She argued that the law infringed her mission to help minor clients experiencing gender dysphoria “to live a life consistent with their faith.” There is an argument the case poses of whether or not what Chiles is doing counts as conversion therapy, as to her, she is simply using verbal inter-faith techniques to get clients to accept their bodies who consensually seek religious-affirming care. She also argued that the law doesn’t act on a compelling state interest in protecting minors from harm, as there’s a “lack of empirical evidence” of harm from talk therapy. There’s another argument posited that allows minors, with informed parental consent, to undergo treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy and medical marijuana, yet Colorado didn’t enact “state categorical bans.” 

Chiles argued that speculation is not enough to justify such legal scrutiny, and the state’s right to regulate mental health conduct doesn’t give them the power to enact a gag order. However, the district court denied her request for an injunction on the basis that Chiles “failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits,” and that the law regulates conduct rather than speech and any imposing of freedom of speech was incidental. Chiles appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the court held that Colorado’s state ban on conversion therapy was of state interest to protect minors from harmful therapeutic practices and maintain the integrity of professional mental health regulation. The court cited National Institute of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, in which two religiously affiliated pro-life entities in California that provide pregnancy related services had to, by Crisis Pregnancy Center Law, provide information about low-cost/free abortion services and other things that they claimed violated their views. They sued, but the court struck down their claim as they argued that some “professional conduct may be regulated by states even if this incidentally involves speech.” The court also stated that the MCTL did not reference a religion or any religious practices, and that conversion therapy simply being associated with religious practices doesn’t mean that religious neutrality is being violated. The case has since been appealed to the Supreme Court. 

I agree with the court’s ruling as conversion therapy isn’t an inherently religious practice. Chiles is a Christian based mental health professional, and there are many ways to engage with clients in an inter-faith way that doesn’t necessarily include sexuality and gender expression. The MTCL also has state interest as the safety of minors is a factor. The court presented evidence of the harm of mental health professionals of using therapeutic techniques such as conversion therapy, which for some groups, involves a long and painful history. The protection of minors who, under parental request, could be subjected to conversion therapy nonconsensually overrules Chiles’ talk therapy being infringed upon, in my opinion.

The Tension Between Civil Rights Enforcement and Religious Privacy: The Case of Penn and the EEOC

   A recent federal court ruling involving the University of Pennsylvania (Penn) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) highlights an emerging conflict in constitutional law: the balance between the government’s mandate to investigate religious discrimination and the First Amendment protections afforded to religious identity and association. This case serves as a critical junction for understanding how the state interacts with religious communities within secular academic institutions.

In March 2026, U.S. District Judge Gerald Pappert issued a ruling requiring the University of Pennsylvania to provide the EEOC with records identifying Jewish employees as part of an ongoing federal investigation. The request was initiated following allegations that the university’s workplace is filled with antisemitism and that the administration failed to maintain an environment free from harassment.

The investigation cites several specific antisemitic incidents, including the destruction of property at a Jewish student center, the painting of a swastika on an academic building, and the shouting of obscenities at Jewish community members. The EEOC contended that obtaining contact information for Jewish employees is essential for determining whether the work environment was both objectively and subjectively hostile.

Penn resisted the administrative subpoena, arguing that it has a constitutional bligation to protect the rights of their employees. The university claimed that it does not keep formal lists of employees by religion and expressed concern that being compelled to create lists for the government raises privacy and First Amendment issues. Judge Pappert’s ruling attempted a middle ground: while he upheld the subpoena’s core requirement, he specifically exempted information regarding three independent Jewish organizations, Penn Hillel, MEOR, and Chabad Lubavitch House, noting they are legally and financially separate from the university.

The primary constitutional issues in this case involve the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the implied First Amendment right to freedom of association.

Under the Free Exercise Clause, the question is whether the government’s request for the identities of religious practitioners creates a chilling effect on the practice of faith. If employees fear that their religious identity is being tracked by a federal agency, they may be less likely to associate with religious organizations on campus. Rabbi Menachem Schmidt of Chabad at Penn noted that the “non-consensual disclosure of personal information” could cripple the mission of religious groups by compromising the privacy of those they serve.

From an Establishment Clause perspective, the case touches upon the doctrine of excessive entanglement. By requiring a secular university to categorize and report its staff based on religious identity, the state risks intruding into the internal administration of religious life. Penn and various advocacy groups argued that government-mandated “lists of Jews” carry historical weight, a comparison the judge found “unfortunate” but which highlights the deep-seated fear of state-sponsored religious tracking.

The constitutional challenge is to determine whether the EEOC’s request is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. This debate is deeply rooted in historical legal precedents. A foundational case related to this issue is NAACP v. Alabama (1958). In that instance, the Supreme Court ruled that the state could not compel the NAACP to reveal its membership lists because doing so would violate the members’ right to pursue their collective interests privately and would expose them to potential retaliation. Penn’s argument rests on a similar logic, that the government’s forced outing of religious identity infringes upon the privacy of association.

However, the government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. To satisfy the First Amendment, the state must show that its methods they are using are the least restrictive means of achieving that goal. Judge Pappert concluded that the EEOC’s request met this standard because it was “narrowly tailored” to specific individuals who could have witnessed or experienced harassment.

I argue that Judge Pappert’s decision represents a necessary constitutional compromise. By exempting independent religious bodies like Penn Hillel and Chabad, the autonomy of purely religious institutions. This prevents the state from exerting too much power over a ministry, which would likely violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on excessive entanglement.

Furthermore, the ruling preserves individual liberty by clarifying that employees retain the right to refuse participation in the investigation. This ensures that the government’s attempt to remedy a "hostile environment" does not itself become a form of administrative coercion.

This case sets a potential precedent for how federal agencies handle religious identity in civil rights probes across the country. If the government were completely barred from identifying potential victims based on religion, it would be impossible to enforce civil rights laws. Yet, if the government’s power to demand religious lists were absolute, it would signal the end of religious privacy. The Penn ruling suggests that while the state may request such data to protect citizens, it must do so with extreme caution, respecting the boundaries of independent religious associations and individual consent. This balance is essential to maintaining a society where the rule of law protects religious practitioners without violating the sanctity of their private beliefs.

https://abcnews.com/US/university-pennsylvania-give-trump-admin-list-jewish-campus/story?id=131594362 

https://apnews.com/article/eeoc-probe-penn-ac1f54c0d585f7d184383f955822ec68

Does Prior Religious Affiliation Make You ineligible for Public Benefits?

 In Moody Bible Institute of Chicago v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, the ongoing debate over the role of religion, and Free Exercise thereof, in public education continues. 

The Moody Bible Institute is a not-for-profit, Christian-based higher education institution located in Chicago, Illinois. As put forward in their mission statement, “Moody exists to proclaim the gospel and equip people to be biblically grounded, practically trained, and to engage the world through gospel-centered living.” This mission became a point of concern for the Chicago Board of Education in relation to Moody’s Elementary Education degree program. Through this biblically centered, state-approved program, Moody trains future elementary school teachers by requiring students to spend varied amounts of time participating in classroom observations, practicums, and some form of student teaching. In order to better help students meet these requirements, Moody attempted to join the Chicago Public Schools’ (CPS) student-teaching program but was denied on the grounds that allowing them to use the CPS’s resources would result in an excessive entanglement of church and state. Therefore, Moody was told they must give up their religious hiring policies before they would be able to participate in the CPS’s student-teacher program. With this ultimatum, Moody, along with the help of the Alliance Defending Freedom, filed a lawsuit that would attempt to allow them to maintain their hiring practices and still participate in the government-provided programs. Their primary argument was that, seeing as their hiring policies were in strict accordance with a religious mission, the government could not penalize them without threatening their Free Exercise of Religion. 

                  It is important to note that in the end, this case was settled outside of court before moving to trial, and Moody was permitted to partake in the CPS’s student-teacher program without having to give up their hiring policies. That does not, however, take away from the contribution this case brings to the ongoing debate and deliberation over Supreme Court Free Exercise cases.

This case wrestles with the difficulties of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The Constitutional question that was at hand was whether or not a government entity could deny a generally accessible public service/benefit to a religiously affiliated institution without violating the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause. 

Moody and their student teachers never had the express intention to go out and directly spread the gospel through their student-teacher placements. While Moody’s Elementary Education degree would teach its student-teachers biblically centered doctrines in conjunction with its education requirements, its explicit student-teacher policy required that any student working at a school must comply with the rules, policies, and district regulations of their designated school. In practice, this meant that just like the CPS, Moody was attempting to avoid the excessive entanglement of church and state with their teachers and their placements. Furthermore, because of these internal policies put in place by Moody, the CPS’s discrimination begins to be viewed in a much poorer light.

To provide some legal precedent for this debate, I will briefly explain the Supreme Court cases, Carson v. Makin and Locke v. Davey. In Carson v. Makin, the Supreme Court determined that a religious institution cannot be excluded from partaking in public benefits of the state. If the Moody case had proceeded to trial, any ruling that would deny these benefits would be seen by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional discrimination against the religious institution. While any state benefits or funds that these institutions could utilize have the potential to indirectly support religious instruction, they cannot allow the state to block the allocation of benefits to these institutions. Conversely, in Locke v. Davey, the court ruled that it is permissible to refuse allocation of benefits to deeply religious activities, the most prominent being direct religious instruction. While this case seemingly provides a base for the opposition to stand on in their argument, it is difficult to know whether or not the argument would stand against Moody’s actions. Seeing as Moody was not sending student-teachers to actively facilitate direct religious instruction in their school placements, because they were coming from an institution where they themselves received direct religious instruction, it is reasonable for the CPS to have concerns about establishing one religion over another. 

            I believe that this case allows for a very poignant conversation and reflection about the way in which we as individuals interpret our Free Exercise. While the case never made it to any high court, let alone the Supreme Court, I still believe that 1) this case was handled in such a way that adds a semi-new layer of legal precedence to Free Exercise cases, and 2) had the most optimal outcome in constitutional terms. In this case, I believe that the result of the settlement to allow Moody to partake in the CPS’s program was the correct and most constitutional course of action. The key issue I recognized as I was researching and contextualizing the case was what the Moody students’ intentions were with these programs if allowed to participate? I believe that the Moody students saw a deficit of teachers in the CPS and decided that it was their right to lend their talents and experiences to ensure that every student had equal access to education. In the end, that could only be provided if the teachers themselves were provided equal opportunities to teach whether they had a religiously affiliated background or not. Moody wasn’t pursuing preferential treatment from the CPS, but rather equal treatment.            

https://adflegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/moody-bible-institute-v-boe-city-of-chicago-2025-11-04-complaint.pdf

https://dailycitizen.focusonthefamily.com/moody-bible-institute-wins-religious-freedom-case-student-teachers/

https://adflegal.org/article/moody-bible-institute-students-free-to-participate-in-chicago-teaching-program/

https://www.moodybible.org/about/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1315

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1088

Medical Ethics and Religion: The Constitutional Debate in NIFLA v. Treto

When it was originally enacted nearly forty years ago, the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act protected healthcare providers who refused to endorse or participate in abortion by granting them immunity from lawsuits and other disciplinary measures. Thus, if a medical professional declined to include abortion in their practice due to religious reasons, they could not be punished legally for doing so. This Act was beneficial to not only religious healthcare providers, but also established pro-life pregnancy centers. However, in 2016, the state of Illinois altered this longstanding Act to mandate religious healthcare professionals who refuse to participate in abortion practices due to their beliefs to discuss the supposed “benefits” of abortion with and refer patients to abortion providers. Evidently, these mandates are contradictory to the purpose of these providers’ practices, as they are left with what Becket deems “an impossible choice”: Promote messages about abortion that they strongly disagree with, or risk being subject to malpractice suits, stricter state enforcement, and discrimination cases that non-religious providers do not have to face.

Therefore, an ongoing constitutional debate over how to balance religious liberty with medical ethics has transpired in the case of National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Treto. The plaintiff is a religious organization encompassing a large network of pro-life pregnancy centers, whereas the defendant is Mario Treto Jr., the director of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. The Treto case raises a core constitutional issue:

Is the state of Illinois’ requirement that religious healthcare providers must provide information about abortion services a violation of their Free Exercise rights?

In an amicus brief filed in December of 2016, Becket argued that the government cannot force religious groups to promote messages that they do not believe in. Having no choice but to do so, Becket asserts, threatens the reputation of the Church which the healthcare professional belongs to and undermines the integrity of the medical services these individuals provide. Additionally, Becket references minority religions, such as the Orthodox Church in America, who may feel coerced to comply with the Act’s requirements due to their minimal representation in America alongside a limited understanding of the rationale behind their religious beliefs against abortion. Overall, Becket argues that an indirect burden is placed on religious healthcare providers–While they are free to refuse abortion services to their patients, they must defy their religious beliefs to endorse access to these services, which in turn coerces individuals to act against their spiritual values, especially for religious minorities.

Contrastingly, in a 2019 amicus brief in support of Illinois’ adjustments to the Act, several groups including the Illinois Academy of Family Physicians argue that doctors are ethically required to provide patients with complete medical care and treatment information, regardless of if it is in violation of their religious beliefs. If the doctors do not, the brief states, then patients cannot legally provide required informed consent, which is central to medical ethics. The brief also notes how failure to provide all treatment options to patients can result in harm, citing a particular incident where, due to her doctor’s religious beliefs against abortion, Illinois resident Mindy Swank was forced to wait to terminate her pregnancy despite hemorrhaging for several weeks. Additionally, an earlier amicus brief from 2017 upheld similar points while also arguing that in some cases, abortion is medically necessary and thus patients must be kept informed when relevant. In all, these briefs suggest that there is a compelling state interest in ensuring patients are knowledgeable of all medical options available to them.

A prior Supreme Court case providing insight into the Treto case is West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). While contextually different, the decision in this case held that the government cannot force individuals to affirm religious beliefs they do not hold. More recently, in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018), the court struck down a law mandating pregnancy centers to provide information about abortion services, a case strikingly similar to Treto. These precedents suggest that across professional contexts, the government cannot have unlimited regulation over the free exercise of religious beliefs.

In my opinion, Illinois’s requirement that healthcare professionals provide information about abortion services to patients is both reasonable and necessary to protect patient health and uphold the basic medical ethics of informed consent. While religious providers may disagree with abortion on moral grounds, the Act does not force them to perform or endorse the procedure themselves. Rather, it merely requires that patients are given full, accurate medical information to make informed decisions, some of which may be life or death. The state has a compelling interest in preventing delays of harm to patients, as highlighted in cases like Mindy Swank’s where she suffered health risks due to her doctor’s unwillingness to provide her with resources he did not support. Unlike the situations in Barnette and Becerra, the Illinois law does not coerce professionals into affirming a belief they disagree with, it ensures the medical transparency they are ethically obligated to provide. Thus, I would rule in favor of Treto, as the Illinois Act has been modified to be the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling interest of patient protections in medical settings. 

Sources:

https://becketfund.org/case/national-institute-of-family-and-life-advocates-v-treto/

https://www.aclu-il.org/cases/national-institute-family-and-life-advocates-et-al-v-mario-treto-jr-and-ronald-schroeder-et-al/?document=Amici-brief-of-ACOG-et-al-in-opp-to-PI

https://www.aclu-il.org/cases/national-institute-family-and-life-advocates-et-al-v-mario-treto-jr-and-ronald-schroeder-et-al/?document=Amici-brief-of-ACOG-et-al-in-opp-to-MSJ

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/3:2016cv50310/331888/294/#:~:text=Parties%20This%20case%20involves%20two,Defendant%20as%20%E2%80%9Cthe%20State.%E2%80%9D

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/319us624

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140

Limits on Religious Care in Detention Facilities

 Religious organizations commonly provide spiritual care for detainees in immigration detention facilities. In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building has offices for federal agencies, an immigration court, and serves as a detention center for immigrants. It is typically a processing and holding site before moving detainees to another location. The number of detainees has significantly increased in the Whipple Federal buildings due to Operation Metro Surge. This was a large-scale federal immigration enforcement operation started by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in December 2025, where thousands of federal agents were deployed in order to deport undocumented immigrants. Clergy members of religious organizations around Minneapolis were typically allowed access on a case-by-case basis, but since the operation began, access has been consistently denied. 

While the Operation officially ended on February 3rd 2026, access for pastors was still being rejected in the following weeks, leading to clergy members filing a lawsuit against the DHS and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), the Minnesota Conference of the United Church of Christ (UCC), and Father Christopher Collins, an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church, filed the lawsuit together because they had the same claims and all experienced substantial religious burden through the prevention of religious practice. A preliminary injunction has been granted by U.S. District Judge Jerry Blackwell to allow in-person visits to all detainees in the Whipple Federal Building while the case continues. 

The central issue raised by the pastors is that the government's actions impose a significant burden on their ability to freely exercise their religion by preventing them from carrying out essential religious duties. The burden is substantial because the clergy were not only denied access on ordinary days, but also on major religious holidays, when it is most important for them to complete religious services for others. The most prominent example happened this past Ash Wednesday, a holy day in Christianity that marks the start of lent, when Reverend Gonzalez attempted to enter the facility to provide pastoral care and administer ashes for detainees. She notified the officials of her purpose, but was denied access and given no alternatives, even after offering to meet with detainees in small groups. The imposition of ashes on those who practice Christianity is an essential pastoral obligation, and the prevention of this action means she cannot fulfill that obligation until the following year. Similar denials occurred in other instances, including Father Collins being refused on December 12th, which is the date of the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe, a celebration of Mary as a figure in the catholic religion and her appearance in Saint Juan Diego. Taken together, these types of incidents show a pattern of denying access to religious care without exploring reasonable alternatives for the clergy to fulfill their obligations. As a result, the argument is that the restrictions are a substantial and unjustified burden on the free exercise of religion. 

From the perspective of DHS and ICE, the constitutional issue centers around whether restricting access to the facility is justified by a compelling government interest, specifically maintaining safety and order during the time of increased enforcement. Officials have cited safety concerns due to the high number of detainees in the building during Operation Metro Surge, as well as the presence of protests and civil unrest near the facility, which have made visits more difficult. This suggests that the government may claim its actions were necessary to maintain the security of the building. Additionally, existing ICE policies require background checks and advanced notice for clergy visits, and mandate religious services only in facilities that hold detainees for more than 72 hours. Because DHS and ICE claim that the Whipple building is a short-term processing site and holds people for less than 24 hours, they could argue that the requirements do not apply in the same way. However, this claim is complicated by the reports that some detainees are held for longer periods at this location. The government also plans to argue the case is moot, since restrictions have been eased and access allowed more recently for clergy members. This highlights the question of whether the government’s interest in security is enough to justify limited religious access, and if the limits were applied consistently with constitutional protections for religious exercise. 

While free exercise of religion is often limited in detention settings, constitutional protections still apply to both detainees and religious leaders. In this case, the actions of DHS and ICE are unconstitutional because even if safety concerns are legitimate, they failed to use the least restrictive means to address them, or at least investigate the possibility of one. Clergy members were completely denied access to detainees, and no reasonable alternatives were offered. This total denial, rather than a limited restriction, created a substantial burden on their religious obligations. 

The policies listed by ICE seem to conflict with the actions they have taken. They require religious services and coordination in the facilities when individuals are held for more than 72 hours, yet they neglected to adhere to these policies during the duration of the Metro Surge operation. It is important to acknowledge the possibility that detainees could have been there more than 72 hours, knowing that the increasing number of people being held likely caused longer transfer processes. Even in the case that this building adhered to the proper requirements to be considered a temporary holding facility, denying all access violates religious exercise because it is preventing practice for both the religious leaders and the detainees. Overall, I think that restricting access to detention facilities from religious care without exploring less restrictive means violates free exercise of religion. 

Sources: 

https://minnesotareformer.com/2026/02/23/minnesota-clergy-sue-trump-administration-over-ability-to-minister-to-detainees-at-whipple/

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27356421-complaint-26-cv-1576/

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/03/20/clergy-seek-court-order-to-allow-pastoral-access-immigrants-at-minneapolis-ice-facility

Abortion Accessibility in Indiana

 In 2022, a group of plaintiffs including five anonymous women and the group Hoosier Jews for Choice challenged Indiana’s abortion ban using the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as testimony. The ban allows for abortion under circumstances of rape, incest, lethal fetal abnormality, and “death or a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”. The plaintiffs proceeded to raise religious objections to address seeking access to abortion under certain circumstances. One plaintiff, a Jewish woman, argued that she hoped for another child but held religious beliefs that would require termination of her pregnancy if it threatened her physical or mental health. Another plaintiff, unaffiliated with a particular religion, claimed that she held beliefs regarding autonomy and the beginning of life that would also require termination of a pregnancy under specific circumstances. 

The RFRA was passed by Congress in 1993 to further protect religious freedom after various Supreme Court decisions had weakened the Constitution’s  protections. The RFRA states that the government cannot interfere with one’s religious practice unless there is compelling reasoning and no alternatives. The act only applied on a federal level, leading various states, such as Indiana, to pass their respective versions. Since then, 29 states have their own RFRAs. Following the Supreme Court’s decision to ban abortion on a federal level, abortion rights lawyers have used these laws as a means to advance their agenda.

Following the plaintiff’s challenge, a trial court granted a preliminary injunction in December 2022, which exempted the group from the state’s abortion ban. The court additionally specified those who hold similar religious obligations. An appellate court went on to sustain the rulings, but requested that the trial court specify that the injunction's scope only applied to when plaintiffs sought abortions for sincere religious reasons. They also specified that these reasons should not implicate the RFRA. In December 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the appellate court’s affirmance of the injunction. 

A couple weeks ago, the trial court made the injunction permanent, meaning the state cannot deny abortions to plaintiffs with sincerely held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana went on to pursue a class action, meaning the ruling will apply to all state residents. State defendants went on to argue that the Hoosier Jews for Choice did not have standing to use the RFRA for their claims. The Court of Appeals then proceeded to utilize the three part criteria that was established in the US Supreme Court Case Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, to determine whether or not the organization may sue. The criteria states that members have the standing to sue individually, the lawsuit is directly related to the purpose of the organization (HJFC), and individual members don’t need to participate personally. The court ended up affirming the injunction as the group met the criteria. 

The state then argued that the case was currently invalid because the plaintiffs weren’t currently pregnant, which the judge rejected because the law protects when religious freedom is likely to be burdened, not just when it is actively being burdened. The state then argued that the ban didn’t burden women because only doctors face criminal punishment, which the judge also rejected because the women couldn’t access abortions in the first place. The state lastly argued that protecting fetal life is compelling interest, which the judge disagreed with since there are already exceptions (rape or IVF), which undercuts that fetal life must be protected. Indiana’s attorney general appealed.

The case raises the question: should a state be able to use its own religious freedom policy to create abortion access that state law does not allow under most circumstances? It also raises a question regarding the Establishment Clause: does allowing abortion for religious practitioners favor religion over non-religion, since non-religious people are not granted the same right? 

I would argue that the plaintiffs, and citizens in general, should be able to be granted abortion access through religious freedom. When a state creates their respective RFRA, they are voluntarily agreeing to restrain their future authority. Indiana’s RFRA prevents the state from “substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion”, as the federal RFRA does similarly. While determining what qualifies as “substantial” is fairly subjective, one could define it as when government actions proceed mere inconvenience to force an individual to violate their religious beliefs. Even if the doctors are the ones that face punishment, if the plaintiffs can’t act on their sincere religious beliefs in the first place, then who gets punished is somewhat beside the point. The plaintiffs also claimed to have already actively rearranged their personal lives around the abortion ban, making the harm present and not just a potential future burden. Overall, this is a substantial burden on religious practitioners. As for the Establishment clause, I believe that this serves more as an accommodation of religion than an establishment. If the plaintiffs here genuinely believe that their religion is being substantially burdened, then they are not asking for special treatment in their views, but to be treated equally in regards to their religion. Obviously that is very tough to determine and arguments for both sides could be made.

John Woolard v Tony Thurmond

    John Woolard represents the voices of a group of parents whose children attend Blue Ridge Academy and Visions in Education, two charter schools in California, and the independent study programs the schools run. The main difference between charter schools and public schools is what they operate under. Charter schools operate under independent contracts, while public schools work under a school district. They are both funded by taxpayers and are tuition-free, and provide publicly funded material. 

    Woolard and the parents requested that the schools purchase “sectarian” materials for the programs. These programs are overseen by the school but run mostly by parents in homes. The schools rejected the request because of California law, which prohibits public schools, including charter schools, from teaching sectarian or religious material. One example was that Blue Ridge denied the parents' request to purchase Bob Jones University text, which teaches “‘God is great, and God is good; God created me and all things; the Bible is God’s Word, and it is true; and I learn in order to serve God and others”’(Factual Background). Woolard sued Tony Thurmond, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the school system, arguing that they violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses in the First Amendment.

    The parents argue multiple points as to why they should be allowed to include religious material in the program. Woolard argued, “that the charter schools’ independent study programs are really in substance homeschooling, not public education…”(Plaintiffs). They are essentially saying that because the independent study programs are not part of the school's curriculum, the parents should have a say in what is being taught. Because Woolard classified these programs as “private homeschooling”, they argued that the state was not allowed to deny them funding based on religious ideals since the Court cannot deny any “recipients of state grants for private homeschooling based on religious belief”(Court Discussion). They obviously believed that sectarian material should be allowed to be taught. The final argument they had was that forcing parents to use the state-approved material in the programs that didn’t align with their religious values violated the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause. Woolard contended that they were being “categorically excluded” from public benefits because of their religious background.

    There are relevant precedents that are important for deciding the outcome in this case, but the one case that I thought was most important is the following: Employment Division v Smith. 

Employment Division v. Smith was a case focused on the Free Exercise Clause and the idea that laws can burden religion but not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Two Native Americans who were members of a Native American Church and employees of a drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote as part of their religious ceremony. The organization had strict rules against using drugs, and they were fired for misconduct. When the two gentlemen filed for unemployment compensation, they were denied. They sued and argued that the organization had violated their Free Exercise rights. Ultimately, the court held that even with a burden on the men’s religion, the law was neutral and therefore the burden on the religion was not protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 

    The logic in Employment Division v Smith was the same logic that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used when it made the decision on this case. They affirmed the decision. The Court held that even though these schools were charter schools, they were still part of the California free public school system. California is required by law to provide a strictly secular curriculum. They also held that the public school system’s education choices were government speech, which made Woolard and the parents' allegations against Free Exercise unreasonable. They use Supreme Court logic and past decisions, saying that the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent a “state from providing ‘a strictly secular education in its public schools”’(Court Discussion). The Court discusses how the independent study programs were directly intertwined with the school, and the plaintiffs' classification of them as private homeschool programs was unjustified. They are run by state-provided teachers, and each student must agree to a written contract with the school. The Court agrees that most of the independent study programs are taught by the students' parents. However, they are only allowed to do so if they are supervised by a state employee. 

    I agree with the decision that the Ninth Circuit Court came to. There is no justification for the parents claiming a violation of their Free Exercise rights because the law about strictly teaching secular material is neutral to all public and charter schools. They were asking for preferential treatment, not equal. California bans all religious teachings in all public schools, and because the charter schools are paid for by taxpayers, they are part of the public school system. The parents' classification of the study programs as private homeschooling is completely wrong because of the agreements that both the parents and students have, along with the direct relationship between the school and the programs. Another point that I have is that the Court never said that the parents were banned from teaching religion. In their own home and on their own time, they can teach their children all the religious beliefs that they have. They are just not allowed to use public funding to do so.

    Ultimately, the Free Exercise Clause states that the government is not allowed to restrict religious beliefs and practices, and in my opinion, the state hasn't done that. I am confident that if the case makes its way to the Supreme Court, they will come to the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit Decision

Resources: 24-4291.pdf

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith | Oyez

When Does Religious Conversation in a Public School Become Unconstitutional?

    The case of Chaudhry v. Thorsen raises a complex yet relevant question: when does the action of a public-school teacher regarding interaction with a student about religion cross the line into a violation of the First Amendment? The answer, according to the Northern District of Illinois, is that it does not, if the action is voluntary, initiated by the student, and free from any coercion. This case ultimately reinforces a foundational principle of the modern interpretation of the First Amendment: The Constitution prohibits the government from endorsing any religion, but it does not require the complete absence of religion from public life or personal interaction.

            Aliya Chaudhry entered high school as a Muslim who had long been questioning her faith. Before meeting her teacher, Pierre Thorsen, she described herself as always struggling with the core beliefs of Islam imparted by her parents and actively searching for answers. When she later encountered Thorsen in his role of history teacher, whose curriculum included the study of world religions, she chose to propose her questions to him on her own. Their private conversations about religion occurred outside of school hours, were initiated by the student, and were a part of her independent research about different religions. Ultimately, she converted to Christianity (the same religion as Thorsen), which led to her parents firing a lawsuit alleging violations of the Establishment Clause.

            Initially, the parents’ argument seemed persuasive: a public-school teacher influenced one of his students to convert to his religious beliefs. However, constitutional law does not operate on persuasiveness alone. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit religious influence but prohibits government endorsement or coercion of religion.

            Historically, Establishment Clause cases were scrutinized under the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework, but the Supreme Court has slowly shifted away from the Lemon Test. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the Court replaced Lemon with a more nuanced approach grounded in historical practices and a more focused approach on coercion. Under this new framework, the central question is not whether religion is present, but whether the state is pressuring individuals into religious activity.

            Applying this modern standard, the court found no constitutional violation. The interaction between Thorsen and his students was completely voluntary. She was not a captive audience, nor was she required to participate in the religiously influenced conversations. Unlike seen previously, there was no endorsed prayer or display of religious text comparable to cases like Lee v. Weisman. Instead, the record showed a student seeking guidance and a teacher simply responding to her questions with his own personal views. As the district court emphasized, allowing private religious discussion is fundamentally different from state coercion, even if the individual is employed by the state.

            The distinction, in this case, is crucial. In Lee, the Court found unconstitutional coercion where students were effectively pressured to participate in prayer. However, in Kennedy, the Court protected a coach’s private religious expression because it did not compel students to participate. Chaudhry fits well within the latter category. The case emphasizes that the presence of religion is not enough to substantiate a valid lawsuit.

            I think Chaudhry v. Thorsen ultimately gets the constitutional question correct, even if the situation itself feels uncomfortable. The key issue is not whether or not a teacher influenced a student, that happens daily, but whether the teacher (serving as a state actor) coerced the student into religious conversion. The district court makes it clear that that was not the case. The student was already questioning her faith (imposed by her parents) and initiated the religiously charged conversation herself.

            What stands out most to me is how strongly the court emphasized the personal agency of the student (unlike in previous cases). It goes against the idea that exposure to a religion counts as coercion. If influence alone were enough, teachers could not meaningfully discuss religion, which is a fundamental part of world history.

            However, I do think that this case exposes a moral grey area. While the conduct was not unconstitutional, it could be argued that the teacher crossed professional boundaries, especially engaging with a student about religion without an outside religious contact or involving the students’ parents. The court acknowledged this distinction well: an action can be inappropriate without being unconstitutional.

            Overall, the decision made by the court reinforces an important limit within constitutional law. Parents have the fundamental right to raise their children, but that right does not extend to controlling every influence in the child’s life. When a student, especially more developed high-school aged ones, seek out ideas to form her own beliefs, the Constitution protects that process even if the method could be viewed as inappropriate or the outcome difficult.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/3:2020cv50381/392015/310/0.pdf?ts=1773935422