Free Exercise Debates in Mental Health Settings: Catholic Charities v. Whitmer

In recent years, as debates surrounding gender identity and youth mental health intensify, state governments across the country have increasingly intervened in the regulation of mental health treatment for minors who are experiencing gender dysphoria. One of these state governments is in Michigan, where there is a law that prohibits licensed mental health professionals from using non-affirming therapy practices, and as a result, these professionals must affirm a child’s beliefs about their gender and provide them with information about related medical interventions. These interventions include puberty blocking drugs, hormones, and surgeries. 

Thus, the case of Catholic Charities v. Whitmer is introduced. Emily McJones, a Catholic therapist who includes her religious faith in her everyday counseling practice, works with children experiencing psychological distress related to their gender identity. Through her Catholic faith, McJones seeks to help her clients explore the underlying causes of their distress, rather than affirming their expressed gender identity or endorsing any medical procedures. Specifically, McJones emphasizes the Catholic belief that God created only two human biological sexes, male and female, in her counseling. However, the Michigan law prohibits McJones and other religious mental health professionals from offering this type of therapy, placing them in a position where they must either change their practice, misaligning it with their religious beliefs, or they must risk losing their professional licenses and paying fines amounting to $250,000.

In June 2024, McJones filed a lawsuit challenging the law alongside a Catholic Charities counseling ministry and other mental health professionals. The lead defendant in this case is Gretchen Whitmer, who is the current Governor of Michigan. The Whitmer case raises the constitutional question:

Does a Michigan law prohibiting Catholic mental health professionals from using non-gender affirming therapeutic practices in their counseling violate their First Amendment right to Free Exercise?

In an amicus brief filed in support of McJones, the neutrality of the Michigan law is questioned. While the law was created to protect the beliefs of all children questioning their gender identity, the brief notes how it allows for only one viewpoint regarding gender identity to be used within therapeutic settings, and that viewpoint directly defies Catholic professionals’ religious beliefs. Additionally, McJones believes she has a compelling interest as a Catholic mental health professional to prevent young, impressionable children from partaking in gender-affirming medical procedures that are both irreversible and potentially harmful. Specifically, while these procedures were once thought to be scientifically validated and safe, more recent research suggests that the support for them is “weaker” than originally thought, as critics refer to the ongoing debate about long-term outcomes and risks associated with these interventions, including a number of health problems ranging from sexual dysfunction to cancer. Overall, given the goals of McJones’s religious practice and the lack of neutrality of the Michigan law, supporters of this brief describe the law as an indirect, yet substantial burden on McJones’s free exercise of religion.

Contrastingly, supporters of the Michigan law argue that the state has a compelling interest in protecting minors from potentially coercive therapeutic practices. They uphold the neutrality of the Michigan law, referencing its application to all mental health professionals, not just religious ones. From this perspective, there is a further compelling state interest in providing children with mental health treatment that validates their experiences and affirms their gender identity. Supporters of the Michigan law refer to the potential psychological harms that children may face if therapists discourage their expressed gender identities. In all, the state seeks to prioritize the protection of the mental well-being of minors experiencing gender dysphoria over individual providers’ rights to practice in accordance with their religious beliefs.

A relevant Supreme Court case that may act as a precedent in Whitmer is Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In Smith, the court argued that neutral laws which are generally applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if an individual’s compliance with them incidentally burdens their religious practice. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law is truly neutral in practice and applied equally to all mental health counselors, then it is constitutional. However, another case, NIFLA v. Becerra (2018), complicates this debate. In Becerra, the court struck down a law that required pregnancy centers to provide patients with abortion services information, arguing that the government cannot compel individuals to share messages that violate their religious beliefs. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law requires counselors to endorse practices which they fundamentally disagree with, then it is unconstitutional. 

Therefore, based on the current arguments and the precedent in Becerra in particular, I would rule in favor of McJones and Catholic Charities in this case. I would argue that the Michigan law is not facially neutral to begin with, because it regulates counselors’ practice in a way that coerces them to affirm a particular viewpoint on gender identity. The viewpoint permissible by the law is in direct violation of Catholic mental health professionals’ religious beliefs. Thus, the Smith precedent is not applicable in Whitmer because the law itself is not neutrally applicable. Moreover, while I understand that the state does have an interest in protecting minors from psychological harm and providing them with proper care, I think that the compelling state interest in protecting these children from potential irreversible health effects is more crucial, given that gender-affirming care options are the subject of current ongoing medical and scientific debates regarding long-term health effects.

Religious Expression and Solicitation in Public Parks

 On January 16th, 2026, Brant Zeller and his friend visited Woldenberg Park in New Orleans to practice their Christian faith and evangelize by sharing the gospel with pedestrians in Woldenberg Park. They held signs that expressed their beliefs and distributed literature while engaging in conversations to communicate their religious message. Their approach was peaceful and non-disruptive, as they did not use amplification or aggressive tactics. Despite this, they were stopped by New Orleans Police as a result of a complaint from a park employee. The city code prohibits solicitation in public parks, including the distribution of materials such as religious literature. The officers warned them that if they did not leave immediately, they could be removed or arrested. In response, First Liberty Institute, a nonprofit law firm that supports religion cases, sent a demand letter to the City of New Orleans on Zeller’s behalf, arguing that the enforcement of this policy violated his constitutional rights. 

The events in Woldenberg Park raise significant constitutional questions involving both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While the City of New Orleans justified its actions by citing a general prohibition on solicitation, the situation is not only about regulating speech in a public space. It raises real concerns about whether a facially neutral law can constitutionally restrict an individual's ability to engage in religious practices, such as evangelism, in a public forum. For Brant Zeller, sharing his faith in a public park is not simply expressive conduct, but a fundamental aspect of practicing his Christian faith. Evangelism has long been recognized as a form of religious exercise, which centers on spreading beliefs through conversations and distributing literature. Restricting this activity appears to impose a burden on Zeller’s free exercise rights. If a law is not neutral or is applied in a way that affects religious conduct, it could be subject to strict scrutiny through courts. The city's prevention of solicitation raises concerns about whether it is being applied in a way that burdens religious activity more than other forms of expression. 

At the same time, the City of New Orleans may argue that its solicitation prevention is due to government interests unrelated to religion. The purpose of preventing solicitation is typically to maintain order, protect visitors from unwanted interactions, and prevent heavy traffic in areas such as parks. While these are real concerns that cities often work to prevent, it is important to consider if this broad restriction is actually achieving those goals without unnecessarily burdening religious exercise. 

In addition, Louisiana has a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which explains that the government may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Spreading faith is a core religious practice, meaning the city would need a strong justification for the burden and be able to prove that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this interest.  

This issue relates to Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), where the Supreme Court held that individuals have a right to engage in religious solicitation and distribute literature, even in public spaces, as a part of their free exercise rights. This case emphasizes that peaceful evangelism is a protected religious activity, especially in public forums. 

The constitutional framework was later narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. Here, the City of New Orleans would likely argue that its solicitation rule is neutral and applies to all individuals regardless of the content of their speech. However, this case is complicated by Louisiana's RFRA, which requires courts to apply strict scrutiny when a law substantially burdens religious exercise, rather than the standard in Smith. As a result, the focus shifts away from whether the law is generally applicable and toward whether the City can justify its restriction under a constitutional test. Even if the policy is upheld under Smith, it must still satisfy RFRA’s requirement that the government use the least restrictive means. 

I think that the City’s enforcement of the city code against all solicitation and against Brant Zeller is an unconstitutional application of the law because it places a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion. While the city has legitimate interests in maintaining order and preventing unwanted or disruptive actions in the park, those interests do not justify a broad restriction that effectively prohibits sharing religious messages, which is a key religious conviction of Zeller. Under RFRA, the city must show that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. Preventing all types of solicitation is broader than what is necessary. Less restrictive alternatives, such as regulating aggressive conduct or obstruction, could address the city's concerns without limiting Zeller’s religious practice. This issue shows the importance of protecting religious exercise in traditional public forums and ensuring that regulations do not unintentionally prevent constitutionally protected religious practices. 

Sources: 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/brant-zeller/#simple1 

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-08-Demand-Letter-sent-to-City-Zeller_Redacted.pdf 

https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?p=y&d=725122

California AB 1578: Anti-Hate Speech Training and Free Exercise

A bill that would require elected state officials to complete mandatory anti-hate speech training called AB 1578 is currently moving through the California legislature. AB 1578 was composed by Corey Jackson, who represents the 60th State Assembly District, and passed the Assembly Committee on Local Government on April 14th by a 8-2 vote. It would embed one hour of anti-hate speech training into California’s sexual harassment prevention training, which the state already requires for state and local officials. The bill would become effective on January 1, 2028. The bill would not just apply to state level officials, but also city council members, county supervisors, and school board trustees across the 58 counties of California. 

The bill specifically states that state agencies must offer ethics training at least twice a year, and that officials must attend every two years. Officials must also complete anti-hate speech training within six months of taking office, then every four years from there. Local agency officials specifically must complete the hour of training within six months of taking office, and attend every four years after. The California constitution also requires reimbursement for this training. Jackson claimed that the bill was an appropriate public safety response to “documented trends in hate activity”, referencing findings from the Commission on the State of Hate. He claimed that words of officials heavily influence hatred, claiming that they are “the primary impetus of hate crimes”. With this, he suggests that correcting this through AB 1578 will uphold the state's claim of valuing equality. 

That being said, California and the federal government do not currently have an official legal definition for “hate speech”. The Supreme Court case Matal v. Tam upheld the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech and ruled that the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act, which denied trademarks that disparage, was unconstitutional. The bill additionally delegates the curriculum design to exterior parties and does not establish standards for who develops the training or what views may be promoted in the training. 

Given this lack of definition and delegation of content and interpretation to exterior parties, residents of California have raised concerns about subjectivity and bias among the training. The California Family Council (CFC) believes that this training will label unpopular Christian viewpoints related to sexuality and gender as hateful based on comments from California legislators over recent years. The CFC specifically stated that “Mandatory ideological training that frames certain viewpoints, particularly traditional religious beliefs about marriage, sexuality, or gender, as inherently hateful would stigmatize these individuals”. With this, a couple concerns are raised regarding the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Firstly, Christians and other religious practitioners must make the choice to either comply with training that may frame their sincerely held beliefs as intolerable, or fail a government mandated requirement. Secondly, since Free Exercise protects from acting against one’s religious beliefs, and the Free Speech protects from being forced to conform with beliefs that one rejects. With that, one could argue that the bill requiring officials to treat religious beliefs as hate could implicate both. This raises the question: does requiring mandatory training that may label certain religious views as “hate speech” violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

This case is similar to Sherbert v. Verner since government officials were forced to make a choice between religious convictions and public benefit, with both cases creating a choice between faith and office. In addition, in Sherbert the state placed an indirect burden by denying benefits, and in this bill, opposers argue that the state is imposing an indirect burden by requiring officials to go through training that may deem their sincerely held religious beliefs to be intolerable hate speech. 

In my opinion, this bill is unconstitutional as it forces officials to make a choice between faith and office. First and foremost, the fact that it is built around the term “hate speech”, which is not defined by the California or US government, is already questionable. Given that the training is administered with hostility toward religious viewpoints, which the CFC suggests that the California legislature has already demonstrated, a substantial burden is placed on free exercise. If an official with sincerely held religious beliefs must sit through this training that frames their beliefs as hateful in order to remain in office, the government is implying that the practice of their faith makes them unfit for their position. While the bill looks neutral from the surface as it applies to all, the fact that it would burden certain religious beliefs in practice makes it not neutral. In addition, since there are no defined standards of curriculum content, the state can delegate curriculums which target viewpoints that they oppose, making it not generally accessible. While the state’s interest in reducing hate speech and crimes is compelling, the government would likely not be able to prove that this training is the least restrictive means in achieving this as the training labels certain beliefs as hateful. The bill would need to define “hate speech”, establish standards for content, and explicitly exclude sincerely held religious beliefs from that definition in order to achieve the least restrictive means.

 

Harris v. Muhammad

Maurice Lydell Harris is a California state prisoner who identifies as a Nichiren Buddhist. As a Nichiren Buddhist, Harris believes that he must follow a clean diet. The clean diet includes “‘not highly processed,’ ‘organic,’ ‘not artificial or synthetic,’ ‘described as natural,’ and which do not ‘have a chemical-sounding name.’” While the prison did not have a specific diet program for his specific religion, he enrolled in the halal prison diet, as he believed that this was the program that most closely aligned with his religious beliefs. The prison diet that Harris chose was called the Religious Meat Alternative Program (RMAP). However, the prison removed him from the diet plan when he “purchased non-halal items from the prison commissary.” Harris argued that his First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) rights were violated, so he filed suit. 

The RMAP diet that Harris enrolled in had specific requirements for its participants. It required that they not purchase any food that is not part of their religious diets, but are allowed to eat those foods if the RMAP meals are unavailable for whatever reason. California argues that these rules must be enforced strictly because, if they aren’t, it opens the door to people who enroll in the program insincerely, simply because they prefer the food to the normal diet plan. It also costs more than the normal meal plans, so the prison wants to make sure that every member of the diet is sincere. 

In 2018, the prison changed the ingredients of the RMAP, replacing “halal meat with vegetarian options.” Harris said that he felt malnourished, and his doctor told him to increase the amount of calories and protein he was eating. Harris also had an irregular heartbeat, and all of these factors led him to buy non-halal products. He bought non-halal items such as “beef and chicken flavored instant ramen soups, pork rinds, beef steaks, and salami.” All of these are highly processed foods, which violate the halal diet. In 2019, Harris received his first warning and continued to get warnings all the way through 2022. Harris argued that the ramen products were a “staple in Nichiren Buddhist culture.” In 2023, Harris received more violations and was eventually cut from the RMAP. Harris filed for a preliminary injunction but was denied by the district court. 

The primary issue the Ninth Circuit had to decide was whether Harris's beliefs were sincere. The decision first went through the lower court, in which the Ninth Circuit Court argued that they made a poor decision as they “erroneously dictated the content of Harris’s beliefs and questioned the centrality of those beliefs.” The lower court agreed with the prison and decided to affirm the decision to cut Harris from the RMAP. The Ninth Circuit Court decided to review the decision made by the district court because it believed that there could be a case of abuse of discretion. The Court argued that neither the district court nor the prison “inquired into the sincerity of Harris’s beliefs, only their centrality to his religion.” The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the decision, meaning that the decision made by the district court would be nullified and the Ninth Circuit would send it back to the district court for a correct ruling, making sure they look at all of the factors. 

Harris argued that denying him access to the RMAP was a substantial burden on his religious exercise. He argued that prison forced him to choose between following a diet that partially followed his religious beliefs, and following that diet, but breaking the rules of the diet to buy other foods he believed were important to him, following his religion. He is essentially saying that he will either have to sacrifice his religious beliefs or his health. The Court argued that Harris is requesting to be reenrolled in RMAP while allowing him to purchase other goods that also follow his religious beliefs. He is not asking for a separate meal plan; he is just asking to be able to accommodate himself while still following the basic dietary guidelines of the RMAP. 

A relevant precedent is O’lone v Estate of Shabazz(1987) because it deals with prisoners' religious rights. Two prisoners, Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen, were Muslim inmates at New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison and were denied the opportunity to go to their weekly religious service on Fridays. They were denied because of their classification within the prison and were forced to work during the weekly service. They sued the prison, arguing that their Free Exercise rights had been violated. The Third Circuit Court agreed with the inmates, arguing that the prison was required to seek alternatives and present proof that there were no other reasonable alternatives. The Supreme Court overturned its decision, arguing that the prison had a compelling interest in keeping order within the prison. They also concluded that being held in a prison places necessary limitations on inmates' rights, and they felt that to keep order within the prison, a necessary burden had to be placed on the inmates' rights. 

In my opinion, I agree with Harris’s argument. The prison does not have a plan that follows Harris’s specific religion, so he was forced to join the RMAP, which only partially followed his religious beliefs. The RMAP also switched out the protein from the halal meat to vegetarian options, which had an impact on the health of Harris. The doctor said that he needed to consume more protein, which made Harris need to buy non-halal foods to make up for the protein he was missing. Not only was there a substantial burden on his religious beliefs when he was removed from the program, but there were also significant health concerns. The health concerns were a result of the RMAP changing the ingredients, and there were no records of Harris violating the RMAP before 2017-2018, because he was getting the protein he needed. He also claims that the foods he bought did not violate his specific religious diet, even if they violated the RMAP guidelines. There isn’t enough of a compelling interest from the prison or the state to deny Harris access to the RMAP, with the ability to purchase products that violate the RMAP. All of the prisoners in that specific diet program already follow it because it is their specific religion. Harris is not Muslim, but it is the best option that fits his Nichiren Buddhist religious beliefs. He should be reenrolled in the RMAP with the exemption, unless the court determines that he is insincere in his religious beliefs. 

Sources:

24-3307.pdf

24-3307 Harris v. Muhammad, et al. - YouTube

O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz | Oyez

When ICE Comes to Church: Does the Revocation of the Sensitive Locations Policy Violate RFRA?

            The case of Mennonite Church USA v. US Department of Homeland Security raises a question that sits at the intersection of immigration enforcement and religious freedom: when does the federal government’s conduct at or near a house of worship cross the line into a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? On January 20, 2025, the Trump administration rescinded the Department of Homeland Security’s “sensitive location” policy, which had restricted Immigration and Customs Enforcement from conducting raids at churches, mosques, synagogues and schools for over thirty years. In its place, the acting DHS Secretary directed ICE officers to rely on “discretion” and “common sense” when conducting enforcement actions at places of worship. Within weeks of the change, over two dozen Christian and Jewish organizations filed suit against the DHS in deferral court. The case remains active on appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court.

           The plaintiffs’ argument is grounded primarily in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. This standard is applied even when the burden results from a facially neutral, generally applicable policy. Unlike a purely First Amendment challenge, RFRA cannot be sidestepped by simply arguing that the rescission was not aimed at religion. The question is whether it substantially burdens religious exercise in practice and if it does, the burden shifts entirely to the government to justify it.

            The facts of the case suggest the answer to the first question is yes. Since the rescission, congregations with large immigrant memberships reported large drops in attendance, with some losing up to 100 weekly attendees. Congregations providing food distribution, soup kitchens, and weekly meals (which the plaintiffs argue is an expression of their faith not an optional charity) have also reported declining participation. When congregation members stop attending services because ICE may enter, or when food pantries become empty because those who need help are afraid enter, the ability to actively exercise religion as a group is diminished.

           The District Court, in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in April of 2025, focuses mainly on standing rather than the merits of the RFRA claim itself. The ruling judge found that the plaintiffs had not established a credible threat of enforcement because DHS had not specifically directed agents to target churches. This is an important distinction because standing doctrine and RFRA’s substantial burden analysis are separate inquires which will need to be examined by the D.C. Circuit Court. The attendance declines alone provide significant evidence of the presence of a substantial burden, even without direct enforcement action at a plaintiff’s church.

            Assuming substantial burden can be established, the government then faces two additional hurdles: demonstrating compelling interest and proving it has chosen the least restrictive means of achieving its goal. On the issue of compelling interest, the government must show a specific interest that justifies the burden on this form of religious exercise. The relevant question is not whether immigration enforcement is compelling in the abstract, but whether there is compelling interest in conducting enforcement specifically at or near a place of worship rather than somewhere else. The DHS offered no evidence that the prior sensitive locations policy had allowed criminals to shelter in churches or meaningfully impeded immigration enforcement.

            Furthermore, the least restrictive means facet of RFRA is where the DHS’s position is the weakest. The prior sensitive locations policy itself was a less restrictive alternative to immigration enforcement as it permitted enforcement actions at houses of worship under emergency circumstances or written supervisory approval. That framework coexisted with immigration enforcement for more than thirty years. Replacing it with nothing more than personal officer discretion is very difficult to justify as the least restrictive option when a more tailored alternative had already existed for so long.

            In my opinion, the plaintiffs ultimately have a stronger argument, even if the District Court’s procedural ruling was defensible on its own terms. What stands out to me the most is the least restrictive means question. The government is not being asked to totally stop enforcing immigration law, but rather they are being asked to explain why it needs to enforce it specifically inside places of worship without any procedural guardrails. The prior policy answered that question for thirty years. The rescission of the policy provides no answer at all.

            That being said, I do think that this case exposes a genuine tension between religion and executive power. Immigration enforcement is legitimate and constitutionally grounded function of the executive branch, and courts historically have been rather reluctant to oppose enforcement policies. One could argue that requiring supervisory approval before entering a church imposes a true operational constraint on time-sensitive executive action. But under RFRA, the government does not get the benefit of the doubt, rather it bears the burden of providing sufficient proof. The complete elimination of a decades-old protective framework, without evidence of necessity and without considering a less restrictive alternative, does not meet the burden of proof required.

            Ultimately, Mennonite Church USA v. US Department of Homeland Security asks whether RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard has any real force when invoked against widespread executive enforcement priorities. The answer the D.C. Circuit gives will matter beyond immigration policy. If the government can suddenly rescind longstanding protections for religious exercise without satisfying RFRA’s demanding tests, the practical value of the statute and its protections become significantly diminished. The church has long been understood as a place of sanctuary. Whether that understanding survives this time of aggressive enforcement is now up to the courts.

Sources:

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11490

https://www.brethren.org/news/2025/general-secretarys-declaration-filed/

https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/our-work/defending-immigrants-and-sanctuary-cities/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security-u-s-district-court-for-d-c-2025/

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/religious-groups-sue-over-immigration-raids-at-places-of-worship

Coates v. Williamson et al.

Keshel S. Coates is an African American, non-Catholic woman employed as a first-grade teacher at St. Peter Claver Catholic School (SPCCS). Coates brought this case against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah (RCDS), SPCCS, Principal Sister Cheryl Hillig, and the school Superintendent Carrie Jane Williamson. She alleged nine counts of allegations against the group, of which the major allegations were race and religious discrimination, constitutional violations, and a breach of contract.

Coates stated that during her interview, she informed Hillig that she would not worship as a Catholic. Hillig allegedly assured her and stated that she would only need to escort students to Mass, while another teacher handled religious instruction. Despite these assurances being only verbal, Coates signed employment agreements stating that her employment was conditional and rested on her adhering to Catholic tenets, thus acknowledging her role was "Ministerial." Throughout her time on the job, Coates received positive reviews and initially did not participate in religious rituals, as she stated she would not. However, she alleges that Hillig eventually pressured her to participate in religious rituals, such as requiring all faculty, religious and non-religious, to receive ashes on Ash Wednesday. 

In April of 2024, Coates provided a police statement regarding an incident involving another teacher and a student. Afterward, she alleges she faced increased scrutiny and "fabricated allegations." Then, on May 29, 2024, a month later, Coates was informed her contract would not be renewed by SPCCS. The reason given was her failure to "fully participate in the religious aspects" of the school program, which she alleged was verbally promised she wouldn’t have to do. Coates then filed a lawsuit based on nine expressed counts, of which three, in relation to religious discrimination under Title VII, were dismissed. Three more, in relation to employment discrimination and retention, proceeded, and the final three were dismissed as well.

The US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed Coates’ claims for religious discrimination under Title VII. Title VII contains an express exemption allowing religious educational institutions to employ individuals based on their religious beliefs. Because SPCCS is a religious institution, it is legally permitted, in some ways, to discriminate based on religion for work connected to its activities. Thus, Coates' claims of religious discrimination were denied by the Court.

 Williamson et al. argued that the "ministerial exception," which prevents courts from interfering in how religious groups select their leaders, should be able to block all of Coates’ employment claims. However, upon examining the role required of Coates, the Court found that while Coates’ contract called her a "minister," she had reasonably claimed that her duties in practice were secular. She did not teach religion or lead prayer in any way, and SPCCS allegedly accepted her non-participation for two years. Due to the fact that it was plausible she served a non-ministerial function, the motion to dismiss her employment claims was denied by the court.

Lastly, Coates alleged that there were violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court found that section 1983 only applied to "state actors" acting under color of law. SPCCS was considered a private entity; thus, the Court ruled that receiving federal funds or being subject to state accreditation does not turn a private school into a state actor. Ultimately, this meant that the claims made by Coates via section 1983 were dismissed. In the end, the court chose to proceed with the claims on Racial discrimination (Title VII/§ 1981), retaliation claims, and state law claims/breach of contract.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC is an important case to look toward when thinking about how the ministerial exemption is being discussed in Coates v. Williamson et al. Historically, the court has decided the role of “ministerial” through the actions and duties of the individual in question. Contrary to Perch in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court found that although the role upon hiring was ministerial, the role in practice was not religious. Coates was restrained from getting involved with any religious practices within her duties; this was judged differently from Perch, who was deeply involved with both the religious and secular parts of her job. Furthermore, Perch was a leader within the church and school communities and acted as a direct public representation of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. 

Another important case that played a role in this decision is Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, which was quoted by the judge when making the decisions for Coates v. Williamson et al. Following the decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court reinforced its evaluation of the role of a minister. The Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru led to the expansion of ministerial exemption as it held that the formal title of ministerial doesn't matter as much as function, and even teachers with relatively limited religious duties can fall under the exception. I believe Coates’ greatest challenge will be centered around her duty being non-religious, but her signing agreements which label her official capacity as ministerial. As she agreed to the role and the weight the title bears. Furthermore, the agreement stated that teachers would serve as “a Catholic role model, both inside and outside the classroom, regardless of his/her personal beliefs or different religious affiliation.”

 Coates also technically failed to meet the criteria given by the school; thus, her termination was indeed valid. The court may be able to find evidence of retaliation, but when looking at whether the claim is reasonable, I believe that it is. Coates' claim to a verbal agreement holds little to no weight against written agreements; thus, I do not believe this aspect of the case will be ruled in her favor. With the decisions made in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, I believe that Coates has some chances of winning the case, but I can also make various points in which she may not.

South Carolina Resident refuses Poll Working's 'So Help Me God' requirement

On October 8, 2025, South Carolina resident James Reel filed a lawsuit against the Greenville County Voter Registration Office for violating his right to freedom of religious expression and the Establishment Clause. Reel sought to become a poll worker for future elections and attempted to complete the training required before the 2024 November election. In December 2023, after completing the required online poll worker training courses, Reel learned about the religious oath required of poll workers. Applicants who complete the training are required to certify an oath prescribed by the statute. The oath includes the statement, “So help me God,” which Reel claimed went against his beliefs as an atheist. He said that he, with his conscience as a non-believer, can’t swear by God. Reel called a representative of the county elections office to request that he be allowed to strike out that part of the oath. However, the representative stated that the oath was dictated by the state’s statute, so a version of the oath without that phrase wouldn’t be valid. Reel tried to offer a secular alternative to the oath, but that also wasn’t accepted.

There’s an implication within S.C. Code § 7-13-72, stating “After their appointment, the managers and clerks must take and subscribe, before any officer authorized to administer oaths, the following oath of office prescribed by Section 26 of Article III of the Constitution: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm)...” An affirmation, unlike an oath, is a vow without referring to a religious deity, but the Interim Executive Director declared that citizens who don’t abide by the oath are ineligible to work as a poll worker and that affirmations/exceptions weren’t an option for future applicants. In response, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, composed of thousands of atheists, agnostics, and other religious dissenters, informed the director that the practice of an oath violated the First Amendment. They claimed that the Constitution bans any religious tests for public offices as "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion, in correspondence with Torcaso v. Watkins (1961).

In that case, Roy Torcaso was appointed as a notary public for Maryland. However, Maryland’s constitution required a declaration of belief in God, and Torcaso, an atheist, refused, as it went against his beliefs. His appointment was revoked, and Torcaso sued, claiming that his freedom of religious expression had been violated. The Supreme Court found that Maryland’s requirement for a person in office to state a belief in God violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, in 1997, Herb Silverman’s application for notary public in South Carolina was denied when he crossed out the phrase, “So help me God,” and the Supreme Court once again ruled that religious test requirements violate the Constitution.

Although the FFRF argued that the statement is coercive and denies nontheists or polytheists the right to serve as poll workers without believing in a singular deity, the Director held that the policy complies with  S.C. Code § 7-13-72. FFRF also argued that by not allowing an alternative, it’s a violation of the Establishment Clause as it’s a legal statute coercing a statement of belief in a singular God. The lawsuit specified that South Carolina routinely lets attorneys, jurors, and witnesses make secular affirmations as alternatives. Reel specified in his lawsuit that he wanted a permanent injunction that prohibits defendants from requiring citizens to swear to a god and requiring that they offer a secular alternative in the oath.

No ruling has officially been made, but I believe that the court should rule in favor of Reel. There’s already been previous Supreme Court rulings that establish that requiring religious tests is a violation, and while one could argue that needing to swear to God isn’t a religious test, the fact that no secular alternative or exemption is allowed, as well as the director calling that the oath needs to remain as is even though affirmations was included in the policy, I would argue that it is. Additionally, a statute requiring the swearing of God has no compelling state interest, as attorneys and others have been allowed to make secular affirmations already. While the inclusion of the word God has been embedded in things like the Pledge of Allegiance and other Oaths, I believe this issue is denying Reels the ability to make a secular alternative. Other religious groups such as Quakers and Jehovah' s Witnesses have barred swearing, so there’s a neutrality issue in my opinion. And finally, requiring the statement is coercive and compelled speech, as it forces people who might not agree with the swearing to a singular God by putting a job on the line.

​

Dorsey: Amazon and Employee Discrimination

Meet Connor Dorsey of Mississippi. Dorsey, a devout Catholic, is considering filing a suit against Amazon for denying him a religious accommodation that would allow him to observe the Sabbath, Holy Days of Obligation, and refrain from laboring on Sundays. His current schedule as an L5 Area Manager is what is called “Back Half Nights.” It goes from Wednesday through Saturday, and/or Thursday through Saturday/Sunday with overnight hours from 10:00 pm to 5:00 am; this equates to four days and 10 hours per day shift. Dorsey has requested numerous times to be switched to a “Back Half Days” schedule, which would allow him to have off Sundays. Despite the position being open and Dorsey fitting the job description, a Human Resources manager told him, “If we set that precedent [granting accommodations], then we’ll have to grant those requests any time we receive them.” (First Liberty Institute) That same HR manager also told Dorsey to “find a job that works out for his personal situation.” (First Liberty Dorsey Demand Letter) Dorsey’s complaint was emailed to Amazon by First Liberty Institute on April 1st, 2026, with a response deadline of April 15th; to my knowledge, Amazon has not responded. 

This case questions the precedents on the Free Exercise Clause set by numerous cases, including Sherbert v. Verner. Sherbert was a case in which the plaintiff, Adeil Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired from her job in South Carolina after refusing to work on her Sabbath Day, Saturday. The Employment Security Commission denied her unemployment benefits because of her refusal to work on her Sabbath. Interestingly, South Carolina law held that employers were not allowed to require work on Sundays. Another case similar to Sherbert is Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida. The plaintiff, also a Seventh-day Adventist, informed her employer that because of her sincerely held religious beliefs, she would not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday because it was her Sabbath day. Her employer then dismissed her, and consequently, Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation. Her compensation was denied. 

In both Sherbert and Hobbie, the Supreme Court held that both cases violated the Free Exercise Clause and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Sherbert’s outcome created the Sherbert test and set the precedent that a substantial burden cannot be placed on someone, and impede the free exercise of their religion. Hobbie set the standard that a state cannot deny unemployment compensation to someone dismissed because of religious conflicts with their employer. 

More recently, in Groff v. DeJoy, Groff, a Christian USPS worker, was fired after refusing to work Sundays because of his religious beliefs. After being scheduled on Sundays, Groff and USPS would fail to find coverage, and Groff would not work. After being fired, he sued USPS for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stating that the company failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps were unsuccessful and did not solve the conflict. Title VII, in section A, states that “All personnel actions affecting employees…in the United States Postal Service…shall be made free from any discrimination based on…religion…” (Department of Labor) Title VII also requires employers to reasonably accommodate their employees’ religion unless it would cause “undue hardship.” The Court ruled in favor of Groff because USPS did not demonstrate a substantial burden, or substantial increased costs, by granting his accommodation requests. 

Dorsey’s case relies on the precedents set in other cases, specifically concerning the Free Exercise Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the view of First Liberty Institute and Dorsey, Amazon is required to grant his religious accommodation, unless it can prove that doing so would cause substantial increased costs. Despite multiple attempts at solutions by Dorsey, Amazon has ignored his requests in addition to scheduling him this past Easter Sunday. Due to instances like this, Dorsey has had to use numerous PTO days; he has taken one every Sunday since January 19th, 2026. 

My intuition in this case is that Amazon will be very unlikely to show any undue hardship, like in Groff, because of Dorsey’s absences on Sundays. His PTO days have been approved every Sunday for multiple months, and he has not faced any disciplinary actions for taking off every week. In addition, Amazon is the second-largest private employer in the country, and as a private employer, subject to scrutiny under Title VII. Amazon has clearly demonstrated knowledge of Dorsey’s sincerely held religious beliefs through multiple meetings with HR. I believe that it is unconstitutional for Amazon to place a substantial burden on Dorsey by giving him no other solution besides draining his PTO days and denying him the free exercise of his religion. Denying him these rights would overturn all three cases described: Sherbert, Hobbie, and Groff. This case has not yet made it to court, and I am curious to see what Amazon’s defense is. 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/connor-dorsey/#simple1

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/480/136/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/22-174

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/centers-offices/civil-rights-center/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-of-1964

Sincerity of Nick Rolovich's Religious Beliefs

In October 2021, former Washington State Football Coach Nick Rolovich was fired because he refused to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Rolovich had claimed that as a Catholic, he was exempt from the state’s vaccine mandate, but his exemption request was denied by the school, which eventually led to his termination when he still refused to get the vaccine. In 2021, Washington State had given religious and medical exemptions for the vaccine mandate, but not ones based on personal and philosophical reasoning. Washington State found that Rolovich’s religious convictions were not sincere and thus did not provide him with a religious exemption for the COVID-19 vaccine mandate.

Subsequently, on November 14, 2022, Rolovich filed litigation against the school over the denial of the religious exemption, where they deemed his beliefs as not being sincere. Fast forward a few years, in January 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Rice ruled that Washington State could not accommodate Rolovich’s religious exemption without undue hardship because of his position that involves him directly interacting with students, coworkers, donors, the media, and others. In other words, the judge is suggesting that this accommodation would pose a significant burden for the school. Furthermore, the judge added that in thousands of pages of evidence, there were many examples of Rolovich expressing secular concerns about the vaccine, but not religious ones, which aligned with Washington State's previous assessment of Rolovich’s religious beliefs when he filed for a religious exemption. Ultimately, the judge reaffirmed and justified Washington State University’s decision to fire Rolovich.

Although the original lawsuit was filed nearly five years ago, Becket Law has stepped in to help Rolovich appeal his case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Becket Law explains that Patrick Chun, former Washington State athletic director, exhibited hostile actions toward Rolovich when Rolovich discussed his intentions of applying for a religious exemption that would go through a blind review process by the school. Despite these hostile actions, Rolovich submitted his religious exemption proposal, which was later approved because the review board found his religious views were sincerely held. However, Becket Law says that Chun and others in the athletics department asked the school to reverse its approval by questioning the sincerity and religious nature of his beliefs. Washington State University’s Environmental Health and Safety department proposed accommodations to the athletics department, but they were rejected. Becket Law, when it comes to their future litigation, is painting this case as one that is an attack on individual beliefs, and they are looking to prove that Rolovich’s religious beliefs are sincere. Ultimately, I believe the main issue in this case is whether Washington State University violated Nick Rolovich’s right to Free Exercise by denying him a religious exemption because they deemed his religious beliefs to be insincere. 

United States v. Ballard (1944) applies to Rolovich’s case because it set a precedent for examining the sincerity of religious beliefs. In this case, Guy Ballard was charged with mail fraud by preaching a religion that the lower court accused Ballard of knowing was false. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that religion should be determined by the sincerity of the belief, not by whether it is true or false. The court pointed out that if Ballard’s religion was to be put on trial, then the same would have to be done for other organized religions. This precedent applies to Rolovich’s case as he and Becket Law are looking to prove the sincerity of his religious beliefs as they pursue further litigation. The Court can not tell him his beliefs are false, but they can certainly examine how sincerely he holds them and if they are sincere enough to have been awarded a religious exemption. However, it seems that this might be a difficult feat given that Rolovich has only expressed secular reasons for not getting the vaccine, and not religious ones. 

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) is worth including in this discussion as the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, explained that the Cantwells' religious messaging, while offensive to some, did not threaten physical harm to any individuals and was protected by the First Amendment. This case helped establish protection for an individual’s religious beliefs against state action, which is similar to what Rolovich is fighting in his case as he fights for religious protection against the State of Washington’s COVID vaccine mandate. Cantwell draws many parallels to Rolovich’s case, with the most notable being that they are Free Exercise issues, but I think there is a glaring difference between them, which is that Rolovich’s action could lead to physical harm. Without obtaining the vaccine, Rolovich was putting everyone else at risk because he had an increased chance of contracting the virus and spreading it to others in the community. While this is up for argument, I believe that the COVID vaccine mandate is a neutral policy that has the secular intention of protecting people from public health threats like COVID, and Rolovich was contributing to this threat by not getting vaccinated. 

In the end, I side with the U.S. District Court’s decision that Washington State was justified in firing Nick Rolovich. I do not think Rolovich deserved a religious exemption, as evidence suggests that he was expressing secular concerns about the COVID vaccine to his family, friends, and coworkers rather than expressing religious concerns about it. There is seemingly a lack of consistency in his expression of his beliefs, which I think is needed to earn a religious exemption from this vaccine mandate that has secular intentions of minimizing a public health threat. From the evidence I gathered for this blog post, it seems that Rolovich had turned to his Catholic faith as a last-ditch effort to earn an exemption from the vaccine mandate. While Ballard helped clarify that religious beliefs should be judged based on sincerity, it is still difficult to determine an individual's sincerity toward religion, as there is a lot of nuance involved in these types of cases. However, in this case, I find that the evidence presented in the discovery phase clearly shows that Rolovich’s reservations about the vaccine are purely secular. Unless Becket Law is able to produce new evidence to prove Rolovich’s sincerity, I think that this decision will continue to stand as they continue to pursue further litigation.

Sources:  

https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/43323303/nick-rolovich-loses-suit-washington-state-firing

https://www.kxly.com/sports/wsu-cougars/judge-rules-in-favor-of-washington-state-university-in-rolovich-vaccine-case/article_713af8b4-cc66-11ef-a8af-bb49c3f32edd.html

https://becketfund.org/case/rolovich-v-washington-state-university/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296

https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-chemerinsky/first-amendment-religion/united-states-v-ballard/