John Woolard v Tony Thurmond

    John Woolard represents the voices of a group of parents whose children attend Blue Ridge Academy and Visions in Education, two charter schools in California, and the independent study programs the schools run. The main difference between charter schools and public schools is what they operate under. Charter schools operate under independent contracts, while public schools work under a school district. They are both funded by taxpayers and are tuition-free, and provide publicly funded material. 

    Woolard and the parents requested that the schools purchase “sectarian” materials for the programs. These programs are overseen by the school but run mostly by parents in homes. The schools rejected the request because of California law, which prohibits public schools, including charter schools, from teaching sectarian or religious material. One example was that Blue Ridge denied the parents' request to purchase Bob Jones University text, which teaches “‘God is great, and God is good; God created me and all things; the Bible is God’s Word, and it is true; and I learn in order to serve God and others”’(Factual Background). Woolard sued Tony Thurmond, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the school system, arguing that they violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses in the First Amendment.

    The parents argue multiple points as to why they should be allowed to include religious material in the program. Woolard argued, “that the charter schools’ independent study programs are really in substance homeschooling, not public education…”(Plaintiffs). They are essentially saying that because the independent study programs are not part of the school's curriculum, the parents should have a say in what is being taught. Because Woolard classified these programs as “private homeschooling”, they argued that the state was not allowed to deny them funding based on religious ideals since the Court cannot deny any “recipients of state grants for private homeschooling based on religious belief”(Court Discussion). They obviously believed that sectarian material should be allowed to be taught. The final argument they had was that forcing parents to use the state-approved material in the programs that didn’t align with their religious values violated the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause. Woolard contended that they were being “categorically excluded” from public benefits because of their religious background.

    There are relevant precedents that are important for deciding the outcome in this case, but the one case that I thought was most important is the following: Employment Division v Smith. 

Employment Division v. Smith was a case focused on the Free Exercise Clause and the idea that laws can burden religion but not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Two Native Americans who were members of a Native American Church and employees of a drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote as part of their religious ceremony. The organization had strict rules against using drugs, and they were fired for misconduct. When the two gentlemen filed for unemployment compensation, they were denied. They sued and argued that the organization had violated their Free Exercise rights. Ultimately, the court held that even with a burden on the men’s religion, the law was neutral and therefore the burden on the religion was not protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 

    The logic in Employment Division v Smith was the same logic that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used when it made the decision on this case. They affirmed the decision. The Court held that even though these schools were charter schools, they were still part of the California free public school system. California is required by law to provide a strictly secular curriculum. They also held that the public school system’s education choices were government speech, which made Woolard and the parents' allegations against Free Exercise unreasonable. They use Supreme Court logic and past decisions, saying that the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent a “state from providing ‘a strictly secular education in its public schools”’(Court Discussion). The Court discusses how the independent study programs were directly intertwined with the school, and the plaintiffs' classification of them as private homeschool programs was unjustified. They are run by state-provided teachers, and each student must agree to a written contract with the school. The Court agrees that most of the independent study programs are taught by the students' parents. However, they are only allowed to do so if they are supervised by a state employee. 

    I agree with the decision that the Ninth Circuit Court came to. There is no justification for the parents claiming a violation of their Free Exercise rights because the law about strictly teaching secular material is neutral to all public and charter schools. They were asking for preferential treatment, not equal. California bans all religious teachings in all public schools, and because the charter schools are paid for by taxpayers, they are part of the public school system. The parents' classification of the study programs as private homeschooling is completely wrong because of the agreements that both the parents and students have, along with the direct relationship between the school and the programs. Another point that I have is that the Court never said that the parents were banned from teaching religion. In their own home and on their own time, they can teach their children all the religious beliefs that they have. They are just not allowed to use public funding to do so.

    Ultimately, the Free Exercise Clause states that the government is not allowed to restrict religious beliefs and practices, and in my opinion, the state hasn't done that. I am confident that if the case makes its way to the Supreme Court, they will come to the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit Decision

Resources: 24-4291.pdf

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith | Oyez

When Does Religious Conversation in a Public School Become Unconstitutional?

    The case of Chaudhry v. Thorsen raises a complex yet relevant question: when does the action of a public-school teacher regarding interaction with a student about religion cross the line into a violation of the First Amendment? The answer, according to the Northern District of Illinois, is that it does not, if the action is voluntary, initiated by the student, and free from any coercion. This case ultimately reinforces a foundational principle of the modern interpretation of the First Amendment: The Constitution prohibits the government from endorsing any religion, but it does not require the complete absence of religion from public life or personal interaction.

            Aliya Chaudhry entered high school as a Muslim who had long been questioning her faith. Before meeting her teacher, Pierre Thorsen, she described herself as always struggling with the core beliefs of Islam imparted by her parents and actively searching for answers. When she later encountered Thorsen in his role of history teacher, whose curriculum included the study of world religions, she chose to propose her questions to him on her own. Their private conversations about religion occurred outside of school hours, were initiated by the student, and were a part of her independent research about different religions. Ultimately, she converted to Christianity (the same religion as Thorsen), which led to her parents firing a lawsuit alleging violations of the Establishment Clause.

            Initially, the parents’ argument seemed persuasive: a public-school teacher influenced one of his students to convert to his religious beliefs. However, constitutional law does not operate on persuasiveness alone. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit religious influence but prohibits government endorsement or coercion of religion.

            Historically, Establishment Clause cases were scrutinized under the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework, but the Supreme Court has slowly shifted away from the Lemon Test. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the Court replaced Lemon with a more nuanced approach grounded in historical practices and a more focused approach on coercion. Under this new framework, the central question is not whether religion is present, but whether the state is pressuring individuals into religious activity.

            Applying this modern standard, the court found no constitutional violation. The interaction between Thorsen and his students was completely voluntary. She was not a captive audience, nor was she required to participate in the religiously influenced conversations. Unlike seen previously, there was no endorsed prayer or display of religious text comparable to cases like Lee v. Weisman. Instead, the record showed a student seeking guidance and a teacher simply responding to her questions with his own personal views. As the district court emphasized, allowing private religious discussion is fundamentally different from state coercion, even if the individual is employed by the state.

            The distinction, in this case, is crucial. In Lee, the Court found unconstitutional coercion where students were effectively pressured to participate in prayer. However, in Kennedy, the Court protected a coach’s private religious expression because it did not compel students to participate. Chaudhry fits well within the latter category. The case emphasizes that the presence of religion is not enough to substantiate a valid lawsuit.

            I think Chaudhry v. Thorsen ultimately gets the constitutional question correct, even if the situation itself feels uncomfortable. The key issue is not whether or not a teacher influenced a student, that happens daily, but whether the teacher (serving as a state actor) coerced the student into religious conversion. The district court makes it clear that that was not the case. The student was already questioning her faith (imposed by her parents) and initiated the religiously charged conversation herself.

            What stands out most to me is how strongly the court emphasized the personal agency of the student (unlike in previous cases). It goes against the idea that exposure to a religion counts as coercion. If influence alone were enough, teachers could not meaningfully discuss religion, which is a fundamental part of world history.

            However, I do think that this case exposes a moral grey area. While the conduct was not unconstitutional, it could be argued that the teacher crossed professional boundaries, especially engaging with a student about religion without an outside religious contact or involving the students’ parents. The court acknowledged this distinction well: an action can be inappropriate without being unconstitutional.

            Overall, the decision made by the court reinforces an important limit within constitutional law. Parents have the fundamental right to raise their children, but that right does not extend to controlling every influence in the child’s life. When a student, especially more developed high-school aged ones, seek out ideas to form her own beliefs, the Constitution protects that process even if the method could be viewed as inappropriate or the outcome difficult.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/3:2020cv50381/392015/310/0.pdf?ts=1773935422

Are Ristrictions on Praying in Visibility of Students a Violation of the 1st and 14th Amendment?

Cardiff junior high teacher Staci Barber alleges that her constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and First Amendments were violated. She also alleged violations of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 

Barber pursued these allegations in court after an incident within the school. As a member of Cardiff's Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Barber and other club members planned to host an event called See You at the Pole or SYATP. At this event, an annual prayer would commence, and students across the country gather voluntarily to pray together before school at the school’s flagpole. Barber and the club had been hosting this event for three years already and invited staff to join her in prayer at 8am on the day of the event. Barber was under the impression that the student group who would be praying would not arrive until after she and her colleagues finished praying. 

After sending those emails, Cardiff Principal Bryan Scott Rounds responded with two emails. The first was to all staff, letting them know that district policy prohibited staff members “from praying with, or in the presence of students”. The second email was directed to Barber and stated that employees strictly cannot pray with or around students, and he also stated that, regardless of the fact that Barber would be praying before the start of school, she would still be on campus and visible to students as an employee. She responded by stating that the invitation was only for staff prior to students arriving, thus not visible to students, and that she and other teachers have done this previously with no students around. Principal Rounds responded by letting Barber know that students are at the gates of school waiting by 8am, and thus their presence while the event is occurring would be a violation of school policies. After receiving said email, Barber proceeded to go through with the event, which resulted in a reprimand from Principal Rounds.

Barber then filed a suit against Katy Independent School District, KISD, and Rounds, “in his individual and official capacity” as a result. In the district court, Rounds asserted qualified immunity regarding federal constitutional claims against him individually. The court granted this motion in regard to her Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and nothing else, but later decided he was not entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Barber’s complaint plausibly alleged that rounds imposed a “categorical ban on visible religious expression” and that another case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, had previously established the unlawfulness of these restrictions under the First Amendment. 

Qualified immunity is granted to government officials and protects them unless their actions in some way violate a clearly established constitutional right that any reasonable official would know. Here, the court has held that Barber's private religious expression outside of her official capacities is protected by the First Amendment's free speech and Free Exercise clause, regardless of whether students observe or not. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the district court in part but also reversed it by stating that Rounds was not entitled to qualified immunity on Barber’s First Amendment claims, but he was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Barber’s Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because she was not able to provide proof that the Rounds personally treated her differently or in a discriminatory context.

The decision presented by the Fifth Circuit is one that I agree with completely. I support the decision because it protects Barber’s First Amendment Right while also recognizing the limits of the claims that can be made against government officials relating to constitutional claims. Barber should not have faced restrictions when participating in SYATP, as it was before school and outside of her official duties. Barber and other members were engaging in private religious expression, which is protected under the First Amendment, thus prohibiting her from praying where students may see is an undue burden on her religious expression. A point I found important was the Supreme Court decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, where it was clearly stated that schools cannot restrict personal religious expression simply because there's a chance that students may observe it. Thus, I believe that the court's decision was correctly determined. 

Lastly, I think that the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Barber’s claim of violations of her Fourteenth Amendment was also correctly determined. I believe that the decision serves as a reminder of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and the implications it has in court.

Barber v Rounds: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Burke v. Mahaniah: Do Catholics Make Good Foster Parents?

Michael and Catherine “Kitty” Burke are a Massachusetts couple looking to adopt children through the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF). The couple first applied in January of 2022. They strongly desired children aged 4-12 years old with the end goal of adoption, not reunification. The couple are devout Roman Catholics who regularly go to mass and work as musicians for their local churches. Their traditional religious beliefs include “...children should not undergo procedures that attempt to change their God-given sex, and they uphold Catholic beliefs about marriage and sexuality.”(Burke Complaint) Despite being praised in primary interviews by the DCF in 2023, the couple was denied a foster care license for one reason: “...would not be affirming to a child who identified as LGBTQIA.”(Burke Complaint) The Burkes filed a lawsuit on the grounds that this decision violated their First Amendment rights of free exercise of religion.

A DCF licensing requirement for applicants is that they must be able to support and respect a foster child’s sexual orientation and gender identity, called the LGBTQ+ Requirements; this was enacted in order to protect the mental well-being of children who would be negatively impacted by a placement that violated such a requirement. In order to be accepted, applicants must comply with the set requirements. Other requirements include the LGBTQIA+ Nondiscrimination Policy, effective June of 2022 and provided March 2023, foster parents “...must be respectful of how individuals ask to be identified and use the terms an individual uses to describe themselves,” “children/youth in care are allowed to express themselves through clothing, accessories, hairstyles, and other means of expression consistent with their identities,” and, “do not make attempts to convince LGBTQIA+ children/youth to reject or modify their sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.” (Defendants Memo) Another policy, the “Licensing of Foster, Pre-Adoptive, and Kinship Families,” stated that DCF had the expectation of foster parents supporting the child’s sexual orientation and gender identity and will be treated with respect regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity. Each policy requirement is applied to every applicant, regardless of religion, and is not open for exceptions.

In addition to the numerous policies for foster children, DCF regulations, and the Massachusetts Foster Parent Bill of Rights have protections for foster parents. One of them includes, “a foster parent shall not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, race, color, creed, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, age or disability.” (Mass.gov) 

The Burkes’ lawsuit relies on a previous case, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. In Fulton, the city of Philadelphia prevented Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of CSS’s policy against licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. Both parties had a shared contract that stated the CSS would not reject prospective foster or adoptive parents based on sexual orientation unless an exception is granted by the Commissioner.  CSS then sued Philadelphia on the grounds that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled the agency to reject same-sex couples because of their sexual orientation, not any qualities related to childcare. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s free exercise of religion by forcing the agency to choose between its stated religious beliefs or certify same-sex couples. Although in a previous case the Court had ruled that generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because exceptions could be granted to the anti-discrimination requirement through the Commissioner. CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodation laws because being certified as a foster parent is not a public service. Therefore, the city of Philadelphia could not bar CSS from enforcing its policy. 

The defense’s case is backed by a licensing requirement established in 2016 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case Magazu v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. This held that, “DCF can lawfully apply a licensing requirement meant to protect children in its custody even where the requirement may, in effect, exclude certain applicants due to their religious beliefs.” (Defendants Memo) Despite the burden on religious beliefs, the court held that DCF had “a sufficiently compelling interest to justify this burden”—“‘protect[ing] children from actual or potential harm.’” (Defendants Memo). 

I fully agree with the DCF’s mission to protect foster children, a vulnerable population, but I also do not want children to stay in foster care if there is a safer option for them. It does not seem that the Burkes are bad people; their religious beliefs do not make them so, but they do make room for potential conflict. A LGBTQIA+ child placed in their care could suffer actual or potential harm. In this case, I am anticipating that the court will rule in favor of the DCF, following the precedent in Magazu. Ultimately, I do believe that, in this case, the compelling interest to protect an extremely vulnerable population in our society justifies the burden that might have been placed on the Burkes. 

https://becketfund.org/case/burke/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-123

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20260316122241/2026-03-13-169-Defendants-Memo-ISO-MSJ.pdf

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20230808154524/Burke-Complaint-and-Exhibits.pdf

https://www.mass.gov/info-details/mass-general-laws-c119-ss-23c

Childs v. Webster

            Shareef Childs, an inmate at Stanley Correctional Institution in Central Wisconsin, is a practicing Muslim and prays five times a day at precise times. The prison chaplains printed and distributed prayer schedules out of courtesy to the inmates, but were not obligated by the state to do so. However, Childs noticed that the prayer schedule was inaccurate and led to prayer times being off by several minutes because of the prison chaplains entering the wrong location into an online tool. While the chaplains corrected the schedule for meal deliveries during Ramadan, they did not distribute the revised prayer schedules to the inmates because of a policy that prohibits the use of government funds to purchase religious items for inmates. Childs eventually received an accurate schedule through a donation, but was unsatisfied that the prison had failed to provide him with a revised prayer schedule. 

After navigating the internal grievance procedures without any success, Childs sued the correction staff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, where he alleged violations of the Religion Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court, in its initial findings, declared that the error in the prayer schedule was not a deliberate or malicious constitutional violation. Additionally, the district court determined that neither RLUIPA nor the Free Exercise Clause required prison officials to purchase religious materials for prisoners with the use of government funds.

On March 4, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary and found that the inmate using their own funds to purchase a prayer schedule does not qualify as a substantial burden under RLUIPA. Furthermore, they found that RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates, which the district court declared in their summary as well. Finally, the court affirmed that the neutral prison policy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Ultimately, the main issue in this case is whether the correction staff at Stanley Correctional Institution is violating the rights of Shareef Childs that are supposed to be protected by RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

Holt v. Hobbs (2015) and O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) relates to Childs v. Webster (2026) because they all deal with the issue of free exercise of religion of those incarcerated in the United States penal system. In Holt, Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, was a Salafi Muslim and asked for temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections’ grooming policy because he believed that growing a beard was necessary to practicing his religion. Holt believed that the grooming policy was a violation of RLUIPA, and his case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled, in a 9-0 majority, that the Arkansas Department of Corrections' policy on beards violates RLUIPA. Part of the majority decision was based on the fact that Holt met the standard for accommodation that was established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. (2014), where the accommodation needed to be based on a sincere religious belief. 

However, in O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), the Court reached a different conclusion. In O’lone, two men, Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen, sued New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison over their workplace policies, which they believed violated their free exercise to religion that is protected under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the prison policies plausibly advanced the intended outcomes of maintaining security, order, and rehabilitation. Additionally, the majority opinion stated that while prisoners do not forfeit their rights after being convicted of a crime, the state is allowed to place necessary limitations on the rights of those incarcerated. In the dissenting opinion, the justices argued that the prison failed to properly demonstrate that the necessary restrictions placed on these inmates were needed to maintain security at the institution. Ultimately, both of these precedents are important because they provide valuable context for how the Supreme Court has decided on the issue of free exercise of religion in prisons. 

From a constitutional standpoint, in Childs v. Webster (2026), I side with the United States Court of Appeals in their decision that the prison's decision not to purchase a revised prayer schedule does not violate RLUIPA or Child’s right to free exercise of religion. First, I believe that the inmate having to use their own funds to purchase a revised prayer schedule for a small fee is a minimal burden. The inmate is able to acquire a prayer schedule by their own means, so I believe the responsibility is on the inmate, not the prison, to obtain the correct prayer schedule; the prison is not restricting their right to free exercise of religion. As previously mentioned, RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates. Based on these facts, I believe the inmate is asking for preferential treatment rather than equal treatment. Additionally, I think O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) is the stronger and more applicable precedent to this case because of the key argument made in the Supreme Court majority opinion, which implies that the state is allowed to impose necessary limitations on the rights of incarcerated individuals. Incarcerated individuals choose to commit crimes and thus pose dangers to society, which provides the justification for the state to intervene and place necessary limitations on their rights in order to rehabilitate them and maintain safety within prisons and society as a whole. I believe courts should defer to prison administrators, like those at Stanley Correctional Institution, when it comes to their decisions about regulating prison life, as long as they provide reasonable explanations for these decisions and are not flagrantly violating the individual rights of prisoners. In the end, I think if this case were to reach the Supreme Court, the justices would reach the same opinion as the recent decision made by the United States Court of Appeals. 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1817/24-1817-2026-03-04.html

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827

Chelsey Nelson and the Limits of Free Exercise in Public Business

    In recent years, conflicts between religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws have increasingly appeared in American courts. One case that showcases this tension involves Chelsey Nelson, a wedding photographer in Louisville, Kentucky. Nelson’s story raises an important constitutional question about the limits of the government’s power to regulate businesses when those businesses are connected to religious beliefs and expression.

    Chelsey Nelson runs a small photography business where she primarily photographs weddings. As a Christian, Nelson believes that marriage is a sacred covenant between one man and one woman. Because of this belief, she wanted to operate her business in a way that reflects her faith. She was willing to work with people from many different backgrounds, but she did not want to photograph same-sex wedding ceremonies because she felt that doing so would communicate approval of a view of marriage that contradicts her religious convictions.

    The conflict arose because the city of Louisville has a local law known as the Fairness Ordinance. This law prohibits businesses that are considered public accommodations from denying services on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The ordinance also prevents businesses from publishing statements indicating that they would decline services for those reasons. In other words, Nelson believed that if she publicly explained her religious position on marriage or declined to photograph a same-sex wedding, the city could investigate or penalize her.

    Because of her concerns, Nelson filed a lawsuit challenging the ordinance before any punishment had occurred. She argued that the law violated her First Amendment rights, particularly the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech. According to Nelson, the city’s policy would force her either to create artistic expression that conflicts with her religious beliefs or to remain silent about those beliefs altogether.

    This situation raises several constitutional questions about the meaning and limits of the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has struggled with how to interpret this clause when religious beliefs conflict with generally applicable laws. One important case is Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court ruled that the government cannot burden religious practice without a compelling reason. In that case, the Court sided with a Seventh-day Adventist woman who was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturday, which was her Sabbath. The Court concluded that forcing her to choose between her religious practice and government benefits placed an unconstitutional burden on her faith.

    However, the Court later narrowed this approach in Employment Division v. Smith. In that case, two individuals were denied unemployment benefits after they were fired for using peyote during a Native American religious ceremony. The Court ruled that neutral and generally applicable laws can be enforced even if they incidentally burden religious practices. Allowing religious exemptions from every law would make it difficult for governments to function effectively and create a slippery slope. 

    These precedents show that the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause depends heavily on whether a law is neutral, generally applicable, or specifically burdens religious practice. Nelson’s case falls into this complicated area of constitutional law. The city argues that the ordinance is neutral and applies to all businesses equally. Nelson argues that applying it to her artistic work would force her to act against her faith in a way that burdens her religious exercise.

    In my view, Nelson has the stronger constitutional argument. While anti-discrimination laws serve an important purpose in ensuring equal access to public services, the Constitution still requires the government to respect sincere religious convictions. For Nelson, photography is not a regular commercial service. She uses wedding photography as a form of artistic expression that communicates meaning about an important event. Forcing her to participate in a ceremony that directly contradicts her beliefs places a significant burden on her religious exercise.

    Allowing the government to force individuals to act against their faith in expressive professions could end up weakening the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment. Religious liberty is meant to protect individuals not only in private worship but also in how they live out their beliefs in everyday life. If people must abandon their religious convictions in order to participate in public commerce, then the promise of free exercise starts to dissipate.

    For these reasons, I believe the Constitution should protect Nelson’s ability to operate her business according to her religious beliefs. Protecting religious freedom in cases like this does not mean eliminating anti-discrimination laws altogether. Instead, it means recognizing that in a pluralistic society, the law must allow space for individuals with different moral and religious convictions to coexist while still participating in public life.

https://adflegal.org/article/chelsey-nelson-story/

https://www.fairness.org/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/

Can Secularism Be Defined as a Religion Under the Law?

 In Texas, debate is ongoing regarding what pertains to be “religion” according to the courts and who should be protected by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Current Texas state law allows only certain people to administer wedding ceremonies and sign marriage licenses. These people include “Christian ministers and priests, rabbis, and as well as federal and state judges in Texas”. In McCutchan v. Nicholson, the Center for Inquiry (CFI), a secular humanist group, filed a lawsuit seeking the same legal rights as religious officers to perform wedding ceremonies and sign marriage licenses in Texas. According to the plaintiff, McCutchan, the current criminal penalties in place for anyone who is non-religious discriminates against secular groups. The CFI claimed that their trainees, or as they refer to them “secular celebrants” should be allowed to conduct wedding ceremonies in the same way that religious officials are allowed. The CFI has made it clear that they are in no way a religious organization and in fact quite the opposite, but that nonetheless, their group members should be treated equally under the law. The CFI is based in Amherst NY, and has had prior success in similar aims toward getting their secular celebrants ability to administer marriages in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. 

 The main constitutional question is whether or not the CFI should be allowed to conduct weddings in the same way that religious organizations do. To address this question, it is crucial to consider prior history and how the Supreme Court has determined what qualifies as religion under the law. In Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, he expresses that religion is in part the “the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it”. So from the founding perspective, many felt that to be religious, you must be theistic. Almost two hundred years later, the Supreme Court came up with a more functional definition for religion. In United States v. Seeger, Justices decided that religious protections of the First Amendment encompass theistic and non-theistic beliefs. They determined that despite Seeger not having a traditional belief in God, the role that his belief and practice of religion played in his life constituted a constitutional exemption from military service. 

The CFI argues that the current marriage law in Texas is an example of the government giving preferential treatment to religion. Richard Conn on behalf of the plaintiff argues that “requiring religious affiliation in order to celebrate a marriage in Texas — and imposing criminal penalties on those who would choose otherwise — turns nonbelievers into second-class citizens”. The CFI’s primary argument is that this law violates the Establishment Clause because it fails the Lemon Test: the law has no secular purpose, it endorses/privileges religion over secular interests, and it makes the government excessively entangled in religion. In the district court, the Attorney General actually advocated that under Texas Family Code, the CFI was already a religious group and had access to marriage licensing under the law. However, the CFI disagreed with the Attorney General and assured the court that they are not religious, although they still requested the right as a secular group to solemnize marriages.

The district court in Texas dismissed the case on standing; however, disagreed with the reasoning of the Attorney General and believed that defining the CFI as a religion would set a dangerous precedent by distorting the true meaning of religion. In this particular case, the district court adopted this theistic standard to determine that CFI does not qualify as a religion under the law, disregarding precedents in Seeger and Torcaso which suggest it is possible to have a religion without the traditional worship of a God. The district court also claimed that this is not a matter of privileging religious interests over secular ones because if someone wants to have a secular marriage in the state of Texas, nothing is currently stopping them, it just must be done so by an authorized federal or state judge. The CFI was not satisfied with the district court’s ruling and reasoning and filed an appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where it is currently awaiting a decision. 

The Beckett Organization urged the Fifth Circuit Court through an amicus brief to consider the potential implications of allowing the CFI to be recognized as a religious group. Their primary concern being that if increasingly more secular groups are called “religious organizations” then the term “religion” would become rather meaningless. Then groups like the “Boy Scouts, Sierra Club, Rotary International, Lions Club, or even the Dallas Cowboys” could all technically be “religious”. Furthermore, they point out that CFI does not claim themselves to be religious and is “overtly anti-religious”. In order to safeguard religion and the protections outlined in the First Amendment, Beckett advocates that the Fifth Circuit Court consider the original meaning and history of religion that the Founding Fathers intended. 

Another relevant issue is that of free exercise. The American Humanist Association and the Interfaith Alliance, both advocated through amicus briefs, that the courts consider the implications upholding the district court's ruling that the CFI is not a religion. These two organizations are concerned about the free exercise rights that would be potentially limited for all non-theistic religions if the court denies the CFI. These non-theistic groups include “Buddhists, Hindus, Reconstructionist Jews, and Unitarian Universalists, among others”. As mentioned, the six decade historical precedent set in Seeger demonstrates that non-traditional but still functional religious behaviors deserve the same protections under the Constitution as do theistic religions. The free exercise rights of other non-theistic religions would be at stake if the court rules CFI as non-religious. 

I believe the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should not allow the CFI to perform marriage ceremonies and sign marriage licenses. The Supreme Court case Seeger provides a functional definition for religion that allows for greater protections for non-theistic groups; however, the CFI has repeatedly denied they are a religious organization. Even under the broad definition of non-theistic religion that would grant them the right to solemnize marriages, CFI does not wish to accept a “religious” label. I think courts should only allow secular organizations to solemnize marriages if they are willing to state how their functionality operates similar to religion. Furthermore, I am not convinced that the issue of Establishment of Religion is persuasive enough in this case. The case of neutrality could be made if the state only provided religious weddings; however, they do not. If someone currently wants a non-religious wedding they can do so with a state official.

Mirabelli v. Bonta & Parental Rights - Free Exercise of Religion

 FACTS: 

    In Mirabelli v. Bonta, teacher and parent plaintiffs sued to get an exemption from a California law. This law prevented schools from notifying parents about children's engagement in gender-transition activities. Additionally, this law required schools to use children's preferred names and pronouns, regardless of parental input. The plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirement for student-consent "violated [parental] rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment", as well as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    The District Court provided an injunction that favored these suing plaintiffs. This injunction gave new training directions to state officials, prioritizing parental oversight instead of previously requiring student consent for disclosures.  However, The Ninth Circuit Court challenged this injunction on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause.

ISSUE:

    Does the state violate the Free Exercise Clause with California law requiring a student's consent before state officials disclose gender-transition engagement to parents?

HOLDING:

    The Supreme Court ("SCOTUS") majority opinion held that the Free Exercise Clause protects parental religious exemptions against California law requiring a student's consent for disclosures (of gender-transition engagement).

PRECEDENTS APPLIED:

    The SCOTUS used the "four-factor" test from "Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs. (2021)" ("Alabama"). This Alabama precedent established four factors, and the SCOTUS majority applied the following: Likelihood of success on the merits, Irreparable harm, and Balance of equities.  For the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of all these factors. In regards to likelihood of success on the merits, the SCOTUS majority argues that California law requiring a student's consent for disclosure(s) is likely to substantially interfere with the right of parents to pass their religion onto their children. Thus, the California law is not likely to succeed on the merits of free exercise of religion.

    As established in "Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)" ("Mahmoud"), the SCOTUS deemed that LGBTQ+ storybooks in school without parental consent were sufficiently violative of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the SCOTUS majority argued California's law as greater in violation of the Free Exercise Clause than even the sufficiently violative storybooks from the Mahmoud case. As such, the majority argues the state violates the Free Exercise Clause by requiring a student's consent to disclose gender-transition engagement to parents.

PERSONAL ARGUMENT:

    In contrast, Justice Kagan ("Kagan") has three critiques for the SCOTUS majority's argument: based on their use of the emergency docket, their reasoning, and how the absorption of the parental right to pass religion onto children via the Due Process Clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment) is debatable in nature.

    First, Kagan admonishes the dismissive decision made using the emergency docket, which precluded usual deliberation and discussion of deeper legal questions that were present in this case. Kagan elaborated that many other cases also have plaintiffs' objecting to school policies similar to the California law seen in the case today. However, rather than waiting to process this case or any others, the SCOTUS used the emergency docket poorly to rule out deliberation.

    Next, Kagan argues against the SCOTUS majority reasoning by criticizing the use of the Mahmoud precedent. Kagan addresses the majority's reasoning that California's law "substantially interferes" with the Free Exercise Clause of parents to pass their religion to their children. However, Kagan opposes this use of the Mahmoud decision on the basis that its application is still within infancy, and therefore the precedents' reach has not been refined and/or solidified.

    Finally, Kagan argues the case's deeper legal questions extend beyond a free exercise debate: questioning parental oversight against a child’s own religious exercise. Kagan ponders whether the right to pass their religion to children is merely an implied right within the Due Process Clause, as the parental right is not written, which makes it difficult to recognize as definite legal doctrine. Kagan cites "Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022)" ("Dobbs") to illustrate importance, as Dobbs constrains judges from using their own "personal views" for decisions instead of definite written doctrine.

CONCLUSION:

    I disagree with the SCOTUS majority that parental rights would supersede student agency because I disagree with the application of the Mahmoud precedent. I believe that equating LGBTQ+ storybooks to interpersonal relationships between children and parents is inadequate, and warrants deliberation (precluded by the emergency docket). Although I am skeptical that the Dobbs precedent would weaken parental rights, my opinion still leans towards prioritizing student rights over parental religious exemptions.

    "25A810 Mirabelli v. Bonta (03/02/2024)" :    https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a810_b97d.pdf

    "US Supreme Court blocks California privacy protections for transgender students" : 

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-supreme-court-blocks-california-privacy-protections-transgender-students-2026-03-02/