Is the VTAG Program Exclusive? Bethany Hall v. A. Fleming

    The state of Virginia offers a Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program (VTAG). This grant is a non-need based grant that can be awarded to Virginia residents attending accredited Virginia colleges and universities. The only requirement for this grant is being a full time student and Virginia resident. However, in the fine print for being able to hold this grant lies an additional factor of how the grant can be used for education. Stating it’s, “...primary purpose is to provide collegiate, graduate, or professional education and not provide religious training or theological education”. This is where Bethany Hall, a student at Liberty University in Virginia, feels as though her rights have been violated.

    Hall, who was a recipient of the VTAG grant and who was driven by her faith, changed her major from Elementary Education to Youth Ministries. This caused the VTAG grant to be revoked from her. Because she relied on this grant to help pay her tuition, she again, changed her major to Music and Worship, and was once again, denied by VTAG to receive the grant because of the religious nature of her major. 

    Hall claimed that this violated her Free Exercise Rights under the Constitution's First Amendment. Hall, however, has run into trouble with moving her case forward because of the precedent established with Locke v. Davey, where a precedent was established in 2004 stating that a state does not violate one’s First Amendment rights when it provides funds to secular college majors but not religious ones. Joshua Davey filed suit after his scholarship was taken away after he had chosen to pursue a major in theology. He believed that the ban on him being able to be awarded scholarship money because of choosing to pursue a major surrounding religion violated his First Amendment Right to his Free Exercise of Religion. The court stated that this law does not violate free exercise as states have always historically had an interest in not providing public funds for religious activity. Since 2004 Locke v. Davey  has been used as precedent for several cases surrounding the issues of public scholarship funds and free exercise rights; Hall wishes to overturn the ruling for this case and to establish a new precedent for cases such as hers. 

    One of Hall’s attorneys, Jeremy Dys, has stated that, “Excluding students from a state scholarship or grant simply because their choice of major is religious is discriminatory”, which calls into the main issue of this case, can the state of Virginia revoke and withhold earned public grant money because the college or university student has chosen to pursue a religious major?

    Although this case, at face value, does seem to be infringing on Hall’s Free Exercise rights, upon further research of the VTAG program and Liberty University’s major offerings, this may not be the case. Liberty University is an evangelical Christian university which offers a variety of religious studies majors and programs, and some of these majors are eligible to be studied and have a VTAG grant. These include: 

-Christian Studies

-Global Studies

-Philosophy and Religion

-Religion

-Religion: Evangelism

-Religion: Christian Counseling

-Religion: Christian Counseling

-Religious Studies: Global Studies

-Religious Studies: Old Testament 

-Religious Studies: Theology and Apologetics 

-Religious Studies: Jewish Studies

    The ineligible programs, although a greater amount than the eligible programs, all include some form of worship, leadership, and ministry components. VTAG is not explicitly denying students who wish to participate in religious studies the right to the grant, but students who wish to study, in short, the proclamation of the Christian faith.

    Although some students would not be able to pursue exactly what they are wishing to pursue through the VTAG program, their First Amendment rights are not being infringed upon because of this requirement with VTAG. Public funds should not be explicitly used to support the proclamation of any faith. In the case of many of the majors excluded from VTAG studies of how to teach and spread the Christian faith are included. Religious majors are not explicitly ineligible for VTAG, they are simply narrowed down so that public funds are not provided to students so that they can then proclaim a religion. If students were able to receive state funds to study ministry, for any religion, it could be perceived as a state supporting a religion and violating the Establishment Clause, which states that there should be no law that respects the establishment of religion. 

    Though the VTAG requirements seem to separate students that wish to procure religious degrees from those wishing to earn secular degrees, upon further investigation it seems that Free Exercise of religion is respected through these requirements, and ultimately, the Establishment Clause is what is being protected through the decision to deny public funds to ministerial based university majors.

Proof, Power, and Procedure: Taking a look at Arroyo Castro v. Gasper

Imagine a public-school teacher placing a small crucifix on her classroom wall. For the teacher, it is a personal reminder of faith; for others, it may signal a religious message from the school. This tension is central to Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper, a recent Connecticut case that has attracted national attention. It raises a difficult constitutional question: When does a public-school employee’s personal religious expression become government-sponsored religious expression? The answer could have nationwide implications as public schools try to balance respect for individual religious freedom with government neutrality.

In the fall of 2024, Marisol Arroyo-Castro, a seventh-grade social studies teacher in New Britain, Connecticut, hung a crucifix that was one foot tall and six inches wide on the classroom wall near her desk. In December 2024, school administrators instructed her to remove it or place it somewhere students could not see it. They were concerned that a visible religious symbol in a public-school classroom could create the perception that the school was endorsing religion. Arroyo-Castro refused to remove the crucifix, saying it has personal and religious meaning to her. 

The school district disciplined Arroyo-Castro and, in a letter, said the Establishment Clause prohibits public school employees from placing religious objects in a classroom. The school district also said the crucifix had no curricular purpose. Arroyo-Castro challenged the school district’s actions in federal court, alleging violations of her First Amendment right to Free Exercise of religion and free speech. She also asked for a preliminary injunction to reverse the school district’s decision and allow her to keep the crucifix on the wall. In November 2025, the federal district court denied Arroyo-Castro’s request for a preliminary injunction. She appealed to the Second Circuit. 

At the center of this case is a disagreement about how to characterize the crucifix. Arroyo-Castro views it as a form of religious expression protected by the Free Exercise Clause, while the school district views it as a religious symbol in a public classroom that violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on government establishment of religion. This distinction places two First Amendment principles in tension: protecting an individual’s religious exercise while preventing government endorsement of religion.

Arroyo-Castro’s position that displaying the crucifix expresses her religion and should not automatically become government speech simply because she works for a public school draws support from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment protected a public-school football coach’s right to kneel and pray midfield after football games. Arroyo-Castro can similarly argue that her crucifix represented her beliefs, not the school’s. If teachers can display family photographs, sports memorabilia, or inspirational messages, restricting a religious object specifically because it is religious raises concerns about unequal treatment. She also did not require students to pray or teach Christianity as part of the curriculum, making her display seem more personal than governmental.

The school district and Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), however, argue that the issue is not simply whether Arroyo-Castro can practice her religion. Public schools also have an obligation to avoid government promotion of religion. A classroom differs from an ordinary workplace because teachers have authority over students, control the classroom environment, and communicate to students who cannot simply choose to leave. FFRF argues that the crucifix was displayed in plain view alongside classroom-related materials and that Arroyo-Castro’s classroom displays were connected to her official responsibilities. From this perspective, allowing teachers unrestricted religious displays could blur the line between personal faith and government-sponsored religion and make students reasonably perceive a religious message as carrying the authority of their public school.

What makes Arroyo-Castro particularly difficult is that both sides claim to be protecting religious freedom. Arroyo-Castro argues that requiring her to hide a symbol of her faith burdens her Free Exercise rights. The district argues that it is protecting students by preventing a government classroom from appearing to promote one religion. The constitutional question of whether the government can protect against an Establishment Clause violation by restricting an employee’s Free Exercise rights has even drawn the U.S. Department of Justice into the dispute. It argues that the district court incorrectly classified the crucifix as government speech and gave too much weight to Establishment Clause concerns. Ultimately, a lot depends on whether the crucifix is understood as Arroyo-Castro’s personal expression or as part of her official role as a teacher.

I believe Arroyo-Castro has the stronger constitutional argument, though her right to religious expression is not unlimited. The Establishment Clause should not mean that religion must become completely invisible whenever someone works for the government. Instead, context should determine when personal expression becomes government promotion. If Arroyo-Castro had led students in prayer, encouraged them to accept Christianity, pressured them to participate in religious activities, or incorporated her beliefs into instruction, the district would have a much stronger reason to intervene. A personal crucifix near her desk, however, does not necessarily communicate the same message. Equal treatment also matters. If teachers can personalize classrooms with secular objects reflecting their identities and beliefs, but religious objects are excluded specifically because they are religious, government neutrality risks becoming unequal treatment. True neutrality should mean treating religious and nonreligious personal expression equally while still preventing teachers from using their authority to promote or impose religious beliefs.

Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper ultimately asks where public schools should draw the line between preventing religious endorsement and protecting employees’ religious freedom. Teachers should not have to completely hide their religious identities because they work for the government, but they also cannot use their authority to impose beliefs on students. The Constitution should protect personal religious expression while allowing schools to intervene when it becomes promotion or coercion. How the Second Circuit draws that line could influence how public schools approach religious expression by employees of many different faiths.

Hiester v. School District of Philadelphia: When a Prayer Room Crosses the Constitutional Line

        Public schools must balance two important constitutional principles when addressing religion. They are required to allow students to freely practice their religion while also preventing actions that favor or establish a particular religion. A recent case, Hiester v. School District of Philadelphia (2026), raises questions about what the line is between these two principles. The case involves a prayer room at the Academy at Palumbo, a public high school in Philadelphia, that the plaintiffs claim was effectively reserved for Muslim students. While providing students with a place to pray and practice their religion can be seen as a reasonable religious accommodation, I believe the school crossed the constitutional line because it restricted the room to Muslim students and used public resources to support one religion over other religions.

        The controversy began on June 11, 2024, when M. Danowitz, a former Jewish Palumbo student, visited some friends at the school. Danowitz, John Hiester, and Meru Parmar eventually entered a room in the school library labeled as the "Quiet Room". Inside, however, they found Islamic decorations, Arabic signs, a “Happy Ramadan” message, and guidelines from the school’s Muslim Student Association all over the room. Danowitz recited a short Jewish prayer in Hebrew, saying he was a proud Zionist, and did a handstand at the end of the prayer. Before leaving the room, he also removed a laminated placard from the wall and then placed it on the floor.

        The situation quickly became more escalated. Rumors were being spread that the students had trashed or damaged the prayer room and/or harassed the Muslim students that were present. Hiester received threatening messages, and school administrators began investigating what they described as a potential hate crime incident. Hiester and Parmar were eventually suspended, and the plaintiffs claim that the school disciplined them because, as non-Muslims, they entered a space that had only been designated for Muslim students and no one else. The families eventually sued the School District of Philadelphia and several school officials after the incident. In Hiester v. School District of Philadelphia (2026), the federal district court did not decide that the school had definitely violated the Constitution. Instead, they found that the students had made a plausible Establishment Clause claim that could continue rather than being rejected.

        The main constitutional issue seen is whether the school was simply accommodating Muslim students’ religious exercise or whether it was actually favoring Islam in violation of the Establishment Clause. There is nothing actually wrong with a public school allowing students to use a room to pray. Students do not lose their ability to practice their religion simply because they attend a public school either. The real problem arises if the government goes beyond providing equal opportunities for religious exercise and begins giving special treatment to one specific religion.

        The court relied on Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams (2025), a similar case, which explains that government action can violate the Establishment Clause. Two characteristics in this case were particularly important. One was restricting the participation of religious dissenters and providing government financial support in a way that favored only one religion. The court found it reasonable that Palumbo officials suspended the students for entering the Muslim Prayer Room as non-Muslims and also reinforced that the organization and the way things looked within the room were available only to Muslim students. 

        I believe this is where Palumbo crossed the constitutional line. If the "Quiet Room" was genuinely available to students of all religions at the school, then allowing Muslim students to pray there should be considered a reasonable accommodation of their religious exercise. However, if school officials allowed it to become a Muslim-only space and then punished non-Muslim students for entering it, the school was no longer acting in neutral way towards each religion and that's when this situation became an issue. The government does not need to remove religion from public schools in order to comply with the Constitution, but it should not decide that one religious group deserves privileges that others do not receive, therefore it does not make all religious groups equal.

        Ultimately, I personally believe public schools should accommodate and help religious exercise without promoting or privileging a particular faith. The actual prayer room at Palumbo was not necessarily a constitutional problem in my opinion. The more important issue was how that room was actually “operated”. Religious freedom is better protected when students of every faith have equal opportunities, because that is when not every faith and religion is equal.

When Safety Limits of Religious Freedom: Chase Hadez and the Celestican Church of Christ

Chase Hadez, more commonly known as Colton Lexus, filed for emergency occupation of his self-constructed “tiny-home” or “POD Structure” on August 28, 2026 after the city of Springfield, Illinois deemed it unsafe for human occupation. As Hadez explains in his attempt to appeal the city’s injunction, his order to vacate his home violates Free Exercise of the US Constitution, as he claims that it is his “calling from God” to live in this austere manner, as he is an “adherent of the Celestican Church of Christ,” and  “holds sincere religious beliefs that require him to ‘live off-grid and faith-based tiny-home or POD structure on real property that he owns or controls.’” 

For context, his home stands at 18 square-feet large, on “a corner lot at 17th and Carpenter streets.” As alluded to above, he crafted the structure himself from watching how-to videos on YouTube, and it features solar panels, battery-powered generators, a foundation of heavyweight tires, air conditioning, insulation, a six-foot bed, a microwave and an internet connection from a cheap satellite service.” That said, the house cannot seem to pass code set in place by the city of Springfield in order to ensure the safety and health of its constituents. Some of the grounds that make it “unfit for human habitation”  are as follows: it lacks running water, a sewage or septic system, access to electricity, and other utilities that promote the safety of an inhabitant. 

Hadez argues that the order to vacate the home is a clear violation of his right to freely exercise his religion, as guaranteed by the US constitution. It is important to note that Hadez views his home as an official place of worship. As he claims his home is central to his religious beliefs as a member of the Celestican Church of Christ and was “called upon by God” to create and dwell in this home, he believes that his house not only should be exempt from city zoning laws as it falls under the by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). This act was intended to “protect individuals, houses of worship, and other religious institutions from discrimination in zoning and landmarking laws.” Not only that, if he is not free to be in his home, he believes that the city of Springfield is violating his right to Free Exercise of his religion The court order explains that he “ contends that enforcement of the order requires removals of the unit, which violates violates the plaintiff’s rights to worship in his home and substantially burdens his free exercise of religion”  In his own words, he iterates that the city of Springfield is “unjustly harassing [him].” 

The official court order explains that Hadez argues that the forced removal of his home on account of zoning and code issues should be repealed as his house is “used for worship,” which makes it exempt from zoning laws according to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Overall, he argues that  “by enforcing the state court injunction, [the] City’s actions deprive him of personal property and liberty interests without due process of law in violation of the 14th amendment. Additionally, he contends that the City’s land-use regulation and injunction impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious exercise in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).” The RLUIPA ultimately “protect[s] individuals, houses of worship, and other religious institutions from discrimination in zoning and landmarking laws” 

In my opinion, I do not believe that Chase Hadez should be granted religious exemption from Springfield’s zoning standards. Firstly, I doubt his claim to “sincerity” of the religious cause of the Celestican Church of Christ. After extensive googling, I cannot seem to find any information explaining this religion or confirming it exists beyond merely himself as an individual. That said, for argument’s sake, even if the Celestican Church of Christ is an earnest religion and Chase Hadez is truly sincere in the belief that God has called upon him to create and live in a very… austere… home, I still believe that the City of Springfield is correct in its condemnation of the home. As the zoning laws’ primary function is to protect the safety of the residents of Springfield, a compelling interest of the state, the zoning parameters should supersede his claim of exemption due to the RLUIPA. Moreover, the degree of unsafety of his home, in my opinion, poses a relevant threat of danger, and I believe that it is just that it is deemed uninhabitable. Because the “religious space” of his tiny home doubles as both a place of worship, and more importantly, a home, the city of Springfield undoubtedly has the authority to ensure that he cannot continue living in this home. 

Therefore, if he continues to be granted appeals, the court should undoubtedly rule against him. As the order to leave his home is not an attack on his religion but merely a means to protect him, it is not a violation of the right of Free Exercise. However, if his adherence to the Celestican Church of Christ were to be deemed sincere, I do believe that this space can still be used to worship his religion, but not be able to act as his residence. If it truly is a religious space, it should in fact be protected and exempt from zoning laws. Hence, while Chase Hadez, an alleged member of the Celestican Church of Christ, claims the condemnation of his “austere home” limits his right to freely exercise his religion, the decision of removal from his home by the City of Springfield should be upheld, as the unsafety of his home poses a threat of danger, and is a compelling interest of the state. 

Sources: 

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2026/09/compliance-with-building-code-does-not.html

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilcdce/3:2026cv03224/100310/11/0.pdf?ts=1788191766

https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-act

https://www.illinoistimes.com/news/tiny-house-owner-has-his-day-in-court/

When Does Religious Neutrality Go Too Far? Barber v. Rounds

    What does it mean for a public school to be religiously neutral? Is neutrality the absence of religion, or the equal protection of people who practice it? And when does preventing religious influence become preventing religion itself? These questions are at the center of Barber v. Rounds, a Fifth Circuit case involving a Texas public-school teacher who organized prayer with other teachers before the start of a school day.

    Staci Barber is a Christian teacher at Cardiff Junior High School in Texas. Before the events that led to her lawsuit, Barber regularly prayed and participated in a Bible study with other teachers before school. In September of 2023, she invited several teachers to join her in prayer at the school's flagpole before a student-led “See You at the Pole” event—importantly—Barber expected the teachers to finish praying before students arrived. Principal Bryan Rounds informed her that teachers could not pray “with or in the presence of students.”According to Barber, the restriction went further: teachers could not pray where students might see them, even when they were not acting in their official capacity. Barber and several colleagues prayed anyway, and Rounds stopped them. Barber then sued, arguing that the restriction violated her First Amendment rights.

    The constitutional question is not simply whether Barber should be allowed to pray at school, rather it’s a question of if public school can restrict a teacher's private religious expression because students might observe it. Although public schools have a legitimate interest in preventing teachers from using their authority to pressure students into religious activity, does that same interest allow the school to prohibit private prayer outside a teacher's official capacity?

    The Fifth Circuit did not ultimately rule that Barber had won her constitutional claims. Rather, the court considered whether Rounds could claim qualified immunity, effectively protecting him from a lawsuit unless he violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court concluded that—accepting Barber's allegations as true—Rounds had imposed a categorical restriction on teacher prayer whenever students might observe it. Thus, the court held that Barber's Free Speech and Free Exercise claims could therefore continue.

    The court referred to precedent of great importance in deciding this case. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, decided by the Supreme Court in 2022; in which Kennedy, a public-school football coach was disciplined for praying after football games. The Supreme Court held that his personal religious observance implicated both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses and rejected the idea that religious expression by a public-school employee automatically becomes unconstitutional simply because students might observe it.

    There is also an important distinction between preventing coercion and preventing visibility. Although public schools have a strong constitutional interest in making sure students are not pressured by teachers to adopt a particular religion, nothing in the allegations suggested that Barber was attempting to recruit students and direct their beliefs by using her authority to compel or promote participation. The school's concern instead appears to entirely rest on the possibility that students might witness the prayer which was deemed too weak a basis for restricting a fundamental constitutional right. If merely being seen practicing a religion were enough to justify government intervention, then religious neutrality could too easily become a justification for suppressing religious expression rather than protecting it.

    For the court, the connection between the cases is too strong to overlook. In both, a public-school employee engaged in personal religious expression outside ordinary instructional duties AND students could potentially observe that expression. Why should simply seeing one pray automatically make prayer official speech? If a student simply observes a teacher praying, has the government suddenly prayed through the teacher? The presence of religion is clearly separate from the establishment of religion.

    I believe the Fifth Circuit reached the correct conclusion in allowing this case to continue. Barber was not teaching Christianity to her students or compelling them to participate in prayer. Rather, she was praying with other teachers before the school day—that clear distinction matters. The alleged rule in question was not simply that teachers could not lead students in prayer (which is already clearly illegal) but that teachers could not pray where students might see them, which is an expansion that goes too far. This expansion does not merely prevent government-sponsored religion; it risks suppressing private religion.

    The case matters because it forces us to confront what religious neutrality actually means. Yes, neutrality should prevent the government from promoting religion, but it should also prevent the government from treating religious practice as something that must be hidden or that is forbidden. A teacher does not cease to be a person of faith when they enter a public-school building—forcing one to act as if they are secular simply oversteps the bounds of neutrality.

    The important question is not whether teachers should be allowed to pray. The question is this: If religious neutrality means equal treatment, is it truly neutral when private religious expression becomes a constitutional problem? Merely because someone else might see it? I think not.

Barber v. Rounds, No. 25-20125 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-20125-CV0.pdf

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022).
Supreme Court of the United States.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf

Maine Supreme Court Rules on Religious and Medical Decision-Making Authority Between Two Separated Parents

 

    On September 1, 2026, the Supreme Court of the state of Maine made a ruling in a case having to do with the free exercise clause under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In this particular case, Bickford v. Bradeen, the Maine Supreme Court affirmed the father, Matthew Bradeen's right to have authority over religious and medical decision-making dealing with his 13-year-old daughter. The child's mother, Emily Bickford was told by the court that she was no longer able to make decisions about the child's religious or medical life without approval from the father, giving him the right to make the final decision on all matters pertaining to spirituality and the child's health.

    This decision by the court was due to the fact that the mother, Emily Bickford, had taken the 13-year-old girl to church, specifically Calvary Chapel in Westbrook, where she heard teachings about the Second Coming of Christ, as well as teachings about how her father, Matthew Bradeen, would suffer for all eternity. These visits to Calvary Chapel allegedly caused the child to experience severe anxiety including panic attacks. It is also understood that Ms. Bickford failed to remove the child when the pastor led a six minute prayer talking about the separated parents and their specific dispute, naming them and the child nearly 30 times during the prayer. On many occasions where Ms. Bickford brought the girl to Calvary Chapel, Mr. Bradeen was not made aware.

    Ms. Bickford also opposed vaccinating her daughter. She sued after a lower court granted Mr. Bradeen medical decision-making power, saying that the decision was in violation of her parental rights. But, the Maine Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, saying it was made without bias, based on the best interest of the child, and not based on Ms. Bickford's religious convictions.

    In a recent article, Matthew Staver, an attorney with the conservative Christian Group Liberty Counsel representing Ms. Bickford responded to the Maine Supreme Court's recent decision and stated the following, "This opinion goes against other state court decisions involving custody in the context of religious free exercise rights and ignores precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court. We will ask the High Court to take this case and overrule the decision." Ms. Bickford and her legal team are currently following through with the appeal.

     There are a couple questions on the table in regard to this case. The first is whether or not there is a "compelling state interest" for the government to interfere with and restrict the mother's free exercise rights to take her daughter to the church that she desires and to provide the religious upbringing that she thinks best? And the second question is whether or not the court or government is treating the mother's religious beliefs and behaviors neutrally?

     In response to the first question, whether or not I believe there is a "compelling state interest," we first must define what that phrase means. A "compelling state interest" is a situation in which there is a threat to "peace and good order" as explained by Thomas Jefferson. However, another definition which I believe proves useful for understanding this issue within Bickford v. Bradeen is that a "compelling state interest" is when there is a "clear and present danger" as stated in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. So do I believe that based on that definition there is a "compelling state interest" in this case? Yes, I absolutely do. The "clear and present danger" in this case is displayed by the fact that the 13-year-old daughter's mental health was at risk, suffering panic attacks and severe anxiety due to her experience at Calvary Chapel. Therefore, the court has reason for concern about the well-being of the daughter. But the second part of the question, whether or not that "compelling state interest" is enough reason to restrict the mother's free exercise rights? That adds some gray area to the situation.

     I am personally of the opinion that the "compelling state interest" in this case is enough grounds for the government to interfere and place restrictions on the free exercise of the mother due to the fact that attending Calvary Chapel has cause the daughter to experience a decline in her mental health, "peace and good order" has been disrupted due to a "clear and present danger," and that danger must be addressed. 

    To the question of neutrality, I do believe the court is treating the mother's religious beliefs and behaviors neutrally to an extent. The claim made by the court was that the decision was made out of what they believed were the best interests of the child, however I would be remiss to say that the decision was made without prejudice whatsoever. I believe the court has exercised "facial neutrality" by taking the focus off of the mother's beliefs and choosing to rule based on the child's safety. However, making Mr. Bradeen the sole authority when it comes to the child's religious and medical life is nowhere close to neutrality by any means.

    All that being said, what ruling do I believe the United States Supreme Court should land on? Ultimately, I do not believe that the Supreme Court should overrule the decision made by the Maine Supreme Court, and that Mr. Bradeen should remain the final authority when it comes to the religious and medical life of the daughter. Even though the outcome might not demonstrate neutrality, like I stated previously, the "clear and present danger" the daughter is faced with must not go unaddressed.

https://www.mainepublic.org/courts-and-crime/2026-09-02/maine-supreme-court-upholds-fathers-sole-authority-over-religious-and-medical-decisions-for-child

https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/sjc/lawcourt/2026/26me094.pdf

https://www.lc.org/newsroom/details/090126-lc-will-ask-us-supreme-court-to-hear-no-church-case 

Public Safety v. Religious Exercise: The Case of Hope Prison Ministries

    In 2026, Hope Prison Ministries, a non-profit Christian organization that provides faith-based support, mentoring, and transitional housing for incarcerated individuals returning to society after release, filed a complaint against the city of Fort Worth after the city put in place an ordinance restricting where sex offenders involving minors could live. In the case of Hope Prison Ministries v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, an ordinance stated that a sex offender involving a minor could not establish a residence within 2000 feet of locations where children gather regularly. The ordinance also made it against the law to lease or rent property to someone who falls under this category of sex offender. Hope Prison Ministries argued that the ordinance would substantially burden its religious exercise because providing transitional housing to formerly incarcerated individuals is not simply a service that the ministry offers, but a central part of its faith-based mission to help people rebuild their lives after incarceration. From the ministry’s perspective, being unable to house individuals because of their criminal history prevents them from serving a population they believe their religious mission requires them to support and limits their ability to put their Christian beliefs of service, forgiveness, and rehabilitation into practice. Therefore, they challenged the ordinance because it unconstitutionally makes it harder to freely exercise their religion under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 

    The first major question is whether there is a “compelling state interest,” or a legitimate reason for the government to interfere and restrict the ability to exercise religion through a transitional housing program. There is a strong argument that the government does have such an interest in restricting where registered sex offenders who committed offenses involving minors can live. The government has an obligation to protect children from sexual abuse and predatory behavior, and this responsibility should justify placing restrictions on an individual's freedom who has proven to violate the safety of children, even when those restrictions create difficulty and inconvenience for a religious organization. This ordinance does not specifically target Hope Prison Ministries for practicing Christianity. Instead, the city is trying to address what it considered a threat to the public. The government is not discriminating against the ministry because of its religious practices; it applies the ordinance neutrally. 

    The government treated the ministry’s beliefs and behavior neutrally. The ordinance applies to any registered child sex predator, regardless of whether they are associated with a religious housing organization or a secular organization that is housing them. The court found that the ordinance was not aimed at a religious practice and that it applies neutrally to both religious locations and locations not affiliated with any specific cause or religion. Because the city did not regulate the ministry or the religion of Christianity, I do not believe there is enough evidence to say the government acted with prejudice toward the ministry’s religion or prohibited it from carrying out its religious mission. 

    When grappling with this case, you can see this decision is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. The Supreme Court established that a neutral, generally applicable law does not necessarily violate the Free Exercise Clause simply because it burdens religious practice; the government may enforce laws that regulate conduct even when those laws make it more difficult to practice one's religion. This applies directly to Hope Prison Ministries, as Fort Worth’s ordinance was not directed at Christianity or religious organizations specifically. It is neutral towards sex offenders and minors. 

    Similarly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized that the government cannot impose laws that unconstitutionally interfere with the free exercise of religion. However, the circumstances in Cantwell are different; the law required individuals seeking to solicit for religious causes to obtain government approval, allowing the government to decide whether a religious cause was legitimate. The court found that this requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on Cantwell's religious exercise. In Hope Prison Ministries, Fort Worth does not require them to obtain government approval or restrict their organization's religious beliefs. Instead, it neutrally applies the same housing restriction to all registered sex offenders who committed offenses involving minors. Because the Fort Worth ordinance aims to prevent potential harm to children rather than regulate religious activity, I believe the circumstances differ significantly from Cantwell. Although the ordinance may make it harder for Hope Prison Ministries to fulfill part of its religious mission, the government is regulating conduct based on public safety rather than controlling or discriminating against religious exercise. 

    What justifies a restriction of or a burden on the free exercise of religion? In this case, I believe the city of Fort Worth did not unconstitutionally restrict Hope Prison Ministries’ free exercise of religion, because the ordinance is neutral and generally applicable rather than directed at religious beliefs and practices. In this case, the city is regulating where registered sex offenders who committed crimes against minors can live, regardless of their religious beliefs or the organization providing their housing. In Cantwell, however, the government deliberately restricted religious activity. Fort Worth is not prohibiting or discriminating against Hope Prison Ministries' religious beliefs. Instead, it regulates conduct based on public safety. For these reasons, I believe the court’s decision was correct and that the ordinance does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 

Pennsylvania Mandates Medicaid Coverage for Abortions

            On April 20, 2026, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a historic ruling that fundamentally altered the landscape of reproductive rights in the state by striking down a decades-old ban on Medicaid coverage for abortions. This decision represents a significant shift in state constitutional law, moving away from federal precedents and placing Pennsylvania among a select group of states that recognize abortion as a fundamental right.

The legal battle began in 2019 when several women's health clinics, including Planned Parenthood and the Allegheny Reproductive Health Center, challenged a provision of the 1982 Abortion Control Act. This provision prohibited the use of state Medicaid funds to pay for abortions except in rare cases of rape or incest. The plaintiffs argued that this exclusion constituted sex-based discrimination and violated the equal protection rights of low-income women.

After years of litigation, including two trips to the state Supreme Court, a 4-3 majority of the Commonwealth Court ruled that the coverage exclusion was unconstitutional. The court determined that Pennsylvania’s Constitution grants a fundamental right to reproductive autonomy. Consequently, any state attempting to restrict this right must meet strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review, meaning the state must prove a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means possible. The court found that the state failed to show that banning Medicaid coverage was the only way to achieve its stated interests, such as protecting fetal life or maternal health.

The case highlights a profound conflict between individual constitutional rights and religious or moral objections to state-funded healthcare. A central issue is the state’s argument regarding the conscience of its citizens. Attorney General Dave Sunday’s office contended that the state has a compelling interest in not violating the conscience of those who oppose abortion. This argument suggests that taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize a procedure they find morally or religiously objectionable.

This brings to the forefront the tension between the Equal Protection Clause and the Establishment Clause. Opponents of the ruling, such as Michael Geer of the Pennsylvania Family Institute, argue that mandating taxpayer-funded abortion forces millions of citizens to subsidize the killing of unborn children, which they view as an infringement on their moral and religious principles. Conversely, the court focused on the liberty of the individual, asserting that reproductive choices belong to the people, not the government, and that income should not determine access to a fundamental right.

The Pennsylvania court’s decision is a critical assertion of state sovereignty in the post-Dobbs era. By declaring reproductive autonomy a fundamental right, the court has created a constitutional shield that operates independently of the federal Constitution. This issue is vital because it addresses whether a state’s interest in accommodating the moral conscience of a majority can override the equal protection of a minority, specifically low-income women who rely on Medicaid.

In my opinion, the court correctly prioritized the individual’s fundamental right over the state’s conscience argument. While the free exercise of religion is a protected right, it generally does not grant citizens the power to veto secular government spending because they disagree with the policy. If the state were allowed to withhold funding for a fundamental right based on the conscience of objectors, it would set a dangerous precedent. This logic could be extended to allow pacifists to withhold taxes for military spending or religious groups to block funding for medical research that conflicts with their beliefs. 

Furthermore, the state’s argument regarding protecting fetal life as a compelling interest was logically undermined by the court’s observation that the state has more least-restrictive ways to achieve that goal. As Judge Wolf noted, if the state truly wishes to promote carrying a pregnancy to term, it should invest in maternal and infant healthcare or childcare resources rather than coercing the reproductive choices of poor women through financial exclusion.

This case suggests that the intersection of religion and law is increasingly shifting toward the conscience of the taxpayer as a legal tool. However, the Pennsylvania ruling reinforces the principle that equal protection must remain neutral to religious dogma. By ensuring that reproductive autonomy is treated with the highest degree of legal protection, the court ensures that the state cannot use its power to enforce one specific moral viewpoint over the fundamental liberties of its citizens. Ultimately, this decision is a victory for constitutional consistency, ensuring that a right is only truly a right if it is accessible to all, regardless of their socioeconomic status.

https://www.goerie.com/story/news/politics/state/2026/04/21/court-says-pa-must-treat-abortion-as-fundamental-right/89713292007/

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/20/pennsylvania-medicaid-abortion-funds

Kravitz v Purcell - Confinement Case Involving Free Exercise Rights

Jay Kravitz, an inmate at New York’s Downstate Correctional Facility, initiated a lawsuit against officers for violating his First Amendment right to the Free Exercise of Religion. Kravitz claimed that the officers prevented him from celebrating the Jewish holiday of Shavuot, which commemorates the giving of the Torah to the Israelites at Mount Sinai, and typically lasts two days. It's known as a celebration that brings people together.

On June 3rd 2014, Jay Kravitz was released from his cell at the Downstate Correctional Facility to celebrate Shavuot. Kravitz and his fellow Jewish inmates were brought to the common area, but weren’t allowed to gather for prayer and a meal. Correctional officers gave them bagged food and sent them right back to their cells. The inmates made sure to mention that the holiday was intended to bring people together, and Kravitz asked if they could at least share a meal, but the officers denied him. Kravitz was sent back to his cell, where he ate, prayed, and studied his religious texts alone. Kravitz then filed a complaint with the prison officials and was told he would be allowed to celebrate the second night of the holiday. The very next day, the inmates came together, and Kravitz began leading the prayer, but yet again, officers interrupted, and the service was incomplete. 

Following the events, Kravitz brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correctional officers, claiming they violated the Free Exercise of Religion. He argued that the officers prevented him from celebrating Shavuot. Furthermore, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers for two reasons. First, the court found that some of the officers Kravitz named were not directly involved in what happened on the first night of the event. Second, the court held that Kravitz was still able to take part in the second night of the event, even though it was condensed, and that it did not amount to a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. The District Court referenced Sherbert v Verner (1963) to consider whether or not this was a substantial burden for Jay Kravitz. In Sherbert v Verner (1963), a Seventh-day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on the day of Sabbath. The court ruled that it was a substantial burden on her religious freedom because it forced her to choose between her faith and receiving benefits, which ultimately penalized her for exercising her religion and was not justified by a compelling state interest. The District Court, however, did not find that the same level of burden applied to Kravitz and his situation. The case was later sent to the Second District Court. 

On appeal, the Second Circuit Court reviewed the case and relied on Ford v. McGinnis (2003) as precedent. The District Court's approach was rejected because the Second Circuit agreed that the court should not focus on whether the burden was substantial. In Ford v. McGinnis (2003), the court held that the denial of a religious meal is a substantial burden on free exercise rights. Therefore, the question should be whether the religious activity the inmate claims was interfered with is important to their religious practice, rather than whether it qualifies as a substantial burden. The Court noted that the substantial burden test used since Sherbert v Verner (1963) raises concern that the court overlooks the importance of religious practices and does not fully evaluate the prison's reasoning. The Second Circuit Court concluded that inmates can claim a violation of free exercise if prison officials interfere with a sincere religious practice without a valid penological reason. The case was sent back for further proceedings based on this decision. 

In my view, the Second District Court handled this case correctly. The Ford v. McGinnis (2003) case is more applicable than Sherbert v Verner (1963). More often than not, the burden assigned to inmates is overlooked by an invalid state interest to enforce penological guidelines. The focus should be on protecting the rights of the inmates, not trying to measure how much of a burden they felt based on their situation. Confinement is already a substantial burden in itself, so why should we question or try to measure the impact of burden on a prisoner who only has his or her religion? Rather than challenging the religious rights of these individuals, we should be seeking accommodations to aid the inmates’ rehabilitation process. With that being said, I agree that inmates should only have to claim interference with a sincere religious practice to receive justice unless penological reasons are reasonable, and yes, the officers violated Jay Kravitz’s free exercise rights. 

Sources:

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2024/oct/15/second-circuit-new-york-prisoners-religious-discrimination-need-not-show-substantial-burden-beliefs/ 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-764/22-764-2023-11-27.html 

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-2nd-circuit/115545209.html 

https://plsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Vol.-34-No.-2.pdf