Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Religious Belief vs. Criminal Conduct: Alleged Forced Labor and Abuse in a Church

The relationship between religious freedom and the government’s ability to regulate conduct is a contentious one. This conflict is especially relevant in United States v. Taylor, a federal criminal case in the Eastern District of Michigan involving David Taylor, the leader and self-proclaimed “apostle” of Kingdom of God Global Church (KOGGC), formerly known as Joshua Media Ministries International. Taylor and two other church executives, Michelle Brannon and Kathleen Klein, were charged with conspiracy to commit forced labor. Taylor and Brannon also faced additional forced labor and money laundering conspiracy charges. According to the indictment, Taylor operated church-run call centers across Michigan, Florida, Texas, and Missouri where members solicited donations without pay. Prosecutors alleged that workers were subjected to extremely demanding schedules, sleep deprivation, and even physical abuse. Workers would face punishments, such as being withheld food and shelter if they failed to meet fundraising goals or attempted to leave without permission. Taylor allegedly used religious teachings, including threats of divine punishment and eternal damnation, to maintain control over church members.

Kingdom of God Global Church (KOGGC)
Over the course of about ten years, KOGGC collected approximately $50 million in donations, some of which was used for personal expenses such as real estate, travel, and vehicles. Most recently, on November 9, 2026, a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the charges. The court reasoned that neither the First Amendment nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) prevented the prosecution from moving forward. This decision raises an important constitutional question about the extent to which religious practices are protected when they allegedly involve conduct that violates generally applicable laws.

The defendants’ central argument is that the government’s prosecution improperly interferes with their religious beliefs and practices. Taylor argues that his teachings about divine consequences for disobedience are expressions of religious belief, not criminal threats. He largely relies on United States v. Ballard (1944), which established that courts cannot determine the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. The defense argues that prosecutors are effectively questioning the legitimacy of Taylor’s religious teachings by using them as evidence of coercion in pursuing forced labor charges. Additionally, Taylor argues that the workers voluntarily participated in the ministry and that the conditions under which they lived, such as demanding work schedules, communal living, and highly disciplined religious instruction do not automatically constitute forced labor. The defense also cites RFRA, arguing that prosecuting him substantially burdens his religious exercise. Under RFRA, the government is prevented from substantially burdening an individual’s exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. However, the central issue in this case is whether the government is actually targeting Taylor’s religious beliefs or regulating criminal conduct that would be illegal regardless of the religious motivation behind it.

The court ultimately rejected the defendants’ constitutional arguments, emphasizing the distinction between religious belief and religious conduct. Citing Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the court reasoned that the freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act on those beliefs is not. Additionally, the court emphasized that the federal forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, is not directed toward any particular religion. It prohibits obtaining another person’s labor through serious harm, threats of serious harm, or other prohibited forms of coercion. The statute is neutral and generally applicable. The court focused on whether the indictment alleged criminal conduct rather than simply religious practices. It distinguished between expressing a general religious belief about divine punishment and using targeted threats, physical violence, and other forms of coercion to force individuals to continue working under the guise of religion. The court also recognized that religious threats could be considered evidence of psychological harm when evaluated alongside the surrounding circumstances. That being said, it made clear that the truth or falsity of Taylor’s religious beliefs could not be put on trial. The court also rejected the RFRA defense, finding that protecting alleged victims from forced labor was a compelling governmental interest and that criminal prosecution was the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Taylor is to remain in detention while he awaits trial. The defendants’ motions to dismiss were therefore denied, allowing the prosecution to continue.

I agree with the court’s decision not to dismiss Taylor’s charges because I believe that religious freedom should protect an individual’s right to believe and practice their faith, but doing so should not provide an exception to generally applicable laws. The constitutional issue in this case reminds me of the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States (1878), which involved George Reynolds, a member of the Mormon Church, who argued that his religious beliefs justified his practice of polygamy. This argument was rejected, with the Court distinguishing between religious belief and conduct and holding that religious beliefs could not excuse actions prohibited by generally applicable law. I think the same principle applies in this case. Just as religious beliefs did not exempt Reynolds from laws prohibiting polygamy, Taylor’s religious beliefs should not exempt him from laws prohibiting forced labor. The government is not attempting to determine whether his teachings are true or whether his church’s beliefs are legitimate, but it is addressing allegations of criminalized conduct. The forced labor statute applies regardless of an individual’s religious affiliation. Religious organizations should have the same freedom to structure their practices and establish expectations for their members as other organizations, but they should not have the ability to use religion as justification for conduct that violates the law. Ultimately, the First Amendment protects religious belief, not religious conduct that threatens the rights and safety of others.

Monday, November 16, 2026

Religious Neutrality or Discrimination?


The protection of religious freedom and the application of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses become particularly challenging when determining whether the government is treating religious organizations equally or breaching neutrality, and whether or not its treatment is constitutionally justified. This tension is at the center of Calvary Chapel Belfast v. University of Maine System, a case involving a public university’s decision to sell a former education building in Belfast, Maine. In the summer of 2024, the University of Maine System began a competitive bidding process to sell the Frederick Hutchinson Center. Calvary Chapel Belfast, a local religious organization, submitted a bid and was initially selected as the winning bidder. However, following significant public criticism of the University's decision to sell the property to a church, two unsuccessful bidders filed appeals challenging the university’s selection due to the religious nature of the Chapel. During the appeals process, the University claimed that its original bidding criteria had failed to account for the potential savings of keeping an existing internet infrastructure hub inside the building rather than relocating it, which could cost approximately $500,000 (meaning they needed to adjust the bidding criteria to avoid having to relocate the hub). Due to this oversight, the University rescinded its original award, revised its bidding criteria, and reopened the bidding process. Calvary Chapel ultimately lost the second bidding process to Waldo Community Action Partners, which submitted a bid of approximately $3.06 million, in comparison to Calvary's revised bid of $1.1 million. Claiming that the University's reversal was motivated by hostility toward its religious identity, Calvary Chapel filed a lawsuit claiming that the decision violated its rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.



The central constitutional question in this case is: Does a public university violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause when it reopens a bidding process after initially selecting a religious organization, if the organization alleges that the decision was motivated by religious discrimination rather than genuine financial considerations? Ultimately, the District Court of Maine ruled that Calvary Chapel presented insufficient evidence that the reversal was due to religious discrimination and the reaction from the public, and sided with the university, which claimed its reversal was based on flaws in the original bidding criteria. In their decision, they acknowledged that public hostility towards a religious organization has the potential to influence government officials into making decisions that lead to religious discrimination, however, this was not the case. The First Circuit therefore concluded that Calvary Chapel had not presented enough evidence beyond their claim of public disapproval and did not allow for the preliminary injunction. 


Personally, I agree with the Court’s decision. I do find there to be insufficient evidence presented by the Church, and ultimately find the stated reasoning of the university to be compelling and reasonable. I find it very compelling that the university officials, after finding the financial flaws and liabilities in their original bidding process, opened the bidding back up to all of the organizations again (including the Church). This demonstrates that the university was not denying them specifically because of their religious nature, and supports their claim that they had to open the bidding process back up due to financial concerns. It also shows that the university was acting in a neutral manner as they allowed for all organizations, regardless of their religious nature, to reapply.

Furthermore, I think it is important to consider that the University's original selection of Calvary Chapel did not mean it was a finalized sale. The original award given to the Church through the bidding process, gave Calvary the exclusive right to negotiate a purchase agreement, but the University still reserved the right not to proceed if doing so was no longer in its best interests. With this in mind, I do not think that reconsidering the original decision, by itself, demonstrates religious discrimination, even within the context of the public backlash. I think the most important consideration is whether the University applied its revised criteria equally to all participating organizations (which it did). 

This being said, I do understand Calvary Chapel's concerns, particularly considering the significant public backlash that followed the University's original announcement and how it might have influenced the University to rescind its award to the Chapel. As established in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, the government cannot exclude an otherwise eligible religious organization from a public benefit simply because it is religious. Although this case involves the sale of public property rather than a government funding program, I believe the underlying principle is still relevant to this case. Religious organizations should be able to participate in public programs/opportunities on the same terms as secular organizations, and I think it is clear in this case, they were allowed to do so. I also think Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission is relevant because it establishes that the government must remain neutral toward religious beliefs and cannot make decisions based upon hostility toward religion. Based upon these precedents, I argue that if the University had reversed its decision because members of the public objected to the property being sold to a religious organization, it would be a violation of religious neutrality and clear religious discrimination, however, this was not the case. 

Ultimately, I believe that religious neutrality requires equal, not preferential treatment. Religious organizations should not be excluded from public benefits/opportunities because of their beliefs, and they should also be subject to the same financial considerations and procedures as secular organizations. In this case, I agree with the First Circuit that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the University's decision was motivated by religious discrimination and that the reopening of the bidding process was not a violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.


https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1452/25-1452-2026-06-30.html

https://mainemorningstar.com/2025/07/11/claiming-religious-discrimination-midcoast-church-appeals-judges-hutchinson-center-ruling/

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-1st-circuit/179455.html

https://www.courthousenews.com/churchs-discrimination-suit-against-umaine-falters-at-first-circuit/

https://www.christianitydaily.com/news/calvary-chapel-belfast-sues-university-of-maine-over-property.html

Should a Public School Rent Space to a Church?

In 2022, The Pines Church asked to rent space at Hermon High School in Maine for Sunday services. The school committee turned down a longer lease and voted 4–1 to offer month-to-month use. As Libby Palanza reported in The Maine Wire on November 14, a federal judge found that the committee let hostility toward the church and its beliefs influence that decision. One committee member had asked about the church’s denomination and its positions on abortion and LGBTQ+ issues. I agree with the judge. The committee had reason to examine what a year-long rental would mean for a public school, but the church’s answers to those questions had little to do with whether the school could accommodate Sunday services. The church and its pastor, Matt Gioia, were seeking a venue for a congregation that, according to the article, draws around 150 people to weekly services at a movie theater in Orono. The request would have been a new arrangement for Hermon. Palanza notes that another Maine congregation, The Rock Church, rented the auditorium at Bangor High School for Easter services in 2011. On November 13, 2026, U.S. District Judge Lance Walker found that religious bias helped drive Hermon’s decision. He awarded the church and Gioia one dollar in damages. The ruling did not require the district to grant a longer lease. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is the central issue. Once the school makes its facilities available for public use, Judge Walker explained, it cannot deny a group access because of its religion. In practice, that means asking why the committee offered the church a shorter lease. A school has good reasons to look at whether a booking would interfere with student activities, overload the parking lot, or leave staff scrambling to get the building ready for Monday. Those concerns would matter just as much if a secular group wanted the space. In my view, the harder question for Hermon was whether those concerns explain the decision it actually made. The Bangor example shows that a Maine public school can make its auditorium available for a worship service. It has limits as a comparison. That event was a single Easter service, at a different school. It tells us little about whether Hermon could accommodate weekly services for a congregation of that size. A better comparison would be a secular organization asking for the same space on Sundays for a year. Both uses could bring similar traffic, create similar cleanup needs, and compete with school activities. I would expect Hermon to ask either applicant about attendance and scheduling. The church’s views on abortion would tell the committee nothing about those demands. The month-to-month offer is the strongest argument for the district. It suggests that a majority of the committee was willing to let the church meet at the school. Shorter terms could also serve a legitimate purpose. For example, if Hermon could confirm custodial coverage only a month in advance, it could offer the same shorter term to any group requesting comparable access. But a shorter offer does not by itself explain the questions about doctrine or overcome the judge’s finding that bias influenced the decision. I would give the district’s defense more weight if the reason for choosing a short lease could also explain what it would have done with an equivalent secular request. Even if staffing were a compelling concern, the district could explore whether limiting Sunday access with confirmed custodial coverage would solve the problem before denying a longer agreement. A separate concern is whether a year of Sunday services could make families think the public school sponsors the church. That concern goes to the Establishment Clause, which limits government involvement in religion. I can see why a recurring service might be more visible than a one-time event, especially to families who see the school’s name on an announcement. But the church would rent the space and run its own services. If the school worried about confusion, it could require all renters to identify who runs their events in any publicity. That would address what families actually see without making the lease depend on officials’ opinions about a congregation’s beliefs. I would rule for the church on the First Amendment claim. The district should be able to reserve dates for school events, set attendance limits, and require renters to cover custodial costs when those conditions apply equally to comparable groups. For example, a limit on Sunday bookings would be defensible if students needed the building for scheduled rehearsals and every renter had to work around them. The committee could ask whether the lease would fit the school’s calendar. It crossed the constitutional line when it let its views about the congregation’s beliefs influence the answer. Sources The Maine Wire, November 14, 2026 https://www.themainewire.com/2026/11/federal-judge-rules-hermon-school-committee-violated-pines-churchs-first-amendment-right-maine-human-rights-act/

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Silver Spring Jewish Center v. Montgomery County: Should firearms be allowed within 100 yards of a house of worship?

 When Montgomery County in Maryland imposed a bill banning the use and holding of firearms within 100 yards of places of worship, it did not seem like there would be backlash that would concern a case regarding religious liberties. However, this past July, the New Civil Liberties Alliance filed suit against Montgomery County, stating that the bill was unconstitutional. The practicing members of the Silver Springs Jewish Center, stated that this bill goes against their religious beliefs. According to them, Jews are called to, “proactively provide their own security and security for other Jews.” It is believed that Jewish law compels their people to act in this way of security and that outsiders or other people (such as a security team) around their house of worship, does not fulfill these callings of having required security and protection over their own people. Since October 7th, 2023, the synagogue has created a security team that stands outside of the church, however, they say that this has, actually, only increased anti-semetic activity, and that a synagogue member was attacked outside while this security team was present. Because of many recent antisemitic threats both against the church and around the country, the members of the Silver Spring Jewish Center believe that their Free Exercise Rights are being infringed upon. 



The constitutional issue in question is as follows: Does the Montgomery County gun bill that prevents firearms within 100 yards of a house of worship infringe on the Free Exercise Rights of the Jewish people who attend Silver Spring Jewish Center? Additionally, does this law disrespect the Establishment Clause by having the government make rules in place of the religious leaders of the synagogue? 


Silver Spring Jewish Center, and the New Civil Liberties Alliance who is representing them, argue that this bill not only prevents them from participating in the act of protection their religion calls them to do, but also that they are being singled out as a religious institution. In light of the growing antisemitic attacks around the country, the members of Silver Spring Jewish Center believe that it is imperative to their safety, and the safety of those in the synagogue, that they are allowed to carry guns in, and around, the synagogue. They state that the bill forbidding them to do this is not only targeted, and not neutral, but also  discriminates on the basis of beliefs. In terms of the issue of establishment, they claim that this bill disrespects their autonomy as a religious institution by not allowing religious leaders to make decisions that are best for their congregation (in this case, bringing firearms to the synagogue).


I think this a very interesting and complex case with many factors working against each other. Montgomery County has said that Bill 23-26 was enacted to keep places of public assembly safe, as they are places where children grow and families gather. The spaces that have this 100 yard restriction are houses of worship, schools, parks, and libraries. The creation of this bill stems from Montgomery County working to decrease gun violence across the county, especially in areas frequented by children. 


After reading about the bill, its creation, and implications, I do not believe that this bill is unconstitutional. To start, I don’t think there is a very strong claim that there is an issue of establishment in this case. This bill does not instruct the leaders of the Silver Spring Jewish Center to do or not do anything. The bill is not being made with the purpose to overstep into the synagogue’s leadership and tell them what they can and cannot do. Even though leaders of a church do have say over what they instruct their congregation to do, a law passed concerning the good of an entire county does not over-step religious freedoms in terms of establishment. With that being said, I also do not think that there is an unconstitutional suppression of Free Exercise Rights. When looking at the case Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, there was a similar issue with laws being passed that inhibited Free Exercise Rights against religious groups to inhibit their worshiping. However, in that case, unlike this one, the laws were made in direct response to the church members moving into town and looking to set up a house of worship, therefore making the laws unconstitutional. In this case, the laws were made in order to curb gun violence in areas that are often inhabited by children and families. Although there is an indirect burden to the people of the synagogue by this bill, the state has a very strong compelling interest to protect spaces, such as houses of worship, from possible instances of gun violence. 


I believe that Bill 23-26 is not an unconstitutional law made by Montgomery County. I do not find the issue of the establishment that the New Civil Liberties Alliance is claiming, of the government making rules in place of church leaders to be very compelling. When this law was made, they were not looking to “step on the toes” of religious leaders and churches. When viewing this from an issue of Free Exercise Rights, I understand the concern that the people of the synagogue feel it is their religious right and duty to protect themselves and other members of their congregation. However, I more importantly believe that the state has an extremely compelling state interest to regulate the possession of firearms in spaces such as houses of worship, to look out for the wellbeing and safety of the families who reside there. 


Sources:

https://www.courthousenews.com/maryland-synagogue-sues-county-over-prohibition-on-firearms-near-places-of-worship/ 

https://nclalegal.org/press_release/ncla-to-court-stop-maryland-countys-new-ban-on-religious-community-self-defense-with-firearms/ 

https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/news/montgomery-update-new-gun-safety-law-keeps-every-protection-still-allowed-viva-white-oak-clears-major-financing-hurdle-standing-our-haitian-neighbors-tps-expires 


Wednesday, November 11, 2026

How Does Qualified Immunity of Public Officials Interact with the First Amendment?


In Bossier, Louisiana, Richard Hershey stood outside of a Christian rock concert (on public property) to hand out pamphlets to spread awareness about his religion: the Christian Vegetarian Association. While he was expressing his First-Amendment right of free-exercise of religion and of free speech, he was threatened with arrest and forced to leave by both the local police and the concert arena staff. As a result, Hershey sued the city, along with those he found to be individually guilty, including the Deputy Marshal present, as well as several others who he also claimed to have curbed his First Amendment rights (Richard Hershey v. City of Bossier (LA), Bobby Gilbert, Daniel Stoll, David Smith, Tyshon Harvey, Eugene Tucker).

 However, Hershey “filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under a statute commonly known as Section 1983. But rather than vindicate his rights, the federal district court granted the officers qualified immunity, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.” In other words, Hershey attempted to express how his First Amendment right was infringed upon, and used Section 1938 to hold his perpetrators accountable. Yet, he was unsuccessful as the defendants were granted qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a protection which “allows state and local officials to avoid personal consequences related to their professional interactions unless they violate ‘clearly established law’ and has been repeatedly used by police officers to escape accountability and civil liability.” This application of qualified immunity complicates a seemingly simple case of free exercise, and raises the following constitutional question: To what extent does the First Amendment protect an individual’s right to distribute religious literature on publicly owned property, and can government officials avoid liability for restricting that expression by relying on qualified immunity or delegating authority to private entities? What takes precedence: The First Amendment or qualified immunity? 

To answer the first prong of the above question, this case clearly relates to Marsh v. Alabama (1946). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a privately owned company town could not prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious literature on its streets. This case is relevant to Hershey v. City of Bossier because both involve the distribution of religious materials in spaces that serve the public. In Hershey, the arena was publicly owned, yet it was privately managed, thus raising questions similar to Marsh about whether private management could limit First Amendment protections. That said, Marsh supports the argument that constitutional protections for public expression should not necessarily disappear simply because private entities exercise control over property traditionally used by the public. Although Marsh and Hershey differ in several factual and legal respects, both cases involve the distribution of religious materials in spaces that serve a public function. Their similarities raise the question of whether constitutional protections for religious expression should extend to these quasi-public spaces, even when private entities exercise some degree of control over them. Thus, Marsh provides a useful legal foundation for examining the First Amendment issues raised in Hershey, proving that there is a clear violation of First Amendment rights at play here. 

However, the granting of qualified immunity to the defendants raises an important question about the applicability of existing legal precedent. One particularly relevant case is Hope v. Pelzer (2002), which also examines the relationship between qualified immunity and constitutional protections. Specifically, this case dictates that qualified immunity cannot trump the the Bill of Rights In fact, Oyez explains that the the case concluded that “prison guards could be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” So, actors of the state cannot be granted qualified immunity when someone’s rights are violated in a way that would appear reasonable. However, as this case does not deal with the First Amendment or religious liberty, the lower courts did not invoke its precedent, ultimately upholding the officers’ qualified immunity.

With all of this in mind, I believe that the violation of the First Amendment should trump the qualified immunity at hand. It is beyond clear that Hershey was not guilty of any offense that solicited the threat of his arrest. His religious speech was entirely protected by the First Amendment, and there was a clear and obvious violation of his rights. Because of this, I think that this case should follow the precedent of Hope. While the lower courts did not use it as a precedent, I believe that qualified immunity should never supersede any of the core rights listed in the Bill of Rights. This case specifically showcases that religious liberty was, in fact, deprived from Hershey. Very interestingly, this case has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, with both parties filing petitions for a writ of certiorari in 2026, but the federal review of this case has not yet been granted. 

References

https://www.cato.org/blog/hershey-v-city-bossier-city-brief-qualified-immunity-should-not-shield-blatant-first-amendment

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/HersheyPetition_Redacted.pdf

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983

https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/hershey-v-city-of-bossier-city/

https://christianveg.org/

https://www.naacpldf.org/qualified-immunity/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-309


Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Drawing the Line for Religious Autonomy: Doe v. Catholic Relief Services

    Concerning religious freedom, what happens when the religious beliefs of an organization conflict with laws that protect employees from discrimination? Should religious organizations be permitted to make employment decisions according to their beliefs, even when those decisions would otherwise violate civil law? The Fourth Circuit confronted this difficult question in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services (2026), a case that illustrates the tension between religious institutional autonomy and the government's authority to enforce employment protections.

    John Doe, an openly gay man, was hired by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a Catholic-affiliated nonprofit organization governed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. During the hiring process, Doe disclosed that he was married to a man and asked whether his husband would qualify for dependent health insurance. He was told that he would. However, approximately five months after beginning employment, CRS informed Doe that providing benefits to his husband conflicted with its religious beliefs. The organization terminated the coverage and offered an alternative compensation arrangement, which Doe declined. After working for CRS for several years, Doe eventually resigned and brought claims under federal and Maryland employment-discrimination laws.

    The district court ruled in Doe's favor and CRS appealed—arguing that its religious beliefs and constitutional protections afforded it immunity from liability. On October 16, 2026, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgments under Title VII and Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act, while dismissing the Equal Pay Act appeal. The majority concluded that neither the statutes nor the First Amendment provided the broad immunity CRS requested.

    The constitutional question is particularly interesting because the First Amendment protects an individual's right to believe and worship while it simultaneously protects the independence of religious institutions. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC (2012), the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception, which prevents government interference with a religious institution's selection of its ministers. The Court later clarified in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) that an employee's actual religious responsibilities, rather than simply their job title, determine whether the exception applies. Both decisions recognize that religious organizations must retain authority over the individuals entrusted with carrying out their religious missions.

    However, the existence of institutional autonomy does not necessarily mean that religious organizations are exempt from every law governing their employment practices. The majority relied on the distinction between protected ecclesiastical matters and ordinary secular disputes. It explained that the First Amendment protects matters such as religious doctrine, ministerial employment, church membership, hierarchy, and discipline. But it does not establish a general immunity from secular laws merely because an organization invokes religious motivation. The majority also relied on the Free Exercise framework established in Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Under Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws may ordinarily be enforced even when they incidentally burden religious exercise. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) clarify that this protection changes when government selectively burdens religious conduct or permits comparable secular conduct. In Doe, the majority concluded that the relevant statutory exemptions did not demonstrate that religious employers were treated less favorably than comparable secular employers. For example, the small-business exemptions applied equally to religious and secular organizations.

    I find the majority's reasoning persuasive because constitutional protections should have meaningful boundaries. The First Amendment protects religious institutions' independence in matters of doctrine, religious leadership, and internal ecclesiastical governance. However, this protection does not create unrestricted immunity from neutral and generally applicable civil laws—employment decisions involving nonministerial employees do not automatically constitute matters of protected ecclesiastical governance. Since Doe's responsibilities were primarily secular rather than ministerial, CRS's sincere religious beliefs should not, by themselves, establish a constitutional exemption from generally applicable employment-discrimination laws. The conclusion does not require courts to question the sincerity or theological correctness of religious beliefs. Rather, it distinguishes between protecting religious doctrine and granting immunity to conduct regulated by civil law. If religious motivation alone were sufficient to exempt an organization from employment protections, what meaningful limits would remain? Could an organization invoke its religious identity to avoid virtually any employment obligation? The majority's approach recognizes that religious liberty cannot become a blanket exemption from the legal responsibilities shared by other participants in civil society, avoiding the slippery slope.

    Judge Quattlebaum's dissent raises an important objection; he argues that church autonomy extends beyond the ministerial exception and protects religious organizations' authority to make employment decisions reflecting their theological commitments. His concern is that requiring religious institutions to comply with laws that conflict with their beliefs can interfere with their ability to preserve their religious identity. This argument deserves consideration. Religious organizations should not be forced to surrender their convictions simply because they operate within a broader legal system. Nevertheless, institutional autonomy must be distinguished from unrestricted authority over every employment relationship. Otherwise, the scope of constitutional protection would depend almost entirely on how broadly an organization characterizes its religious mission.

    Ultimately, Doe v. Catholic Relief Services demonstrates that religious freedom and civil equality need not be mutually exclusive. The First Amendment must protect religious institutions from government interference in their distinctly religious affairs. But that protection should not automatically extend to every employment decision made in the name of religion. The challenge is not whether religious autonomy deserves protection, but is in determining where that autonomy ends and the government's legitimate authority to protect individuals under neutral civil law begins.

References

Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, No. 25-1569 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026). Full opinion.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020).

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021).

When Does Religious Freedom Become Employment Discrimination? Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel

 Religious freedom is a key First Amendment protection. Religious organizations can practice their beliefs, but conflicts can arise when those beliefs clash with laws that protect people from discrimination. Should these organizations be able to make hiring decisions based on their beliefs, even if it goes against state law? This is the main issue in Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel, a Michigan case about where to draw the line between religious freedom and employment discrimination.

Christian Healthcare Centers is a nonprofit medical group in Michigan that includes Christian beliefs in its healthcare services. Employees are expected to follow specific religious principles, such as beliefs about marriage, sexuality, and gender identity. The organization also does not provide some gender-transition treatments and does not use pronouns that differ from a patient’s biological sex at birth.
The issue centers on Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in jobs and public services. In 2023, Michigan updated the law to clearly include protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. Christian Healthcare Centers said these changes might make them hire people who do not share their beliefs or offer services that go against their faith. The group sued Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel and other officials, saying that enforcing these rules would violate their constitutional rights.
In August 2026, a federal district court issued a mixed ruling. It protected the organization's religious practices involving pronouns, certain medical treatments, and hiring for its Biblical Counselor and physician positions. However, the court declined to extend those protections to all other employees. Christian Healthcare Centers appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
This case brings up key questions about the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious practice from unfair government limits. Christian Healthcare Centers says that being forced to hire people who do not share its beliefs would interfere with its religious mission. In their view, hiring is not simply a business matter but part of their religious practice.
On the other hand, Michigan has a duty to protect workers from discrimination. The state’s laws intend to give everyone equal job opportunities, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. If exemptions are too broad, these protections could be weakened, and some people might face discrimination.
A key precedent is Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In that case, the Supreme Court said that neutral laws that apply to everyone can usually be enforced, even if they affect religious practices. This means that religious beliefs do not always excuse organizations from following general laws.
However, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012), the Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception, which protects religious organizations' authority to hire and fire employees who perform important religious functions. This matters here because Christian Healthcare Centers says its employees help carry out its religious mission. They should be allowed to practice their beliefs, but that freedom should not automatically exempt them from antidiscrimination laws. I believe courts should consider each employee's actual responsibilities and connection to the organization's religious mission rather than automatically granting exemptions for every position. 

For example, if someone teaches religious doctrine, gives spiritual counseling, or leads religious activities, it makes sense to require them to communicate the organization’s beliefs. Their job is directly tied to the religious mission. But things get more complicated for employees who mostly do administrative work or jobs not related to religious teaching.
If someone works in scheduling, billing, or another office job, should their personal beliefs about marriage or sexuality determine whether they can be hired? I think they usually should not. While the organization has religious values, these workers are not in charge of teaching or sharing those beliefs. Allowing discrimination in all jobs could make religious exemptions go further than needed to protect religious freedom.
Another consideration is that Christian Healthcare Centers offers medical care. Healthcare groups have duties to both their religious missions and their patients. I can see why some medical staff might not want to take part in treatments that go against their beliefs. Still, I think all patients deserve to be treated with respect, no matter who they are. Religious freedom should not be used as a reason to deny patients dignity or treat them unfairly. I believe the court should protect Christian Healthcare Centers’ authority to select employees for genuinely religious roles while allowing Michigan to enforce its antidiscrimination laws for other positions. Rather than automatically prioritizing religious freedom or employment equality, courts should examine the particular circumstances and responsibilities involved.
Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel shows how hard it is to balance two key American values: religious freedom and protection from discrimination. Both are important and should not be ignored just because they sometimes clash. I believe protecting religious freedom matters, but setting its limits is just as important for fair treatment under the law.

The Limits to Religious Freedom and Government Power: The Case of Youth 71Five Ministries

    Religious freedom is one of the Constitution's most important protections, but does the religious freedom and importance it holds in the Constitution mean a religious organization should be exempt from the rules attached to government funding? And how much excessive control should the government have over an organization’s religious practices simply because it provides financial assistance? In the case of Youth71 Five Ministries v. Williams, these questions were at the center of a 2025 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

Youth 71 Five Ministries is a Christian nonprofit organization in Oregon that provides mentoring, youth centers, vocational training, and other programs for at-risk young people. While the organization serves youth regardless of their religious beliefs, its primary mission is to share Christianity. As a result, it requires employees and volunteers to affirm a statement of Christian faith. Since 2017, the organization has received multiple grants from Oregon’s Youth Development division. However, for the 2023-2025 grant cycle, Oregon introduced a new requirement prohibiting grant recipients from discriminating in employment based on religion and other characteristics (the state discovered this practice after receiving an anonymous complaint). Although Youth 71Five maintained its Christian hiring requirements, it certified compliance with the new policy, believing its religious practices were constitutionally protected. Oregon initially offered the organization $410,000 in grants but withdrew the money after discovering its hiring practices. Youth 71Five sued, arguing that Oregon had violated its First Amendment rights. In June 2024, the district court ruled against the ministry and dismissed its lawsuit. Later, on August 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit partially reversed that decision: Oregon could enforce nondiscrimination requirements for state-funded grants as that is constitutionally neutral, but this non- discriminatory requirement did not extend to the ministry’s activities receiving no funding from Oregon’s Youth Development Division. The Court did not order Oregon to restore the grants.

Fundamental to this case is the Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious practice from improper government interference. One of the main constitutional debates of this case is: Is the government turning down Youth 71Five because of what they wanted to do with the grant money or because they are a religious institution? In the case of Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld Washington State’s decision to exclude students from pursuing devotional theology degrees from a publicly funded scholarship program, recognizing that the state had a legitimate interest in not funding the religious training of ministers, and this could be considered an overlap between church and state. In contrast, in the case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), it was established that the government cannot deny an otherwise eligible religious organization a public benefit simply because of its religious status. This case established important protections against excluding religious organizations because of their religious status. These two cases show that the government cannot discriminate against an organization merely for being religious, but it can impose constitutional restrictions on how public funds are used; if funds are used to fund a program that has discriminatory practices, that would look as the government endorses that behaviour.


I believe that the Ninth Circuit Court applied this distinction in this case. Oregon did not deny funding simply because Youth 71Five was a Christian organization or because it promoted Christianity. This ministry intended to promote Christianity and accentuate the importance of a relationship with Jesus Christ. The Organization also required all of its employees and volunteers to affirm their Christian beliefs, which was in violation of Oregon’s nondiscrimination requirements. This is an important part of the state's argument. In my opinion, this case more closely corresponds to Locke v. Davey, while in this case it isn't a matter of the state funding a minister, a leader of a religion, this case reiterates that one can exercise their religion freely but the government can decline to subsidize certain activities. Both cases simply drew distinctions concerning funding rather than flat out excluding an applicant, because they are religious, no one told Davey that he can not pursue that theology degree, but the state can not fund it. This notion of funding a religious education also corresponds to Youth 71Five as they both consider government's discretion to fund a religious education. The state is not prohibiting Youth 71Five from practicing and spreading Christianity and even allows flexibility for Christian programs within its grant-funded initiatives. The detail of this case being that the discriminatory hiring practices would make it unconstitutional as the government would be publicly funding and there by endorsing christianity, and the turning away of people who have different beliefs. In both cases, neither government was prohibiting or regulating religious practice, but imposing limits on what they were willing to financially support. The state of Oregon continued funding faith-based organizations, but because of the ministry's failure to apply with the nondiscrimination requirements the grant was pulled.

Ultimately, I agree with the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the basis that it establishes an important balance between protecting religious freedom and allowing the government to enforce reasonable restrictions on taxpayer-funded programs. I believe and agree that religious programs, especially those looking to help troubled individuals, should have every right to practice and spread their beliefs and operate without government interference. However, religious freedom does not mean an organization receiving government funding should not adhere to non-discrimination requirements, and the government should not be funding the spreading a certain religion. The Ninth Circuit wasn’t ruling that these hiring requirements that the ministry had in place had to go away, but the government could not give them financial support while spreading a specific religion and discriminating about who is hired at the location; this is where I see contrast between this case and Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), Youth 71Five is spreading christianity in a discriminatory manner. The First Amendment protects religious freedoms and liberties, but it doesn't guarantee access to taxpayers' money. The ministry was not denied funding because of its religious identity or its mission to spread Christianity- rather because of the requirement of employees to adhere to christian beliefs. I agree with the Ninth Circuit court because the government should be able to enforce neutral requirements when there are public funds involved without preventing religious organizations from practicing their faith. ​