LifeWise Inc v. Everett Public School District

LifeWise Inc is a religious non-profit corporation that offers religious instruction to public school students, with over 400 chapters in over 400 school districts nationwide. With parental permission, LifeWise staff members check students out of school during non-mandatory instruction, such as lunch or recess, and transport them offsite for religious instruction. The religious instruction consists of “biblical literacy and character development,” including “lessons in virtues like courage, honesty, kindness, and forgiveness.”

In January 2025, LifeWise began offering these programs to students attending Emerson Elementary School in the Everett Public School District. LifeWise provided religious instruction off-campus two days per week to Emerson students with parental permission. More than sixty children attending Emerson Elementary School were enrolled in the LifeWise program. LifeWise does not use school resources or property for its lessons, and the LifeWise staff members pick up students from Emerson in a LifeWise-owned bus and transport them to and from a nearby church. LifeWise ensures that all of its staff and volunteers pass comprehensive background checks before working with students. In September 2025, the school board implemented new permission slip policies that limit students' access to the LifeWise programs, by requiring a new permission slip for each student every time they attended LifeWise instruction.

In May 2025, Emerson held its annual Community Resource Fair which “is a District-sponsored event organized by the Family Engagement Team for the purpose of providing access to resources such as legal, health, mental health, special education services, immunizations, and services provided through the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services to families of vulnerable students.” The school district denied LifeWise’s request to obtain a booth at this event because the district does not allow religious organizations to partake in school-sponsored events.

During the spring of 2025, LifeWise displayed flyers in the lobby at Emerson Elementary. On June 13, 2025, Everson Elementary principal Blythe Young informed LifeWise that they would no longer be able to display their flyers in Emerson's lobby. Young cited the school board policy regarding promotional material that states students may “distribute materials, including religious materials, before and after school,” but non-students “are prohibited from distributing materials on campus, and students are not allowed to distribute materials on behalf of groups or individuals who are not students.” LifeWise then submitted an electronic flyer for distribution which was rejected by the school district, requiring “a few changes” before it was distributed.

At the beginning of the 2025-2026 school year, Principal Young began receiving complaints about non-religious students being encouraged to attend LifeWise classes. Teachers at Emerson have also raised concerns about students distributing religious material to other non-religious students in the class. In response, the school district began requiring students to keep all material received from their LifeWise education in a sealed envelope in their backpacks during the school day. LifeWise filed suit against the District on December 18, 2025, alleging that the new RTRI guidelines adopted in September 2025 violate the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.

The constitutional question regarding religion in this case is whether the School District violated the Free Exercise rights of the students and their parents through the implementation of its new RTRI guidelines.

The most relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding this case is Zorach v. Clauson (1952). This was a similar religious release time case in New York public schools. In Zorach, the Supreme Court held that parents can have public schools release their children during the school day to obtain religious instruction as long as the religious instruction is conducted off school property, is privately funded, and parents give their permission. LifeWise represents a similar but not exact constitutional question regarding religion. Zorach focused mainly on if allowing students to leave for religious instruction violated the Establishment Clause, whereas LifeWise focuses on if the school district's RTRI policies violate the Free Exercise Clause.

In this case, I believe the Court will rule that the school district did violate the Free Exercise Clause of the students and their parents. I believe that there are two reasons for this violation: the policy requiring students to keep all religious material to be kept in a sealed envelope, as well as the policy requiring extensive permission slips for students to attend LifeWise programs. I believe that requiring students to conceal all religious material suppresses their right to express and practice their religious beliefs. I also believe that this is not a neutral policy since it only applies to students who are attending LifeWise instruction and does not include students of other religious denominations. The School District could argue that students have been using this religious material to coerce other students into believing in certain religious practices or doctrines that they do not hold. I do not believe that this is a strong enough argument to limit the students' right to exercise their religion freely, and that there may be less restrictive ways of trying to achieve their goal.

Regarding the permission slip process, I believe that these policies limit students' ability to attend LifeWise instruction. I believe that adding these extra steps to obtain permission may discourage parents from sending their children to LifeWise due to administrative discouragement of these programs. It also requires students to obtain permission every time they want to participate in practicing their religion which I believe places a substantial burden on them and violates the Free Exercise Clause. In conclusion, I believe these policies place unnecessary burdens on the students seeking to attend LifeWise’s programs, violating their First Amendment rights. While I do believe schools have compelling interests in preventing religious coercion, I do not believe the school approached this by implementing policies using the least restrictive means.

Sources

https://firstliberty.org/cases/lifewise-everett-washington/#simple1

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2025cv02604/356406/43/

LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District

 LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District 

LifeWise, Inc. is a religious instructional institution that provides off-site education to students at upwards of 400 public schools. This instruction takes place on two days per week, known as “release time religious instruction,” with each day dedicated to a different age group. LifeWise additionally provides Bibles to its students in order to ensure unanimity and, therefore, “unique teaching and editorial material” in lesson summaries. It was proposed by parents, specifically the Co-Plaintiff Sarah Sweeny, that LifeWise join the Everett Public School District in Washington State. At this point of request, LifeWise included over 60 children at Emerson Elementary within the Everett Public School District in its programming. 

However, the Everett Public School District required some caveats to joining. The District is clear that there is no contract or partnership with LifeWise and therefore requires parents or guardians of children attending religious instructions to give permission slips for a student to leave. In 2025, the District expanded this requirement by mandating that a new permission slip or request for release “must be made for each instance separately” and for each individual student being released. This changed from previous years, allowing students to be released in groups of four with one slip and for a longer period of time. LifeWise proposed semester-long or multiple-absence permission slips, but the District rejected them.

Additionally, the School District barred LifeWise from participating in Emerson’s annual Community Resource Fair in May of 2025. The District argues that because this event is sponsored by the public school, and therefore its taxpayers, they “do[es] not allow religious-based organizations of any type to participate in school-sponsored  events.” LifeWise seeks to participate in the May 2026 Community Resource Fair and argues that, in the past, the policy has permitted religious organizations to use District facilities, as long as it doesn’t interfere with educational activities. 

LifeWise, in its partnership with Emerson, had displayed paper flyers in the school lobby to advertise its religious services. Everett allows this and additionally allows for electronic flyers. Sweeny, a parent and member of LifeWise, used this opportunity. However, in June of 2025, the District barred further flyers from LifeWise from being displayed in the lobby because it was a use of school resources by a non-student to promote religion. Sweeny then offered to distribute an electronic flyer, but was met with further requests to change it before distribution, such as “replacing the photo of the boy praying.” The District explained that it could be viewed as coercive. LifeWise was eventually granted permission to distribute after the suggested changes were made.

Emerson Elementary began receiving complaints from parents whose children were not attending LifeWise religious instruction. These parents explained that children at LifeWise were encouraging their peers to join throughout the school day. LifeWise students would also come back to class with bags of candy, and sometimes other LifeWise items such as religious instructional materials, leading to distractions in the classroom. Subsequently, Emerson Elementary required LifeWise students to keep items received during LifeWise religious instruction in “a sealed envelope in their backpacks during the school day” to minimize the stated distractions. 

As a result, Sweeny and LifeWise filed suit on December 18, 2025, against the Everett Public School District and its Superintendent. The plaintiffs filed four claims, two of which were claims in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause: the new RTRI guidelines applied to LifeWise, adopted in September 2025, and the new RTRI guidelines applied to Sweeny. As of now, a federal district judge has granted a preliminary injunction against the Everett Public Schools District. This injunction, granted by U.S. District Judge, allows LifeWise’s participation in community fairs, printed flyers on school grounds, semester-long permission slips for up to four individuals, and for religious materials to be used during free times at school. First Liberty, on behalf of the Co-plaintiffs, explained that the lawsuit arose from its substantial burden and lack of neutrality.

Beyond its discussion of Free Speech, the constitutional issue as it relates to the free exercise clause then remains: Does the District’s new RTRI guidelines neutral or burdensome and therefore a violation of the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment? 

The most relevant court precedent to LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District is the 1948 case McCollum v. Board of Education. The issue in question for this case was whether religious classes within public school systems violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The court argued yes because of its use of tax dollars to support religious instruction. An additional case, Zorach v. Clauson, followed this decision in 1952 and challenged a New York program that designated a “release time” for students to participate in religious instruction off campus. The court concluded that this program did not violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause or Free Exercise because it did not use public facilities and was not coercive. 

In the consideration of neutrality, First Liberty reported after an initial inquiry to Everett Public School District, a board member replied with “hostility.” Charles Adkins, said board member, openly stated “"I want to make it very, extremely, abundantly clear, that, yes, I do in fact hold animus toward LifeWise Academy," Adkins said. "It is an organization of homophobic bullies who are active and willing participants in the efforts to bring about an authoritarian theocracy," as reported by Fox News. As it appears to LifeWise, this is targeted. As it appears to some school officials, they argue their compelling interest to avoid “authoritarian theocracy” made of “bullies.”

Based on these previously upheld cases, I believe the Supreme Court may uphold Zorach v. Clauson in its conclusion of LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District and rule that the Everett District’s new RTRI guidelines about the distribution of religious materials and the use of religious materials in classrooms violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. If this is the conclusion they reach, which seems likely given their most recent preliminary injunction, I would have to agree. Placing my own opinions aside about LifeWise, I would argue that on a Constitutional basis the District’s updated guidelines violate the Free Exercise Clause because of its lack of neutrality, and substantial burden. While I see how these updates can be facially neutral in its compelling interest of remaining religiously unestablished and a coercive free zone, I think it warrants hesitation. Prohibiting a students’ ability to read religious material in their own freetime at school places a substantial burden on a student who may then believe their religion is something they must keep quiet and hide. That goes the same for keeping their religious materials hidden. This burden outweighs its possible coercive effects to their peers. I would argue, however, that filling out a permission slip once a week for lawful “release time” is not a substantial burden, as permission is required either way. Lastly, the requirement for flyers to be filtered, as well as barred from certain areas on campus, appears to be a slippery slope. It allows for school officials to decide what is coercive or not which is ultimately subject to bias. As it appears to school officials, like the quote from the board member, there is bias and subsequent targeting of LifeWise when it comes to these update RTRI guidelines. 

Citations:

https://www.foxnews.com/media/washington-school-district-forces-students-hide-bibles-backpacks-lawsuit-alleges

https://www.foxnews.com/media/judge-orders-washington-school-district-loosen-limits-campus-bible-club-public-school-students.amp

https://firstliberty.org/cases/lifewise-everett-washington/

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2025cv02604/356406/43/

https://www.aol.com/news/judge-orders-washington-school-district-140019601.html

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/343us306

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/333us203

Faith, Speech, and the Classroom: Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education

            In recent years, disputes over religion in public education have become increasingly complex, especially as they intersect with questions of identity, speech, and the authority of public institutions. One such controversy is presented in Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education, a case involving a public school teacher who refused, on religious grounds, to use transgender students’ preferred pronouns in the classroom. The teacher argued that complying with the school district’s policy would violate their sincerely held religious beliefs about gender identity. However, the school district required teachers to respect students’ identities as part of maintaining an inclusive learning environment. After disciplinary action was taken, the teacher challenged the policy, claiming it violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The Fourth Circuit ultimately ruled against the teacher, holding that the speech at issue was part of the teacher’s official duties and therefore subject to regulation by the school district.

The case raises a difficult constitutional question: when a public employee’s religious beliefs conflict with workplace requirements, which interest should prevail? The teacher and their supporters argue that the policy compels speech that contradicts deeply held religious convictions, effectively forcing the teacher to affirm a belief they do not hold. The school district maintains that teachers are representatives of the state when acting in their professional capacity and that it has a responsibility to ensure that all students are treated with dignity and respect. From this perspective, regulating how teachers address students is part of the district’s legitimate authority.

Several precedents help clarify the constitutional issues at stake. One of the most relevant is Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, in which the Supreme Court held that a high school football coach’s post-game prayer was protected by the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that the coach was engaging in private religious expression rather than official government speech. At first glance, Kennedy appears to support the teacher’s claim in Polk, since both involve public school employees asserting religious rights. However, the distinction between private and official speech is critical. In Kennedy, the coach’s prayer occurred outside his formal duties, whereas in Polk, the teacher’s use of pronouns takes place directly within classroom instruction. This suggests that the teacher’s speech is more properly understood as government speech, which the state may regulate. Another important precedent is Employment Division v. Smith, which held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. The school district’s policy in Polk can be understood as such a rule: it applies to all teachers and is not targeted at religion. Under Smith, this weighs against the teacher’s claim. At the same time, the case highlights ongoing tensions in Free Exercise doctrine, especially as more recent decisions have sometimes favored stronger protections for religious claims.

The school context also matters. In cases such as Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court emphasized that public schools are environments where authority and coercion are especially significant. Although those cases arise under the Establishment Clause, they highlight that what happens in schools carries particular constitutional weight. In Polk, the teacher speaks with institutional authority, which strengthens the argument that the school district can regulate that speech to protect students.

In my view, the Fourth Circuit reached the correct result, but the case exposes important tensions within First Amendment law. The decision reflects the practical need for public schools to enforce policies that promote inclusion and prevent harm. Requiring teachers to use students’ preferred pronouns can reasonably be seen as part of ensuring equal access to education and maintaining a respectful learning environment. In this sense, the school district’s interest is both legitimate and compelling. At the same time, the case raises concerns about the limits of religious freedom in public employment. The teacher’s objection is grounded in a sincere belief, and the Constitution has long protected religious conscience. By rejecting the claim, the court effectively affirms that individuals working in public institutions may be required to set aside certain beliefs in order to fulfill their roles. This may be necessary in some contexts, but it also risks narrowing the space for religious diversity in public life.

          Ultimately, Polk v. Montgomery County Board of Education shows the ongoing challenge of balancing individual rights with institutional responsibilities. The case suggests that courts are likely to prioritize the authority of public schools when employee conduct directly affects students, particularly in sensitive areas like identity. At the same time, it leaves open important questions about how far that authority should extend and whether more nuanced accommodations might be possible.

Ban on Demonstrations at Healthcare Facilities & Free Exercise Rights

    Matthew Lipscomb is a pro-life advocate from Detroit, Michigan and these beliefs are rooted in his Christian faith. Specifically, Lipscomb believes that life begins at conception and that every individual was created in God’s image and deserves a chance to live, so he thinks that abortion is wrong as it ends a life. As a result of his religious convictions Lipscomb wanted to share his beliefs with as many people as possible, so he would go to public sidewalks that border an abortion clinic in Michigan to speak with women and other individuals entering the facility. He would also hold whiteboard signs to share his pro-life views and offer those entering the clinic with information about abortion alternatives.
    In October of 2024, the city of Detroit enacted Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” which aimed to minimize demonstrations from taking place outside of all healthcare facilities. Specifically, the policy made it criminal for individuals within 15 feet of the entrance to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket, or demonstrate.” It also made it criminal for those within 100 feet of an entrance to “knowingly approach within eight feet of another person” and prohibited individuals from engaging in protest, education, or counseling without consent from the other person near these facilities. In Lipscomb’s view, this severely restricts his free speech and free exercise rights because it prevents him from sharing what he believes to be God’s message.
    As a result of this, Lipscomb filed suit against the city of Detroit claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutional. He also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The central issue that the court will consider is: Does Detroit Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
    In cases that may inflict a burden on the Free Exercise rights of citizens it is important to consider if there is a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in place. However, this is not directly applicable in this case because the state of Michigan does not have a state-level RFRA policy. Nevertheless, the precedent set in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) should still guide this decision. Specifically, this case held that neutral, generally applicable laws which incidentally burden religious exercise are constitutional. The holding in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) is also relevant because it asserted that policies which directly target a religious practice are not neutral.
    Given these precedents, the city of Detroit would likely argue that this law is neutral and generally applicable because it applies to all people regardless of the message they are sharing. The policy also does not target any particular religious practice or belief; rather, it places a ban on all advocacy regardless of if it is religiously based or offers a pro-life or pro-choice perspective. Furthermore, even though there is no state-level RFRA in place, the city would also likely highlight that there is a compelling state interest for this policy as it makes healthcare facilities more secure. Specifically, there is evidence that protestors outside of abortion clinics sometimes physically block entrances and their presence adds unnecessary levels of anxiety for patients and staff. Therefore, in the city’s view, patients, visitors, and healthcare professionals would be more safely able to access these places because of the ordinance.
    After considering the facts of this case, I would hold the Michigan policy to be constitutional because it is neutral and generally applicable. This is because the ordinance applies to all people regardless of their religious beliefs and importantly regulates behavior outside of all healthcare facilities. This is a critical distinction, because Lipscomb has expressed that the policy is pro-abortion as he feels that it restricts his ability to share his pro-life beliefs; however, because the ordinance applies to all healthcare facilities, not just abortion facilities and does not target any particular religious belief or viewpoint on abortion making the ordinance neutral and generally applicable.
    It is equally as important to note that this policy serves the important purpose of keeping healthcare facilities secure. Specifically, it minimizes the barriers that patients may face when attempting to access healthcare as protests or other demonstrations outside of the facility which they are entering could deter them from accessing the care that they need. Moreover, this would also minimize the number of barriers that providers face when going to work so that important care can be provided to patients. In sum, the ordinance appears to be neutral and generally applicable and it serves an important purpose, so I hold it to be constitutional.

References:

• https://firstliberty.org/cases/matthew-lipscomb/
• https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/001-Verified-Complaint-3-31-2026_Redacted1.pdf 
• https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/prc/our-research/prc-research-brief-series/reproductive-maternal-and-infant-health/women-s-experiences-with-abortion-protestors.html

St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy: Anti-discrimination in Public-funded Programs

The Supreme Court is hearing a case involving religious freedom and LGBTQ+ rights, both of which are perhaps the most polarizing constitutional questions in America today. Colorado has a universal preschool initiative set up to provide equal access to children called "Universal Preschool Colorado" (UPC). Preschools that participate in UPC must comply with the state's laws regarding nondiscriminatory practices and allow all children regardless of gender identity and sexual orientation to enroll in their programs. Catholic preschools affiliated with the Archdiocese of Denver, including St. Mary Catholic Parish, have refused to comply with these requirements because their faith prohibits them from serving children of same-gender couples or LGBTQ families. As a result, the state of Colorado will not include such Catholic preschools in the UPC. St. Mary Catholic Parish and its associated preschools have sued the state of Colorado, seeking damages.

The affected Catholic preschools claim that complying with the state’s requirements would force them to act in ways contrary to their beliefs about family and sexuality, and therefore believe Colorado is penalizing them for exercising their religious rights by excluding them from UPC. In contrast, Colorado contends that the law is neutral and generally applicable, meaning that any preschool (religious or not) can participate as long as it meets the clearly defined nondiscrimination standards. The lower courts ruled in favor of Colorado, confirming that the program does not target religion specifically, but instead applies a consistent standard to all recipients of government assistance. This case raises a significant constitutional issue that has yet to be addressed by the Court: Must the government provide accommodations for religious institutions trying to receive exemptions from general non-discrimination law when the government is providing public benefits? The issue relates to whether or not religious institutions should have to choose between their religion and other methods of accessing public programs.

Looking at similar cases, Employment Division v. Smith (1990) held that the government may enforce neutral and generally applicable laws that do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if those laws may technically burden religious practice. Colorado has a long-standing reliance on the argument that its non-discrimination criteria applies to all preschools equally and has cited many cases to support this position. However, recent case law has resulted in an expansion of protections for religious claimants and given further indication that the Court may be increasingly inclined to grant exceptions for religious beliefs. For example, in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023), the Court found that a website designer's refusal to provide services to same-sex weddings demonstrated a need to protect religious and expressive rights. In light of these examples, the Court could want to extend the same latitude to the preschools’ religious beliefs.

The state of Colorado also relies upon the long-standing principle that anti-discrimination laws serve a compelling government interest. These laws protect all individuals from discrimination based on their sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation within all places of public accommodation. The state argues that allowing religious exemptions for public programs would undermine the State's protection of these groups and put vulnerable families at risk of being denied essential services.

I believe that the constitutional issue at hand cannot just be solved by focusing on one principle over another. Because the case involves both religious freedom and general equality, reaching a resolution requires an approach that considers each of these principles. I think the state of Colorado ultimately has the stronger argument in this case. This situation is not comparable to cases that have involved church governance or private conduct, as they relate to the church's own private internal governing processes and matters. Because the involved institutions must accept the publicly funded service rather than be granted the government funds by default, the state may rightfully require them to accept certain conditions. Additionally, allowing for exemptions in this instance would inhibit children’s access to preschool education based upon traits that the law specifically protects. 

In my opinion, the just outcome would be to uphold Colorado's policy, as it does not infringe upon religious autonomy on strictly internal matters, but rather concerns actions that externally conflict with basic fundamental principles of anti-discrimination. This outcome would create a distinction that preserves the integrity of the two principles at hand, such that the religious and nonreligious have the same level of freedom while still maintaining that the public (particularly when taxpayer funded) has the same level of access and equal opportunity for all.

Sources:

1. https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/04/supreme-court-will-hear-religious-liberty-case-on-catholic-preschools-and-lgbtq-families/

2. https://www.aclu-co.org/cases/st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy-amicus/

3. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213

4. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476

Can you be in prison and still be religious? The court might say no.

 In Firewalker-Fields v. Lee the question of whether or not a Virginia correctional facility violated the First Amendment rights of a Muslim inmate by authorizing Christian centered religious services and allegedly restricting Islamic services. 

            In 2017, David Nighthorse Firewalker-Fields, a Sunni-Muslim inmate filed a complaint against the Middle River Regional Jail Authority and its Superintendent, Jack Lee. (Approximately 3 months after filing, Firewalker-Fields was transferred to the Virginia Department of Corrections where the legal battle continued.) This complaint was filed on the grounds that the prison was promoting Christianity, prohibiting Muslim religious practices, and unfairly segregating the broader Muslim community of the facility. Firewalker-Fields sought to participate in the Islamic Friday congregational prayer, Jumu’ah, but the prison claimed they were unable to accommodate this request due to a lack of volunteers and donations, and a limited number of available officers that would be required for this specific gathering. Ultimately, the prison argued “that kind of get-together for every faith was daunting.” This refusal of accommodation by the facility was seen as an abomination by Firewalker-Fields seeing as the facility permitted and facilitated Christian religious services. 

Firewalker-Fields was classified as a maximum-security inmate, which is why the prison deemed him ineligible from attending group activities including religious services. While this might seem like an imposition onto the inmate’s religious freedom under the First Amendment, it is understood that prisons such as the one Firewalker-Fields was placed into are granted the ability to burden, even significantly, an inmate’s religious practices, so long they are pursuing “legitimate penological interests.” The prison had three policies that the court ruled were in line with these “legitimate penological interests”: no prison groups led by inmates; no large, in-person groups or activities of maximum-security inmates allowed; and prison classes and activities must be organized by volunteer or donation only. In the end, while the question of whether or not the prison justifiably imposed on Firewalker-Fields’ constitutional right to Free Exercise is in a bit of a gray area, the court ruled in favor of the prison. The reason for this ruling was due to precedents set in Supreme Court cases such as O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and Turner v. Safely.  

            The restrictions placed on Firewalker-Fields, however, were not the only actions subject to scrutiny in this case. Firewalker-Fields also raised Establishment Clause concerns, claiming that the prison was unequally promoting Christian religious services over Islamic and other religious sects’ services and activities. The prison claimed that this was due to a lack of volunteers and donations from other religious sects outside of Christian denominations. This still resulted in an indirect burden to many inmates in the way in which Christians had a greater opportunity to practice their faith in the facility. Through these volunteers and donations, the prison implemented what they saw as non-denominational religious classes which featured the Bible as the central teaching tool, and then most importantly for this case, they broadcast a sermon-like Christian video into all of the common areas of the facility on Sunday mornings. Firewalker-Fields commented that to avoid these facility practices one could either remain in his or her housing unit or be forced to listen to religious teachings they might disagree with; in short Firewalker-Fields claimed it felt like one had to “be Christian or be penalized.”

            In attempts to remedy this perceived oppressive nature of the prison, Firewalker-Fields requested to perform the traditional Islamic prayer of Jumu’ah under the supervision of the prison. This was in an attempt to have the facility begin to offer Islamic religious services and classes, which they did not already do so. He was refused on grounds that it would cause a safety risk to the facility. 

            This standard comes from O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, where the Supreme Court ruled that prison regulations restricting religious participation are constitutional if they are able to provide legitimate safety concerns. This precedent, applied in conjunction with the Turner Test, led the court to determine that the prison was justified in their restriction of Firewalker-Fields’ Free Exercise rights. In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court established what is now known as the Turner Test. The Turner Test is a four-factor rubric that questions: 1) rationality of restriction, 2) alternative means available, 3) impact on resources, and 4) absence of ready alternatives. With the precedent set in O’Lone and the use of the Turner Test, the court ruled against the Firewalker-Fields in his claims that the prison unlawfully imposed on his Free Exercise rights. The court however was ambivalent in their ruling regarding his Establishment Clause claims, inevitably remanding the decision back to the lower court to re-evaluate their earlier ruling. 

            The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is designed to apply a stricter scrutiny in cases like these, the standard failed to assist Firewalker-Fields here. While it had the potential of providing Firewalker-Fields with his strongest argument, the government must meet strict scrutiny in addressing whether or not a burden is placed on an inmate’s religion, RLUIPA ultimately failed to assist Firewalker-Fields because it does not allow for monetary damages to be awarded in cases against state officials. Since the state the court could not change Firewalker-Fields’ sentence or shift the nature of the original claim, RLUIPA is unable to successfully support the case made by Firewalker-Fields. 

I believe Firewalker-Fields was slighted in the court’s ruling. Do I think that generally speaking, they applied the right precedents to this case? Yes, I do. However, I believe that the prison is being allowed to get away for very mediocre efforts to accommodate plurality of religious beliefs in the facility. While I understand the prisons must have an overriding state interest for safety within the facility; and I also understand that when you commit a crime you relinquish many of your rights, I still believe that the lack of considerate accommodation is unjust in this situation. Especially since there are clearly ways in which religion is broadly facilitated by the prison administration. If the prison wasn’t promoting any religious activity whatsoever and breaching the Establishment Clause of the first Amendment, than I believe that I would find myself positing a very different opinion. As it always seems to happen in cases like these, Firewalker-Fields wasn’t looking for preferential treatment, but equal treatment, a consideration I don’t believe was fully regarded in this ruling. 

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/197497.P.pdf

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/muslim-inmate-wins-another-shot-at-challenge-to-sunday-services

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1384

Free Exercise Debates in Mental Health Settings: Catholic Charities v. Whitmer

In recent years, as debates surrounding gender identity and youth mental health intensify, state governments across the country have increasingly intervened in the regulation of mental health treatment for minors who are experiencing gender dysphoria. One of these state governments is in Michigan, where there is a law that prohibits licensed mental health professionals from using non-affirming therapy practices, and as a result, these professionals must affirm a child’s beliefs about their gender and provide them with information about related medical interventions. These interventions include puberty blocking drugs, hormones, and surgeries. 

Thus, the case of Catholic Charities v. Whitmer is introduced. Emily McJones, a Catholic therapist who includes her religious faith in her everyday counseling practice, works with children experiencing psychological distress related to their gender identity. Through her Catholic faith, McJones seeks to help her clients explore the underlying causes of their distress, rather than affirming their expressed gender identity or endorsing any medical procedures. Specifically, McJones emphasizes the Catholic belief that God created only two human biological sexes, male and female, in her counseling. However, the Michigan law prohibits McJones and other religious mental health professionals from offering this type of therapy, placing them in a position where they must either change their practice, misaligning it with their religious beliefs, or they must risk losing their professional licenses and paying fines amounting to $250,000.

In June 2024, McJones filed a lawsuit challenging the law alongside a Catholic Charities counseling ministry and other mental health professionals. The lead defendant in this case is Gretchen Whitmer, who is the current Governor of Michigan. The Whitmer case raises the constitutional question:

Does a Michigan law prohibiting Catholic mental health professionals from using non-gender affirming therapeutic practices in their counseling violate their First Amendment right to Free Exercise?

In an amicus brief filed in support of McJones, the neutrality of the Michigan law is questioned. While the law was created to protect the beliefs of all children questioning their gender identity, the brief notes how it allows for only one viewpoint regarding gender identity to be used within therapeutic settings, and that viewpoint directly defies Catholic professionals’ religious beliefs. Additionally, McJones believes she has a compelling interest as a Catholic mental health professional to prevent young, impressionable children from partaking in gender-affirming medical procedures that are both irreversible and potentially harmful. Specifically, while these procedures were once thought to be scientifically validated and safe, more recent research suggests that the support for them is “weaker” than originally thought, as critics refer to the ongoing debate about long-term outcomes and risks associated with these interventions, including a number of health problems ranging from sexual dysfunction to cancer. Overall, given the goals of McJones’s religious practice and the lack of neutrality of the Michigan law, supporters of this brief describe the law as an indirect, yet substantial burden on McJones’s free exercise of religion.

Contrastingly, supporters of the Michigan law argue that the state has a compelling interest in protecting minors from potentially coercive therapeutic practices. They uphold the neutrality of the Michigan law, referencing its application to all mental health professionals, not just religious ones. From this perspective, there is a further compelling state interest in providing children with mental health treatment that validates their experiences and affirms their gender identity. Supporters of the Michigan law refer to the potential psychological harms that children may face if therapists discourage their expressed gender identities. In all, the state seeks to prioritize the protection of the mental well-being of minors experiencing gender dysphoria over individual providers’ rights to practice in accordance with their religious beliefs.

A relevant Supreme Court case that may act as a precedent in Whitmer is Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In Smith, the court argued that neutral laws which are generally applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if an individual’s compliance with them incidentally burdens their religious practice. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law is truly neutral in practice and applied equally to all mental health counselors, then it is constitutional. However, another case, NIFLA v. Becerra (2018), complicates this debate. In Becerra, the court struck down a law that required pregnancy centers to provide patients with abortion services information, arguing that the government cannot compel individuals to share messages that violate their religious beliefs. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law requires counselors to endorse practices which they fundamentally disagree with, then it is unconstitutional. 

Therefore, based on the current arguments and the precedent in Becerra in particular, I would rule in favor of McJones and Catholic Charities in this case. I would argue that the Michigan law is not facially neutral to begin with, because it regulates counselors’ practice in a way that coerces them to affirm a particular viewpoint on gender identity. The viewpoint permissible by the law is in direct violation of Catholic mental health professionals’ religious beliefs. Thus, the Smith precedent is not applicable in Whitmer because the law itself is not neutrally applicable. Moreover, while I understand that the state does have an interest in protecting minors from psychological harm and providing them with proper care, I think that the compelling state interest in protecting these children from potential irreversible health effects is more crucial, given that gender-affirming care options are the subject of current ongoing medical and scientific debates regarding long-term health effects.

Religious Expression and Solicitation in Public Parks

 On January 16th, 2026, Brant Zeller and his friend visited Woldenberg Park in New Orleans to practice their Christian faith and evangelize by sharing the gospel with pedestrians in Woldenberg Park. They held signs that expressed their beliefs and distributed literature while engaging in conversations to communicate their religious message. Their approach was peaceful and non-disruptive, as they did not use amplification or aggressive tactics. Despite this, they were stopped by New Orleans Police as a result of a complaint from a park employee. The city code prohibits solicitation in public parks, including the distribution of materials such as religious literature. The officers warned them that if they did not leave immediately, they could be removed or arrested. In response, First Liberty Institute, a nonprofit law firm that supports religion cases, sent a demand letter to the City of New Orleans on Zeller’s behalf, arguing that the enforcement of this policy violated his constitutional rights. 

The events in Woldenberg Park raise significant constitutional questions involving both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While the City of New Orleans justified its actions by citing a general prohibition on solicitation, the situation is not only about regulating speech in a public space. It raises real concerns about whether a facially neutral law can constitutionally restrict an individual's ability to engage in religious practices, such as evangelism, in a public forum. For Brant Zeller, sharing his faith in a public park is not simply expressive conduct, but a fundamental aspect of practicing his Christian faith. Evangelism has long been recognized as a form of religious exercise, which centers on spreading beliefs through conversations and distributing literature. Restricting this activity appears to impose a burden on Zeller’s free exercise rights. If a law is not neutral or is applied in a way that affects religious conduct, it could be subject to strict scrutiny through courts. The city's prevention of solicitation raises concerns about whether it is being applied in a way that burdens religious activity more than other forms of expression. 

At the same time, the City of New Orleans may argue that its solicitation prevention is due to government interests unrelated to religion. The purpose of preventing solicitation is typically to maintain order, protect visitors from unwanted interactions, and prevent heavy traffic in areas such as parks. While these are real concerns that cities often work to prevent, it is important to consider if this broad restriction is actually achieving those goals without unnecessarily burdening religious exercise. 

In addition, Louisiana has a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which explains that the government may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Spreading faith is a core religious practice, meaning the city would need a strong justification for the burden and be able to prove that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this interest.  

This issue relates to Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), where the Supreme Court held that individuals have a right to engage in religious solicitation and distribute literature, even in public spaces, as a part of their free exercise rights. This case emphasizes that peaceful evangelism is a protected religious activity, especially in public forums. 

The constitutional framework was later narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. Here, the City of New Orleans would likely argue that its solicitation rule is neutral and applies to all individuals regardless of the content of their speech. However, this case is complicated by Louisiana's RFRA, which requires courts to apply strict scrutiny when a law substantially burdens religious exercise, rather than the standard in Smith. As a result, the focus shifts away from whether the law is generally applicable and toward whether the City can justify its restriction under a constitutional test. Even if the policy is upheld under Smith, it must still satisfy RFRA’s requirement that the government use the least restrictive means. 

I think that the City’s enforcement of the city code against all solicitation and against Brant Zeller is an unconstitutional application of the law because it places a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion. While the city has legitimate interests in maintaining order and preventing unwanted or disruptive actions in the park, those interests do not justify a broad restriction that effectively prohibits sharing religious messages, which is a key religious conviction of Zeller. Under RFRA, the city must show that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. Preventing all types of solicitation is broader than what is necessary. Less restrictive alternatives, such as regulating aggressive conduct or obstruction, could address the city's concerns without limiting Zeller’s religious practice. This issue shows the importance of protecting religious exercise in traditional public forums and ensuring that regulations do not unintentionally prevent constitutionally protected religious practices. 

Sources: 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/brant-zeller/#simple1 

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-08-Demand-Letter-sent-to-City-Zeller_Redacted.pdf 

https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?p=y&d=725122