Religious Freedom and Vaccination: Perry v. Marteney

A state law in West Virginia requires students attending public and private schools to receive certain vaccinations before they can attend school. The law allows students to receive an exemption for medical reasons, but it does not allow exemptions for religious beliefs. This became an issue for Krystle and Anthony Perry when they chose not to vaccinate their daughter because of their Christian faith.

 

The Perrys believed that receiving certain vaccines would go against their religious beliefs because some vaccines were developed or tested using cell lines that originally came from aborted fetal tissue. Their daughter attended a public virtual school from home, but she was removed from the school after the Perrys were denied a religious exemption. West Virginia law only allows exemptions when there is a medical reason that prevents a student from receiving a vaccine. Since the Perrys were requesting an exemption based on their Christian faith rather than a medical reason, their daughter did not qualify. The Perrys then challenged the law by arguing that it violated their right to freely exercise their religion. This raises the main constitutional question in Perry v. Marteney: Does West Virginia’s refusal to allow religious exemptions from its vaccination requirement violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

After their daughter was removed from the virtual school, the Perrys filed a lawsuit against West Virginia officials. They asked the court to allow their daughter to return to virtual school while the case continued. The District Court sided with the Perrys and granted them a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary court order that is put in place before a final decision is made. To grant the preliminary injunction, the District Court had to consider whether the Perrys had a strong chance of winning their case.

One of the main things the District Court looked at was whether West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. This idea comes from Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court decided that a law that is neutral and generally applicable can still be constitutional even if it places a burden on someone’s religious practices. The District Court decided that West Virginia’s law was not generally applicable because the state allowed exceptions to the vaccination requirement in certain circumstances while refusing to provide an exception for the Perrys’ religious beliefs.

West Virginia disagreed with the District Court’s decision and asked a higher court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, to review the decision. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the District Court and decided that West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. The court saw the medical exemption differently and explained that it was meant for students who could face health risks from receiving a vaccine. Because of this, the Fourth Circuit decided that allowing medical exemptions did not mean that West Virginia was also required to provide religious exemptions. The court reversed the District Court’s preliminary injunction.

Another important part of the Perrys’ argument involves the way West Virginia treats students who are educated outside of traditional public and private schools. Some homeschooled students and students attending microschools and learning pods do not need to fulfill the same vaccination requirements. The Perrys argued that this was important because their daughter was also learning from home through a public virtual school. Even though she was not physically attending a school with other students, she was still required to meet the vaccination requirement because she attended public school. The Perrys argued that the difference in treatment shows that the law is not generally applicable.

Although I understand the Perrys’ argument, I do not think the lack of a religious exemption by itself means that West Virginia’s law violates the Free Exercise Clause. The law does not appear to target religion because students are required to follow the vaccination requirement regardless of whether their reasoning is religious or nonreligious. For example, if parents opposed vaccinations for personal reasons that had nothing to do with religion, their child would still have to meet the vaccination requirement to attend public school. The law does place an indirect burden on the Perrys’ ability to exercise their religion, but I do not think it targets their religious beliefs. The state also has a strong interest in protecting public health among students who attend public schools.

However, the fact that the Perrys’ daughter attended a virtual public school makes this case more complicated. I understand that public schools are run by the government, which gives the state the ability to set requirements for students who attend them. At the same time, the Perrys’ daughter was attending school from home and was not physically around other students. If the purpose of the vaccination requirement is to protect public health and prevent the spread of disease within schools, it is harder to understand why the same requirement should apply to a virtual student. Although I understand why the state has more control over students enrolled in public schools, I do not think being enrolled in a public school alone creates the same public health concern when the student never physically attends the school. Ultimately, I do not think West Virginia’s refusal to provide religious exemptions violates the Free Exercise Clause because the law does not treat religious objections differently from nonreligious objections. My concern is not the lack of a religious exemption, but whether a vaccination requirement meant to protect public health in schools should apply to a student who attends school entirely from home.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-2132/24-2132-2026-04-08.html

https://adfmedia.org/case/perry-v-marteney/

A Water Dispute: Grace Community Church v. Southern Montgomery Municipal Utility District

In August 2023, the Grace Community Church, a non-denomination Evangelical organization, was nearing the completion of its new church in Woodlands, Texas. One of the final tasks for the Church to complete was installing an eight-inch water tap connection to the main Woodlands water line; the water tap was necessary so that the fire suppression system of the church would be active, allowing for church goers to practice in their place of worship. For installation the Church had to use the Montgomery County Municipal Utility District. The District then, alleged by the Church, quoted them a fixed estimate of $24,900 for installation.

However, before installation, the District stated that the “tap fee” would actually amount to $61,500. When the Church protested the new bill and asked for an explanation for the adjusted price, the District said it's because that’s what the installation rate for commercial-entities is. The Church again protested and clarified to the District that they were a religious organization. The District responded with a recalculated bill of $147,938.85, explaining that a new price was the result of the Church being a tax-exempt entity. 

Threatening legal action against the District, the Church said the “new amount was too high,” and the District in response proposed a final quote of $83,780. This new number was reached according to Water Code §49.212(d)(2)(B), which allowed for the district to charge non-taxable entities extra fees to cover the costs of building shared infrastructure, but only if the money spent by the District to build was raised by issuing bonds. It is unclear that the money for the tap installation was from bonds. In September 2023, the Church paid the fee, but claimed it was making the payment “‘under protest and duress.’”

In November 2023, Grace Community Church filed a lawsuit against Southern Montgomery County Municipal Utility District and its Directors. In the 457th District Court, the Church was challenging the local District’s tax as a non-neutral charge that was a disguised tax which imposed a “substantial burden” on the Church’s right to Free Exercise, and that the tax was paid under duress. They invoked two fronts to challenge the tax: 1) The 1999 Texas Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (TRFRA), which used guidelines on religious burden like those in the Sherbert test from Sherbert v. Verner (1963), and 2) 42 U.S.C. §1983, a federal law passed in 1871 to allow Americans to sue state actors in court (this is how the Church would challenge alleged violations of their right to Free Exercise).

The District responded to the Church’s allegations. The District first said, setting just foundations, that the Water Code §49.212 was lawful. In addition, the District argued the way that they charged the Church was consistent with how they charged all other non-taxable entities— the Church was not being singled out because it was religious. 

After the District Court made a decision regarding immunity and jurisdiction (not merits of Free Exercise yet) on April 15, 2024, both parties cross-appealed on May 19, 2025, to the Court of Appeals, Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont. This was an interlocutory appeal, an appeal in the middle of a lawsuit rather than after a decision was made, on issues of governmental immunity which resulted in the Court of Appeals denying immunity of the District or the Directors and remanding the decision back to the District Court. The case is ongoing.

This creates the constitutional question: Did the Municipal Utility District's water tap fee violate Grace Community Church's Free Exercise of religion guaranteed under the First Amendment? I think yes, and I have a chain of reasons why:

Firstly, I think the tax-exempt status of the institution removes additional indirect-taxes levied against the Church. The increased price of $83,780 from $24,900 was justified by the District using Water Code §49.212(d)(2)(B), yet the District has provided no evidence that the project to install the tap had been paid for with bonds. If it wasn’t paid for with bonds, then the price of $83,780 seems more like a hostile action against the church than a neutral application of the policy.

Second, I think the means by which the District went about demanding the money was coercive; the church could not get the water tap that they needed to open, and therefore to provide its religious services to its community unless it paid the disputed charge in full. I think the option of either opening the church’s doors for religious services or keeping them shut imposes a substantial burden preventing free exercise.

Third, I think the non-neutral application of the Water Code policy and the substantial burden on the Church violate both the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and TRFRA.

Fourth, even if someone was to argue that the Church was nonetheless able to pay the fee, I ask, what kind of precedent does that set? Suppose there were a small religious group who needed to also connect their tax-exempt place of worship to a water line. Is the tax-exempt group supposed to be denied their ability to worship because they can only afford installation without a tax?

The Ten Commandments in Texas Public Schools

 “An appeals court says Texas may require the display of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms…. The Fifth Circuit ruled 9 to 8 [on April 21, 2026] that the Texas law does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits the government from establishing a religion and requiring individuals to participate in that religion. They also ruled it doesn't violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. That's the idea that all of us have the ability to exercise our own religions or not to exercise religion. That means the state can enforce the law mandating the display of posters of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom in the state. And the wording has to be from an explicitly Protestant translation of the Ten Commandments.” -Steve Inskeep and Andrew Schneider (NPR law)

The appeal court states that the state of Texas must require the display of the 10 commandments in all public school classrooms. The Fifth circuit made the decision by a slim majority that the law in Texas does not in fact violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (prohibiting the government from establishing a religion and enforcing all individuals to participate in that religion). They also ruled the law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (which protects citizens’ rights to practice their own religion without government interference). This means the state has the power to enforce the law mandating the display of posters of the Ten Commandments seen in public school. 

Previously, on June 20, 2024, Louisiana enacted a similar law. This law was blocked by a lower federal court until February of 2026 when the block was lifted by a federal appeals court. Currently, a Louisiana teacher, Christ Dier filed a motion in the U.S. Supreme Court to stop enforcement of these mandates.

The display of protestant, Christian religious symbols and text has become a central cultural issue recently. Historically, you might empathize with this since many of the founding fathers of this country were certainly protestant and Christian. However, a huge portion of the early settlers of the U.S. came here to avoid religious persecution. This is why the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are so important. They did not want another Church of England. They realized that already, many very different religious groups made up the fabric of the early United States. 

 

In 2018, a group from the Satanic Temple successfully sued Arkansas when they decided to erect a sculpture of the ten commandments outside of the state Capitol Building.  They argued that if lawmakers could place a statue of the ten commandments, they should be able to place a state of a goat headed demon (figure below). The Legislature went into emergency session when it became apparent that they would actually deliver this statue and rescinded the law thus prohibiting public displays of religious icons.

After reading this article, my initial reaction was that seeing the ten commandments in public schools, in theory, should be a beneficial thing. The requirement that the Texas display of the ten commandments must be protestant immediately demonstrated that it creates a slippery slope (figure comparing different versions of thew Ten Commandments below). The first amendment right creates the understanding that the country does not have one overarching religion that everyone is bound to. 

 

Requiring the protestant 10 commandments in public school is not constitutional as it violates our first and 14th amendment right. In conclusion I do disagree with this. The problem can continue if this keeps happening if we don't generalize religion amongst our government. If the government wants to make a law that all public schools need to have a statue of a religious figure we don't all acknowledge within each classroom that would be a problem for most students and parents. How would you like Q’uranic verses?

 

The government should not be able to promote and harm any religion which is practiced in the United States. Our ability to tolerate difference in religion is what fosters peace in the United States. Religion is sacred and what is feared and loved amongst all people who follow. In the United States, we live under secular laws that don’t favor any particular religion; this allows people to come to the United States from vastly different backgrounds and assimilate into a culture that promises not to persecute them based on religious differences. Certainly, this hasn’t always been perfect historically- or even now. But, every day is a new opportunity to bring this into practice.

Can Religious Items Be Confiscated in Jail?

  

Everyone has a right to use the items of their choice to practice their religion. But how does this right extend to individuals who are behind bars? This is an issue raised in Goff v. Rode, a case involving Shawn Goff who is an Arizona State Prisoner, and sued four prison officers as well as a complex manager for taking items which he claims violate his freedom to practice religion. Goff is a practicing member of Wicca, which is the largest of the modern Pagan religions. The question the court was looking to answer was not whether or not Wicca is a genuine religion, but instead did the items confiscated substantially burden his ability to practice his religion. 

Goff is 43 years old, and he was sentenced to life in prison for a murder that took place back in 2001. He says that in 2019 he saw guards carrying a plastic bag out of his cell which contained an altar cloth and a medallion. Goff says that he heard the guards describing the items as “satanic” and “devil stuff.” According to Goff however, they were talking about items connected to his religious faith. Goff went on to claim that not having the altar cloth and medallion “deprived him of his sincerely held religious belief.” 

Goff brought forward claims under the free exercise clause of the first amendment while also bringing forward a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). RLUIPA gives additional protection for religious exercise by people who are institutionalized, including prisoners. The case began in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona where the court decided to grant summary judgement for the defendants, by finding that Goff hadn’t provided enough evidence to establish the necessary violation to the first amendment. Goff appealed and the majority decided that Goff had provided sufficient evidence to create a legitimate argument of whether the confiscation of his religious items created a substantial burden on his religious exercise. They decided that a jury could reasonably conclude that taking away Goff’s medallion and altar cloth substantially burdened his exercise of Wicca. Goff states that these items store energy and are important parts of him performing his rituals. 

There are some things about this case that are important to note. To begin, after the religious items were confiscated, they were never returned. This means that taking these items was substantial and more than just a momentary or temporary confiscation. Another important fact is that Goff had previously gotten approval for these religious items to be in his cell. When these items were taken in a search, they were in a box labeled “religious items” and it is reasonable to assume that the guards knew that these items held religious significance. Although these items were never returned to Goff it is also important to note that these two items were $12 each, and Goff had the option to purchase new ones, however he refused. 

I find Judge Rawlinson’s dissent more persuasive, claiming that taking these items from Goff did not substantially burden his ability to practice his religion. Rawlinson mentions how in order to count as a substantial burden the action in question must put substantial pressure on an individual to modify their behavior or violate their beliefs. Rawlinson claims that even after the confiscation Goff continued to practice daily meditation and prayer. Goff does not say that he cannot afford to purchase the replacement cloth and medallion but instead says that he will not buy them until after he gets his lawsuits taken care of. 

Ultimately, I believe that the confiscation of Goff’s medallion and altar cloth do not violate his free exercise of religion. I think that the emphasis here is on whether or not his ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened. Goff was able to continue practicing Wicca, which has a very wide variety of techniques and methods not relating to the medallion or altar cloth, well after these items were confiscated from him. Additionally, Goff’s refusal to purchase replacements, while still practicing his religion makes it seem as though these items are not necessary for his ability to exercise religion. From my perspective this is important because it shows that the government did not substantially interfere with Goff’s ability to practice his religion. If Goff was still able to practice his religion through prayer, meditation, visualization, and other actions, then taking two relatively inexpensive objects would not rise to the level of a substantial constitutional burden. 

If Goff was to win this case and it is ruled that taking his medallion and cloth provided a substantial burden to his free exercise of religion, then there may be a compelling state interest. In prisons the government has a legitimate interest in controlling property, preventing contraband, and maintaining order in protecting staff and inmates. The issue here however is that this argument falls apart quickly with the idea that Goff had already gotten approval to have these items. If Goff had these approved items in a box clearly labeled as religious material, then it is not a question of whether it was right or wrong to take the items, but instead whether Goff’s first amendment rights to free exercise of his religion were taken from him.

When Can a Public College Tell a Christian Club Who Can't Lead It?

 Should a public college be allowed to strip a Christian student group of its official status because that group insists its leaders actually be Christian? That's the question playing out right now in federal court in Binghamton, New York, where two campus ministries, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship and Campus Bible Fellowship, have each sued SUNY Broome Community College over the same policy.

For years, both groups were recognized student organizations at SUNY Broome. That recognition isn't just a formality. It comes with access to meeting rooms, student activity funding, and the ability to recruit at campus events. Both groups' constitutions require their officers (the students who lead Bible studies, prayer, and worship) to personally affirm the Christian faith. Regular membership, though, is open to anyone, no matter what they believe.

SUNY Broome decided that leadership requirement violated its nondiscrimination policy, which says recognized clubs can't exclude students from leadership roles based on religion. When the groups wouldn't drop the requirement, the college pulled their official status. InterVarsity filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York on August 21, and Campus Bible Fellowship followed on September 3. Both are represented by religious liberty law firms (Becket for InterVarsity, Alliance Defending Freedom for Campus Bible Fellowship), and both lawsuits argue the college's policy violates their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of association.

This isn't totally uncharted legal territory, but it's also far from settled. The closest thing the Supreme Court has said on the subject is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), which upheld a public law school's "all comers" policy requiring every recognized student group to accept any student as a member or leader, as long as the policy applied the same way to every group on campus. SUNY Broome will almost certainly lean on that case. But the clubs' lawyers point to something important: they claim the policy isn't actually neutral, that other, nonreligious student organizations at SUNY Broome are allowed to restrict their own leadership in ways these Christian groups aren't. If that turns out to be true, this stops looking like a neutral rule applied evenly and starts looking like a policy that quietly singles out religious groups, which is a much harder thing for a public college to defend.

There's also a separate issue worth thinking about: expressive association. A campus ministry exists to teach and model a particular faith. Making it accept leaders who don't share that faith doesn't just affect private worship. It can genuinely change what the group is. That's close to the reasoning the Supreme Court used when it let the Boy Scouts exclude a gay scoutmaster in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), on the idea that forcing an organization to include certain people can distort its whole message.

Here's where I come down on this. SUNY Broome has a real interest in making sure its recognized clubs aren't discriminatory, but a policy that forces a religious group to accept leaders who reject its core beliefs asks too much. There's a meaningful difference between membership and leadership. No one is being kept out of InterVarsity's meetings or told they can't hear its message or even push back on it. What's being asked is that the people running the group, the ones actually teaching its beliefs, believe what they're teaching. A vegan club shouldn't have to let a committed carnivore lead its cooking demos, and a Christian ministry shouldn't have to let someone who rejects Christianity teach its Bible studies. That's not exclusion for its own sake. It's what the group needs to keep being the thing it is.

The more evidence there is that SUNY Broome enforces this rule unevenly (tolerating leadership restrictions from some clubs while targeting religious ones), the weaker its Martinez defense gets, since Martinez only protects policies that are genuinely neutral and apply to everyone. Courts have sided with religious groups in similar disputes before, including InterVarsity cases at Wayne State University and the University of Iowa. Given that history and what's been alleged here, I'd expect these plaintiffs to have a real shot, though a hearing on InterVarsity's request for a preliminary injunction is still ahead this fall, so nothing is decided yet.

Sources:

Christian Post, "NY college faces another lawsuit from Christian club": https://www.christianpost.com/news/ny-college-faces-another-lawsuit-from-christian-club.html

Worthy News, "Christian Club Sues New York College Over Rule For Choosing Its Leaders": https://www.worthynews.com/117577-christian-club-sues-new-york-college-over-rule-for-choosing-its-leaders

Deseret News, "A New York college said a Christian club must let non-Christians lead prayer. Now they're suing": https://www.deseret.com/politics/2026/09/03/lawsuit-filed-against-suny-broome-over-christian-prayer-group/

Christianity Daily, "Christian Campus Ministry Sues SUNY Broome After Club Recognition": https://www.christianitydaily.com/news/christian-campus-ministry-sues-suny-broome-after-club-recognition.html

Oyez, Christian Legal Society Chapter v. Martinez: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1371

Oyez, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-699

Free Exercise and Equal Treatment in the Hopewell Valley FCA Dispute

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How far should a public school go to make sure it is not promoting religion? That question is at the center of Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. Board of Education of the Hopewell Valley Regional School District. The case involves the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, or FCA, a Christian student organization. FCA argues that the school district restricted outside adult participation in its student group while allowing similar involvement in some secular student organizations. From FCA’s point of view, this means the district treated the religious club differently because of its religious character. The district, however, can argue that it was trying to avoid the appearance that the school itself was supporting or promoting Christianity. This creates a clear tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Public schools cannot establish or promote religion, but they also cannot discriminate against students simply because their activities are religious. The main question is whether giving FCA the same opportunities as other student groups amounts to government endorsement of religion or simply equal treatment. 

FCA’s strongest argument is that the district is not acting neutrally. If adult mentors, volunteers, or guest speakers are allowed in secular organizations but completely prohibited in religious organizations, then religion is being treated differently. The Constitution does not require public schools to give religious groups special treatment, but it also should not allow schools to place extra restrictions on them just because religion is involved. A useful Supreme Court case for thinking about this issue is Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens. In Mergens, a public high school allowed several noncurricular clubs but refused to recognize a Christian Bible club. The Supreme Court concluded that the Equal Access Act required the school to give the Christian club the same access as other student groups. An important part of the case is that allowing a religious student organization to meet does not automatically mean that the school endorses its beliefs. That idea seems very relevant here. If students choose to participate in FCA on their own, allowing an adult mentor to attend does not necessarily mean the school supports Christianity. Schools regularly allow clubs to have different viewpoints without officially agreeing with everything those clubs believe.

At the same time, I think the school district has a reasonable concern. This case involves middle and high school students, not adults at a university. Younger students may be more likely to believe that an adult participating in a school activity has the school’s approval. The district also has an interest in making sure that student clubs actually remain student-led instead of becoming controlled by outside organizations. A recent NJ Spotlight article by Seth Siditsky described the dispute as a question of whether the district unlawfully singled out religious clubs or was properly. That concern should not simply be ignored. However, I do not think it justifies a rule that singles out religious clubs. If the real concern is outside adults having too much influence over students, then the district could create one rule that applies to every student organization. For example, all clubs could be required to remain student-led, and outside adults could be limited to advisory roles. The school could also make clear that allowing a club to meet or inviting an outside mentor does not mean that the school agrees with the club’s message.

This is why I think neutrality is the most important part of the case. If the district had a rule saying that no outside adults could participate in any student club, that would be much easier to defend. The rule would apply equally to religious and nonreligious organizations. But if secular clubs are allowed adult mentors while religious clubs are not, then the district may be neutral only on paper and not in practice. The school should be able to set reasonable limits on all student groups, but the rules should not change depending on whether the activity is religious.

This case matters beyond one Christian club in New Jersey because public schools constantly have to balance avoiding government endorsement of religion with protecting students’ private religious expression. Those two goals do not have to conflict. In my view, the best approach is for schools to create clear rules and apply them equally to religious and nonreligious groups. Equal treatment of a religious organization should not automatically be seen as an establishment of religion. Sometimes, it is simply neutrality.

For that reason, I think FCA should prevail if it can prove that secular clubs are allowed similar adult involvement while religious clubs are not. The school has a legitimate interest in avoiding the appearance of endorsing religion, especially because minors are involved. But equal treatment of religious students is not the same as government endorsement of religion. If the same kind of outside involvement is acceptable for other student organizations, then it is hard to justify banning it only for FCA.

Interference with Sacred Land: Gary Perez and Matilde Torres v. City of San Antonio

        For centuries, Native Americans have lived and worshiped at a sacred site near the San Antonio River, in an area now known as Brackenridge Park. Native American artifacts dating back thousands of years have been found in the park, which is also listed on the National Register of Historic Places. However, the City of San Antonio has planned a redevelopment project in this area that would remove heritage trees and deter the nesting of birds such as cormorants. The ecology of this ancient riverbend plays an important role in the religious beliefs and practices of the Lipan Native American Church. Because of this, leaders of the church argue that the city's redevelopment plan would interfere with their ability to practice their religion at the sacred site.

        The City of San Antonio has rejected this claim, arguing that its redevelopment plans do not prevent members of the church from practicing their religion. When the case reached the federal district court, the court required the city to provide the church access to the area for certain religious ceremonies, but it did not stop the planned removal of trees or efforts to deter nesting birds. The court determined that these parts of the redevelopment project did not burden the church's religious exercise significantly. The church leaders disagree, arguing that the environment of Brackenridge Park is essential to their religious practices and cannot be replaced by another location.

        The main constitutional issue in this case involves the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The government of the United States cannot stop its citizens from exercising their religion and the Constitution protects this. Regarding the case at hand, the constitutional question is whether San Antonio’s redevelopment of Brackenridge Park, which is located on sacred land, violates this protection to practice one’s own faith. This interference with the location and ecology that surrounds it is essential to the Lipan Church and their beliefs. 

        However, the issue is complicated by the fact that San Antonio claims to not be directly interfering or prohibiting the Lipan people from practicing their faith. The city is redeveloping public land that it owns and has good intentions with the project that is currently set to take place. The project is intented to promote the public’s health and safety, who also use this park for a multitude of purposes. As time has gone on, “trees have weakened and died, and bird excrement has greatly increased”, giving the city a logical purpose for removing trees and deterring bird nesting. The plans also include repairing retaining walls, which were constructed while accommodating the Lipan Church’s religious gatherings.

        This begs the question: can religion simply be seperated from the physical envrionment of Brackenridge Park? The trees, birds, river, and surrounding ecology are directly connected to the Lipan people’s religious practices, interfering seems to be a direct misunderstanding of the First Ammendment and its Free Exercise Clause. Telling church members they are free to practice their religion elsewhere shows a lack of accomodation to freedom of religion because there is no equivalent place that can be found. 

        Another important question the case raises is how much authority the courts should have to determine what is necessary to one’s religion. In the Lipan petition, the attorneys argue “courts are not arbiters of theological truth”, meaning that a court’s role is to interpret the Constitution, not to determine whether someone is understanding their own religion correctly. 

        I believe the city of San Antonio’s redevelopment plan violates the First Ammendment of the Constitution. There is a difference between making religious exercise less convenient and destroying something crucial. San Antonio argues that it poses no direct hindrance to the Lipan Church since it is not prohibiting the religious practice. However, if the Lipan people could pick up and practice somewhere else, they would, and evidently tampering with this area would become much less important. Since that isn’t the case and their beliefs need these aspects in touch, there is no fixing the damage that would be done. 

        This should not set precedent for all religious groups to get complete control of public land due to religious practices. This would lead to a slipperly slope in which every religious objection prevents the government from making changes to public property. There has to be a significant justification that a religious practice is tied to a specfic area. San Antonio’s interests in health and safety are legitimate, and while the city may not intend to interfere with religion, the religious importance of Brackenridge Park to the Lipan people cannot be understated.

        With this in mind, the city should be allowed to address legitimate safety concerns, but it should avoid unnecessary interference with the Lipan Church’s religious practices. If less destructive alternatives are available, the city should be expected to consider them.

        Ultimately, this case raises a difficult question about what the “free exercise” of religion actually protects. Religious freedom means little if the government can destroy something necessary to practice one’s beliefs. Courts should respect the Lipan people’s beliefs rather than decide what is important to their religion.

https://firstliberty.org/cases/leaders-of-the-lipan-native-american-church/#simple1

https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2025/24-0714.html

Public buildings and Religious figures: The Line Between Civic Recognition and Religious Endorsement

Government neutrality toward religion does not always require removing religious symbols from public spaces. On the other hand, the government cannot use public property to favor one religion over others. A recent 2026 case, Fitzmaurice v. The City of Quincy, raised the question of where the line falls between these two principles. The case involves two statues of Catholic saints that Quincy planned to install above its new public safety building. While the statues have clear religious significance, the city argues it selected them because of their longstanding connections to police officers and firefighters. I believe concerns about the statues' size and placement are reasonable, but their Catholic roots alone should not determine their constitutionality. The more important question is whether the city is promoting Catholicism or recognizing symbols with legitimate civic meaning.

The controversy began when Quincy Mayor Thomas Koch commissioned two ten-foot bronze statues of Saint Michael the Archangel and Saint Florian. Saint Michael is traditionally associated with police officers, whereas Saint Florian is the patron saint of firefighters. The Saint Michael statue depicts him with wings, carrying a shield and standing over a demon. In contrast, the Saint Florian statue shows him pouring water over a burning building that houses police, fire, emergency services, and other public offices. The city had already spent more than $760,000 on them, and the final cost was expected to reach about $850,000.

This case became more controversial because most City Council members and the public did not know about the statues until after they had been commissioned. After the plan became public, many residents attended meetings and voiced their concerns. There was, in fact, even an online petition that received more than 1,600 signatures, and several local religious leaders argued that placing Catholic figures on a municipal building would coerce residents of other religions to feel excluded. Fifteen residents eventually sued Quincy under Article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. A lower Court temporarily blocked the installation, and the statues are being kept in storage in the meantime.

In Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not decide that the statues definitely violated the state constitution. Instead, the court upheld the preliminary injunction, finding that the residents were likely to succeed and that the statues should remain in storage while the lawsuit is ongoing. The main constitutional issue is whether Quincy’s plan represents a permissible recognition of symbols connected to public service or government endorsement of Catholicism. There is no general rule that prevents the government from displaying an object merely because it has a religious origin. The problem arises only when the government’s purpose is to give one religion a preferred position.

The residents' strongest argument concerns how the display would appear in practice. Both statues are large, new, and closely associated with Catholic beliefs. They would also stand alone as the only ‘decorations’ in front of a building used by residents of every religion, as well as some with none. Residents represented by the ACLU argue that this would signal government approval of Catholicism. Even if the city’s stated purpose is secular, the display could still lead some residents to believe their government values one faith more than another reasonably. The lack of transparency around commissioning these figures raises doubts that their purpose was entirely civic.

Quincy, however, has a reasonable argument that the statues represent more than something merely Catholic. Saint Michael is commonly used in police imagery, awards, and professional traditions. The Florian Cross appears on fire-department badges throughout Massachusetts, and Saint Florian has become a symbol of courage and sacrifice among firefighters. The city’s attorneys argue that these figures were selected to honor first responders rather than encourage Catholic worship. No visitor would be required to pray, participate in a religious ceremony, or merely accept Catholic worship. From this perspective, the government is recognizing the professional importance of the figures rather than endorsing their religious meaning.

The court relied on Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver General, which explains that questions involving religion and government require consideration of history, purpose, effect, and political divisiveness. These factors support both sides. The statutes have a secular purpose because they honor police officers and firefighters, but their isolated placement could create the effect of religious endorsement. History also matters. In American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the Supreme Court allowed a cross-shaped war memorial to remain on public land because it had developed a commemorative meaning beyond its religious origin. The Quincy statues are new, but the Saints' connection to first responders is long-standing in American history. Therefore, the statues' age should be considered alongside the history of the traditions they represent.

The use of public money also deserves attention. Quincy paid for the artwork directly, but the money did not go to the Catholic Church, fund worship, or support religious instruction. The statues would remain as city property; this differs from the government directly financing a religious organization, although the city is still responsible for the message communicated by artwork it selects and purchases. Because this is government speech rather than private religious expression, Quincy must make sure the display does not suggest that Catholicism has an official or preferred status.

The court acted reasonably by keeping the statues in storage while it examined the case more fully. However, that temporary decision should not automatically lead to a permanent prohibition. If Quincy can show the statues were selected for their professional meaning and clearly explain that purpose through a plaque or a broader public-service display, their religious origins should not make them unconstitutional. Religious neutrality is better protected when the government neither promotes a particular faith nor excludes a civic symbol solely because it connects to religion.

Freedom and Funding: Wollard v. Thurmond

The protection and consideration of the First Amendment becomes particularly challenging when trying to determine religious freedom and expression’s place in public schools (and if there should even be any in the first place). This tension is at the center of Woolard v. Thurmond, in which a group of parents at two California charter schools, Visions in Education and Blue Ridge Academy, filed a lawsuit against the two schools, as well as various of their officials, in October of 2023 claiming the schools refusal to buy religious curricular materials and instructions was an unconstitutional discrimination against religion and a breach against their rights pertaining to the Free Exercise Clause. For context, in 1992, California began allowing the establishment of charter schools, these being public schools that are funded with public money, but are run by individuals. It is important to note, however, that while some charter schools are in-person, both Visions in Education and Blue Ridge Academy are not, meaning that parents play an integral part of their children’s education. To this point, as parents primarily homeschool their children, aside from a handful of online classes, the plaintiffs claim is that they should have some agency over the curriculum and the materials they should be allowed to request and in turn, teach to their children, in this case this being religious material. This being said, while the parent’s perspectives were acknowledged, their requests were denied by the schools based upon California state rules that provide: “sectarian or denominational doctrine shall not be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State,” subsequently bringing on the lawsuit. 

After being rejected by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, this case was brought to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where on September 11, 2025, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to reject the plaintiffs argument on the basis that the plaintiffs had no ground on which they can demand religious material to be provided as part of their education in public schools that are paid for with taxpayer money. Specifically, the plaintiffs' claim of religious discrimination and an infringement upon their freedom of exercise was rejected by the courts as they, nor their children, were being “categorically excluded” from any public benefit. Rather, California’s public schools were required to provide a secular education, meaning that the plaintiffs were not being denied any public benefit because of their religion, and that ultimately California’s laws on public school education were neutral, and therefore, non-discriminatory. With this reasoning, ultimately, the courts rejected the parents' arguments under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 

The central question being raised in this case is whether a public school violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause when it refuses to buy proposed religious educational material to religious students and educational facilitators, simply because the materials are religious? Personally, I do not think public school boards refusing to buy religious material to be taught is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Continually, while I do agree with and support the courts Free Exercise reasoning, and agree with their ruling to reject the parents' lawsuit, I think there is also another First Amendment concern that the courts surprisingly did not address. This being if they did support the parents’ argument, publicly purchasing religious material for one's curriculum could potentially pose a violation of the Establishment Clause. Regardless of this, however, I think the most compelling argument made by the courts is that of neutrality, as making sure public education remains secular in all capacities helps ensure that the government is not endorsing or establishing any religion.

This being said, I do understand the perspective of the parents in this case, as they are the ones teaching their children. In this context, the parents weren’t asking public school teachers to promote any sort of religion, or teach it in schools, they were parents in independent study programs who held a major responsibility for educating their own children. I think there is an important distinction between the government teaching religion in public schools and an individual, religious family being allowed to use religious materials within a public school system. 

Nevertheless, as I mentioned before, while there is this distinction, the main point is that the programs are funded by the public, and an extension of government speech, and in my opinion this outweighs the parents’ free exercise argument. In the end, public funding matters because the parents are not asking to teach religion to their children privately, or separately from the state provided curriculum, they are asking to be provided the religious materials as part of the education provided to them by the state, which is, in my opinion, a possible establishment of religion, and not a violation of their ability to exercise their religion, as they are not being prevented from purchasing and using religious materials independently of the government supported and supplied curriculum.

Is the VTAG Program Exclusive? Bethany Hall v. A. Fleming

    The state of Virginia offers a Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program (VTAG). This grant is a non-need based grant that can be awarded to Virginia residents attending accredited Virginia colleges and universities. The only requirement for this grant is being a full time student and Virginia resident. However, in the fine print for being able to hold this grant lies an additional factor of how the grant can be used for education. Stating it’s, “...primary purpose is to provide collegiate, graduate, or professional education and not provide religious training or theological education”. This is where Bethany Hall, a student at Liberty University in Virginia, feels as though her rights have been violated.

    Hall, who was a recipient of the VTAG grant and who was driven by her faith, changed her major from Elementary Education to Youth Ministries. This caused the VTAG grant to be revoked from her. Because she relied on this grant to help pay her tuition, she again, changed her major to Music and Worship, and was once again, denied by VTAG to receive the grant because of the religious nature of her major. 

    Hall claimed that this violated her Free Exercise Rights under the Constitution's First Amendment. Hall, however, has run into trouble with moving her case forward because of the precedent established with Locke v. Davey, where a precedent was established in 2004 stating that a state does not violate one’s First Amendment rights when it provides funds to secular college majors but not religious ones. Joshua Davey filed suit after his scholarship was taken away after he had chosen to pursue a major in theology. He believed that the ban on him being able to be awarded scholarship money because of choosing to pursue a major surrounding religion violated his First Amendment Right to his Free Exercise of Religion. The court stated that this law does not violate free exercise as states have always historically had an interest in not providing public funds for religious activity. Since 2004 Locke v. Davey  has been used as precedent for several cases surrounding the issues of public scholarship funds and free exercise rights; Hall wishes to overturn the ruling for this case and to establish a new precedent for cases such as hers. 

    One of Hall’s attorneys, Jeremy Dys, has stated that, “Excluding students from a state scholarship or grant simply because their choice of major is religious is discriminatory”, which calls into the main issue of this case, can the state of Virginia revoke and withhold earned public grant money because the college or university student has chosen to pursue a religious major?

    Although this case, at face value, does seem to be infringing on Hall’s Free Exercise rights, upon further research of the VTAG program and Liberty University’s major offerings, this may not be the case. Liberty University is an evangelical Christian university which offers a variety of religious studies majors and programs, and some of these majors are eligible to be studied and have a VTAG grant. These include: 

-Christian Studies

-Global Studies

-Philosophy and Religion

-Religion

-Religion: Evangelism

-Religion: Christian Counseling

-Religion: Christian Counseling

-Religious Studies: Global Studies

-Religious Studies: Old Testament 

-Religious Studies: Theology and Apologetics 

-Religious Studies: Jewish Studies

    The ineligible programs, although a greater amount than the eligible programs, all include some form of worship, leadership, and ministry components. VTAG is not explicitly denying students who wish to participate in religious studies the right to the grant, but students who wish to study, in short, the proclamation of the Christian faith.

    Although some students would not be able to pursue exactly what they are wishing to pursue through the VTAG program, their First Amendment rights are not being infringed upon because of this requirement with VTAG. Public funds should not be explicitly used to support the proclamation of any faith. In the case of many of the majors excluded from VTAG studies of how to teach and spread the Christian faith are included. Religious majors are not explicitly ineligible for VTAG, they are simply narrowed down so that public funds are not provided to students so that they can then proclaim a religion. If students were able to receive state funds to study ministry, for any religion, it could be perceived as a state supporting a religion and violating the Establishment Clause, which states that there should be no law that respects the establishment of religion. 

    Though the VTAG requirements seem to separate students that wish to procure religious degrees from those wishing to earn secular degrees, upon further investigation it seems that Free Exercise of religion is respected through these requirements, and ultimately, the Establishment Clause is what is being protected through the decision to deny public funds to ministerial based university majors.