Vaccinations for Online School?

In West Virginia, many public schools are facing challenges mediating the clash of personal religious beliefs with the state compulsory vaccination law (CVL). Last week, Perry v. Marteney appeared in the Fourth Circuit courts in West Virginia to determine if the state has compelling interest to not grant the Perry family a religious exemption from the CVL. Krystle and Anthony Perry sued on behalf of their child, K.P., as administrators of the school unenrolled K.P. for not complying with the state vaccination requirements. K.P. was enrolled in the Upshur County School District as a virtual student, and only ever physically entered the school for test taking purposes. The state of West Virginia’s compulsory vaccine requirement is aimed at protecting students against diseases such as polio, chickenpox, measles, meningitis, and whooping cough. The Perry’s are suing the state on the grounds that the CVL is in contradiction with their free exercise of religion because “using vaccines that scientists researched, tested and developed through the use of aborted fetal cells is at odds with their religious beliefs”. 

The main issue present in this case is whether or not the compulsory vaccination law is generally applicable to all people regardless of their religion, and if it isn’t, if the state still has a compelling interest to enforce the law. The law of compulsory vaccination is applied to all students who go to Upshur County School District, in person or online, so in that way it seems to be neutral. However, the state of West Virginia has made two exceptions: those with medical exemptions, and those who are homeschooled. This is far from the norm, as stated in the brief, as West Virginia has been an outlier in vaccine exceptions, “forty-five states (plus the District of Columbia) currently offer religious exemptions to their school vaccination laws.”

One of the most salient dangers to allowing a religious exemption to the law is the threat to public health. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, measles cases spiked from 285 nationwide in 2024 to 2,255 in 2025.” Stacy Marteney, on behalf of the defense, explains how even if the compulsory state vaccination law infringes on the families religious beliefs, the law can do so because of a greater interest in protecting children from deadly diseases. Above all, parents who send their children to school should not have to worry about their children being exposed to a variety of potentially deadly contagious diseases. Defendants also argue on the basis that medical exceptions are very different from religious ones in that they are oriented directly toward the state's interest in maintaining public health. 

The Perry family believes the law is not applied equally because there are some students who are able to obtain medical exemptions and others who are homeschooled who also do not have to comply with the CVL. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue that based on the precedent set in the Supreme Court decision, Fulton v City of Philadelphia, strict scrutiny should be applied to interpret their free exercise rights. Strict scrutiny means that the judges must show the state has a compelling interest for infringement on religious beliefs and the laws are narrowly tailored toward that interest. According to the West Virginia Legislature, a recent law states that strict scrutiny must be applied if religious rights have been burdened. So in this case, judges would have to provide a convincing argument that K.P. not being vaccinated poses a dangerous threat to the health and well-being of other students. While the state has claimed the vaccination policy is essential for building herd immunity within its schools, the plaintiffs have argued in their appellate brief that online students such as K.P. pose minimal risk to the in-person students saying “infectious diseases do not spread over the internet”. Furthermore, since exemptions to the law have been made on non-religious grounds, there are already students within the school who are unvaccinated that pose a greater risk to spread those diseases than K.P. learning from home. Because the coordinator of Upshur County School District unenrolled K.P. from the school, the parents now face additional indirect burdens of having to find other options to avoid penalties for not sending K.P. to school; homeschooling was not a reasonable option for them.

I believe that due to West Virginia’s medical and homeschooling vaccine exemptions that the law at hand is “facially” neutral, but not generally applicable. If the state allows some students with medical reasons to have an exemption to the law but not others for religious reasons, they are privileging secular interests over religious ones. While the secular interests of public health are of utmost importance, I do not think the court has enough of a compelling interest to argue in favor of K.P.'s vaccination. I think an especially relevant fact that should be considered is how being an online student means there is little opportunity to expose other students. There seems to be no clear and present danger to the public, especially while the state is continuing to allow other non-vaccinated individuals into the school for secular reasons.

John Doe Case & "Ministerial Exception" - Free Exercise of Religion

FACTS: 

    In the case “John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services”,  John Doe (“Doe”) claims that Catholic Relief Services (“CRS”) practiced discrimination based on sexual orientation. Doe claims this discrimination violated the Civil Rights Act, which protects historically oppressed demographics, including sexual orientation. In 2016, Catholic Relief Services hired this employee (anonymously referred to as John Doe) who worked until 2024. Doe was hired as a “Program Data Analyst”, and took additional roles later. Doe only worked on computer systems and managerial roles, rather than preaching Catholic doctrine. From Doe's employment, his same-sex spouse got CRS provided health benefits starting in 2016, as CRS would provide health benefits to its employees’ spouses within the first month of work. However, CRS stopped providing benefits for Doe’s same-sex spouse in 2017. CRS argued that, under the free exercise clause, the organization should have the right to express their faith in defiance of homosexuality by not providing spousal health benefits to Doe’s spouse. However, Doe argues that an employer’s religious exemption only allows discrimination if the employee’s job function directly contributes to religious matters for the organization. This means that, despite how CRS is a religious organization, not every employee is required to be a devout Catholic. Therefore, the ACLU argues that Doe’s employee role did not require Catholic faith, and makes any religious exemption unlawful if used to deprive his same-sex spouse of health benefits. The U.S. District Judges ruled in favor of Doe for his spouse’s entitlement to health benefits.

ISSUE: 

    The issue is: Does the free exercise clause protect CRS’s right to have religious exemption from fulfilling their employer duties toward homosexual employees? Without a religious exemption, CRS legally has to violate their religious condemnation of homosexuality.

PRECEDENTS APPLIED:

    To answer this issue, it is important to know two case precedents. The first case precedent will discuss how the “ministerial exception” allows Churches to discriminate against employees to ensure that their religion survives by being taught by credentialed ministers. Next, the second case will create a definition for a “minister”. CRS’s argument uses the “ministerial exception” of the Civil Rights Act, as the organization argues that Doe’s job function at CRS was religious in nature and therefore CRS had the First Amendment right to discriminate based on the free exercise of the Catholic religion. This rule is meant to be used by religious organizations to only hire their own denomination as clergy: priests can only be hired if they are Christian, rabbis can only be hired if they are Jewish, and imams can only be hired if they are Muslim. In the landmark case “Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC”, a teacher at a religious elementary school was determined to be a "minister" because she taught daily religion classes. Thus, the Hosanna-Tabor case shows that the “ministerial exception” applies to jobs defined as serving a core religious function. 

    The decision in the Hosanna-Tabor case was unanimous, but the Justices would soon find their definitions of “minister” to differ. As such, in the case “Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru”, the definition of “minister” was determined by whether an employee is educating young people in the employing entity’s religious doctrine. Therefore, when applying the “ministerial exception” rule to the case “John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services”, Doe should not be defined as a “minister”. Doe is not a minister because his job function was focused on computer systems (and occasional training employees in computer systems). Overall, Doe’s job did not require educating others on religious doctrine, and so Doe would not be classified as a minister. This is the reason why CRS would not get a religious exemption if this case went to the Supreme Court.

PERSONAL ARGUMENT:

    My argument is that ministers are determined by having official clergy title, training, and specialty in religious preaching. My opinion differs from the case precedent, as my definition of a “minister” is more narrow than the definition in the Morrissey-Berru case. The Morrissey-Berru case establishes that ministers “educate” others in religious doctrine. However, I am concerned about possible arguments that working for a religious organization, even on computer systems, helps organizations with any ultimate “mission” of educating others in religious doctrine. To make sure Doe and other secular job positions are not classified as “ministers”, I agree with the dissenting opinion in the Morrissey-Berru case: “ministers” require substantial religious titles and training, and must be devoutly religious. This would strictly define ministers by their clergy position, as opposed to ministers being defined by any casual aid in teaching religious topics.

When Private Faith and Public Roles Collide

  In 2020, Florida State University was put in the spotlight for a consequential free-speech and religion case. A student named Jack Denton was removed from his position as president of the Student Senate after private messages he sent in a Catholic student group chat were made public and widely criticized.

    Denton, a devout Catholic and an active student leader, had been elected by his peers to run the student senate, which is a position that, at a public university, carries official duties and recognition. In late May 2020, during a GroupMe chat among members of the Catholic Student Union, another student shared a video raising money for different causes, including organizations associated with racial justice. Denton responded by expressing his view that some of those organizations advocated for positions that contradicted what he believed were core Catholic teachings on issues like abortion, gender identity, and the “common good.”

    Although this exchange took place privately, someone took screenshots and shared them outside the chat. Outrage spread quickly on social media and on the FSU campus, and a petition calling for Denton’s removal received thousands of signatures. The student senate initially held a vote of no confidence, which ended up failing; but later voted again and removed Denton as Student Senate President solely because of his remarks. 

    Not satisfied with internal appeals, Denton filed a federal lawsuit against the university and student senate officials, arguing that his removal violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. He claimed that he was punished for expressing deeply held religious beliefs that were unpopular. Federal courts eventually sided with Denton. A judge agreed that his claims were likely to succeed and ordered the university to stop withholding his salary. The student university Supreme Court also ruled that his removal violated his constitutional rights and reinstated him. Florida State later settled the case, compensating Denton and publicly affirming its commitment to students’ First Amendment rights.

    Denton was punished because of what he said, which was religiously and politically motivated. Even though this was private speech, the argument is that public institutions cannot penalize speech just because others find it offensive or disagree with it. If the state, which includes a public university, penalizes someone because of religiously grounded beliefs, that raises a free-exercise concern. 

    The Supreme Court has emphasized that public institutions must protect speech, including religious speech, even when it discomforts others. If student government bodies can remove leaders for speaking on controversial but constitutionally protected topics, then participation in public life will become artificial and less genuine. This issue matters because student governments are a strongly influential part of universities. They are also part of the government structure at public universities, which often work with budgets, influence, and official recognition. If members must hide their beliefs to serve, then it sends a message to students that your voice is acceptable only if it aligns with other people’s beliefs.

    At the heart of the Jack Denton case is a difficult constitutional question that is at the intersection of free exercise of religion, free speech, and state action: Can a public university, acting through its student government, remove an elected official because his religiously motivated speech conflicts with prevailing campus values?

    No, I believe that public universities have a constitutional obligation to protect speech, including religious speech, even when it’s unpopular or uncomfortable. Student governments function as part of state institutions, so they must operate within First Amendment bounds. From a policy perspective, universities should prioritize dialogue and debate over looking to seek out a punishment for it. Our constitutional tradition recognizes that free and open discourse, especially on matters of religion and morality, is central to democratic life. Conditioning student government participation in agreement with particular viewpoints based on other people’s opinions undermines that ideal. 

https://adflegal.org/article/jack-denton-story/

https://www.ewtnnews.com/world/us/catholic-florida-man-sues-university-over-religious-freedom?utm_source=chatgpt.com&redirectedfrom=cna

Can Cities Ban Religious Messaging at a Public Festival?

   David Hoffman and a small group of associates are seeking the ability to share their religious beliefs and literature at the Winterhaven Festival. Every winter, this light festival occurs in the historic Winterhaven neighborhood in Tucson, Arizona. The festival is a popular holiday event that takes place on these public streets and sidewalks. The event is from December 13th to December 27th in the evening. It is open to the public, with no ticket entry fee, and participants can walk through the streets to enjoy food, drinks, and light displays. On the very first day of the festival this year, Saturday, December 13, 2025, David Hoffman and a few of his associates entered the festival to share their religious beliefs, as Christians. The group was not trying to sell anything, ask for donations, or create a disturbance, they were simply there to share their Christian faith. However, Tucson police officers informed Hoffman of the city's solicitation policy, which barred “political, religious, or commercial materials or messaging” (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). Due to this, the officers claimed that the group violated the policy and ordered them to relocate to a fenced-off area outside the festival that was a “Designated Space for Peaceful Messaging and Literature Distribution” (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). If the group failed to comply with the officers, they threatened to arrest them for trespassing, as that was what the solicitation policy demanded as consequence. Hoffman complied with the officers, but he wanted to come back to the festival and continue his preaching the rest of the days and in future years (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). 

This case involves free speech and implications on the free exercise of religion, but for the purposes of our class, I am focusing on the latter. Many Christians believe that spreading the “word of god” is extremely important to their religious practices. The question is whether the Tucson policy and enforcement on Hoffman put a burden on that religious practice and if the city violated the constitutional right of free religion. Part of the key legal issue is whether the area is public space or private space because courts treat government property differently depending on the type of forum. In this case, the streets and sidewalks of Winterhaven are still considered traditional public forums, where viewpoint-based restrictions are prohibited (Religious Speech and Advertising 2019). Even in cases where the government is able to restrict speech in a nonpublic forum, it still cannot be viewpoint discrimination. This is important because it gives the city no right to control speech based on religion at the Winterhaven festival, especially since it occurs on public streets and sidewalks. 

The Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment requires that the government acts neutral in accordance with religion and the policies that surround it. The policy around solicitations at the Winterhaven Festival may appear to be neutral because it forbids several forms of messaging, not just religious. However, while the policy is facially neutral, it is not neutral in impact. Hoffman was not engaging in casual speech; he was practicing his religion in a way that is important to his faith. Forcing him and his associates to relocate outside of the festival takes away his ability to carry out his religious duties. Meaning, the city is interfering with the practice of their religion in front of the intended audience. In my opinion, this policy is therefore not neutral in its impact on religious communities. When the government is able to interfere with religious exercise, there must be a compelling state interest, and it must be the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling state interest. The Tucson city may argue that this policy against solicitation is necessary for peace at the festival, but in my opinion, the policy and forced removal are not the least restrictive means to achieve this. The city could have addressed these concerns by enforcing rules against harassing attendees, but instead, it imposed a sweeping rule that banned all religious messaging.  

Based on the judicial precedent of religious neutrality and the free exercise clause, I expect that the courts will rule in favor of Hoffman. In my opinion, Tucson’s enforcement against Hoffman is a violation of the free exercise clause in the First Amendment. While regulating solicitation in a public space is okay for cities to do, categorically excluding religion in the public space goes against the Constitution and the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The city’s policy was not used just to regulate disruptive behavior and it instead singled out religious practices. The First Amendment exists to protect religious beliefs, even if they do not align with other people's beliefs. It is the government's role to remain neutral and allow people to participate in their religion without discrimination. 

This case is important because it highlights how religious expression can be viewed as something that is controversial and needs to be regulated, even though the Free Exercise Clause protects religion. The implications to consider if the courts side with the city of Tucson is that this would create a precedent that cities can treat religion unfairly in public events on public property. Meaning, that anything hosted on public space would have the ability to ban religious practices, with the claim of preserving peace. This would especially unfairly impact those whose faith requires public outreach. Allowing this kind of policy would have disproportionate effects on minority groups, as they may be pushed further away from public spaces. If religious expression can be removed from public spaces that are supposed to give citizens equal rights, then the Free Exercise Clause would be much weaker. Due to this, I believe that Tucson’s policy surrounding solicitations during the Winterhaven Festival is unconstitutional and does not reflect neutrality.

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Hoffman-Demand-Letter-12.16.25_Redacted.pdf

https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB10383.html 

After School Satan Club?

    In February 2023, The Satanic Temple (TST), a recognized church and sponsor of various After School Satan Clubs (ASSC) throughout the nation, applied to use the facilities of the Saucon Valley School District (SVSD) for monthly after-school gatherings. Initially, the SVSD approved the TST's use of their facilities, but after immediate backlash and what appeared to be a policy violation, they revoked all access to the ASSC. In response, The Satanic Temple filed suit against the Saucon Valley School District in Pennsylvania due to this direct infringement of their First Amendment rights that explain “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” 

    The Saucon Valley School District has authorized the use of facilities after school hours for various “civic, educational, and recreational activities,” provided that such activities comply with the “Rules and Regulations for the Use of School Building, Facilities, and Equipment” Policy. Various organizations have used and been approved to use the SVSD facilities in the past such as the Good News Club (a Christian group sponsored by a local church and Child Evangelism Fellowship), privately operated sports camps, youth sports associations, the Scouts, Girls on the Run, the Lion’s club, etc. On February 1, 2023, TST applied to sponsor an After School Satan Club at Saucon Valley’s Middle School. It is important to note that TST met all qualifications at that time for the use of District facilities and was approved to hold their monthly ASSC meetings on February 16, 2023. 

    On February 20, 2023, an email was sent to all parents of students in SVSD regarding the opportunity to attend the ASSC with parent permission after school hours, by SVSD Superintendent Vlastly, including important reiterations that the school district does not endorse any groups or content affiliated groups that use their facilities after school hours, and that by law the district cannot discriminate among groups wishing to use their facilities. Soon after this message was sent, the school received a violent message threatening students and staff, referencing the decision of the district to allow the ASSC to meet. This threat was later traced back to a male in North Carolina with no affiliation to TST. Following this threat, the district closed all schools on the evening of the 21st. On the morning of February 22, 2023, the superintendent of Saucon Valley School District sent an email to all district parents stating that the ASSC’s application would be reviewed due to the disruption and threat to safety it had caused. Shortly after this announcement, the SVSD revoked The Satanic Temple's use of school facilities for a policy violation. The school district claimed there was no clear communication that the activities being sponsored are not sponsored by the school district due to the font sizing within the ASSC flyer that stated “our club is operated by The Satanic Temple and we do not operate under any specific school or school district” being too minuscule to read. I note that this school policy provides no specific guidance on what would or would not constitute a violation of the requirement to “clearly communicate that the activities are not being sponsored by the school district.” 

    The Satanic Temple then sued the SVSD in court for violating the First Amendment by denying the club EQUAL access to the school’s facilities, after initially approving them. The delayed exclusion of the ASSC imposed on The Satanic Temples' free exercise rights, as they had already met all criteria (were previously approved), and similar religious groups, such as the Good News Club, were allowed to use district facilities.  TST argued that the district’s decision to revoke facility access for the ASSC effectively allowed public opinion to determine whether or not a religious group could meet, which is referred to as a “heckler’s veto.” Which under the First Amendment “protected speech or religious exercise does not readily give way to a 'heckler’s veto'”. The full outline of this case, in greater detail, is available here. 

On May 1, 2023, the Federal court ordered SVSD to allow the ASSC to meet in district facilities. By November 16, 2023, SVSD settled the lawsuit with TST and agreed to pay $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs to TST’s attorneys. 

    The question I will address concerns the School District's authority to revoke access to the ASSC for a policy violation identified upon review of the TST’s application. Superintendent Vlastly would argue yes, but was this really because of a tiny font, or the backlash and threats received by her and the school district in reaction to this minority religious group, The Satanic Temple? 

    In the case The Satanic Temple V. Saucon Valley School District, I side with The Satanic Temple; the School Board demonstrated unequal treatment of religion within their after-school facilities. If they allow a Christian group, or another group such as the Scouts, to gather on their premises, they must also allow religious or morally grounded organizations to use the space, even if they are in the minority. The First Amendment’s free exercise clause protects this very concept of picking on minority religious groups like The Satanic Temple. This was never an argument about a policy violation; this was an attempt to exclude a minority based on “heckler’s veto.”

Will your Tax Payer Dollars be Used to Fund Religious Public Schools?

    Can your tax dollars contribute to the funding of a public charter school that explicitly teaches a religion you may or may not agree with? Wilberforce Academy of Knoxville v. Knox County Board of Education has the potential to be the next landmark case in the intersection of state funding and religious education. Wilberforce Academy, a Christian non-profit organization, is attempting to create a publicly funded charter school that provides an “explicitly biblical and Christian education”. However, their proposal was shut down by the Knox County Board of Education due to the Tennessee State law that does not allow for a religious interpretation of bible studies for publicly funded schools. The law states that public funds may be used for “a nonsectarian, nonreligious academic study of the Bible”. Now, Wilberforce Academy is taking the Board to court, asserting that they are facing religious discrimination due to their inability to use state funds for their charter school, while other secular nonprofit organizations have that ability, citing a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 

    Charter schools operate as a middle ground between public and private education but lean much more towards the public end. Due to the fact that charter schools receive tax payer dollars, it becomes an issue as to whether or not the funding of Wilberforce Academy would violate the establishment clause in the constitution. The establishment clause in the constitution serves as a barrier between the church and the state that prevents public funding from going towards religious endeavors such as a religious charter school. However, Wilberforce can argue that it is unfair treatment to allow other public schools that are secular to receive these state funds while religious ones cannot. Wilberforce is not asking for a connection of the church and the state, rather that religious charters are treated the same as secular ones. 

    In 2017 the Supreme Court made a decision that greatly impacts the outlook of the Wilberforce case. The Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer case decided whether or not a religious preschool could receive state grants for a playground resurfacing, the same grants that were given to secular schools. After Trinity Church, a religious non-profit, had their application for the grant denied, they took their appeal to court and the court decided in a 7-2 decision that the denial of the grant violated the free exercise of religion clause. Similar to the grant for playground equipment, public funds are a public benefit, meaning under the constitution, everyone should have equal access to them and should not be discriminated against for their religious goals.

It is also worth mentioning that the Supreme Court recently split 4-4 (Judge Barrett recused herself) on Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond, an almost identical case. Previous to being brought to the Supreme Court, the Oklahoma supreme court ruled that the public funding of the religious charter school was unconstitutional.

    Based on the judicial precedent that has been set by the Trinity case, I expect that, assuming the case reaches the supreme court, the supreme court will rule in favor of Wilberforce Academy. The precedent has been set that the judicial system views public goods, from playground equipment grants and now likely to taxpayer dollars, as necessarily equally accessible for secular and religious institutions. Given that these charter schools are optional, tuition free, and open to the public, similar to public schools, it gives the families more autonomy and makes it difficult to argue that students could receive religious education against their will. With that being said, I think judicial precedent and a valid interpretation of the first amendment allows for the funding of religious public charters like Wilberforce Academy. 

    There are many important implications that need to be considered if the courts side with Wilberforce Academy. Most importantly, being that non secular public charter schools will now be able to be funded through tax payer dollars for the first time in American history. This likely outcome will provide a difficult path for the success of minority religious groups in the United States. Although this interpretation of the law seems neutral at face value, as it allows all religious and non-religious groups to open public charters, it will likely be unequal in practice. 

Even though public charters receive a portion of their funding from state grants, those grants alone are rarely ever enough to get a school up and running. Public charters still receive a large amount of private funding to operate, the state grants are just a portion of that funding. Therefore, minority religious groups will have a much more difficult time to start a charter school, if they ever do, than the dominant religions. All in all, I would be surprised to see the judicial precedent that was set in the Trinity case be turned around. However, I think that the lack of neutrality and equality that this decision would create calls for the court to decide in favor of the Tennessee School Board’s interpretation of the free exercise and establishment clause.

Apache Stronghold v. United States

Apache Native Americans are fighting to save Oak flat which is a sacred location for religious activities. For centuries, Native Americans have been visiting this site in the Tonto National Forest to pray and worship. Oak Flat consists of “old-growth oak groves, sacred springs, burial locations, and a singular concentration of archeological sites.” However, the U.S Forest Service has ignored the sacred religious site classification and plan on giving the land to Resolution Copper, a mining company, in exchange for other land. The actions Resolution Copper would do to mine the land would destroy the sacred site. Oak Flat has many resources, particularly around two billion tons of metal, that has made this land a commodity. To harvest the metal, the evacuations would likely result in the surface of Flat Oak “to distort and sink until it forms a “large surface crater.”

    The ninth circuit had denied protection of Oak Flat stating that the land transfer does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it does not substantially burden Apache religion. The Religious Freedoms Restoration Act states that the government should avoid applying a substantial burden and use the least restrictive means possible. The RFRA was implemented after Employment Division v. Smith which led to the controversial precedent that Free Exercise can be denied for “neutral laws of general applicability.” The RFRA was created to hopefully undermine this precedent and allow religious exemptions in federal laws.

    Apache Stronghold has appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court has not decided on whether they will take the case. The constitutional question at hand is whether the United States Forest Service giving sacred land to Resolution Copper creates a significant burden on the Free Exercise of Apache Native Americans. The Apache Stronghold leaders have stated “as the dwelling place of the Ga’an, Oak Flat is a direct corridor to the Creator and is ‘uniquely endowed with holiness and medicine.’ Neither ‘the powers resident there, nor religious activities that pray to and through these powers can be relocated.” This represents the importance of this specific location to their religion and that religious activities would be impossible with Oak Flat’s destruction, which is a substantial burden. In one of the briefs, the Apache lawyers sited “the court has already held that when government controls the resources required for religious practice, barring access to those resources is a substantial burden of free exercise” and that “the same must be true for federal lands.” 

     This case is like Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association. The court has “historically resisted recognizing Native American religious claims over public land.” In this case, the Supreme Court denied religious protections against a native American community worried that a logging road would destroy their religious site. The court reasoned that there was not a less restrictive means to please both parties.  They argued that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated as there was “no coercion, discrimination, or penalty for their religious beliefs” and that the government “simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.” This sentiment sited reflects the decision of the 9^th circuit as they argued that the transferring of Oak did not substantially burden the Apache’s religious exercise as they could still freely believe in their religion without the land. The plaintiff in Apache Stronghold v. United States sited this case and the RFRA reasoning that the RFRA would seemingly overturn Lyng and rule in favor of the Apache. The 9^th court disagreed meaning the precedent of general applicability in Employment Division v. Smith should apply to Apache Stronghold v. United States as they believed it was a neutral and a generally applicable decision.

    In my opinion, I believe that the Supreme Court should take this case and rule in favor of the Apache community. The actions of the U.S Service in transferring sacred land to Resolution Copper does significantly burdens their free exercise of religion. Many of their sacred traditions would no longer be able to be performed. For example, Girls approaching womanhood must collect plants from oak flat as “’the spirit of Chi’chil Bildagoteel.’ As she gathers, she speaks to the spirit of Oak Flat, expressing gratitude for its resources.” This important coming of age tradition cannot continue by the destruction of the religious site and this is one of many religious rituals that would be obliterated. This does create more than a substantial burden, but almost eliminates the religion. While they are still free to believe their religion, without the ability to practice, the entire meaning and traditional aspect of their religion vanishes. Traditions and rituals are important for the maintenance and passing down of religion as younger generations may have a hard time grasping the importance without the meaningful nature of Oak Flat. I also believe this case is different than Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association as I could understand the court having a compelling interest in log roads as it directly helps manufacturing within the United States. However, Copper Resolution is an Australian mining company. Personally, I do not believe the government has the right to transfer religious land to a foreign company even if it was in exchange for other land. I just don’t believe that acquisition of other land is a compelling enough interest to so directly burden the religious exercise of their own citizens. They are directly favoring foreign and monetary purposes in expense of the long-exploited group's Free Exercise. 

    This case holds interesting stakes within the religious liberties era. The recent Supreme Court has been very open to accommodating religious exemptions. Christian denominations and prominent republican figures have sided with the Apache believing that religious liberties “rise and fall together.” This represents the sentiment of religious advocacy groups that all religions must have Free Exercise to protect all groups religious exercise. If this case were to rule in favor of the Apache community, the case would also be a crucial win for Native American communities that have long been exploited by the United States. This could bring forth a new age of justice and preservation for Native American communities who have struggled for years to have their religious liberties upheld.

 

https://becketfund.org/case/apache-stronghold-v-united-states/

https://newrepublic.com/article/194582/supreme-court-apache-stronghold-mining

https://narf.org/apache-oak-flat/

https://www.deseret.com/faith/2025/04/22/the-religious-freedom-case-stuck-in-supreme-court-limbo/

Religious Liberty and Anti-Discrimination: YU Pride Alliance v. Yeshiva University

In 2020, at Yeshiva University, a group of students wanted approval for a "Pride Alliance"' club on the undergraduate campus. Yeshiva University is America's oldest Jewish Institution of higher education. At Yeshiva University, students spend multiple hours studying Torah, learning Hebrew, and taking Jewish studies courses. Yeshiva's strong religious commitments are upheld on campus following Torah values. Yeshiva denied the "Pride Alliance" club's request to be officially recognized as a student group, arguing that it would be inconsistent with religious beliefs. Yeshiva University, despite rejecting this club's request, does welcome LGBTQ+ students and bans LGBTQ+ bullying and discrimination. The students, unhappy with the decision, sued and requested Yeshiva University endorse the group.

        Yeshiva argued that, as a religious institution, it has a constitutional right to uphold its religious principles, including making decisions about which student organizations align with its mission. While the two parties reached an agreement before reaching the Supreme Court, I want to consider the case on its merits as if it had gone to the Supreme Court. 

The key constitutional issue is whether the Free Exercise Clause protects Yeshiva University's right to refuse recognition of a student group. In this case, it is important to consider New York's Civil Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which protects against discrimination. The New York County Supreme Court ruled that Yeshiva is an "educational corporation," not a "religious corporation," meaning that it would not be exempt from NYCHRL. Yeshiva University challenged this ruling, arguing that they are a religious institution and defends its right to conduct internal affairs, such as deciding what clubs serve its religious mission. 

Critics of Yeshiva's position argue that the university more closely resembles religiously affiliated universities like Fordham or Notre Dame rather than Christian seminaries, which are typically exempt from anti-discrimination laws (Stack). The New York County Court also argued that the university offers too many secular degrees, making it ineligible for narrowly religious organizations' exemptions. Yeshiva argues that the Court's ruling presents an unprecedented intrusion into its religious autonomy by suggesting government overreach to compel them to act against their beliefs. 

This case presents a challenge. While the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals and religious institutions from government interference in religious practice, it remains unclear whether Yeshiva University qualifies as a religious institution under relevant civil rights laws. It's helpful to consider the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if they incidentally burden religious practices. If applied to the Yeshiva case, then Smith would suggest that if the New York Civil Human Rights Law is both neutral and generally applicable, Yeshiva may not be allowed a religious exemption. However, whether Yeshiva should be legally classified as a religious corporation or an educational corporation complicates this issue. If Yeshiva were treated as a religious corporation, it may qualify for religious exemption under state and federal law, but the New York County Supreme Court ruled that Yeshiva is an educational corporation. 

I would argue that while the law may appear facially neutral, applying it in this context undermines the religious integrity of Yeshiva University. For over 135 years, Yeshiva has had a long history and tradition of following its Orthodox Religious beliefs. Forcing Yeshiva to officially recognize a student club that promotes values incompatible with Torah teaching compels it to act against its sincerely held religious beliefs. In this sense, what may seem neutral at face value, in practice, becomes an act of coercion pressuring religious universities to conform to state laws. 

While Smith set a precedent that generally applicable laws do not require religious exemptions, more recent rulings like Our Lady of Guadalupe have reaffirmed strong constitutional protection for religious schools. In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020), the Court emphasized the "ministerial exception," which protects religious schools from government interference in employment decisions central to their religious identity. While the Yeshiva case involves student clubs instead of employment, the underlying principle is that religious schools are free to make decisions that reflect their faith commitments. Forcing Yeshiva to recognize a club that contradicts its Torah base values would violate that same autonomy. 

Given Yeshiva's long-standing religious tradition and the distinct role religion plays, the university should be provided with religious exemptions. While I see both sides of this debate, I believe Yeshiva University should be legally recognized as a religious institution and granted the exemptions necessary to preserve its religious mission. To protect religious freedom, it is important that all religious schools can carry out their beliefs without being compelled by the government to act in a way that violates their religious convictions.

Sources: https://becketfund.org/case/yu-pride-alliance-v-yeshiva-university/

https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2025/03/after-years-of-refusal-jewish-university-finally-allows-new-lgbtq-club-on-campus/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/nyregion/yeshiva-university-lgbtq-club.html?unlocked_article_code=1.D08._STm.QQ2ae03L7sSe&smid=url-share

Locked Out by Faith: When Religious Freedom Meets Discrimination

 

In October 2015, Raja’ee Fatihah, a practicing Muslim and U.S. Army National Guard member, walked into the Save Yourself Survival and Tactical Gun Range in Oktaha, Oklahoma, to use its public facilities for marksmanship training. He then completed the required liability forms and provided his identification. But once he identified himself as Muslim, the owners, already known for their controversial signage declaring the business a “Muslim-free establishment” armed themselves and interrogated Fatihah about his faith. They accused him, without evidence, of holding beliefs that condone violence and then denied him service, forcing him to leave. A lawsuit followed Fatihah v. Neal, arguing that the business violated Oklahoma’s anti-discrimination laws and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits public businesses from refusing service based on religion, race, or national origin. This case raises significant constitutional issues

related to both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, including how the law protects religious minorities, maintains neutrality, and prevents discrimination in publicly accessible businesses.

At the heart of this case is the principle of neutrality. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court ruled that religious beliefs do not exempt individuals from neutral laws of general applicability. However, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993), the Court struck down facially neutral ordinances that were clearly designed to suppress a particular religious practice. This tension between facial neutrality and neutrality in effect is central to evaluating laws or actions that disproportionately burden specific religious groups.While Save Yourself is a private business, it is open to the public and therefore subject to anti-discrimination statutes designed to ensure equal access. The Civil Rights Act, like the Constitution, reflects the ideal that public accommodations cannot pick and choose customers based on religion. The gun range’s posted sign and discriminatory actions against Fatihah impose a direct and substantial burden on religious liberty not by the state, but by a public-facing business subject to the law.

Supporters of the gun range owners might argue they have the right to refuse service to anyone who poses a perceived threat, or that their actions are protected by their own religious or ideological beliefs. In that way, this case is similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), where a business owner refused service based on religious objections to same-sex marriage. The Supreme Court sided narrowly with the baker, emphasizing the need for government neutrality toward religion. However, there are important distinctions. Fatihah’s faith alone was used as justification for denial of service, and there was no disruptive behavior or request for special accommodation. Denying access based solely on religion reflects the kind of targeted discrimination that civil rights laws were written to prevent. The opposing view grounded in precedent from Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) holds that the government must show a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means when a law substantially burdens religious exercise. But these cases involved individuals seeking religious exemptions from general laws, not individuals or businesses seeking to deny others rights because of their religion.

In my view, the denial of service to Fatihah represents a clear failure to uphold both the spirit and letter of the law. The Civil Rights Act is there to prevent discrimination and ensure equal access to public accommodations. There is no constitutional justification for religious discrimination in commerce. Allowing businesses to selectively deny service to Muslims or adherents of any faith based on bias undermines the rule of law and encourages sectarian exclusion. Furthermore, this case blurs the line between belief and action. While belief is absolutely protected, actions taken in the public square especially by businesses regulated by civil rights law must comply with nondiscriminatory principles. The gun range owners’ conduct crossed that line. This incident also undermines the sincerity standard sometimes used in religious freedom cases. There is no evidence that Fatihah’s belief posed a threat, and no reasonable interpretation of Islam should lead to assumptions of violence a thorough analysis of the faith would actually lead to the opposite conclusion. These arguments perpetuate islamaphobic stereotypes, not legitimate constitutional claims. The Save Yourself gun range case matters because it tests the limits of religious liberty in a pluralistic society and challenges whether religious identity alone can be grounds for suspicion, exclusion, or denial of rights. If allowed to stand, the gun range’s actions would create a dangerous precedent where private businesses can weaponize religion to discriminate against religious minorities.

https://www.aclu.org/cases/fatihah-v-neal
https://www.acluok.org/en/press-releases/oklahoma-gun-range-removes-muslim-free-sign-commits-serving-customers-all-faiths
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oklahoma-us-army-reservist-muslim-free-gun-range-anti-islamic-discrimination/
https://religionnews.com/2019/04/24/civil-rights-advocates-drop-lawsuit-against-oklahomas-muslim-free-gun-range/
https://apnews.com/general-news-a7ac23a441944ff3bebcfdbdff7e206d

Pronouns, Policy, and the First Amendment: A Classroom Crossroads

 In Willey v. Sweetwater County School District #1 Board of Trustees, a Wyoming federal district court ruled against a teacher who challenged a school district policy, referred to as the PNCP - Preferred Name and Pronouns Policy, requiring staff to use students' preferred names and pronouns. The plaintiffs, a teacher who is also a parent, argued that this policy violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and conflicted with their religious beliefs. The court, however, supported the school district’s policy, finding that this system was a neutral law of general applicability, aligning the case with the constitutional precedent set by Employment Division v. Smith (1990). 

 

The key matter in this case is whether the school district’s policy substantially burdened the plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs. As a parent and an educator, the plaintiff claimed the policy prevented her from instructing her child following her faith and forced her as a teacher to violate that same belief in the classroom. Her sole argument is based on that the policy required her to affirm gender identities she did not believe were truthful or religiously valid. 

 

The Free Exercise Clause does protect individuals' rights to practice their religion without undue government interference. However, the court said the protection does not grant individuals the ability to override a neutral, generally applicable law just because it conflicts with their specific religious beliefs. In Willey, the court found the PNCP was equally applied to all staff, regardless of their beliefs, and did not target a religion in any way. The court noted that teachers were allowed to request exemptions “for any reason,” which included but did not privilege religious reasons. The policy did not involve an individualized system of exemptions subject to case-by-case government discretion. This case remained within the decision of what Smith defines as constitutional. 

 

This decision also steps into the broader implications for the school district trying to balance a respect for their employees’ religious freedoms and inclusive practices. For teachers, this means that religious objections to school policies will not be automatically approved and entitle them to disregard their policies. A uniform process will protect the integrity of the policy and the individual rights of the employees. 

 

In my opinion, the court reached the correct decision in this case. I see both sides and how values are being violated, no matter what the decision is. This is not to say that religious convictions are unimportant; the sincerity of the plaintiff’s beliefs was never questioned. However, the Free Exercise Clause does not give an individual the right to exempt themselves from a generally applicable policy because they have a personal or religious disagreement. By upholding the school’s neutral policy, it maintains the educational environment structure and supports all students, without prioritizing one set of beliefs over another. 

 

This decision continues to align with the precedent set by Employment v. Smith (1990), where the Court made it clear that a neutral, generally applicable law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Unless the policy is designed to target religion or involve some government discretion that evaluates religious reasons. The court found no discretion needed in the Sweetwater policy. The exemptions are provided without inquiry into the motives behind them, and they do not discriminate against religious ones. 

 

If the court had ruled the other way, it might have created a precedent that allows public employees to ignore or disregard inclusive policies simply by appealing to religious beliefs. This could create a slippery slope and lead to inconsistent application of school policies and exemptions. This could ultimately affect a school's effort to create a safe and respectful educational environment for all students. While the Free Exercise Clause protects the right to practice religious beliefs, it does not give an individual the ability to ignore workplace policy and rules that are equally enforced and religiously neutral. 

 

The Willey case shows the continuing conflict between religious freedom and public obligations, especially in public school settings. Accommodating religion in these types of situations is very hard for the court to carefully balance with the rights and the well-being of others. This case ruling did not diminish the importance of religious freedom, but purely reinforced that these liberties can be exercised within the structure of civic responsibilities. When a policy is neutral and fairly applied, the Constitution does not demand a religious exemption. 

 

In the end, the court's decision in Willey v. Sweetwater County School District #1 Board of Trustees provides a great example that the Free Exercise Clause is not about lifting one view over another. It is about ensuring that all are treated equally under the law. 

 

Sources: 

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wyd.63372/gov.uscourts.wyd.63372.80.0.pdf

https://religionclause.blogspot.com/

https://www.sweetwaternow.com/parents-suing-scsd-no-1-for-affirming-students-gender-identity-without-their-consent/

https://clearinghouse.net/case/45143/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213

https://cowboystatedaily.com/2024/10/01/wyoming-parents-suing-over-school-gender-transition-taps-national-expert/