When Religious Freedom Conflicts With Public Health: Miller v. McDonald

 

As early as 1830, the Amish began settling in New York. They came to the United States in search of religious liberty. The Amish have been good citizens, and New York has accommodated their faith. The Amish community has a religious objection to vaccinations. For over 50 years, New York State has exempted them from attending their private Amish schools and to tend to their health as their faith permits. In 2019, New York repealed this exemption, following a major measles outbreak. Some New York legislators described religious objections to vaccinations as “fake” and “garbage,” and even called their beliefs “selfish and misguided.” Forty-five states and the District of Columbia continue to allow religious exemptions for school vaccine requirements, making New York an extreme outlier on the issue. The conflict between the Amish community and vaccination requirements is central to Miller v. McDonald, a case that raises important questions about religious freedom and public health. In this case, the main question that can be considered is: Can New York require Amish parents to vaccinate their children when doing so conflicts with their sincere religious beliefs and desire to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs, or does the Free Exercise Clause protect them from that requirement?

In this case, New York wants to impose penalties on three Old Order private Amish schools that exist on their private Amish farms, in small Amish communities that refuse to require vaccinations because it conflicts with their faith. The schools were fined a total of $118,000 for failing to agree with the vaccination requirements. Previously, the Supreme Court said parents have the constitutional right to guide and decide their children's religious upbringing. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court affirmed this right. In this case, the law “Public Health Law 21664” is repeatedly referenced because it requires parents to vaccinate their children even if they have sincere religious beliefs against vaccination. The parents argue that vaccination is especially serious in their faith, as it is permanent and can not be undone. The law interferes with parents' ability to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs.

The Central Constitutional question is whether New York can require the Amish parents to choose between following their religious beliefs and sending their children to Amish schools. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Jonas Yoder refused to send his 15- and 14-year-old children to school after eighth grade because he believed that high school exposed his children to values and lifestyles that directly contradicted his fundamental religious beliefs. The Supreme Court recognized his right to direct his children's religious upbringing and held that requiring him to send his children to high school violated the Free Exercise Clause and outweighed the state's interest in making attendance mandatory. In the case, Miller .v. McDonald, they argue that New York’s law substantially interferes with their ability to raise children according to their faith, as vaccination is permanent and irreversible, and contradicts the values and beliefs that they are trying to teach their children. The petitioners argue that New York’s law forces an unjust burden on the Amish religious exercise, forcing them to commit this irreversible act and forcing them to do so would contradict the ruling of the Yoder case.

The Second Circuit Court disagreed, and it held that New York’s vaccination law was neutral toward religion and applied generally; the court also concluded that the law did not create the same type of burden involved in Yoder. The Second Circuit argued that this vaccination requirement does not interfere with Amish education in the same way Yoder interfered with their religious upbringing. I agree with the court on this point, as the New York court does not specifically target the Amish community and does not prohibit them from practicing their religion. The vaccine requirement applies broadly to students attending New York schools, particularly after a measles outbreak in 2019, giving them a strong reason to demand vaccination. However, I think the facts of this case still need to be considered. The New York Legislators described religious objections to vaccinations as “fake” and “garbage,” along with other hostile wording calling into question whether the government can enforce a law against religious conduct after the government has expressed hostility toward the religious beliefs. This is where Miller can be compared to Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme

Court ruled in favor of a Christian baker after the Colorado Civil Rights Commission made hostile comments about his religion. In this case, a homosexual couple requested a custom cake for their upcoming wedding reception, and the Christian baker refused, as he did not approve of same sex marriage. The Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the baker’s Free Exercise Clause. The court emphasized that the government cannot treat religious beliefs as illegitimate, focusing heavily on the conduct of the Colorado Commission directed at the baker. This is directly applicable to the Miller case: can free exercise be called into question because of the hostile words chosen by the New York Legislators?

I ultimately agree with the Second Circuit Court on their ruling; while medical exemptions do remain available for children who can not safely receive vaccinations, the state has a strong interest in getting involved, as it is a matter of public health. This case has interesting layers as it brings into question how the government's treatment and opinions should affect a free exercise claim. New York clearly has a serious, compelling state interest in public health, especially the requirement that children be vaccinated. However, the Amish are not simply disliking this law; it directly inhibits their ability to practice their religion and would directly burden them. I agree with the Second Circuit that a medical exemption addresses the safety of a child receiving a vaccination, while a religious objection is based on the beliefs of a family, not prioritizing the greater good of child safety. In my view, these comments from the New York legislators are serious, but they cannot automatically determine the case. The government’s concern for public health does not disappear just because of offensive comments or because a community rejects vaccinations due to their religion. In the end, the Second Circuit Court delivered a neutral and generally applicable vaccination requirement; although it imposes a burden on the Amish community, it must also consider the safety of the majority of children; exempting one group from vaccination could open the door for other groups to claim that they also can not receive a vaccination.

Sources:
https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/26-Miller-Petition.pdf
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-681/24-681-2026-06-30.html
https://firstliberty.org/cases/new-york-amish/#simple1
https://firstliberty.org/cases/new-york-amish/#simple2

Can Catholic Schools Engage in Workplace Discrimination?

In late August of 2021, Kenneth Ference applied to be a teacher at the Aquinas Academy Catholic school serving under the Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. He was hired to teach three secular subjects, math science and social studies, and as he himself was not a Catholic, was “forb[idden]...from religion class or engaging in any spiritual instruction” and would serve purely as a secular teacher. That said, weeks into the school year, he had indicated on an insurance waiver that his healthcare coverage was under his husband, “thus incidentally releavl[ing] that he was in a same-sex marriage.” Soon after, Ference was terminated from Aquinas Academy, and it was widely understood that it was due to their disapproval of his same-sex marital status. 

Upon his dismissal from Aquinas Academy, Ference filed a complaint wherein he was suing for compensation for wrongful termination on the basis of discrimination of his sexuality. Ference iterated that “the Diocese violated his Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” which was created to protect people from discrimination of all kinds (racial, religious, gender, or namely sexual orientation in this case). However, his initial attempt to take the diocese to court was placed under review numerous times, as Aquinas Academy argued that as a religious institution, it is within the scope of their power to avoid hiring those that pose a direct conflict with their religious convictions and values. In other words, they have the right to an exemption from the Title VII and civil rights act and can permissibly engage in workplace discrimination for religious purposes. After these attempts by the diocese to dismiss the case, and an amended complaint, the District Court for Western Pennsylvania, the case survives and is still ongoing.

Overall, the constitutional questions at hand are as follows: does Aquinas Academy and its diocese have the right to discriminate against for being in a same-sex marriage? Are Catholic institutions exempt from the parameters of Title VII proceedings because of their religious convictions and ideas about things like sexuality? Does this case limit the free exercise and expression of religion of Aquinas Academy? From the perspective of Aquinas Academy, they believe that having a staff member who, in their opinion, does not live by the teachings of the religion that is central to their students’ education, is a direct violation of their own religious expression. Even as Ference served as a purely secular employee, “Aquinas Academy maintains that ‘at all times, the Catholic school is engaged in the process of catechesis and the formation of the Christian personality, a process which is integrated within the curriculum of all subjects taught in Catholic  schools’” (16). This claim that religious teachings are ongoing even outside of the context of religious classes is vital to this case, as it places Ference in a quasi-ministerial role in the eyes of the school and Catholic Church. 

While it is true that Catholic schools can permissibly not hire certain teachers for religious classes, I believe that this case should rule in favor of Ference. In fact, during his interview and hiring process, Ference was honest about not being Catholic (rather, a member of the Lutheran Church), and as per the school policy, could only teach secular content, which is surely within the school’s right to do. However, If Aquinas Academy genuinely considered every teacher to be responsible for religious instruction, as they iterate in their own defense, it is reasonable to question why Ference was hired in the first place, given that his religious affiliation was disclosed from the beginning. Judge Ranjan explains that “until the incidental disclosure on the waiver form, his marriage status was apparently a complete secret at Aquinas; and nothing about the circumstances of that disclosure imply that Mr. Ference would not, or could not, remain discreet about his marriage at work” (24). This observation complicates the school’s argument that Ference's marriage interfered with his ability to fulfill his professional responsibilities. Because Ference was already considered unqualified to provide religious instruction due to his non-Catholic faith, it seems inconsistent to make him responsible for holding and promoting the religious mission of the school only after the school discovered that he was in a same-sex marriage.

Ultimately, this case raises serious concerns about workplace discrimination in religious spaces, particularly when an employee’s dismissal appears to be based less on his actual job responsibilities than on the discovery of his marital status. Undoubtedly, religious institutions must have the right to constitutional freedom, and should be able to have total autonomy regarding who represents their faith. But, Ference was never a representative of the Catholic faith as an employee of Aquinas Academy. Aquinas Academy used the First Amendment in order to sanctify discrimination, which the constitution does not protect against. I believe that Ference was, in fact, wrongfully terminated. The discrimination at hand seems to forego any right that Aquinas Academy has in the name of religious free-exercise and expression, and that there is, in fact, a compelling state interest here. The proceedings of Title VII should have protected Ference against discrimination, even at a Catholic institution.  

Sources: 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2022cv00797/289970/101/

https://www.legalnewsline.com/pennsylvania-record/former-catholic-diocese-of-greensburg-teacher-alleges-he-was-fired-over-same-sex-marriage/article_8bf177a8-c975-5d7c-93c2-3ecdeb8b1cab.html

https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964

When Public Funding Meets Religious Education

    The government must balance two important constitutional values when providing public benefits that could be used for religious purposes. The government must treat all religions equally while also ensuring people are not treated differently because of their religious beliefs. A recent case, Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District (2026), raises questions about where to draw the line between these two principles. The case involves an Oregon school district that reimburses homeschooling materials but refused to reimburse Tessa Bulzan because her curriculum included Christian educational materials. While the district argues that public funds should not support religious education, I believe it crossed the constitutional line by excluding Bulzan from available educational benefits, specifically because she chose religious materials for her homeschooling.

    The controversy started up when Bulzan, a Christian mother who homeschools her two oldest children, joined the Hillsboro School District’s Homeschooling Partnership. The program reimburses families for educational materials they choose. A program representative told Bulzan that she could use any curriculum, including a religious one. Bulzan chose materials from Abeka and Classical Conversations and enrolled her children in classes through Firmly Planted Hillsboro. These programs provide academic instruction while incorporating Christian beliefs. However, when Bulzan submitted her expenses for reimbursement, the district refused to pay because the materials included religion.

    Bulzan appealed the decision, but the district continued to deny reimbursement because of the religious nature of her curriculum. She then sued the Hillsboro School District, arguing that the district violated her constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This raises the main constitutional question, Can the government provide financial assistance for homeschooling materials while also excluding other eligible materials specifically because they are religious?

    The district has an understandable argument for refusing reimbursement. The program uses public funds, and Bulzan wants to use those funds for materials that incorporate Christianity for her homeschooling. The district could argue that paying for these materials would mean the government is financially supporting religious education. However, I do not think reimbursing Bulzan means the government is promoting Christianity. The difference is that the district is not deciding to support a Christian curriculum. The difference is providing parents with funding for educational materials and allowing them to decide which materials are best for their children. Bulzan is the one choosing to use that funding for a religious curriculum, not the district.

    The decision in a past case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), helps explain the distinction between the government choosing to fund/promote religion and the government giving money to parents to use for religious education. In this case, Ohio provided financial assistance to families so parents could choose where their children attended school. Some parents also used the assistance to send their children to religious schools. The Supreme Court believed that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program seemed neutral toward religion, and parents decided independently where the government funds went. The government provided the benefit, but the parents made the religious choice, and that's what really mattered.

    Zelman's reasoning applies directly to Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District. Neutrality applies because a government benefit should not depend on whether someone makes a religious or nonreligious choice. Bulzan did not ask Hillsboro to create a Christian curriculum or require anyone to use Christian materials. She independently chose those materials for her children. If Hillsboro reimburses secular materials but refuses to reimburse similar materials because they are religious, the district is treating religious and nonreligious choices differently, which isn’t neutrality.

    The Free Exercise Clause also makes the district’s decision concerning. Hillsboro is not directly preventing Bulzan from using Christian materials, as she can still purchase and use them herself. The burden on her religion is indirect. However, choosing a religious curriculum causes her to lose a financial benefit that other homeschooling families can possibly receive. The problem is not that Bulzan wants public money to pay for religious activity but that the district created a benefit and then excluded her from receiving it because her educational choice was religious.

    I understand the concern that government funds would ultimately help purchase Christian materials. However, Zelman shows why this does not automatically mean that the government is establishing religion. If Hillsboro reimburses Bulzan, it is not choosing Christianity over another religion or over nonreligion. Bulzan is making that choice herself. The same program could reimburse another parent who chooses nonreligious materials. The government’s role would be to provide the educational benefit equally and let parents decide how to use it.

    Ultimately, I side with Bulzan because I do not think choosing a religious curriculum should prevent a homeschooling family from receiving a benefit that is available to other families. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris supports this argument because the government can provide educational funding that eventually goes toward religious education when that result comes specifically from the independent choices of parents. The more important issue is not whether public money eventually pays for religious materials, but who is making the religious choice. In this case, Bulzan is making that choice independently, not the Hillsboro School District. Reimbursing Bulzan would not mean Hillsboro is promoting Christianity. Instead, it would mean that religious and nonreligious families are being treated equally.

​

When Faith and Foster Care Collide

    In July of 2024 a Washington woman by the name Shannon McIntire applied to become a foster parent. Following this application was a nearly year-long journey through the state of Washington's "Department of Children, Youth, and Families," also known as "DCYF," and their specific licensing process. This process in summary included home visits, interviews, negotiation, and ultimately two separate denials.

    In January of 2025, Ms. McIntire was denied the first time. This denial was centered on the fact that Ms. McIntire refused to affirm or support a child's sexual orientation and gender identity, known commonly under the acronym "SOGIE" which officially stands for "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Expression." This refusal to affirm and support directly goes against state regulation. Ms. McIntire also told caseworkers that she would not decide to recognize a child's preferred pronouns, and that she would not accompany the child to buy clothing that would attempt to express transitioning between genders. Throughout negotiations, one DCYF worker asked Ms. McIntire why she couldn't just comply in order to make the child happy at the very least, and Ms. McIntire continued to object to compliance.

    It was at this time that McIntire requested a religious exemption from needing to comply with state regulations regarding SOGIE. DCYF also denied her exemption. They concluded that if Ms. McIntire were granted a religious exemption that placement of a foster child in her home “would cause harm to a child who identified as part of the LGBTQ+ community, or who identified as a member of a religion other than mainstream Christianity."

    DCYF cited three main reasons why her original application to become a foster parent were denied. They cited her SOGIE positions, her unwillingness to affirm a foster child's religious beliefs if they happen to be different than her own, and also the condition of her home. McIntire rejects SOGIE. She also states that she would not refrain from admitting that she believed her religion is THE "truth," and that she would not keep this belief about exclusivity hidden from a foster child who might believe differently. Finally, on the topic of the condition of her home, it was noted by caseworkers who were doing house visits that there were cluttered countertops, unwashed dishes, large quantities of pet hair, and on one visit, an "extremely offensive smell" which no one could quite identify. When it comes to the issue of home conditions, McIntire had recognized the issues, taken steps toward improving the conditions, and was having DCYF work with her on these improvements rather than disqualify her. It was noted that DCYF had officially agreed to this arrangement.

    The religious portion of the case got more complicated in May of 2026. Another judge within the same federal district made a ruling in a separate but related case (DeGross v. Hunter) which ordered DCYF to rewrite its SOGIE licensing rule in its entirety. The pronoun mandate was stripped away and this gave foster parents like Ms. McIntire a lot more flexibility. While this portion of her application denial may have been nullified, Ms. McIntire's claims about religion hadn't gone anywhere. She alleges that DCYF "punished" her for saying that her Christian beliefs are true and refusing to tell a foster child that a different faith was ok, even though she confirms that she would transport a child to religious services of an alternative faith as well as support their spiritual practices in every practical sense.

    With all that being said, the main constitutional question at stake in this case is whether or not a state can require a foster parent to affirm beliefs she doesn't hold, or stay silent about the ones she does, as the price of caring for a child. Should Ms. McIntire's foster parent application be denied simply because she refuses to subscribe to the belief that all religions can be equally true? The bottom line question is "Does the denial of Ms. McIntire's foster parent license application violate her Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?"

    In order to analyze the constitutionality of this situation, we must ask a few questions. This is where we can apply the Sherbert Test. The test dealing with issues of sincerity, substantial burden, compelling interest, and restrictiveness of means make this situation a lot more clear for our analysis.

    When it comes to sincerity, McIntire's beliefs are indisputable. She wholeheartedly holds Christian beliefs about truth, gender, and sexuality and has been consistent about these beliefs all throughout her licensing process with DCYF. Her objection is not tactical. Ms. McIntire offered to serve any child of any background, even backgrounds that differ from her own. She even offered transportation to religious services of other faiths. She simply wants to decline affirmatively acknowledging that beliefs contrary to her own are "true" or "okay," because she believes they are SINCERELY wrong.

    On the topic of a "substantial burden," I feel there definitely is one. DCYF did not only inconvenience Ms. McIntire, it actually went as far as basing an entire government license on her willingness to either go against what she believes or withhold her beliefs about the topic. Because she was unwilling to compromise her beliefs, DCYF was unwilling to allow her to be a foster parent. This portion of the test highly favors Ms. McIntire's case.

    When it comes to the compelling state interest in the matter, I do feel that there is one, and this lies in DCYF's favor. The compelling state interest in the specific case of DCYF is maintaining the religious and psychological welfare of foster children, specifically children who identify as part of the LGBTQ+ community.

    The question then becomes whether or not DCYF and the state of Washington have taken the least restrictive path in order to address the situation. It was addressed by the judge that DCYF seemed to have acted a little too broadly. Instead of denying Ms. McIntire's application altogether, DCYF could have chosen selective placement, allowing Ms. McIntire the opportunity to become a foster parent as she desired, and making sure no child placed with her would be in any potential harm simply by placing children with Ms. McIntire who shared in her religious and moral convictions. This is one example of a less restrictive or discriminatory way to have addressed the matter.

    After applying the test and looking at all the information, I have come to the conclusion that Ms. McIntire's application was wrongfully denied. I feel as though Shannon McIntire has been discriminated against and denied opportunities simply because of her beliefs. I am not wholly convinced by the "compelling" state interest. I would argue that Ms. McIntire was cooperating and taking necessary steps to ensure that any child, no matter their identity, would feel safe and cared for in her home. This cooperation can be seen through the fact that she was willing to provide transportation to religious services and have an open conversation when asked about the topic of religion or her values in an honest and straightforward manner. I am not convinced after looking at the facts of the case that DCYF has not discriminated against Ms. McIntire based on her religious beliefs, and therefore violated her First Amendment rights. It is for this reason that I believe that Shannon McIntire should not have had her application denied by DCYF.

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Sources:

McIntire Case:https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/28711236/mcintire-v-senn.pdf

DeGross Case:https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/3:2024cv05225/332789/62/0.pdf?ts=1777043717

When Does Learning About Religion Become Promoting It?

 Public schools are allowed to teach students about religion. But when does teaching about a religion become encouraging students to participate in it? That question is the focus of a new federal lawsuit against the Palo Alto Unified School District in California.

In fall 2025, students in Palo Alto High School's Social Justice Pathway, an interdisciplinary program focused on social justice issues, took a school-sponsored field trip to the Muslim Community Association mosque in Santa Clara. According to the lawsuit, students observed Dhuhr, the Muslim midday prayer, listened to Quran recitations, received Qurans, and were encouraged to wear Islamic religious clothing, including hijabs for female students. The plaintiffs also allege that the program presented Islam more favorably than other religions. The lawsuit was filed on August 7, 2026, by a group of parents and students against the school district and Palo Alto High School principal Brent Kline. Because the case is still at an early stage, these allegations have not been proven in court.

People who participated in the trip have disputed the idea that it was religious instruction rather than education. At least one student who attended has said she did not feel pressured to participate in or adopt Islamic religious practices. That disagreement matters because the constitutional issue is not whether public schools may expose students to religion. The harder question is whether this particular field trip crossed the line between teaching about Islam and facilitating religious exercise.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents the government from establishing or promoting religion. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp (1963), the Supreme Court struck down school-sponsored Bible reading and prayer but made clear that schools may objectively teach about religion as part of an academic program. For that reason, I do not think the mosque visit itself violated the Establishment Clause. Watching prayer can help students understand how a religion is practiced, and a Quran can be studied academically just as a Bible or Torah can.

The allegation that the program presented Islam more favorably than other religions raises a separate concern. In Larson v. Valente (1982), the Supreme Court made clear that the government cannot favor one religious denomination over others. Spending more time learning about Islam would not by itself prove unconstitutional favoritism. However, if the evidence shows that the school promoted Islam while treating other religions differently, that could create an additional Establishment Clause problem.

The constitutional concern becomes more serious when considering whether students were encouraged to participate. If students were simply shown a hijab and taught why some Muslim women wear one, that seems educational. If school officials or hosts encouraged students to put one on as part of experiencing the faith, however, I think that goes further. There is an important difference between studying a religious practice and asking a student to take part in one.

The Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions complicate this question. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), the Court rejected older approaches such as the Lemon test, which focused partly on whether government action had a secular purpose or promoted religion, and instead emphasized historical practices and understandings.

Still, Kennedy did not erase the Court's concern about coercing students. It cited Lee v. Weisman (1992), which held that a public school could not involve students in government-sponsored prayer at graduation. Lee recognized that students can face social pressure even when no one directly orders them to participate. In Kennedy, by contrast, the Court found no comparable coercion when a football coach engaged in personal prayer without requiring students to join him. A school-sponsored field trip is different. Students participating in an academic program may feel less free to simply walk away from an activity. Even so, general pressure may not be enough. There would need to be evidence that the school actually encouraged religious participation.

The parents may also have a Free Exercise argument, although I think it is weaker than their Establishment Clause claim. Their potential burden is not simply that their children learned about Islam. Instead, they could argue that their children were placed in activities conflicting with their families' religious beliefs without sufficient notice or an opportunity to opt out. In Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), the Supreme Court ruled that parents were entitled to notice and an opportunity to opt their children out of particular public-school instruction that substantially burdened their religious exercise. The facts are different here, but Mahmoud suggests that parental notice can become important when school activities seriously conflict with a family's religious exercise.

Based on what is publicly known so far, I think the school has the stronger argument if students simply visited the mosque, observed prayer, and learned about Islam. The outcome should be different if the evidence shows that school officials encouraged students to participate in religious practices or intentionally favored Islam over other faiths.

This case shows why schools do not have to choose between ignoring religion and promoting it. They can expose students to religious traditions while maintaining a clear boundary. Students may be asked to learn, but they should not be asked to practice. Giving parents clear notice of religious site visits and an opportunity to opt out would make that boundary even stronger. 

Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer

Religion and government often come into conflict when a law that applies to everyone goes against the religious beliefs of a particular group. A recent case involving Cedar Park Assembly of God, a Christian Church located in Washington, raises this issue. The case does not require taking a side on whether abortion is right or wrong. Instead, it asks how far can the government go in requiring religious organizations to participate in something that conflicts with their beliefs? In the Cedar Park Assembly of God v. Kuderer, the church challenged Washington’s health insurance laws because they believed it forced the church to be connected to abortion services despite its religious beliefs against abortion. On September 14, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Cedar Park. I believe this case raises an important Free Exercise question because even when a law doesn’t directly target religion, the government still needs to consider how that law affects religious organization. 

 

The controversy began from Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act, which was passed in 2018. Under the law, health insurance plans that provide maternity coverage generally must also cover abortion. Cedar Park provides health insurance for its employees, but believes the abortion and some forms of contraception violate its religious beliefs. Before the law was passed, Cedar parks insurance plan actually excluded abortion coverage. After the law was passed their insurer informed them that abortion would have to be included as a benefit when the plan gets renewed. Cedar park would go on to sue Washington, arguing that the state’s requirements violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

 

There was another major part of Washington law that complicated the situation even more. The state has a conscience statute that protects employers who have religious or moral objections to certain health care services. Because of the law, the state argued that Cedar Park was not being forced to purchase abortion coverage itself. Insurance companies are able to create plans that exclude abortion coverage for objecting employers but still have those services available separately for individuals. The Ninth Circuit majority also pointed to evidence that insurance companies had offered or could offer abortion excluding plans. Because of all of this, the majority did not agree that Washington was forcing Cedar park to pay for abortion services. 

 

The real larger constitutional question involves the Free Exercise Clause. Generally, the government has much more freedom to enforce a law that is neutral toward religion and applies generally to everyone. The supreme court has dealt with this issue in many cases such as Employment Division v. Smith and Church of Lukumi Babalu Ayo v. City of Hialeah. In Lukumi, the court made it clear the law cannot appear neutral while actually targeting religious conduct. This decision is super important for Cedar Park’s case. Washington’s law does not specifically mention Cedar park or prohibit a particular religious practice. The question is whether the way the law operates still places an unfair burden on religious exercise.

 

The Ninth Circuit majority believed that the law was neutral and generally applicable. It found that Washington was regulating health insurance rather than targeting Christianity or religious opposition to abortion. The court also found that the law did not show hostility toward Cedar Park’s beliefs. Since the law was considered neutral and generally applicable, it did not have to satisfy the much more demanding standard of strict scrutiny.

 

Judge Consuelo Callahan actually disagreed with that part of the ruling. In her partial dissent, she argued that the law was not truly neutral toward religion. From her view, Cedar Park was put in a position where the health insurance available to the church still connected its employees to abortion services, even though the church sincerely believed that facilitating those services violated its faith. She also argued that Washington’s system treated some secular circumstances more favorably than Cedar Park’s religious objection. If this is true, the law becomes harder to describe as generally applicable.

 

I found the dissenting concerns convincing. The fact that the law doesn’t specifically mention religion shouldn’t automatically mean that it respects religious freedom. The real effect of the law shouldn’t matter either. Cedar Park is not arguing that its employees should be prohibited from obtaining abortions or that Washington should outlaw it. Rather, it’s arguing that the church itself should not have to participate in providing or facilitating access to something that directly conflicts with its religious beliefs. The difference is super important.

 

At the same time, Washington has a legitimate argument that allowing every employer to determine which health services their employees can access through insurance could raise health care concerns. Religious freedom doesn’t automatically exempt a person or organization from every law that conflicts with a religious belief. If it did, governments would have a difficult time enforcing laws that apply across society.

 

Still, I believe that Cedar Park should receive greater protection in this situation. A religious exemption for the church would not require Washington to adopt Cedar Park’s beliefs or prevent other people from accessing abortion services. Instead, it would allow the church to avoid participating in something it sincerely considers religiously wrong. The government has an interest in regulating insurance, but religious organizations also have a strong interest in being able to operate according to their beliefs. Cedar Park Assembly of God v. Kuderer shows how difficult the Free Exercise Clause becomes when a law does not openly target religion but still creates a serious conflict for a religious organization. As cases like this continue, courts will have to decide where neutral government regulation ends and unconstitutional interference with religious exercise begins.

 

Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer, Nos. 23-35560, 23-35585 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026). https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/14/23-35585.pdf

 

Can Faith Follow You to Work?: Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer

    Cedar Park Assembly of God is a Christian church in Washington that provides health insurance to all of its employees. The issue that they faced was rooted in their powerful belief that abortion is sinful. They refuse to pay for any insurance plan that covers abortion. This is a problem, as Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act states that all health insurance plans that cover maternity care generally must also cover abortion. Does Washington’s law violate Cedar Park’s First Amendment right to freely exercise religion by indirectly connecting church to abortion?

    What happens when an employer’s religious beliefs conflict with employees' personal choices? Religious freedom protects a church from being forced to act against its faith, but does that protection extend to the choices of people who simply work for the church? This is the central issue in Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer, a recent Ninth Circuit case involving Washington’s controversial health insurance laws, religious freedom, and abortion. 

    At first, my mind immediately went to this being a Free Exercise issue. If a church believes abortion is morally wrong, forcing it to purchase a coverage plan that goes against its religious beliefs is wrong, right? Well, not exactly, because that’s not really what Washington’s law does. 

    Washington addresses this issue through a separate conscience statute that protects employers with religious or moral objections. This law allows Cedar Park to claim a religious exemption, allowing the church to opt out of purchasing the abortion coverage. The insurance company is able to offer the church a plan that excludes the abortion coverage. However, the insurance company must still inform employees that the services remain available separately and explain how to access them. This responsibility remains in the hands of the insurance company, not Cedar Park. This is where I had a paradigm shift. 

    Cedar Park argued that this still violates their beliefs and technically still requires their involvement in something they consider immoral. Even if the church does not directly purchase the specific coverage plan, its employees still have access and connections to abortion resources. In the eyes of Cedar Park, they are indirectly facilitating abortion. 

    The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against Cedar Park. The majority believed Washington’s laws are neutral and generally applicable. They do not specifically or intentionally target religion and generally apply across the entire health insurance system. Because the laws were neutral, the court applied rational basis review, meaning Washington needed only a reasonable or legitimate reason for the law. Strict scrutiny, the much harder test requiring a compelling government interest and that the law be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, did not apply. Cedar Park agreed that the law could pass this test, so the court rejected its Free Exercise claim.

    Judge Callahan strongly disagreed, arguing that the laws do burden Cedar Park’s religious exercise and are neither neutral nor generally applicable. She also believed the laws should have faced strict scrutiny instead. Her argument raises an important question: just because a law does not outwardly target religion, does that mean its effects on religion should be ignored?

    Another important concern is how substantial the burden on Cedar Park actually is. Interestingly, the majority did not decide that Cedar Park faced no religious burden. Instead, it assumed that a burden focused more on whether the laws were neutral and generally applicable. The church believes that any connection to abortion goes against its moral beliefs, regardless of how indirect it is. Meanwhile, Washington attempts to separate the two by allowing the purchase of a plan excluding the abortion part. The state tried to balance the church’s religious objections while remaining accommodating to employees and their healthcare plan.

    This disagreement aligns closely with Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not typically receive strict scrutiny simply because they burden someone’s religious beliefs. This approach differs from Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court protected the Amish from a generally applicable school attendance rule because it placed an immense burden on their religious practice. Together, these cases show how the Supreme Court’s approach to determining whether a law is neutral has shifted over time and why considering applicability matters. 

    I can absolutely understand how Cedar Park may believe the line was crossed here. If the church truly and deeply believes that assisting someone in the abortion process is morally incorrect, a court should be careful about deciding the church’s involvement is too indirect to matter. If the government could simply decide which parts of someone’s religious beliefs matter enough to respect, religion would mean less to people. 

    However, I still agree with the majority decision here. Cedar Park is not the only party whose freedom matters in this case. The employees have beliefs and personal choices as well, and those should not be diminished. 

    This is where I think Washington’s solution makes the most sense. Cedar Park is able to follow its religious beliefs by choosing the insurance plan that excludes abortion. They are not being forced to pay for something that goes against their beliefs. Meanwhile, employees can hold their own beliefs and access the healthcare they deem necessary. 

    If Cedar Park could not only refuse abortion coverage but also had the power to refuse separate access, the religious exemption would hold a whole different level of power. This would allow Cedar Park not only to protect its own religious choice, but also to dictate its employees' healthcare choices. I believe that is the most crucial part of the entire case. 

    Religious freedom should protect Cedar Park’s ability to follow its beliefs, but should not give the church control over the independent choices of each person who works there. Washington’s law attempts to protect both sides, which is why I agree with the Ninth Circuit that Cedar Park’s Free Exercise rights were not violated.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-35560/23-35560-2026-09-14.html

https://adflegal.org/case/cedar-park-assembly-god-kirkland-v-kuderer/

City Zoning and Minyans

 Daniel Grand, a practicing Orthodox Jew, faced a difficult dilemma. His city, University Heights Ohio, has strict zoning laws in place concerning places of worship. This has led to synagogues generally being on the outskirts of town. Grand decided to host prayer meetings in his house in order to fulfill what he sees as his religious duty as well as that of the community. Jewish law requires a quorum, called a minyan, of at least 10 men for prayers, so the practice necessarily requires a gathering of at least a small group of people. It also prohibits driving on certain holy days, such as the Sabbath and high holidays, making it difficult to get to a synagogue to gather and pray with other men. Grand’s plan was to host religious gatherings for men on these days so that neither he nor his community would have to drive to a synagogue on a day on which driving is forbidden.

Before his first gathering took place, a neighbor complained to the city of University Heights about the meeting. This prompted a cease-and-desist letter from the city, prohibiting Grand from using his house as a “place of religious assembly”. His house was not zoned for religious gatherings, which made his planned gathering illegal. The next day, Grand filed a Special Use permit under the University Heights Planning Commission in order to hold religious gatherings in his home despite the zoning restrictions. At a public hearing on his application, Grand faced pushback from neighbors, and the discussion was tabled with a second meeting planned. Grand withdrew his application before the second hearing, but the hearing nevertheless commenced. The Mayor asked community members to report violations of zoning law at this hearing. The police department also starting monitoring Grand’s house for violations of the religious gathering policy.

About 18 months after withdrawing his application, Grand filed a lawsuit against University Heights. This suit was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and then in the United States Sixth District Court of appeals. Among other claims, Grand claimed that the city’s zoning rules had a “chilling” effect on his first amendment practice. The court points out that Grand chose to withdraw his applications before the hearings on his special use permit were concluded. In this way, the court says, Grand was “the author of any chilling effect on his First Amendment interests.” Grand also admitted to convening at least 1 minyan on the Sabbath after the planning commission meetings ended, which the court said “does not sound like chill”. The 6^th district court ultimately ruled in favor of the city on all claims. However, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, who accepted the case and will hear arguments in December. Grand also made a facial claim in his lawsuit. He claimed that the zoning ordinances are unlawful because requiring permission for religious assembly is always unlawful. The court ruled that this facial claim is invalid because Grand couldn't prove that the zoning laws would be unlawful in any context.

The fundamental free exercise issue in this case concerns the ability of cities to create zoning restrictions in regards to religious gatherings. Zoning restrictions have a strong potential to violate the free exercise of religions with specific rules about gathering, as Orthodox Judaism does. Religious rules and zoning laws may directly contradict each other which creates an array of potential constitutional issues.

University Heights is highlighted in orange; blue tags show locations of synagogues in and around the city.

Something that the court did not consider that I think is relevant is whether or not the zoning laws geographically prohibit Grand from getting to a synagogue without driving. University Heights is a small city on the outskirts of Cleveland Ohio with a total area of 1.83 square miles. Google Maps confirms that Orthodox synagogues cluster on the outskirts of town. However, due to the small size of the town, there is at least one Orthodox synagogue within a 30-45 minute walk of most of the town, according to the Google Maps navigation tool. It is unclear which part of town Grand lives in. However, I think that having to walk 30 minutes to engage in religious practice is not overly restrictive on Grand’s free exercise. If the city were much larger, he would have a better case that keeping him from holding meetings in his house has a chilling effect on his religious practice. However, given the small size of the city and relative density of synagogues on the outskirts of the city, the zoning laws don’t necessarily chill the religious practice of Orthodox Jews. 

Overall, I think that Grand doesn't have a reasonable claim that the city chilled his free exercise. By choosing to withdraw his Special Use permit before it was fully processed, he chose to self-restrict his religious practice. Moreover, the city doesn't outright prohibit religious gatherings without any exception; the Special Use permit exists for cases like Grand's where there may be a good reason for having an exception to religious gathering laws. Even if he allowed the application to be fully processed and he got rejected I don't think he has a valid first amendment claim. There are likely synagogues within walking distance that he can travel to in order to fulfill his religious duties. 

Sources:

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-3876/24-3876-2025-11-13.html

https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/edit?mid=1TSmrGk8S3Tc0MiSSJx8LYkKoLK_H5Uc&usp=sharing

When Religious Beliefs Conflict with Assisted Suicide Laws

A new Illinois law allowing physician-assisted suicide has created a conflict between the state’s end-of-life policy and some doctors’ religious beliefs. On September 16, 2026, four Muslim physicians, Dr. Akbar Ali, Dr. Asim Babar, Dr. Omar Hussain, and Dr. Umar Shakur (pictured below), filed a federal lawsuit challenging parts of Illinois’ new End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act. The doctors argue that the law forces them to participate in a process that directly violates their Islamic beliefs. It raises the constitutional question: Can the government require doctors to participate in a legal medical process if it conflicts with their religious beliefs? The Illinois’ law, which took effect on September 12, permits terminally ill adults to access medication that they can take to end their lives. In order to qualify, a patient must be an Illinois resident, be at least 18 years old, have the mental capacity to make medical decisions, and have a terminal illness expected to result in death within six months. The medication must also be self-administered by the patient. 

The doctors are challenging the constitutionality of the law under the Affordable Care Act. Their attorneys argue that the Affordable Care Act prevents states that receive federal funding from discriminating against doctors who refuse to participate in assisted suicide. Since Illinois receives federal funding, the doctors argue that they should not be punished or treated differently for refusing to participate because of their religious beliefs.

The Illinois law does not require every physician to prescribe the medication. Illinois' Department of Public Health states that physicians are not required to provide aid-in-dying care. However, doctors who do not want to participate in assisted suicide because of their religious beliefs may still be required to take certain actions connected to the process, for instance, providing information to patients and potentially transferring their patients to another doctor. 

For these four doctors, this difference matters. They believe that human life is sacred and that their Islamic faith prohibits them from assisting someone in ending someone’s life. Their lawyers argue that even if the doctors are not personally prescribing the medication, requiring them to help a patient move toward obtaining it still makes them participate in something that violates their religious beliefs. The doctors are asking the federal court to prevent the State of Illinois from requiring them to comply with the Act in violation of their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion.

The central constitutional issue involves the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which protects the right to practice one’s religion without government interference. The difficult question is whether Illinois is simply regulating the medical profession or whether it is placing an unconstitutional burden on religious exercise. The doctors are not arguing that their beliefs should prevent other physicians from providing assisted suicide or prevent eligible patients from seeking it. They argue that they should not be forced to participate in conduct that violates their faith. 

Both sides make important arguments. Illinois wants to ensure that terminally ill patients are counseled about their legal medical options and can access them. From this perspective, requiring doctors to provide information or transferring patients to another doctor ensures that one doctor’s personal or religious beliefs do not prevent a patient from knowing about or accessing assisted suicide. 

This case also relates to the broader issue of religious neutrality that we have discussed in class. Religious freedom does not necessarily mean religious individuals are automatically exempt from every law that conflicts with their beliefs. At the same time, neutrality should not mean that the government can ignore a serious religious burden whenever it creates a generally applicable policy. The constitutional question becomes especially difficult when protecting one person's religious exercise may affect another person's ability to exercise a right provided by state law.

Doctors who believe assisted suicide goes against their religion should be required to refer their patients to another doctor who can counsel them on all their medical options. This seems fair to both sides because patients would still have access to all of their medical options, while doctors would not have to personally provide advice that goes against their religious beliefs. For example, the state itself or another neutral medical resource could inform patients about participating providers. This would allow patients to still access assisted suicide without forcing a doctor to help them with something that goes against the doctor’s religious beliefs.

Ali v. Vohra demonstrates why conflicts involving religious freedom rarely have simple solutions and shows how difficult it can be to protect religious freedom while also making sure that religious beliefs do not limit another person’s access to rights provided by law. Illinois has chosen to make assisted suicide legally available to qualifying patients, but that does not automatically resolve how much participation the state may demand from religiously objecting doctors. The case asks courts to determine where regulation of medical care ends and where the unconstitutional interference with religious exercise begins. Whatever the court decides could affect other cases where a person’s job responsibilities conflict with their religious beliefs.

https://wng.org/sift/muslim-doctors-sue-illinois-over-assisted-suicide-law-1789669076