How Does Qualified Immunity of Public Officials Interact with the First Amendment?

In Bossier, Louisiana, Richard Hershey stood outside of a Christian rock concert (on public property) to hand out pamphlets to spread awareness about his religion: the Christian Vegetarian Association. While he was expressing his First-Amendment right of free-exercise of religion and of free speech, he was threatened with arrest and forced to leave by both the local police and the concert arena staff. As a result, Hershey sued the city, along with those he found to be individually guilty, including the Deputy Marshal present, as well as several others who he also claimed to have curbed his First Amendment rights (Richard Hershey v. City of Bossier (LA), Bobby Gilbert, Daniel Stoll, David Smith, Tyshon Harvey, Eugene Tucker).

 However, Hershey “filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under a statute commonly known as Section 1983. But rather than vindicate his rights, the federal district court granted the officers qualified immunity, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.” In other words, Hershey attempted to express how his First Amendment right was infringed upon, and used Section 1938 to hold his perpetrators accountable. Yet, he was unsuccessful as the defendants were granted qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a protection which “allows state and local officials to avoid personal consequences related to their professional interactions unless they violate ‘clearly established law’ and has been repeatedly used by police officers to escape accountability and civil liability.” This application of qualified immunity complicates a seemingly simple case of free exercise, and raises the following constitutional question: To what extent does the First Amendment protect an individual’s right to distribute religious literature on publicly owned property, and can government officials avoid liability for restricting that expression by relying on qualified immunity or delegating authority to private entities? What takes precedence: The First Amendment or qualified immunity? 

To answer the first prong of the above question, this case clearly relates to Marsh v. Alabama (1946). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a privately owned company town could not prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious literature on its streets. This case is relevant to Hershey v. City of Bossier because both involve the distribution of religious materials in spaces that serve the public. In Hershey, the arena was publicly owned, yet it was privately managed, thus raising questions similar to Marsh about whether private management could limit First Amendment protections. That said, Marsh supports the argument that constitutional protections for public expression should not necessarily disappear simply because private entities exercise control over property traditionally used by the public. Although Marsh and Hershey differ in several factual and legal respects, both cases involve the distribution of religious materials in spaces that serve a public function. Their similarities raise the question of whether constitutional protections for religious expression should extend to these quasi-public spaces, even when private entities exercise some degree of control over them. Thus, Marsh provides a useful legal foundation for examining the First Amendment issues raised in Hershey, proving that there is a clear violation of First Amendment rights at play here. 

However, the granting of qualified immunity to the defendants raises an important question about the applicability of existing legal precedent. One particularly relevant case is Hope v. Pelzer (2002), which also examines the relationship between qualified immunity and constitutional protections. Specifically, this case dictates that qualified immunity cannot trump the the Bill of Rights In fact, Oyez explains that the the case concluded that “prison guards could be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” So, actors of the state cannot be granted qualified immunity when someone’s rights are violated in a way that would appear reasonable. However, as this case does not deal with the First Amendment or religious liberty, the lower courts did not invoke its precedent, ultimately upholding the officers’ qualified immunity.

With all of this in mind, I believe that the violation of the First Amendment should trump the qualified immunity at hand. It is beyond clear that Hershey was not guilty of any offense that solicited the threat of his arrest. His religious speech was entirely protected by the First Amendment, and there was a clear and obvious violation of his rights. Because of this, I think that this case should follow the precedent of Hope. While the lower courts did not use it as a precedent, I believe that qualified immunity should never supersede any of the core rights listed in the Bill of Rights. This case specifically showcases that religious liberty was, in fact, deprived from Hershey. Very interestingly, this case has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, with both parties filing petitions for a writ of certiorari in 2026, but the federal review of this case has not yet been granted. 

References

https://www.cato.org/blog/hershey-v-city-bossier-city-brief-qualified-immunity-should-not-shield-blatant-first-amendment

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/HersheyPetition_Redacted.pdf

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983

https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/hershey-v-city-of-bossier-city/

https://christianveg.org/

https://www.naacpldf.org/qualified-immunity/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-309

Drawing the Line for Religious Autonomy: Doe v. Catholic Relief Services

    Concerning religious freedom, what happens when the religious beliefs of an organization conflict with laws that protect employees from discrimination? Should religious organizations be permitted to make employment decisions according to their beliefs, even when those decisions would otherwise violate civil law? The Fourth Circuit confronted this difficult question in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services (2026), a case that illustrates the tension between religious institutional autonomy and the government's authority to enforce employment protections.

    John Doe, an openly gay man, was hired by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a Catholic-affiliated nonprofit organization governed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. During the hiring process, Doe disclosed that he was married to a man and asked whether his husband would qualify for dependent health insurance. He was told that he would. However, approximately five months after beginning employment, CRS informed Doe that providing benefits to his husband conflicted with its religious beliefs. The organization terminated the coverage and offered an alternative compensation arrangement, which Doe declined. After working for CRS for several years, Doe eventually resigned and brought claims under federal and Maryland employment-discrimination laws.

    The district court ruled in Doe's favor and CRS appealed—arguing that its religious beliefs and constitutional protections afforded it immunity from liability. On October 16, 2026, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgments under Title VII and Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act, while dismissing the Equal Pay Act appeal. The majority concluded that neither the statutes nor the First Amendment provided the broad immunity CRS requested.

    The constitutional question is particularly interesting because the First Amendment protects an individual's right to believe and worship while it simultaneously protects the independence of religious institutions. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (2012), the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception, which prevents government interference with a religious institution's selection of its ministers. The Court later clarified in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) that an employee's actual religious responsibilities, rather than simply their job title, determine whether the exception applies. Both decisions recognize that religious organizations must retain authority over the individuals entrusted with carrying out their religious missions.

    However, the existence of institutional autonomy does not necessarily mean that religious organizations are exempt from every law governing their employment practices. The majority relied on the distinction between protected ecclesiastical matters and ordinary secular disputes. It explained that the First Amendment protects matters such as religious doctrine, ministerial employment, church membership, hierarchy, and discipline. But it does not establish a general immunity from secular laws merely because an organization invokes religious motivation. The majority also relied on the Free Exercise framework established in Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Under Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws may ordinarily be enforced even when they incidentally burden religious exercise. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) clarify that this protection changes when government selectively burdens religious conduct or permits comparable secular conduct. In Doe, the majority concluded that the relevant statutory exemptions did not demonstrate that religious employers were treated less favorably than comparable secular employers. For example, the small-business exemptions applied equally to religious and secular organizations.

    I find the majority's reasoning persuasive because constitutional protections should have meaningful boundaries. The First Amendment protects religious institutions' independence in matters of doctrine, religious leadership, and internal ecclesiastical governance. However, this protection does not create unrestricted immunity from neutral and generally applicable civil laws—employment decisions involving nonministerial employees do not automatically constitute matters of protected ecclesiastical governance. Since Doe's responsibilities were primarily secular rather than ministerial, CRS's sincere religious beliefs should not, by themselves, establish a constitutional exemption from generally applicable employment-discrimination laws. The conclusion does not require courts to question the sincerity or theological correctness of religious beliefs. Rather, it distinguishes between protecting religious doctrine and granting immunity to conduct regulated by civil law. If religious motivation alone were sufficient to exempt an organization from employment protections, what meaningful limits would remain? Could an organization invoke its religious identity to avoid virtually any employment obligation? The majority's approach recognizes that religious liberty cannot become a blanket exemption from the legal responsibilities shared by other participants in civil society, avoiding the slippery slope.

    Judge Quattlebaum's dissent raises an important objection; he argues that church autonomy extends beyond the ministerial exception and protects religious organizations' authority to make employment decisions reflecting their theological commitments. His concern is that requiring religious institutions to comply with laws that conflict with their beliefs can interfere with their ability to preserve their religious identity. This argument deserves consideration. Religious organizations should not be forced to surrender their convictions simply because they operate within a broader legal system. Nevertheless, institutional autonomy must be distinguished from unrestricted authority over every employment relationship. Otherwise, the scope of constitutional protection would depend almost entirely on how broadly an organization characterizes its religious mission.

    Ultimately, Doe v. Catholic Relief Services demonstrates that religious freedom and civil equality need not be mutually exclusive. The First Amendment must protect religious institutions from government interference in their distinctly religious affairs. But that protection should not automatically extend to every employment decision made in the name of religion. The challenge is not whether religious autonomy deserves protection, but is in determining where that autonomy ends and the government's legitimate authority to protect individuals under neutral civil law begins.

References

Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, No. 25-1569 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026). Full opinion.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020).

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021).

When Does Religious Freedom Become Employment Discrimination? Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel

 Religious freedom is a key First Amendment protection. Religious organizations can practice their beliefs, but conflicts can arise when those beliefs clash with laws that protect people from discrimination. Should these organizations be able to make hiring decisions based on their beliefs, even if it goes against state law? This is the main issue in Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel, a Michigan case about where to draw the line between religious freedom and employment discrimination.

Christian Healthcare Centers is a nonprofit medical group in Michigan that includes Christian beliefs in its healthcare services. Employees are expected to follow specific religious principles, such as beliefs about marriage, sexuality, and gender identity. The organization also does not provide some gender-transition treatments and does not use pronouns that differ from a patient’s biological sex at birth.

The issue centers on Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in jobs and public services. In 2023, Michigan updated the law to clearly include protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. Christian Healthcare Centers said these changes might make them hire people who do not share their beliefs or offer services that go against their faith. The group sued Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel and other officials, saying that enforcing these rules would violate their constitutional rights.

In August 2026, a federal district court issued a mixed ruling. It protected the organization's religious practices involving pronouns, certain medical treatments, and hiring for its Biblical Counselor and physician positions. However, the court declined to extend those protections to all other employees. Christian Healthcare Centers appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

This case brings up key questions about the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious practice from unfair government limits. Christian Healthcare Centers says that being forced to hire people who do not share its beliefs would interfere with its religious mission. In their view, hiring is not simply a business matter but part of their religious practice.

On the other hand, Michigan has a duty to protect workers from discrimination. The state’s laws intend to give everyone equal job opportunities, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. If exemptions are too broad, these protections could be weakened, and some people might face discrimination.

A key precedent is Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In that case, the Supreme Court said that neutral laws that apply to everyone can usually be enforced, even if they affect religious practices. This means that religious beliefs do not always excuse organizations from following general laws.

However, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012), the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception, which protects religious organizations' authority to hire and fire employees who perform important religious functions. This matters here because Christian Healthcare Centers says its employees help carry out its religious mission. They should be allowed to practice their beliefs, but that freedom should not automatically exempt them from antidiscrimination laws. I believe courts should consider each employee's actual responsibilities and connection to the organization's religious mission rather than automatically granting exemptions for every position. 

For example, if someone teaches religious doctrine, gives spiritual counseling, or leads religious activities, it makes sense to require them to communicate the organization’s beliefs. Their job is directly tied to the religious mission. But things get more complicated for employees who mostly do administrative work or jobs not related to religious teaching.

If someone works in scheduling, billing, or another office job, should their personal beliefs about marriage or sexuality determine whether they can be hired? I think they usually should not. While the organization has religious values, these workers are not in charge of teaching or sharing those beliefs. Allowing discrimination in all jobs could make religious exemptions go further than needed to protect religious freedom.

Another consideration is that Christian Healthcare Centers offers medical care. Healthcare groups have duties to both their religious missions and their patients. I can see why some medical staff might not want to take part in treatments that go against their beliefs. Still, I think all patients deserve to be treated with respect, no matter who they are. Religious freedom should not be used as a reason to deny patients dignity or treat them unfairly. I believe the court should protect Christian Healthcare Centers’ authority to select employees for genuinely religious roles while allowing Michigan to enforce its antidiscrimination laws for other positions. Rather than automatically prioritizing religious freedom or employment equality, courts should examine the particular circumstances and responsibilities involved.

Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel shows how hard it is to balance two key American values: religious freedom and protection from discrimination. Both are important and should not be ignored just because they sometimes clash. I believe protecting religious freedom matters, but setting its limits is just as important for fair treatment under the law.

The Limits to Religious Freedom and Government Power: The Case of Youth 71Five Ministries

    Religious freedom is one of the Constitution's most important protections, but does the religious freedom and importance it holds in the Constitution mean a religious organization should be exempt from the rules attached to government funding? And how much excessive control should the government have over an organization’s religious practices simply because it provides financial assistance? In the case of Youth71 Five Ministries v. Williams, these questions were at the center of a 2025 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

Youth 71 Five Ministries is a Christian nonprofit organization in Oregon that provides mentoring, youth centers, vocational training, and other programs for at-risk young people. While the organization serves youth regardless of their religious beliefs, its primary mission is to share Christianity. As a result, it requires employees and volunteers to affirm a statement of Christian faith. Since 2017, the organization has received multiple grants from Oregon’s Youth Development division. However, for the 2023-2025 grant cycle, Oregon introduced a new requirement prohibiting grant recipients from discriminating in employment based on religion and other characteristics (the state discovered this practice after receiving an anonymous complaint). Although Youth 71Five maintained its Christian hiring requirements, it certified compliance with the new policy, believing its religious practices were constitutionally protected. Oregon initially offered the organization $410,000 in grants but withdrew the money after discovering its hiring practices. Youth 71Five sued, arguing that Oregon had violated its First Amendment rights. In June 2024, the district court ruled against the ministry and dismissed its lawsuit. Later, on August 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit partially reversed that decision: Oregon could enforce nondiscrimination requirements for state-funded grants as that is constitutionally neutral, but this non- discriminatory requirement did not extend to the ministry’s activities receiving no funding from Oregon’s Youth Development Division. The Court did not order Oregon to restore the grants.

Fundamental to this case is the Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious practice from improper government interference. One of the main constitutional debates of this case is: Is the government turning down Youth 71Five because of what they wanted to do with the grant money or because they are a religious institution? In the case of Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld Washington State’s decision to exclude students from pursuing devotional theology degrees from a publicly funded scholarship program, recognizing that the state had a legitimate interest in not funding the religious training of ministers, and this could be considered an overlap between church and state. In contrast, in the case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), it was established that the government cannot deny an otherwise eligible religious organization a public benefit simply because of its religious status. This case established important protections against excluding religious organizations because of their religious status. These two cases show that the government cannot discriminate against an organization merely for being religious, but it can impose constitutional restrictions on how public funds are used; if funds are used to fund a program that has discriminatory practices, that would look as the government endorses that behaviour.

I believe that the Ninth Circuit Court applied this distinction in this case. Oregon did not deny funding simply because Youth 71Five was a Christian organization or because it promoted Christianity. This ministry intended to promote Christianity and accentuate the importance of a relationship with Jesus Christ. The Organization also required all of its employees and volunteers to affirm their Christian beliefs, which was in violation of Oregon’s nondiscrimination requirements. This is an important part of the state's argument. In my opinion, this case more closely corresponds to Locke v. Davey, while in this case it isn't a matter of the state funding a minister, a leader of a religion, this case reiterates that one can exercise their religion freely but the government can decline to subsidize certain activities. Both cases simply drew distinctions concerning funding rather than flat out excluding an applicant, because they are religious, no one told Davey that he can not pursue that theology degree, but the state can not fund it. This notion of funding a religious education also corresponds to Youth 71Five as they both consider government's discretion to fund a religious education. The state is not prohibiting Youth 71Five from practicing and spreading Christianity and even allows flexibility for Christian programs within its grant-funded initiatives. The detail of this case being that the discriminatory hiring practices would make it unconstitutional as the government would be publicly funding and there by endorsing christianity, and the turning away of people who have different beliefs. In both cases, neither government was prohibiting or regulating religious practice, but imposing limits on what they were willing to financially support. The state of Oregon continued funding faith-based organizations, but because of the ministry's failure to apply with the nondiscrimination requirements the grant was pulled.

Ultimately, I agree with the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the basis that it establishes an important balance between protecting religious freedom and allowing the government to enforce reasonable restrictions on taxpayer-funded programs. I believe and agree that religious programs, especially those looking to help troubled individuals, should have every right to practice and spread their beliefs and operate without government interference. However, religious freedom does not mean an organization receiving government funding should not adhere to non-discrimination requirements, and the government should not be funding the spreading a certain religion. The Ninth Circuit wasn’t ruling that these hiring requirements that the ministry had in place had to go away, but the government could not give them financial support while spreading a specific religion and discriminating about who is hired at the location; this is where I see contrast between this case and Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), Youth 71Five is spreading christianity in a discriminatory manner. The First Amendment protects religious freedoms and liberties, but it doesn't guarantee access to taxpayers' money. The ministry was not denied funding because of its religious identity or its mission to spread Christianity- rather because of the requirement of employees to adhere to christian beliefs. I agree with the Ninth Circuit court because the government should be able to enforce neutral requirements when there are public funds involved without preventing religious organizations from practicing their faith. ​

Can Universities Restrict Religious Student Organizations?

        Two fundamental principles should guide public universities when creating regulations for religious student groups. First, universities have the authority to regulate student organizations. Second, universities must protect students’ right to practice their religion freely. Women of Victory at Virginia State University v. Branch (2026) raises questions about where to draw the line between these two principles. In this case, two Christian student organizations accuse Virginia State University (VSU) of religious discrimination after the university introduced a policy that removed their official recognition and required them to get permission before holding events. Based on the allegations in the complaint, I believe VSU's policy raises concerns about religious neutrality and whether its rules are generally applicable to all student organizations.

        Before this policy, Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship were registered student organizations at VSU. They could organize Bible studies, host events, and maintain relationships with their national organizations. However, when VSU introduced the new policy, both Christian groups lost their registered status and were placed under the authority of a university-appointed Campus Minister. They needed permission to hold events, invite guest speakers, and organize fundraising activities. The court stated that the Muslim Student Association and VSU Community Faith Alliance could continue operating independently. These cases show that the university did not enforce the policy uniformly. Because certain religious groups were allowed to operate independently while Christian groups were not, the university treated the groups differently.

        The Women of Victory organized an informal pajama party over Labor Day weekend. The complaint says Campus Minister Thomas Wynn criticized the group's leader for organizing the party without prior approval. The policy is alleged to have been enforced in similar cases involving Christian students. If other organizations could hold similar gatherings without permission, it would raise additional concerns about whether VSU enforced its rules neutrally. The Christian student groups sued the university in federal court on September 24, 2026. The students argued that the university violated their First Amendment rights. The two main constitutional issues are whether the policy itself is unconstitutional or whether the university is enforcing it unconstitutionally. VSU argues that the policy was developed to coordinate and manage religious activities on campus. According to Campus Minister Wynn, VSU aimed to offer guidance to students from various religious backgrounds. The right to freedom of religion prevents discrimination based on personal beliefs. I believe that the inequality shown by the university when dealing with Christian clubs is highly discriminatory and has violated the provisions of the Constitution. Even if VSU had good reasons for this policy, it needed to ensure the regulations were generally applicable.

        An important case for understanding this issue is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010). In Martinez, Hastings College of the Law did not officially recognize the Christian Legal Society because its membership requirements violated the school's policy and required registered organizations to accept all students. The Christian group argued that the university discriminated based on religious belief. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, and the majority ruled that Hastings' policy was reasonable and neutral because it applied equally to every student organization. The Court explained that the Christian Legal Society was asking for an exception to a rule everyone else had to follow. The policy's equal application was important because the university did not single out Christian students for different treatment.​

        Martinez's reasoning is relevant here when considering VSU's policy. Both cases revolve around Christian groups being denied some benefit because of their officially recognized status. The only distinction here is whether the university treats all groups equally. In Women of Victory, the plaintiffs argue that the university restricts Christian groups and allows other religious groups to remain independent. While the plaintiff in Martinez sought an exemption from the rule that applied to all groups, Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship seek to be treated the same as all other groups.

        This policy raises constitutional issues. Muslim Student Association will maintain its independence, but the Christians have to be monitored by the university. The policy does not state that Christianity is being targeted, but the exemptions it provides lead to discrimination. The university's application of this policy is also an issue. It requires Christians to seek permission for any gathering, unlike others.

        I side with Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship because I do not think public universities should place greater restrictions on Christian organizations than on other religious groups. VSU has the authority to establish reasonable rules for student activities, but those rules must be neutral and applied consistently. Under Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a university can restrict a religious organization as long as it applies equal rules to all. VSU has crossed its constitutional boundaries by treating certain religions differently.

Sources:

https://adflegal.org/article/women-of-victory-explainer/ 

https://adfmedia.org/case/women-of-victory-at-virginia-state-university-v-branch/

TST's Attempt to Celebrate the Holiday Season Becomes Extremely Controversial

In this case, The Satanic Temple Inc. and Mortimer Adramelech v. Mark Campbell, Adam Steen, and the Iowa Department of Administrative Services, we see a group of individuals seeking to freely exercise their religion within the Iowa State Capitol building. However, this practice is extremely controversial and complicated for a few reasons that we’ll dive into a little further.

The Satanic Temple sought permission to hold a one-day holiday event in the Iowa State Capitol Rotunda. This event would take place on December 12, 2026. At this event, attendees would engage in many activities such as different rituals, caroling, coloring pages for children, ornament-making for families, etc. However, the event would also include a Krampus costume contest, and this causes some concern for certain individuals.

The group had previously sought to hold events very similar to this one in 2024 and 2025 and the Iowa State Department of Administrative Services denied those applications. There was an approved event in 2023 where the group was permitted to hold a display in the Capitol alongside other groups and their displays. The Satanic Temple chose to erect a display of “Baphomet” which became controversial and was destroyed by a man who traveled all the way from Mississippi to do so. The reason for the 2024 denial was in part due to the prior vandalism, but was largely centered around the costume contest. “Krampus” is a horned figure, said to be half-goat, half-demon, and he traditionally accompanies Santa Claus during the Christmas season, most of the time carrying sticks. Legend has it that while Santa rewards well behaved children with gifts, Krampus punishes misbehaving children. Director Adam Steen, after reviewing photos of the proposed costumes, cited concerns that allowing this event to take place in the State Capitol building would be dangerous as the sticks could be used as weapons against children, and also that the event could be “harmful to minors.” After this denial The Satanic Temple offered to eliminate the costume contest and modify the event but the Department never responded to this offer. When the same application was submitted in 2025, the Department again denied it in a short email, and the event was held somewhere else.

Now in 2026, a third application was submitted back in March regarding the potential event this upcoming December. The Department initially showed some cooperation. However, Director Mark Campbell has since formally denied the application, stating that it was the very same event that had previously been rejected time and time again. Because of this, The Satanic Temple sued on claims of prohibited free speech under the First Amendment, as well as violations of the Free Exercise Clause, and concerns about equal protection. They sought a preliminary injunction requiring the State of Iowa to allow their event to proceed.

In the preliminary injunction hearing the court concluded on the following. Rather than conducting his own review, Director Campbell largely relied on Steen’s denial. In addition to that, neither one of the individuals did nearly enough research into the figure Krampus in order to make an informed decision. Less restrictive means were never considered. The denial focused more on the message or symbolism of Krampus more than any actual safety threat. And finally, the Capitol had security procedures in place to help maintain safety at the event. While no official decision has been made regarding the lawsuit, the court granted the injunction and ordered The Satanic Temple’s 2026 event application to be approved by the Department.

The constitutional question at hand in this case seems pretty straight forward at face value but answering it can become quite complex. The question I would like to address is whether or not The Satanic Temple is allowed and protected by the constitution of the United States to hold its holiday event in the Iowa State Capitol building.

From a Free Exercise perspective, The Satanic Temple as a religious group has been repeatedly burdened by the state because of its religious practices, specifically, its attempt to hold a holiday event in the State Capitol building and being denied numerous times while other religious groups had been permitted to do the exact same thing. This event was part of The Satanic Temple’s religious expression, and the denial was due to judgments about the content of the religion rather than any legitimate safety threat. The event was referred to as “evil” by Campbell and Steen, showing a great deal of hostility toward the religion because of their choice of expression, and this allows us to draw on precedents from cases like Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah where government action based on hostility raises a great deal of skepticism when violations of free exercise are in question.

The question of a compelling state interest must be considered. The Department made claims of increased danger because of the event. But, the counter argument could be the fact that the Capitol had procedures in place to make sure that no dangerous objects entered the building. In my mind, this significantly weakens the argument of a compelling state interest because of “sticks” at a costume contest. If the compelling state interest is due to the potential harm done to minors because of the content, message, or symbolism being promoted at the event, that begins to blur the line between judging belief and action.

From an Establishment perspective, we must consider the issue of neutrality. The Capitol regularly permitted Christmas trees, nativity scenes, menorahs, and other holiday displays. One could say, “Well, those displays have long-standing historical significance since the religions they represent have been around for a long time.” This is unconstitutional. To say that one religion should be allowed but another should not simply based on how long each religion has been around is in violation of the First Amendment as it seeks to protect minority religions. If officials approved Christian holiday expression but excluded Satanic holiday expression because they considered it offensive, “scary,” or immoral, that suggests endorsements of some religious viewpoints over others, which is unconstitutional. The Establishment Clause prohibits the state from having the ability to decide which religions are acceptable or deserving of access to public forums.

I don’t think The Satanic Temple should have had its application denied time and time again simply because people don’t agree with their religious viewpoints. If safety were a legitimate concern, and there was enough of a compelling state interest I would have a harder time providing such an accommodation to this religious practice, however, the group agreed to modify its event, and on top of that, the state had security measures in place to ensure safety was maintained. I also don’t think the state should have the ability to restrict certain groups like The Satanic Temple from participating in this open forum while allowing groups of other religious faiths to freely practice and hold events. I would therefore deem the denials of The Satanic Temple’s holiday event in the Iowa State Capitol building unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

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Sources:

52-0-11.2.26.Order-on-PI.pdf

Can a City Restrict Religious Charity in Public Parks?

Feeding someone who is hungry seems like an ordinary act of charity. But what happens when a city requires a permit to serve food to the public in a park, while allowing private gatherings to serve food without one? That question is the focus of a lawsuit brought by St. Herman's Table, an Orthodox Christian ministry, against the City of Phoenix, Arizona.

Every Thursday, volunteers from St. Herman's Table have provided meals to people experiencing homelessness at Cave Creek Park. The ministry is associated with the Exaltation of the Holy Cross Orthodox Church, and its volunteers consider this work "almsgiving," or helping people in need as part of their religious obligations. According to the ministry's legal complaint, volunteers also distribute Bibles and offer opportunities for prayer alongside the meals.

In May 2026, Phoenix approved an ordinance requiring permits for organized food distribution and certain medical services in city parks. It allows only two service permits per eligible park each month. Organizing a covered event without a permit can result in a misdemeanor charge. Private gatherings, including family picnics and birthday parties, are exempt. St. Herman's Table sued in June, arguing that the ordinance would prevent its weekly ministry from continuing. A federal judge temporarily blocked enforcement against the ministry, finding it likely to succeed on its Free Exercise claim. On June 16, the judge extended that protection until a ruling on the next stage of the case.

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects religious practice against unjustified government interference. Phoenix argues that its ordinance applies to religious and secular food-distribution groups alike. The city says public distributions can create crowds, trash, and competition for park space. I think those concerns deserve serious consideration. Public parks belong to everyone, and religious groups should not automatically be exempt from reasonable safety rules.

The first constitutional question, though, is whether the ordinance is neutral and generally applicable. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court held that laws meeting those requirements ordinarily can burden religious conduct without violating the Free Exercise Clause. In Tandon v. Newsom (2021), however, the Court explained that the government cannot treat comparable secular activities more favorably than religious exercise. Comparability depends on the problems the government claims to be addressing.

Phoenix does not explicitly single out religious organizations. It also regulates secular charities, which supports the city's position. But the ordinance covers organized food distribution to the general public for charitable or humanitarian purposes while exempting private gatherings. That distinction still matters if both activities create similar crowding and waste. A birthday party with thirty guests might strain park resources more than a small group handing out meals.

Phoenix has a reasonable response. Events open to the public may attract unpredictable numbers of people, last longer, or require more coordination than private celebrations. In fact, the city has cited complaints and photographs involving alleged unsanitary conditions at food-distribution events. That evidence deserves consideration, but it does not automatically establish that every distribution presents the same problems or that a two-permit limit is necessary.

This is also why Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) matters. There, the Supreme Court struck down ordinances targeting Santeria animal sacrifice while allowing comparable secular conduct. Phoenix's rule does not openly target a religion as Hialeah's did. Still, Lukumi shows why courts should look at which activities a law restricts and which it leaves alone.

If the exempt gatherings pose comparable risks, the ordinance may fail the general-applicability requirement and face strict scrutiny. That is a separate question from whether Phoenix can justify the restriction. Under strict scrutiny, the city must show a compelling government interest and that it is using the least restrictive means to achieve it. Keeping parks safe and accessible is important, and serious sanitation or safety problems could justify strong measures. But the two-permit monthly cap seems difficult to defend as the least restrictive option. Phoenix could require cleanup, regulate events according to size, or restrict activities that actually block paths and facilities. Those measures would address the city's concerns without preventing a weekly ministry from serving meals at the same park.

Phoenix's permit guidance says applications are reviewed for compliance with the city code and park rules. But that does not solve the problem of a ministry that wants to serve the same community every Thursday. Two permits per month cannot accommodate that schedule.

I would rule in favor of St. Herman's Table if Phoenix cannot show why the exempt gatherings are less likely to create the problems it identifies. If the activities are comparable, I do not think the city has shown why a fixed permit cap is necessary when less restrictive options exist. Religious charity should not be above ordinary park rules, but neither should it face stricter rules without a convincing reason.