Fight the Fire or the Contagious Disease

During the Covid-19 Pandemic, the development of the Covid-19 vaccine was an important development to help prevent the spread of this infectious and contagious disease. Many businesses, like Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, made policies mandating the vaccine with religious exemptions. However, many individuals did not want to receive the vaccine, with religious beliefs being a very common reason for not wanting to receive the vaccine. In Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, twenty-five percent of their staff filed for a religious accommodation to not have to receive the Covid-19 vaccination. The response from Snohomish Fire and Rescue was for these firefighters to have an unpaid suspension. From this, eight firefighters filed a lawsuit against Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue for wrongful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discriminating by race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 

Thus the question is if the unpaid suspension of the firefighters of the Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue is an unconstitutional infringement of their free exercise rights as guaranteed by the First Amendment? This issue has been brought to the attention of the Washington District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

A relevant Supreme Court that relates to this case is Groff v. Dejoy (2023), which discussed postal worker Groff seeking a religious accommodation to not work on Sundays. Groff was a devout Christian, which the postal services knew when hiring him, and accepted that he would not take Sunday shifts. Their solution to when Groff was out on a schedule for a Sunday, that he could swap shifts with another coworker. In spite of this seemingly easy solution, many times Groff was left without coverage, and would not go to work in compliance with his religious beliefs. Yet it is this exact action that got him fired. When this court eventually reached the supreme court it was unanimously ruled in favor of Groff. In addition, the decision also set a precedent that for an employer to deny a religious accommodation they must prove an undue burden onto the business.

In the case of the Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, the eighth firefighters suing believe that their wrongful lack of accommodation to their religious practice is analogous to the postal worker Groff. These firefighters have a deep religious convocation preventing them from receiving the vaccine, and thus believe their religious accommodation should be granted. They also argue that these firefighters did follow all other covid procedures, such as wearing a mask and social distancing. However the fire department argues that it's simply not enough. In addition, neighboring fire departments did not have the same restrictions for those who filled out religious exemptions. In fact, some of the plaintiffs were able to work at one of these firehouses, and even worked alongside Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue on many calls.  

On the other hand, Chief of Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue believes that by accommodating these religious beliefs that there is an undue burden on the department. In their case, they state that there is a health and safety cost, a financial cost and  an operational burden associated with allowing these firefighters to continue to work while not vaccinating for Covid-19. In terms of health and safety, the fire department argues that by not getting vaccinated these individuals imposed a risk on the public and their coworkers. Since these firefighters were also EMT/parameter certified, they can easily get the public sick with their job. Thus the department wanted to prevent any potential harm to the general public. 

Beyond the outreach of their jobs, the fire department also states that there is potential harm in getting other firefighters sick since Covid-19 is contagious. This not only imposes a health risk to themselves, but also creates a financial burden. When coworkers contract an infectious and contiguous disease, then there are more people taking sick days, and if enough people must take off then it could require hiring more people. In addition to this financial cost, there is also a case specific cost for Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue. This specific fire and rescue worked with a local Department of Corrections as their primary point of contact for emergency services. To work with this DOC, Covid-19 vaccinations were required for the organizations that worked with them. Thus by having members of the fire and rescue team who were not required, they would no longer be able to respond to these calls. 

Lastly Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue displays that by accommodating the religious exemptions imposes an operational burden. Since twenty-five percent of the department's fire fighters filled out this religious accommodation form, they argued that it was proportionally too many people to properly accommodate for one of their policies. These financial, operational, and health and safety burdens were enough for the ninth-circuit court to say there was an undue burden to accommodate the religious exemptions. Petersen and the other plaintiffs petitioned their case to the supreme court, but were denied. 

In my opinion, I agree with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court that the burden on Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue do constitute the burden on the firefighters. For protecting the health of the public and their coworkers, I believe they have shown the compelling state interest of preventing the spread of a contagious illness. Since preventing the spread of Covid-19 is of an important interest, it justifies the lack of religious accommodation. This also supports the precedent of Groff, as all the burdens associated with granting the religious exemptions are an undue burden that justify the denial of the religious exemption. In addition, I believe by not allowing them to work at Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue they are only placing an indirect burden, as they can still continue to believe their religious convictions, they just simply can not be a fire fighter at this specific station. Thus I believe the Ninth Circuit Court has made the right decision in supporting Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue. 

Resources: 

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/22-174

https://firstliberty.org/snohomish/

https://www.heraldnet.com/2026/10/05/scotus-wont-hear-snohomish-co-firefighters-vaccine-lawsuit/

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1044/24-1044-2025-09-02.html

Should Faith Healing practices be protected or prosecuted?

 

Is refusing medical care for one’s children based on religious beliefs child endangerment or protected religious practice? Pennsylvania courts are in the midst of deciding this in the case of Connie and Martin Deimler, who are charged with child endangerment. The couple allegedly failed to provide medical care to their children, leading to the death of an infant and severe illness of a toddler. The couple held sincere religious beliefs in the efficacy of faith to heal the sick, and against the use of medical treatment. I think that in this case, the government has a compelling interest to protect the welfare of children even if it restricts free exercise of religion. 

On December 12, 2025, EMS and State police were called to the Deimler home in Lebanon County, PA in response to the death of their 6-day-old son. The infant died from complications from neonatal hyperbilirubinemia and multiorgan dysfunction. The couple had not received prenatal care or medical care after birth. State troopers also discovered that the couple had another young child with significant medical issues. That child was taken in for surgery immediately, and Connie and Martin were instructed on how to care for that child’s medical and nutritional needs. After the couple allegedly failed to follow those instructions, the child was placed in the custody of Lebanon County Child services on December 29, 2025. On April 23, 2026, both parents were charged with two cases of felony child endangerment. Under the statute they are charged with violating, child endangerment is defined as a parent knowingly endangering the welfare of a child by violating their duty of care, protection, or support. The statute is neutrally written and includes no text allowing for religious exemptions.

The Lebanon Branch of Faith Tabernacle Congregation

Connie and Martin Deimler are members of Faith Tabernacle Congregation. Faith Tabernacle Congregation is a small non-denominational fundamentalist Christian church. Key to the religious practice of Faith Tabernacle is a belief in faith to heal the sick. As an extension of this belief, members of the church completely eschew any medical treatment, including vaccines and lifesaving treatment. Started in Philadelphia in 1897, Faith Tabernacle Congregation has a long history of legal issues due to their trust in faith healing, from a 1906 case of a child dying from untreated typhoid fever to members being forcibly vaccinated in a 1991 measles outbreak. The church has historically been insular and follows a variety of other fundamentalist practices in addition to faith healing.

At the heart of the case is a question over the limits of the state in protecting children from harmful effects of religious belief. How far does the free exercise clause go in permitting parents to subject their children to their religious beliefs? While no Supreme Court cases have directly dealt with similar faith healing situations, a few dealing with the broader issue of parental authority are helpful in understanding the constitutional context of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Martin Deimler and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Connie Deimler.

Prince v. Massachusetts concerns the ability of members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to enlist children to distribute religious literature in violation of child labor laws. Ruling in favor of Massachusetts, the Court decided that the government has broad authority to regulate the treatment of children, beyond what would be considered unconstitutional restriction of free exercise of religion for adults. The majority opinion notably asserts that “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children…” This statement has proven to be grimly prescient in the Deimler case. The state has a compelling interest to protect the welfare of the child under the legal principle of parens patriae, and this interest can override the free practice of religion.

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court ruled in favor of the old Amish Community allowing them a religious exemption to mandatory schooling laws. The majority opinion appeals to the long history of the Amish in living separately from the world, and to the fact that the contested practice is “intimately related to daily living.” This decision protects the ability to gain exemptions from laws that overly burden foundational religious practices, even if those laws are neutrally written and applied.

While Faith Tabernacle Congregation is not quite as insular as the Amish, I think that it is comparable to the Amish in many ways. Like the Amish, the church has a long history of religious practice that runs counter to the mainstream. If the specific practice were less harmful, perhaps the child endangerment statute could have a religious exemption such as Wisconsin v. Yoder helps establish. It's clear that the statute heavily burdens a practice that is foundational to members of Faith Tabernacle Church: the ability of parents to trust in God to heal their children. However, this situation is a literal case of life and death, which easily meets the standard of a state’s compelling interest to protect a child’s wellbeing. For this reason, I agree with Lebanon County prosecutors that neglecting medical care for children is felony child endangerment. 

Currently, the two cases are being processed by the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas. If the two are found guilty, I think it is unlikely that religious exemptions to the child endangerment statute will be considered, based on both Pennsylvania and Federal precedent. Moreover, under the principle of parens patriae, I feel that the state is fully valid in prosecuting this case.

Does Religious Freedom End in Prison?

    The First Amendment protects people’s right to practice their religion without unnecessary government interference, but how much religious freedom do they have while they are incarcerated? Prisons have regulations that can make religious freedoms harder to accommodate. 

    In Roberts v. Engelke, Stephen Roberts was an inmate at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia and he practiced Sunni Islam. Robert's sincere religious belief was that he is required to follow both the Jewish Kashrut dietary laws as well as fasting during Ramadan. In 2020, Roberts requested that the prison provide meals that followed both of these requirements. However, the prison officials told him they were not able to provide meals that could accommodate both at the same time. He was told to choose between a kosher diet or to switch to another meal plan that would allow him to fast during Ramadan. Roberts tried to follow both practices by saving his meals until sunset, which caused him to get food poisoning many times. 

    Roberts had been receiving his meals from the prison’s Common Fare program, which was supposed to accommodate many different religious dietary restrictions. In 2019 he switched to the Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet and when it became Ramadan he requested to continue to receive his kosher meals while also fasting during the day. Prison officials said they did not have enough time to make the changes because they would need to make a new meal plan, order food, and follow the food safety regulations. If he wanted to change back to the Common Faire meal plan to participate in Ramadan it would take six months to switch back to the kosher meal diet plan.

    He sued the prison officials, arguing that they were violating the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the prison officials, but in July 2026, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered his Free Exercise claim. The court of appeals decided that Roberts had a right to a diet that followed his sincere religious beliefs. However the court did not decide whether the prison had violated his rights. The appeals court sent the case back to the lower court to decide if the prison's actions were related to prison interests. 

    In 2021 the prison found a way to accommodate both of Robert's religious dietary requirements. I understand that the prison has to consider things like cost and food preparation time, however, I do not think those things should outweigh his First Amendment rights. Roberts was not asking for special treatment just because he wanted other food, but that it was his sincere religious belief that required him to follow certain diets. I think how the prison eventually accommodated him raises the question if the original restriction was necessary. I think the prison officials should have to show that their restrictions are reasonable and related to real prison concerns, like safety, instead of saying that accommodating religious practice is too difficult. 

    I think an important constitutional issue for this case is if the prison officials can force someone to choose between two religious practices that they sincerely believe in order to fully follow their faith. The Free Exercise Clause protects people’s ability to follow their religious beliefs. I do not think those protections should automatically disappear because they are in a prison. I think forcing someone to make the choice between his religious beliefs places a heavy burden on his religious freedoms. 

    This case relates to the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court held that neutral laws that apply to everyone normally do not violate the Free Exercise Clause just because they place a burden on religious practices. Even though the content of the cases are different, I think it raises a question of how much power the government should have to interfere with religious practices and how much until it places too much of a substantial burden on those practices. 

    In the end, I think the prison officials should have made a greater effort to accommodate Robert's religious beliefs in the beginning instead of making him choose between two of his religious practices. I understand that the prison had a compelling interest to maintain their regulations for food safety and order, but I do not think that should be held higher than someone’s First Amendment rights. I think the lower courts should rule in Roberts’s favor if the prison cannot justify why they could not accommodate him in 2020. Just because someone is in prison does not mean they lose the ability to practice their religious beliefs freely. 

When Government Benefits Come with Religious Consequences

Does treating everyone the same always mean treating them fairly? This is the central question raised in Alsyrawan v. Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (2026). This case involves a Muslim family requesting a religious accommodation from the state of Pennsylvania under the Medicaid-funded caregiving program. Although one may argue this state policy applies equally to all, it raises questions about whether a seemingly neutral law can place an unequal burden on religious exercise for certain families and their beliefs. I find it difficult to justify Pennsylvania's refusal to accommodate the Alsyrawan family's religious obligations when it has granted exceptions in other circumstances. 

Mohamad Alsyrawan is a non-verbal autistic adult with Down syndrome and requires extensive assistance, care, and supervision in his day-to-day life. His primary caregivers are his mother and sister, and all three are practicing muslims who emigrated from Syria to the United States in 2001. Under Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Waiver program, Alsyrawan was initially approved for 133 hours of caregiving services per week. Shortly after, the 40/60 state rule was implemented, limiting the hours his family could be paid for providing care to 40 hours per week for one family caregiver or 60 hours total across multiple family members. 

The Alsyrawan family requested an exception under their Islamic beliefs, which require certain intimate personal care and interactions to be provided only by family members. Without this exception, Mohamad’s mother and sister would have to provide all the care without additional compensation, as certain outside caregiving arrangements could conflict with their religious obligations. Pennsylvania denied their appeal request regardless of their circumstances and argued that alternative caregiving arrangements were possible.

After several years of appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of Alsyrawan, deciding that to make a religious freedom claim, someone only needs to show that a government rule interferes with their religious practices, not that it causes a substantial burden. This does not automatically mean the government is violating the Constitution, but it does mean the individual’s claim deserves further consideration. The court sent the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings to determine whether this refusal violated the family’s freedom.

The most important question in this case is whether Pennsylvania’s 40/60 state rule places a substantial and detrimental burden on the Alsyrawan family's religious freedom. Technically, the state is not prohibiting the family from practicing Islam or providing care. Instead, the rule is limiting how much the government will pay relatives for providing care to their family. However, I do not believe a burden must involve any prohibition to still deserve constitutional protection. Even when the government technically allows someone to continue their religious practices, if it creates serious financial consequences, it can put crucial pressure on them to act against their religious beliefs. 

This case reminded me of Sherbert v. Verner, where the Supreme Court held that denying unemployment benefits to a woman who refused Saturday work to observe the Sabbath violated her Free Exercise rights. Similarly, the Alsyrawan family faced the challenge of choosing between their religious beliefs and receiving government assistance. While Sherbert focused on whether the government could justify a substantial burden on religious exercise, Alsyrawan clarified that individuals only need to show a burden exists to establish the initial burden required for a Free Exercise claim. This distinction demonstrates that people should not have to prove their religious practices are severely restricted before courts actually consider whether the government has treated them unfairly by interfering with their beliefs. 

On the other hand, a case like Employment Division v. Smith complicates this argument, as the Supreme Court held that a neutral, generally applicable law does not ordinarily violate the Free Exercise Clause just because it burdens religious practices. Alsyrawan follows this framework, emphasizing that individuals don’t actually have to prove a substantial burden before courts consider it a violation or not. This distinction matters because even seemingly neutral laws can still unfairly interfere with religion, especially when the government allows certain exceptions while denying other similar ones for religious purposes. 

Facially, the 40/60 rule seems neutral as it applies the same numerical limits to all regardless of religion, race, gender, etc. However, the policy allows temporary exceptions only to certain circumstances, such as emergencies or the unexpected absence of a caregiver. More importantly, Pennsylvania has previously granted an individualized exception outside those circumstances. This makes me wonder: if the government has authority to accommodate certain people, why should religious obligations receive different consideration? 

Under Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. Hialeah, the Supreme Court struck down laws targeting the Santeria religion’s animal sacrifice practice. Although it does not seem Pennsylvania is targeting Islam in the way Hialeah targeted Santeria, Lukumi demonstrates the importance of examining how laws operate, not just relying strictly on their wording. I believe Pennsylvania’s exceptions deserve similar examination. While I understand an emergency and a permanent religious obligation are not identical, the state should have to explain why those differences justify refusing religious accommodation. 

  It is fair to say Pennsylvania has a legitimate interest in managing public funds, maintaining consistent standards, and ensuring reliable care. However, if strict scrutiny applies, the government must then demonstrate a compelling state interest and be able to show that less restrictive alternatives would not adequately achieve its goals. Could Pennsylvania allow carefully documented religious exceptions while periodically reviewing whether families still qualify? I believe this approach could protect the integrity of the caregiving program without unnecessarily burdening religious exercise. 

The sincerity of the Alsyrawan family's beliefs matters, and his mother even testified that she and her daughter would continue providing care regardless of whether they did receive the additional compensation. This suggests their religious obligations are genuine, not just a financial preference or a facade to get more money. Even if the courts do examine sincerity, they should not have the autonomy to decide if a particular practice is actually central to Islam or if other Muslims would interpret their religion differently. 

Some may argue that allowing this exception creates a slippery slope, encouraging other families to request additional compensation for whatever reason they see fit. This concern deserves consideration, especially when public resources are in fact limited. However, the possibility of future requests should not automatically justify dismissing constitutional protections. Each request should be evaluated in depth based on its circumstances and the government’s justification.

Ultimately, I believe Pennsylvania should grant a carefully limited accommodation, that is, if the family is able to establish its claim and the state is unable to prove that the refusal is necessary to protect a compelling state interest. This does not mean all religious requests should override government policy, but rather that the state must justify its decisions when its own rules inconsistently allow flexibility. Alsyrawan shows that religious freedom should be judged not only by whether a law appears neutral, but also by how the government applies it. A law that treats all equally is not necessarily one that protects all religious freedom equally.  

Sources: 

https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2026/87-map-2024.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

https://laws.com/news/injury-law/pennsylvania-supreme-court-rules-on-dhs-case-involving-faith-11011852  

Protecting the Public, but at What Cost?

    No one should have to choose between their religious beliefs and their job. In Carlson v. City of Redmond, eight firefighters sued the City of Redmond, Washington, arguing they were wrongfully terminated for refusing the mandated COVID-19 vaccine because of their religious beliefs, violating their First Amendment rights. While protecting public health is an important government interest, the firefighters believed the city could have accommodated them by offering positions that did not require the vaccine. 

When the Redmond Fire Department mandated COVID-19 vaccination, eight of the firefighters requested religious accommodations, which the city initially approved as long as they wore a mask and were routinely tested for the virus.

The city later revoked this accommodation because it wanted consequences for employees who did not receive the vaccine. This mandate was not uniformly enforced. Firefighters were required to be vaccinated, but police officers received accommodations.

In October 2021, seven firefighters took medical leave because the vaccine mandate caused them stress. They kept their jobs, but firefighters who did not take medical leave and refused the vaccine were fired. 

The firefighters argue that the city should have accommodated their religious beliefs and should not have required them to be vaccinated. They argue that alternatives were available, such as assigning them to positions that did not bring them into direct contact with the public, requiring them to wear masks, and undergoing regular COVID screening. The city did not inform the firefighters of jobs they could apply for that did not require vaccination and instead assigned vaccinated employees to those jobs. 

In 2025, a federal district court ruled in favor of the city and found that the requested accommodations would create an undue hardship. It found that exempting firefighters from the vaccination mandate placed a substantial burden on the city and created serious public health and safety risks. In October 2026, the firefighters appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the city did not consider reasonable accommodations and discriminated against them due to their religious beliefs. 

This case raises important questions about the Free Exercise Clause, which protects individuals from unnecessary government interference with their religious beliefs and practices. The main issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the city could deny religious accommodations while protecting workplace safety and public health. The Court must consider whether less restrictive alternatives could have protected these interests without placing an unnecessary burden on religious freedom. The firefighters faced a substantial and indirect burden because they had to choose between following their religious beliefs or keeping their jobs. 

This case relates to Sherbert v. Verner (1963), in which a Seventh-day Adventist was terminated from her job and denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, when she observed the Sabbath. The Supreme Court held that the government violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by placing a substantial burden on her religious freedom without a sufficiently compelling state interest. Similarly, the Redmond firefighters were forced to choose between following their religious beliefs or keeping their jobs. Protecting public health is a compelling state interest, but the city could have accommodated the firefighters’ religious beliefs by allowing them to take jobs that did not require vaccination. When balancing a compelling state interest with religious freedom, the Court should require the city to accommodate employees as long as those accommodations do not create serious risks to public health and safety.

The firefighters have a strong argument that their religious beliefs were not given enough consideration. The city had a legitimate interest in protecting public health, but it could have easily accommodated the firefighters by offering positions that did not require vaccination. The fact that the city originally exempted the firefighters from the vaccine mandate suggests that reasonable accommodations were available. The city never explained why the original accommodation of requiring the unvaccinated to wear masks and to be routinely tested was no longer adequate to protect public health and safety.

While the policy did not specifically target a particular religion, it did negatively impact those who refused to be vaccinated on religious grounds. A policy like this can appear neutral but actually negatively impacts those it indirectly affects. Religious freedom should not automatically excuse employees from workplace safety requirements. However, it could be justified if the city could demonstrate that an accommodation created a substantial safety risk or burden. 

Carlson v. City of Redmond requires the Court of Appeals to balance public safety with religious freedom. Government employers have a responsibility to protect the public, but should not lose their jobs for refusing to be vaccinated when the government can offer reasonable accommodations to employees who have sincerely held religious beliefs. I believe the Ninth Circuit should reverse the district court’s decision and send the case back to the trial court to determine if the city could have offered reasonable accommodations that did not negatively affect public safety and health. Religious freedom does not mean individuals are automatically exempt from every government requirement, but it does require that the government give serious consideration to giving those with religious beliefs reasonable accommodations so they do not have to choose between practicing their religion and keeping their jobs.

https://firstliberty.org/cases/washington-firefighters/

Government Oath Confliction with Religious Belief

            Would you still choose to take a job if it required you to be sworn in by an oath that you don’t believe in? This is the main conflict that was presented by the case Bolden-Hardge v. California Office of the State Controller. Just a few years into her career working for the government, Brianna Bolden-Hardge was offered a new position at the California Office of the State Controller. This job required that before Brianna accepted the position, that she would take a loyalty oath pledging her allegiance to both state and federal governments. Brianna was a devout Jehovah’s Witness, and believed that it would be a violation of her religious beliefs to pledge her primary allegiance to federal and state governments. 

Brianna claimed that her allegiance was first and foremost to God, and that she would not take up arms. She tried to come up with a proposal to have the oath slightly altered so that she felt it would not be a violation of her religious beliefs, and the Controller's Office rejected the proposal. After the Controller’s Office decided to reject the new oath proposal they also took back Brianna’s job offer. Brianna had no choice but to return to her previous, lower paying job. Brianna decided to go to the courts with a failure-to-accommodate claim against the Controller's Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. She also claimed that the office refusing to accommodate her deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Brianna argued that taking the oath would force her to choose between her religious beliefs, and having a government job. The defendants would go on to argue that the oath does not require the people saying it to pledge loyalty to the government over religion, so it should not present a conflict. 

The defendants go into detail talking about how the oath does not explicitly state that you are pledging an ultimate or primary allegiance to the federal and state constitutions, but rather just an oath of allegiance. The defendants also argue that taking the oath is critical to ensuring that the government's employees are fully uniform and committed to serving the federal and state constitutions. There was some concern that allowing customized oaths could lead to a slippery slope, and cause administrative and legal difficulties down the road. Additionally they argued that Brianna’s claims that her First Amendment rights were violated held no weight because her claim needed to be filed in California’s two-year litigation period. 

The court ruled in favor of Brianna for the failure to accommodate religion claim. However, due to her not filing the claim for violation of her free exercise in a timely manner the court was unable to move forward with that ruling. The biggest constitutional issue at hand here is if Brianna had filed her claim in time that her First Amendment Free Exercise right was violated, would the court have ruled in her favor? Or in other words, could refusal to take a government oath because you believe it goes against your sincerely held religious beliefs be permissible under the free exercise clause of the first amendment? I believe that the answer should be yes. 

            This is an important issue because it opens the doors for a slippery slope of religious restrictions with individuals working in the government. I do understand the potential significance of trying to have uniformity, and complete devotion to the government be the standard principles of government employees. However, there needs to be a balance between separating deeply held religious beliefs and proclaiming loyalty to the government. In this case specifically, Brianna was not asking to not take an oath at all, she was simply asking for the oath to be altered to accommodate for her religious beliefs. This small change would have little to no impact on the uniform loyalty of government employees. A strong precedent here is set by the case West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette. In this case Jehovah's Witnesses students were expelled for refusing to say the pledge of allegiance. The Supreme Court ended up ruling in favor of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and made the decision that the school cannot force the students to recite the pledge of allegiance. Both Barnette and Bolden-Hardge involve governments requiring an expression of allegiance that Jehovah’s Witnesses say is against their religious conscience. The government should not be able to force a person to express commitments, in terms that violate their religious beliefs just to receive a government benefit or position. 

Legal Battle Over Illinois End-of-Life Act

    On December 12, 2025, Illinois Governor Jay R. Pritzker signed into law the End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act which was scheduled to take effect on September 12, 2026. The act would legalize physician-assisted dying for terminally ill adults, and the law contained protections for healthcare providers who declined to participate. However, healthcare providers who declined to participate were still required to inform patients about legally available treatments, and either refer them to alternative providers or provide information about where those services could be accessed. The Carmelite Sisters, a Roman Catholic congregation of religious sisters dedicated to caring for the sick and frail elderly nearing the end of their lives, filed a lawsuit against Illinois state officials on September 3, 2026, (just nine days before the law would become active) on the grounds that it violated their First Amendment right to Free Exercise; the Carmelite Sisters state that they reject participation in physician-assisted dying, including referrals, because it directly conflicts with their religious beliefs and mission. The question is now this: Does the End-of-Life Act violate the Carmelite Sisters’ First Amendment right to Free Exercise by requiring them to provide information or referrals for physician-assisted dying despite their religious beliefs prohibiting participation in assisted suicide?

    So far in the legal process, there has only been a formal complaint by the plaintiffs, which initiates the lawsuit, but no complete briefs from either side— other than the facts and early arguments provided by the Carmelite Sisters. Both parties have also agreed to a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing for no penalties to be imposed on the Carmelite Sisters, and also (since there was no contesting by Illinois government officials) no brief with arguments submitted by the defendants. This case is being argued in federal court, meaning that legal precedent affecting federal issues from the Supreme Court will most likely be applied to the decision. With that in mind, the plaintiffs are arguing points that specifically conform to various tests established in the Supreme Court cases Sherbert v. Verner (1963); Employment Division v. Smith (1990); and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993).

    The first argument that the Carmelite Sisters make is that there is a substantial burden being imposed upon them by the law, preventing them from freely exercising their religion and would trigger strict scrutiny. This stems from the precedent in Sherbert, where the Court developed the Sherbert test of strict scrutiny; if there is a perceived substantial burden imposed on a religious group by a law, then the government must demonstrate a compelling state interest in defense of the law. If the government fails to do so, the law is struck down.

    However, the precedent of Sherbert changed in Smith raising the bar at which strict scrutiny may be activated. Although the Carmelite Sisters feel that their religion has been substantially burdened, they must argue that the End-of-Life Act is not a generally-applicable and/or not a neutral law (these two criteria are additions from Smith). This means that they must refute either of the following 1) The law can be broadly applied with few exceptions (general-applicability); and 2) The law has hostile intent or language against religion (neutrality). The Carmelite Sisters argue that because the law has exceptions for certain healthcare providers who object on religious grounds to providing physician-assisted dying themselves (not including a mandate to refer), that this is not generally applicable. In addition, they argue that the law is aggressive towards religion, encouraging a type of “religious gerrymander[ing]” (67). And because it does not meet the criteria, they believe it must be analyzed with strict scrutiny.

    The application of strict scrutiny from Sherbert was adjusted in the ruling of Lukumi, refining a higher standard for governments to prove constitutionality of original laws in the post-Smith era. In Lukumi, the Court majority confirmed that if either general-applicability or neutrality were violated, then strict scrutiny would be applied. The test would require both a compelling state interest and a showing that the law was applied through the least restrictive means possible; the government must prove that a law was implemented in the least burdensome way possible. The Carmelite Sisters claim that the defendants don’t have a compelling state interest and that the government has not “selected the least-restrictive means of furthering any alleged government interest” (66). Hence, they find the Illinois law completely unconstitutional.

    I agree with the Carmelite Sisters that they shouldn’t be compelled to comply with the End-of-Life Act and that the court should rule the law unconstitutional, however, I don’t agree with all aspects of their arguments. Starting with the Smith test of neutral and generally-applicable. They claim that the End-of-Life Act isn’t either neutral or generally-applicable; I disagree on fully committing to the idea that the law was absolutely hostile towards religion. I think this because it made clear attempts to be inclusive in their language to allow for healthcare providers to abstain from administering the program. And if anything, I think the law was intended, and shown in its language, to be neutral. However, I agree with the Carmelite Sisters that the existence of exceptions makes the law not generally-applicable, advancing it to the next tests established by Lukumi. Looking at strict scrutiny, I think that only one half of the test is satisfied; is there a compelling state interest in providing residents of Illinois with the types of healthcare they require, and in giving them control over their own being? I certainly think so. However, I don’t think that the law was narrowly tailored enough to be seen as the least restrictive implementation; why can’t the state operate the referral program instead of pushing it onto religious healthcare providers? Because I think it fails the second half of the test, I believe the court should rule the law unconstitutional. It falls on the Illinois legislature to come up with valid legislation.

Sources:

https://becketfund.org/case/carmelite-sisters-for-the-aged-and-infirm-v-prince/?section=caseDetail

https://becketfund.org/case/carmelite-sisters-for-the-aged-and-infirm-v-prince/?section=caseLegal

https://dockets.justia.com/docket/illinois/ilndce/1:2026cv10665/507202

Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation vs Shellem

 

Supporters hold signs as they gather outside the US Supreme Court on April 30, 2025, ahead of oral arguments in St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond and Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board v. Drummond cases. (ALEX WONG / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / Getty Images via AFP)	Rachel Laser, president and CEO of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, speaks in front of the US Supreme Court with Rep. Jamie Raskin in spring 2022. (Lena J. Moreno/Americans United)

In National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem, the Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to open a public charter school in Oklahoma and receive state funding. The Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board initially rejected the application, relying on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond, which held that faith-based charter schools violate the state constitution and state law. However, because the board explicitly cited religious grounds for its initial denial, it opened itself up to a First Amendment "Free Exercise" lawsuit.

The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty represented the Ben Gamla Foundation in federal district court, arguing that excluding religious organizations from publicly available educational benefits violates the U.S. Constitution. Becket cited recent U.S. Supreme Court precedents—including Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson v. Makin—which established that states cannot deny public funds to institutions solely based on their religious status. Federal District Judge David L. Russell issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the foundation, ruling that Oklahoma's nonsectarian restriction unconstitutionally discriminates against eligible recipients based on religious character.

Note that in the three above cases, the Supreme Court decided :
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017) The Court held that denying a public benefit to an entity based purely on its religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause. 

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020) The Court ruled that once a state decides to provide aid for private education, it cannot discriminate against religious schools or parents solely because of the school’s religious identity. 

Carson v. Makin (2022) The Court held that excluding religious schools from a tuition assistance program violates the Free Exercise Clause. 

Despite the federal court order, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board subsequently voted 4–3 against approving the charter application. In later votes, opposing board members cited non-religious justifications, such as a lack of demonstrated local parental support. Board Chairperson Brian Shellem acknowledged the legal tightrope, noting that the federal injunction prevents discrimination against the school based on its religious identity. Nevertheless, because the initial denial explicitly hinged on religious grounds, the ongoing dispute is positioned to move through the appellate courts and potentially reach the U.S. Supreme Court.

Religion and Constitutional Law

    The Ben Gamla Foundation argues that its proposed curriculum maintains constitutional neutrality. While the school incorporates Hebrew language instruction—a subject deeply intertwined with Jewish culture and religious traditions—the foundation contends this is no different than a Spanish immersion school teaching students about cultural traditions like salsa dancing or historical events like the Spanish Inquisition. From the foundation’s perspective, denying public charter status because of cultural-religious heritage constitutes unlawful discrimination against an organization offering a secular curriculum.

However, this case highlights a deep tension between two foundational principles of First Amendment jurisprudence: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Under recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits state governments from excluding religious individuals or organizations from public benefit programs simply because they are religious. Conversely, the Establishment Clause mandates that government bodies remain neutral and refrain from funding or endorsing religious instruction and practice.

My Response

I agree with the state’s position that public charter schools should not receive public tax dollars if they incorporate religious instruction or identity. Public charter schools operate as publicly funded government actors, and they have a constitutional obligation to remain strictly secular. If Ben Gamla were seeking to operate as a private school, it would be free to integrate religious tradition however it sees fit. But once an institution seeks public funds as a charter school, it must abide by public constitutional standards.

Allowing state funding for religious charter schools introduces two significant constitutional risks:

1. Preserving Government Neutrality: A core foundation of American religious liberty is the separation of church and state. Isolating government funding from religious institutions prevents the state from favoring majority religions or getting itself in doctrinal matters. When the state funds religious education, public tax dollars inevitably support religious indoctrination.
   
   

2. The Slippery Slope of Selective Funding: If the state begins funding charter schools affiliated with one religious tradition, constitutional fairness dictates it must fund all religious organizations. While supporters may advocate for a Jewish or Christian charter school, public sentiment often shifts when considering a charter school focused on Islamic Shariah law or Scientology. The Establishment Clause exists precisely to avoid forcing taxpayers to fund religious practices they may disagree with, and to prevent the government from picking winners and losers among faith traditions.

Ultimately, cases like Ben Gamla demonstrate how the line between public education and private religious exercise is eroding. While recent precedents like Carson v. Makin have expanded Free Exercise protections for private religious choices, extending those principles to state-created charter schools crosses a critical line. Public charter schools are public schools; maintaining their strictly secular character is essential to protecting both religious freedom and public education. 

Bibliography

1. Brumley, Jeff. "Oklahoma Board Rejects Jewish Charter School Application." Baptist News Global, 19 Oct. 2026, baptistnews.com/article/oklahoma-board-rejects-jewish-charter-school-application/.

2. Eger, Andrea. "AG: Third Vote on Jewish Charter School Would Be Illegal." Oklahoma Watch, 22 Oct. 2026, oklahomawatch.org/2026/10/22/ag-third-vote-on-jewish-charter-school-would-be-illegal/. 

3. Elia-Shalev, Asaf. "Jewish School Becomes Battleground in US 'Church-State Separation' Legal Challenge." The Times of Israel, 22 Nov. 2025, www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-school-becomes-battleground-in-church-state-separation-us-supreme-court-challenge/. 

4. Helfand, Michael A. "The Fight for a Jewish Charter School Isn't a Christian Nationalist Plot." Jewish Journal, 29 Apr. 2026, jewishjournal.com/commentary/opinion/388411/the-fight-for-a-jewish-charter-school-isnt-a-christian-nationalist-plot/. 

5. Martinez-Keel, Nuria. "Oklahoma State Board Again Rejects Jewish Charter School in 'Shocking' Vote." Oklahoma Voice, 12 Oct. 2026, oklahomavoice.com/2026/10/12/oklahoma-state-board-again-rejects-jewish-charter-school-in-shocking-vote/. 

6. National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem, No. 5:26-cv-00582-R, doc. 121, W.D. Okla., 24 Sept. 2026. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/securepdfs/2026/09/Ben-Gamla-v.-Shellem-District-Court-Order-9.24.26.pdf. 

7. National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem. No. 5:26-cv-00582-R, 2026 WL 440274 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 24, 2026). FindLaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-w-d-okl/440274.html. 

8. "National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem." The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, becketfund.org/case/national-ben-gamla-jewish-charter-school-foundation-v-shellem/.

9. Wallis, Beth. "Oklahoma Jewish Charter School Secures Win in Federal Court." KOSU, 24 Sept. 2026, www.kosu.org/ben-gamla-federal-court-ruling.