Coates v. Williamson et al.

Keshel S. Coates is an African American, non-Catholic woman employed as a first-grade teacher at St. Peter Claver Catholic School (SPCCS). Coates brought this case against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah (RCDS), SPCCS, Principal Sister Cheryl Hillig, and the school Superintendent Carrie Jane Williamson. She alleged nine counts of allegations against the group, of which the major allegations were race and religious discrimination, constitutional violations, and a breach of contract.

Coates stated that during her interview, she informed Hillig that she would not worship as a Catholic. Hillig allegedly assured her and stated that she would only need to escort students to Mass, while another teacher handled religious instruction. Despite these assurances being only verbal, Coates signed employment agreements stating that her employment was conditional and rested on her adhering to Catholic tenets, thus acknowledging her role was "Ministerial." Throughout her time on the job, Coates received positive reviews and initially did not participate in religious rituals, as she stated she would not. However, she alleges that Hillig eventually pressured her to participate in religious rituals, such as requiring all faculty, religious and non-religious, to receive ashes on Ash Wednesday.

In April of 2024, Coates provided a police statement regarding an incident involving another teacher and a student. Afterward, she alleges she faced increased scrutiny and "fabricated allegations." Then, on May 29, 2024, a month later, Coates was informed her contract would not be renewed by SPCCS. The reason given was her failure to "fully participate in the religious aspects" of the school program, which she alleged was verbally promised she wouldn’t have to do. Coates then filed a lawsuit based on nine expressed counts, of which three, in relation to religious discrimination under Title VII, were dismissed. Three more, in relation to employment discrimination and retention, proceeded, and the final three were dismissed as well.

The US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed Coates’ claims for religious discrimination under Title VII. Title VII contains an express exemption allowing religious educational institutions to employ individuals based on their religious beliefs. Because SPCCS is a religious institution, it is legally permitted, in some ways, to discriminate based on religion for work connected to its activities. Thus, Coates' claims of religious discrimination were denied by the Court.

Williamson et al. argued that the "ministerial exception," which prevents courts from interfering in how religious groups select their leaders, should be able to block all of Coates’ employment claims. However, upon examining the role required of Coates, the Court found that while Coates’ contract called her a "minister," she had reasonably claimed that her duties in practice were secular. She did not teach religion or lead prayer in any way, and SPCCS allegedly accepted her non-participation for two years. Due to the fact that it was plausible she served a non-ministerial function, the motion to dismiss her employment claims was denied by the court.

Lastly, Coates alleged that there were violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court found that section 1983 only applied to "state actors" acting under color of law. SPCCS was considered a private entity; thus, the Court ruled that receiving federal funds or being subject to state accreditation does not turn a private school into a state actor. Ultimately, this meant that the claims made by Coates via section 1983 were dismissed. In the end, the court chose to proceed with the claims on Racial discrimination (Title VII/§ 1981), retaliation claims, and state law claims/breach of contract.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC is an important case to look toward when thinking about how the ministerial exemption is being discussed in Coates v. Williamson et al. Historically, the court has decided the role of “ministerial” through the actions and duties of the individual in question. Contrary to Perch in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court found that although the role upon hiring was ministerial, the role in practice was not religious. Coates was restrained from getting involved with any religious practices within her duties; this was judged differently from Perch, who was deeply involved with both the religious and secular parts of her job. Furthermore, Perch was a leader within the church and school communities and acted as a direct public representation of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.

Another important case that played a role in this decision is Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, which was quoted by the judge when making the decisions for Coates v. Williamson et al. Following the decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court reinforced its evaluation of the role of a minister. The Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru led to the expansion of ministerial exemption as it held that the formal title of ministerial doesn't matter as much as function, and even teachers with relatively limited religious duties can fall under the exception. I believe Coates’ greatest challenge will be centered around her duty being non-religious, but her signing agreements which label her official capacity as ministerial. As she agreed to the role and the weight the title bears. Furthermore, the agreement stated that teachers would serve as “a Catholic role model, both inside and outside the classroom, regardless of his/her personal beliefs or different religious affiliation.”

Coates also technically failed to meet the criteria given by the school; thus, her termination was indeed valid. The court may be able to find evidence of retaliation, but when looking at whether the claim is reasonable, I believe that it is. Coates' claim to a verbal agreement holds little to no weight against written agreements; thus, I do not believe this aspect of the case will be ruled in her favor. With the decisions made in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, I believe that Coates has some chances of winning the case, but I can also make various points in which she may not.

South Carolina Resident refuses Poll Working's 'So Help Me God' requirement

On October 8, 2025, South Carolina resident James Reel filed a lawsuit against the Greenville County Voter Registration Office for violating his right to freedom of religious expression and the Establishment Clause. Reel sought to become a poll worker for future elections and attempted to complete the training required before the 2024 November election. In December 2023, after completing the required online poll worker training courses, Reel learned about the religious oath required of poll workers. Applicants who complete the training are required to certify an oath prescribed by the statute. The oath includes the statement, “So help me God,” which Reel claimed went against his beliefs as an atheist. He said that he, with his conscience as a non-believer, can’t swear by God. Reel called a representative of the county elections office to request that he be allowed to strike out that part of the oath. However, the representative stated that the oath was dictated by the state’s statute, so a version of the oath without that phrase wouldn’t be valid. Reel tried to offer a secular alternative to the oath, but that also wasn’t accepted.

There’s an implication within S.C. Code § 7-13-72, stating “After their appointment, the managers and clerks must take and subscribe, before any officer authorized to administer oaths, the following oath of office prescribed by Section 26 of Article III of the Constitution: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm)...” An affirmation, unlike an oath, is a vow without referring to a religious deity, but the Interim Executive Director declared that citizens who don’t abide by the oath are ineligible to work as a poll worker and that affirmations/exceptions weren’t an option for future applicants. In response, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, composed of thousands of atheists, agnostics, and other religious dissenters, informed the director that the practice of an oath violated the First Amendment. They claimed that the Constitution bans any religious tests for public offices as "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion, in correspondence with Torcaso v. Watkins (1961).

In that case, Roy Torcaso was appointed as a notary public for Maryland. However, Maryland’s constitution required a declaration of belief in God, and Torcaso, an atheist, refused, as it went against his beliefs. His appointment was revoked, and Torcaso sued, claiming that his freedom of religious expression had been violated. The Supreme Court found that Maryland’s requirement for a person in office to state a belief in God violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, in 1997, Herb Silverman’s application for notary public in South Carolina was denied when he crossed out the phrase, “So help me God,” and the Supreme Court once again ruled that religious test requirements violate the Constitution.

Although the FFRF argued that the statement is coercive and denies nontheists or polytheists the right to serve as poll workers without believing in a singular deity, the Director held that the policy complies with  S.C. Code § 7-13-72. FFRF also argued that by not allowing an alternative, it’s a violation of the Establishment Clause as it’s a legal statute coercing a statement of belief in a singular God. The lawsuit specified that South Carolina routinely lets attorneys, jurors, and witnesses make secular affirmations as alternatives. Reel specified in his lawsuit that he wanted a permanent injunction that prohibits defendants from requiring citizens to swear to a god and requiring that they offer a secular alternative in the oath.

No ruling has officially been made, but I believe that the court should rule in favor of Reel. There’s already been previous Supreme Court rulings that establish that requiring religious tests is a violation, and while one could argue that needing to swear to God isn’t a religious test, the fact that no secular alternative or exemption is allowed, as well as the director calling that the oath needs to remain as is even though affirmations was included in the policy, I would argue that it is. Additionally, a statute requiring the swearing of God has no compelling state interest, as attorneys and others have been allowed to make secular affirmations already. While the inclusion of the word God has been embedded in things like the Pledge of Allegiance and other Oaths, I believe this issue is denying Reels the ability to make a secular alternative. Other religious groups such as Quakers and Jehovah' s Witnesses have barred swearing, so there’s a neutrality issue in my opinion. And finally, requiring the statement is coercive and compelled speech, as it forces people who might not agree with the swearing to a singular God by putting a job on the line.

​

Dorsey: Amazon and Employee Discrimination

Meet Connor Dorsey of Mississippi. Dorsey, a devout Catholic, is considering filing a suit against Amazon for denying him a religious accommodation that would allow him to observe the Sabbath, Holy Days of Obligation, and refrain from laboring on Sundays. His current schedule as an L5 Area Manager is what is called “Back Half Nights.” It goes from Wednesday through Saturday, and/or Thursday through Saturday/Sunday with overnight hours from 10:00 pm to 5:00 am; this equates to four days and 10 hours per day shift. Dorsey has requested numerous times to be switched to a “Back Half Days” schedule, which would allow him to have off Sundays. Despite the position being open and Dorsey fitting the job description, a Human Resources manager told him, “If we set that precedent [granting accommodations], then we’ll have to grant those requests any time we receive them.” (First Liberty Institute) That same HR manager also told Dorsey to “find a job that works out for his personal situation.” (First Liberty Dorsey Demand Letter) Dorsey’s complaint was emailed to Amazon by First Liberty Institute on April 1st, 2026, with a response deadline of April 15th; to my knowledge, Amazon has not responded. 

This case questions the precedents on the Free Exercise Clause set by numerous cases, including Sherbert v. Verner. Sherbert was a case in which the plaintiff, Adeil Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired from her job in South Carolina after refusing to work on her Sabbath Day, Saturday. The Employment Security Commission denied her unemployment benefits because of her refusal to work on her Sabbath. Interestingly, South Carolina law held that employers were not allowed to require work on Sundays. Another case similar to Sherbert is Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida. The plaintiff, also a Seventh-day Adventist, informed her employer that because of her sincerely held religious beliefs, she would not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday because it was her Sabbath day. Her employer then dismissed her, and consequently, Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation. Her compensation was denied. 

In both Sherbert and Hobbie, the Supreme Court held that both cases violated the Free Exercise Clause and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Sherbert’s outcome created the Sherbert test and set the precedent that a substantial burden cannot be placed on someone, and impede the free exercise of their religion. Hobbie set the standard that a state cannot deny unemployment compensation to someone dismissed because of religious conflicts with their employer. 

More recently, in Groff v. DeJoy, Groff, a Christian USPS worker, was fired after refusing to work Sundays because of his religious beliefs. After being scheduled on Sundays, Groff and USPS would fail to find coverage, and Groff would not work. After being fired, he sued USPS for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stating that the company failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps were unsuccessful and did not solve the conflict. Title VII, in section A, states that “All personnel actions affecting employees…in the United States Postal Service…shall be made free from any discrimination based on…religion…” (Department of Labor) Title VII also requires employers to reasonably accommodate their employees’ religion unless it would cause “undue hardship.” The Court ruled in favor of Groff because USPS did not demonstrate a substantial burden, or substantial increased costs, by granting his accommodation requests. 

Dorsey’s case relies on the precedents set in other cases, specifically concerning the Free Exercise Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the view of First Liberty Institute and Dorsey, Amazon is required to grant his religious accommodation, unless it can prove that doing so would cause substantial increased costs. Despite multiple attempts at solutions by Dorsey, Amazon has ignored his requests in addition to scheduling him this past Easter Sunday. Due to instances like this, Dorsey has had to use numerous PTO days; he has taken one every Sunday since January 19th, 2026. 

My intuition in this case is that Amazon will be very unlikely to show any undue hardship, like in Groff, because of Dorsey’s absences on Sundays. His PTO days have been approved every Sunday for multiple months, and he has not faced any disciplinary actions for taking off every week. In addition, Amazon is the second-largest private employer in the country, and as a private employer, subject to scrutiny under Title VII. Amazon has clearly demonstrated knowledge of Dorsey’s sincerely held religious beliefs through multiple meetings with HR. I believe that it is unconstitutional for Amazon to place a substantial burden on Dorsey by giving him no other solution besides draining his PTO days and denying him the free exercise of his religion. Denying him these rights would overturn all three cases described: Sherbert, Hobbie, and Groff. This case has not yet made it to court, and I am curious to see what Amazon’s defense is. 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/connor-dorsey/#simple1

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/480/136/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/22-174

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/centers-offices/civil-rights-center/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-of-1964

Sincerity of Nick Rolovich's Religious Beliefs

In October 2021, former Washington State Football Coach Nick Rolovich was fired because he refused to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Rolovich had claimed that as a Catholic, he was exempt from the state’s vaccine mandate, but his exemption request was denied by the school, which eventually led to his termination when he still refused to get the vaccine. In 2021, Washington State had given religious and medical exemptions for the vaccine mandate, but not ones based on personal and philosophical reasoning. Washington State found that Rolovich’s religious convictions were not sincere and thus did not provide him with a religious exemption for the COVID-19 vaccine mandate.

Subsequently, on November 14, 2022, Rolovich filed litigation against the school over the denial of the religious exemption, where they deemed his beliefs as not being sincere. Fast forward a few years, in January 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Rice ruled that Washington State could not accommodate Rolovich’s religious exemption without undue hardship because of his position that involves him directly interacting with students, coworkers, donors, the media, and others. In other words, the judge is suggesting that this accommodation would pose a significant burden for the school. Furthermore, the judge added that in thousands of pages of evidence, there were many examples of Rolovich expressing secular concerns about the vaccine, but not religious ones, which aligned with Washington State's previous assessment of Rolovich’s religious beliefs when he filed for a religious exemption. Ultimately, the judge reaffirmed and justified Washington State University’s decision to fire Rolovich.

Although the original lawsuit was filed nearly five years ago, Becket Law has stepped in to help Rolovich appeal his case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Becket Law explains that Patrick Chun, former Washington State athletic director, exhibited hostile actions toward Rolovich when Rolovich discussed his intentions of applying for a religious exemption that would go through a blind review process by the school. Despite these hostile actions, Rolovich submitted his religious exemption proposal, which was later approved because the review board found his religious views were sincerely held. However, Becket Law says that Chun and others in the athletics department asked the school to reverse its approval by questioning the sincerity and religious nature of his beliefs. Washington State University’s Environmental Health and Safety department proposed accommodations to the athletics department, but they were rejected. Becket Law, when it comes to their future litigation, is painting this case as one that is an attack on individual beliefs, and they are looking to prove that Rolovich’s religious beliefs are sincere. Ultimately, I believe the main issue in this case is whether Washington State University violated Nick Rolovich’s right to Free Exercise by denying him a religious exemption because they deemed his religious beliefs to be insincere. 

United States v. Ballard (1944) applies to Rolovich’s case because it set a precedent for examining the sincerity of religious beliefs. In this case, Guy Ballard was charged with mail fraud by preaching a religion that the lower court accused Ballard of knowing was false. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that religion should be determined by the sincerity of the belief, not by whether it is true or false. The court pointed out that if Ballard’s religion was to be put on trial, then the same would have to be done for other organized religions. This precedent applies to Rolovich’s case as he and Becket Law are looking to prove the sincerity of his religious beliefs as they pursue further litigation. The Court can not tell him his beliefs are false, but they can certainly examine how sincerely he holds them and if they are sincere enough to have been awarded a religious exemption. However, it seems that this might be a difficult feat given that Rolovich has only expressed secular reasons for not getting the vaccine, and not religious ones. 

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) is worth including in this discussion as the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, explained that the Cantwells' religious messaging, while offensive to some, did not threaten physical harm to any individuals and was protected by the First Amendment. This case helped establish protection for an individual’s religious beliefs against state action, which is similar to what Rolovich is fighting in his case as he fights for religious protection against the State of Washington’s COVID vaccine mandate. Cantwell draws many parallels to Rolovich’s case, with the most notable being that they are Free Exercise issues, but I think there is a glaring difference between them, which is that Rolovich’s action could lead to physical harm. Without obtaining the vaccine, Rolovich was putting everyone else at risk because he had an increased chance of contracting the virus and spreading it to others in the community. While this is up for argument, I believe that the COVID vaccine mandate is a neutral policy that has the secular intention of protecting people from public health threats like COVID, and Rolovich was contributing to this threat by not getting vaccinated. 

In the end, I side with the U.S. District Court’s decision that Washington State was justified in firing Nick Rolovich. I do not think Rolovich deserved a religious exemption, as evidence suggests that he was expressing secular concerns about the COVID vaccine to his family, friends, and coworkers rather than expressing religious concerns about it. There is seemingly a lack of consistency in his expression of his beliefs, which I think is needed to earn a religious exemption from this vaccine mandate that has secular intentions of minimizing a public health threat. From the evidence I gathered for this blog post, it seems that Rolovich had turned to his Catholic faith as a last-ditch effort to earn an exemption from the vaccine mandate. While Ballard helped clarify that religious beliefs should be judged based on sincerity, it is still difficult to determine an individual's sincerity toward religion, as there is a lot of nuance involved in these types of cases. However, in this case, I find that the evidence presented in the discovery phase clearly shows that Rolovich’s reservations about the vaccine are purely secular. Unless Becket Law is able to produce new evidence to prove Rolovich’s sincerity, I think that this decision will continue to stand as they continue to pursue further litigation.

Sources:  

https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/43323303/nick-rolovich-loses-suit-washington-state-firing

https://www.kxly.com/sports/wsu-cougars/judge-rules-in-favor-of-washington-state-university-in-rolovich-vaccine-case/article_713af8b4-cc66-11ef-a8af-bb49c3f32edd.html

https://becketfund.org/case/rolovich-v-washington-state-university/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296

https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-chemerinsky/first-amendment-religion/united-states-v-ballard/

The Case of Chief Kelvin Cochran

    The case of Kelvin Cochran, a former fire chief in Atlanta, Georgia, has raised significant constitutional questions about the limits of religious expression for public employees. Cochran, a highly respected firefighter and devout Christian, was appointed Fire Chief of Atlanta in 2008. Over the course of his career, he received numerous commendations and was widely regarded as an effective leader. However, his career took a sudden turn after the publication of a small devotional book he wrote for a men’s Bible study group.

    Cochran’s book, titled Who Told You That You Were Naked?, addressed various moral and religious topics from a Christian perspective. The book included passages expressing traditional Christian views on sexuality, including statements that characterized homosexual behavior as inconsistent with biblical teaching. Importantly, Cochran did not distribute the book in his official capacity as Fire Chief. Instead, he shared it privately with members of his church and a small group of colleagues.

    Despite the limited and voluntary nature of its distribution, a copy of the book eventually reached city officials. In response, the city launched an investigation and suspended Cochran without pay. They cited concerns that his views could create a discriminatory environment within the fire department. Shortly after, Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed terminated Cochran’s employment, stating that the chief had exercised poor judgment and that his actions were inconsistent with the city’s commitment to diversity and inclusion.

    Cochran filed a lawsuit against the city, arguing that his termination violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. He contended that he had been punished for expressing sincerely held religious beliefs in a private context. The city claimed that Cochran was responsible for maintaining trust and inclusivity within a diverse workforce, and that his statements contradicted that responsibility.

    A constitutional question arises from this case: To what extent can the government regulate the private religious expression of public employees? More specifically, does the First Amendment allow a public employer to punish an individual for speech that is religious in nature, expressed outside of the workplace, and not directly connected to official duties?

    The Supreme Court has made clear in cases involving public employees that individuals do not lose their constitutional rights simply because they work for the government. At the same time, when the government is acting as an employer, it has more power to limit speech than it does when it is acting as a governing authority. Courts have often tried to balance these interests by asking whether the employee was speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and whether that speech disrupts the functioning of the workplace. In Cochran’s case, his book was written and distributed in a private religious context, which suggests that he was acting as a private citizen rather than as Fire Chief. That distinction matters because speech made in a private capacity is typically entitled to constitutional protection.

    Also, this case raises serious concerns under the Free Exercise Clause. Cochran’s statements were not random or purely political because they were rooted in his religious beliefs. Punishing him for expressing those beliefs, even indirectly, risks crossing the line into religious discrimination. If the government can penalize someone for articulating widely held religious doctrines, it effectively places certain religious viewpoints at a disadvantage in public life. That is precisely what the First Amendment is supposed to prevent.

    Based on these reasons, I believe that the city went too far in this case. There is a difference between holding certain beliefs and acting on them in a way that harms others. The Constitution protects belief and expression, even when those beliefs are unpopular or offensive to some. In Cochran’s situation, there is no clear evidence that he discriminated against anyone or allowed his personal views to interfere with his professional responsibilities. Instead, he was punished based on the potential implications of his beliefs rather than any actual misconduct.

    This kind of reasoning is dangerous because it can create a slippery slope by opening the door for the government to regulate thought and belief rather than behavior.. It sends the message that participation in public service is conditional on holding certain viewpoints. Over time, this could discourage people of faith, or anyone with controversial beliefs, from entering public roles altogether.

https://adflegal.org/article/chief-kelvin-cochran-story/

Are National Leaders Engaging in Religion Differently Than in the Past?

On May 21, 2025, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, began offering the Secretary’s Christian Prayer & Worship Service to all Department of Defense (DoD) personnel. The Prayer Service is led by Hegseth, who sends out RSVP email invitations to all DoD personnel and encourages them to forward his invitation widely within their organizations. The monthly services are held in the Pentagon’s auditorium and are broadcast on internal DoD TV channels. The Prayer Service centers around Hegseth’s own religion, a denomination of Protestant Christianity, as demonstrated by the frequent references to an Almighty God and the consistent use of prayers in Jesus’ name. For example, on March 26, Hegseth led a prayer from the Book of Psalms amid the ongoing military operations in the Middle East, using the same prayer that had been given to troops before the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. In addition to his own remarks at the services, Hegseth has invited Doug Wilson, from the Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches (CREC) to speak at the Prayer Service. Wilson’s prayers also invoke very specific references to Christianity. 

The First Amendment requires the government to remain neutral toward religion and not endorse or promote a particular religious denomination. Although the Prayer Service is voluntary, it raises the constitutional question of whether or not Hegseth is using his influence as Secretary of the DoD to promote religion in government. It also raises the question of government endorsement of a particular religion as the Prayer Service aligns more specifically with a subgroup of Protestant Christianity.

So far, legal action has been taken by the Americans United for Separation of Church and State which has filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to obtain all the information regarding the details of the Prayer Service, including:

All records and communications (including but not limited to letters, memos, emails and attachments, calendar invitations and attachments, text messages, and other electronic messages and attachments on messaging platforms such as Signal, WhatsApp, Teams, Slack, WeChat) related to the Secretary’s prayer services held on May 21, 2025 and any other similar group prayer services held or to be held in the future at the Pentagon.

Americans United’s primary objective is to have the district court review the information requested above to determine whether or not the Prayer Service violates the Establishment Clause. The request under the FOIA was filed on December 19th, 2025. Since then, the DoD has ignored the request and the Americans United group has been clear that they are still waiting for the detailed information on the Prayer Service but are now also requesting further legal action be taken due to the DoD’s initial failed compliance. 

The Supreme Court has demonstrated its careful evaluation in cases dealing with public prayers. In Marsh v. Chambers (1983), it upheld the practice of a traditional legislative prayer before Nebraska legislative sessions. In Lee v. Weisman (1992), it struck down a prayer that was offered in the context of a public school graduation ceremony. The critical considerations in these cases are coercion and neutrality. For example, in public schools, a concern is that young and impressionable children will be coerced to participate in religious prayer. While one could argue the issue of coercion is less applicable to adult personnel in the DoD who are less impressionable than young children, it is worth noting Hegseth holds the highest ranking position in the Department and his military influence is superseded only by the President. Since Hegseth’s appointment at the start of 2025, he has dismissed over a dozen high ranking military officers and denied many promotions of highly qualified military officers. There is speculation that some of these dismissals are disproportionately gender and racial based with mostly no explanations for their removal. The authority Hegseth has established since taking office suggests that the requested information by Americans United may be relevant to determine if potential DoD personnel feel like they must attend these services out of fear that they will lose their jobs or not get promoted. 

On the issue of neutrality, the majority opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014) states that a prayer in legislative contexts can be constitutional while making specific references to a particular religion as long as it represents a longstanding tradition and history and there is no coercion or denigration of other faiths. In terms of the Prayer Service, Hegseth has attempted to unify people by invoking common Christian identity. Last month he said, “we share the same interests, and, because of this, we face an essential test – whether our nations will be and remain Western nations with distinct characteristics, Christian nations under God, proud of our shared heritage with strong borders and prosperous people, ruled not by violence and chaos but by law, order, and common sense.” While the Prayer Service remains voluntary, a potential concern is the lack of neutral language used by Hegseth, especially in a government and military context. Even though roughly seventy percent of the military are of the Christian faith, that still leaves a third that have a plurality of religious backgrounds that might not agree with Hegseth’s explicitly Christian language.

Without the complete details surrounding the Prayer Service, I can only speculate as to how the district court should rule if the information is obtained. If the information demonstrates that the meetings have been promoted within the DoD due to Hegseth's military influence, and that there has been no effort to move the services to a location off of government property, then I believe that the Prayer Service should be ruled unconstitutional. However, if the DoD continues to withhold information regarding the services, there might continue to be a constitutional gray area where the service raises serious concerns but lacks substantive information to make an official ruling. I believe the lack of religious neutrality and the intent to have United States foreign policy informed by Christian values conflicts with the constitutional boundaries designed to ensure the United States does not have an established religion. 

National Religious Broadcasters v. Werfel

    National Religious Broadcasters v. Werfel is an attempt to challenge the Johnson Amendment. The Johnson Amendment prohibits nonprofit organizations, including churches, from endorsing or opposing any candidate running for public office. This is important because all nonprofit organizations receive tax breaks from the IRS, and with those tax breaks come certain restrictions. In August of 2024 the National Religious Broadcasters and Intercessors for America along with two Texas churches filed a lawsuit against the commissioner of the IRS, Danny Werfel. The plaintiffs claimed that their right to speak about political candidates and issues was being unconstitutionally censored. Other organizations have gone out of their way to try to bait the IRS into revoking their tax exempt status just to take them to court, but the IRS has been avoiding this issue.

    This case involves both free exercise and establishment clause issues. The churches are claiming that they are unable to freely speak about politics and political candidates. Meanwhile, the IRS and the government are trying to avoid an establishment of religion through tax breaks to churches that endorse politicians. These organizations receive various financial benefits for maintaining their nonprofit status and following restrictions like the one being debated here. Nonprofit organizations pay 0% federal income tax on revenue, their donors get tax breaks and they receive various other state, local, and property tax breaks. This raises the question, is it unconstitutional to make tax exempt status for religious organizations conditional upon political speech censorship?

    The case of Bob Jones University v. United States provides some legal guidelines for how to handle tax exempt organizations and religion. Bob Jones University enrolls students from kindergarten through graduate school and is dedicated to the teaching and propagation of Christian beliefs. The university operated under the following rules, no interracial dating, students who did so were expelled, members of groups that are affiliated with an organization that advocates for interracial marriage are expelled and students who promote or encourage it are expelled. In 1976 the IRS revoked the university’s tax exempt status. The Supreme Court ruled that the government’s state interest in racial equality is more compelling than the private institution’s tax exempt status.

    The Texas churches would argue that the ruling in Bob Jones does not apply to them. Bob Jones deals with racial discrimination, which is illegal, while National Religious Broadcasters is about their first amendment right. Therefore, they should not be penalized for exercising their first amendment right. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs would argue that similar to how anti-racial discrimination adds to the public interest, so does maintaining a division of the church and state through keeping tax deducted money out of political campaign promotion.

    The implications of a decision in this case make it all the more complex. If the courts were to uphold the amendment, the IRS would be forced to begin to enforce this law and monitor religious organizations. Monitoring creates an entirely new set of issues as it could possibly involve an excessive entanglement between the church and state. Lemon v Kurtzman established that a statute that creates excessive entanglement is unconstitutional. Therefore, one can see how the Johnson Amendment could be deemed unconstitutional because it forces the IRS to monitor religious sermons. However, removal of the amendment altogether would mean that taxpayers are indirectly funding political campaigns. The IRS has only revoked tax exempt status for one church in the 70 year history of the Johnson amendment. Therefore, it is clear that they have been trying to avoid enforcing this law due to its complexity.

    Given these outcomes, I believe that the Johnson Amendment is constitutional and should be upheld. The IRS therefore should enforce this law more accurately and actively than they have in the past. Not upholding the law would create an issue of “dark money”, in which donors of churches are not aware of where their funds are going. There will be increased involvement between the IRS and churches, but this does not necessarily need to be excessive. An alternative that creates less entanglement can be created. The IRS can rely more on reports from church patrons and outsiders and then investigate as needed. Essentially, the cost of some entanglement and more censorship is lower than the cost of tax payers indirectly funding political campaigns.

Apache Stronghold v. United States

    In Apache Stronghold v. United States (“United States”), Congress authorized a sale of “Oak Flat” in 2014. The sale transfers Oak Flat to mining companies, which would allow them to destroy the federal land for the purpose of extracting the valuable copper underneath. However, as Oak Flat is federal land, the federal law of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) applies.

    Additionally, the government protects federal land under federal law like RFRA. As Oak Flat was central to the Western Apache’s religious practices, the nonprofit organization “Apache Stronghold” (“Stronghold”) challenged the sale by invoking RFRA. RFRA prevents the federal government from “substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion”. Thus, Stronghold argues RFRA prohibits government authorization for companies to destroy Oakland Flat, as it would be a (beyond) substantial burden against the free exercise rights of the Western Apache.

Would desecrating sacred indigenous land actually violate the Free Exercise Clause?

    The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the destruction of Oak Flat would prevent the Western Apache from ever “engaging in religious exercise” again (Gorsuch, 2025). However, the Ninth Circuit still rejected Stronghold’s RFRA-argument that this was unconstitutional by invoking “Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association” (1988) (“Lyng”) to apply its precedent, as facts of Lyng and facts of United States are similar. In Lyng, the United States Forest Services planned road construction through federal land, which was religiously “indispensable” (O’Connor, 1988) to Native American Tribes, which is relevant as the road construction would “virtually destroy” the Tribes’ ability to practice their religion. Lyng precedent proclaims the First Amendment does not prohibit “government programs” simply because of their “incidental effects” on religion. This means that the government’s role as a landowner permits its programs, so long as they do not “coerce” people into acting “contrary” to their religious beliefs, to be constitutionally allowed to incidentally hamper religious exercise.

    The facts of Lyng mirror those within United States, as both cases are about corporate use of federal land that would destroy Native Americans’ practice of religion. As such, I understand how the precedent of Lyng could reasonably be applied to the facts of United States. However, I believe that the actual precedent of Lyng is wrong.

    Lyng precedent differentiates free “exercise” and religious “beliefs”. Lyng wrongfully increases government capacity to encroach peoples’ religious actions and practices simply by saying that the “beliefs” are still intact by not coercing people to forgo their faith. However, this nuance between “beliefs” and “actions” is wrong because, so long as the government does not compel one’s internal thoughts and beliefs to change, the government programs are supposedly constitutional. Lyng precedent on its own facts tries to justify the construction of a road offending Native Tribes by saying the indigenous people still believe in their religion. Similarly, Lyng precedent on United States facts tries justifying conglomerates’ destruction against sacred grounds as constitutionally allowed so long as Western Apache still hold their religious beliefs. But the beliefs that make these government actions offensive are also fundamentally changed, as the desecration of sacred lands renders Natives with a new belief from the government’s actions, as the “portal” of Oak Flat is severed Apache connection to “the Creator” (Gorsuch, 2025). Therefore, the argument of “incidental effects” being constitutoinal is wrong because materially changing sacred lands directly changes beliefs. Extreme harm towards indigenous religions in Lyng and United States are far beyond “incidental” effects.

    Lyng precedent is absurd because its wording diminishes the absurdly grandiose suffering of desicrating sacred indigenous lands. I argue to replace Lyng precedent with Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) (“Yoder”) precedent.

    Yoder facts apply to United States facts because both explore the religious right to exist by imparting their faith to their kin. In Yoder, the government mandated compulsory public school for the Amish. However, the Amish have a 300 year religious tradition to limit their exposure to the outside world and its ideas. Compulsory public school would jeopardize the Amish religion, so Yoder established the government can only constitutionally achieve their goals by narrowly tailoring their methods. Yoder relates to United States because desecrating sacred indigenous lands could jeopardize an Apache girl’s rite of passage to become an Apache adult. Apache induction into womanhood “depends on Oak Flat” (Gorsuch, 2025), where girls supposedly receive blessings from “holy spirits” that dwell in the ground (Gorsuch, 2025). However, authorizing copper mining could make a “1,000” foot deep crater, destroying both the practice and belief. I argue that Yoder constitutionally protects Oak Flat.

Sources:

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/439/

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/supreme-court-denial-of-cert-in-apache-stronghold-substantial-burden-analysis-remains-confused

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-291_5i26.pdf

Hunter v. State of California (2026)

In the State of California, marriage is treated as a civil institution over which the state legislature has full authority. It requires a license issued by a county clerk in order to be recognized, and once it is recognized, it can only be dissolved through a state court judgment, the death of a spouse, or a declaration of nullity. For many people, marriage has been interconnected with religious traditions over the course of centuries, which can create tension as it is also interconnected with law. In the case of Hunter v. State of California (2026), this becomes clear from Kathryn Rose Hunter, who entered into multiple state-recognized marriages before later arguing that the state should have no role in marriages at all. She challenged the state of California’s “authority to impose and maintain marital status" and "maintenance of marital records,” by claiming that this violates her First Amendment rights. Hunter based this claim on her deeply held religious belief that marriage should only involve “two persons and God.” She argued that by requiring the issue of marriage licences from the state and by authorizing the marriage, that the state is therefore participating in the marriage, which Hunter claims is the equivalent of polygamy. This violates her right to freely exercise her religious beliefs. 

Additionally, in Hunter’s view, the state inserting itself as a third party into a relationship creates excessive entanglement between religion and the government, as she has a “state imposed marital status” and can not proceed with a divorce without state involvement. She views marriage as religious, meaning that further involvement with legal procedures establishes this entanglement and violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 

In the federal district court, they reviewed this case and dismissed it. In general, the state of  California is immune from lawsuits under the 11th Amendment. In regard to the Free Exercise Clause, the court emphasized that individuals have the right to believe in their religious virtues, but not the absolute right to action based on these views. They said that in order to make a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff has to show that the government action has "substantially burdened” their religious practice and the government action is not justified by a "substantial state interest,” if a law is not “neutral and generally applicable.” In this case, the court found that California's marriage laws are neutral and generally applicable because they do not refer to religion or provide individual exemptions. Even if the law was not neutral, the court still found there to be several substantial state interests, including protecting children, enforcing marital responsibilities, managing property, etc. Therefore, the court concluded that California's legal framework does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.

The district court also rejected Hunter’s claim that the Establishment Clause was violated. They noted that the Lemon Test was used in older cases to determine Establishment cases, but now it is no longer relied upon. Instead, the modern court focuses on historical practices and how the Founding Fathers would interpret what is permissible. The court cited Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), where the Supreme Court said that marriage is a civil institution that the state has the power to regulate, not just a religious or private contract. In using Maynard v. Hill, the court shows how this is a national tradition that has been around for multiple centuries. State involvement in marriages was permissible in the time of the Founding Fathers, meaning that California does not violate the Establishment Clause. 

The central question in this case is whether California’s involvement in recognizing and regulating marriage violates the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. More specifically, the issue is whether a neutral legal system can be considered unconstitutional because it conflicts with individual religious beliefs about marriage. In my opinion, the district court reached the correct decision. California's marriage laws serve as a neutral civil system, not a religious one. Even though marriage is deeply religious to many people, the state still has a compelling interest and secular purpose of maintaining the legal framework in order to regulate issues such as property and family responsibilities. Additionally, there could be a slippery slope if the government were required to remove itself from any institution that has religious significance. Society would not be able to be regulated, and there would be a challenge in determining what counts as significant to a person's religious beliefs. While the Constitution does protect religious belief, it does not require the government to restrict neutral laws to align with every individual's religious views. I do not think the court should rely solely on the intentions of the Founders when determining whether this case violates the Establishment Clause. However, even if the court applied the Lemon test as Hunter was implying, California’s marriage laws would still pass and be considered constitutional. 

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28021311-hunter-v-california-2026-us-dist-lexis-73135pdf/

https://religionclause.blogspot.com/2026/04/californias-marriage-laws-survive.html