Private Faith and Public Funds: What does Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams Means for the First Amendment

 The Ninth Circuit Court’s decision and the subsequent petition to the Supreme Court for the case of Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams forces the confrontation of a difficult yet important constitutional question: if a religious organization applies for public funding, can the state require it to comply with nondiscrimination rules that might interfere with religious hiring practices? 

Oregon’s Youth Development Division is responsible for administering the Youth Community Investment Grant Program, which is designed to support at-risk youth in order to promote educational success. To be eligible for funding for the program, applicants must certify that they do not discriminate in employment or admission on a variety of protected identities, including religion. 

Youth 71Five Ministries, or 71Five, is a nonprofit Christian ministry whose stated purpose is described as to “teach and share about the life of Jesus Christ.” 71Five primarily runs youth centers, mentoring programs, and other community-oriented services. While it does in fact serve youth regardless of faith, it does require all employees to affirm a “Christian Statement of Faith” and verify that they have active involvement in a local church. For multiple years, Oregon’s YDD provided funding for 71Five’s programs. But after the implementation of the non-discriminatory hiring requirement, the state withdrew its public funding. 71Five then sued the state on the grounds that the withdrawal of the grant violated the Free Exercise Clause and autonomous religious practices. 

The Ninth Circuit Court gave a mixed ruling after deciding on the case. It held that Oregon’s nondiscrimination rule was fundamentally neutral and generally applicable due to the fact that the rule applied to all who apply for public funding. Due to the grant’s rules being applied to both religious and secular institutions, it does not single out any particular religion for biased treatment. The Court also rejected 71Five’s claim of religious autonomy on the basis that ministerial exemptions serve to function as a defense in employment litigation, not as affirmative claims to unconditional public funds. 

Ultimately, the court drew an important line: while Oregon could use conditional grants to enforce nondiscrimination requirements, it could not extend those requirements to 71Five’s privately funded programs. However, the ruling in this case brings up questions regarding expressive association status and unconstitutional conditions.

The strongest issue concerns expressive action and unconstitutional conditions. The Ninth Circuit Court mentioned Boy Scouts of America v. Dale’s ruling that organizations engaged in expressive activity must tailor their membership to support their ultimate purpose and message. 71Five argued that by not requiring active participation in a local church and the affirmation statement, the organization's religious expression might be altered. While the Ninth Circuit agreed in part, it ultimately stuck to its ruling that Oregon’s rule was reasonable and neutral, but any further extension beyond funded initiatives would violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 

71Five also argued that it was excluded because of its religious status, invoking cases that were previously mentioned on this blog, such as Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, which prohibit the state from denying public funds based on religious status. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the differences between cases, establishing that Oregon did not deny 71Five funding because of their religious status, but because of their employment practices. 

Personally, I find that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was very persuasive. In regard to the neutrality of the law, Oregon’s grant framework would also disqualify an atheist group from public funds if it required employees to renounce their belief in a god. The symmetry of the rule supports the court’s ultimate conclusion that the state did not target a religious group in particular. Under the current doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee exemptions from neutral rules to obtain public funding. 

Secondly, obtaining public funding generally carries obligations to the public. When a state grants public funds to serve at-risk youth, there is a legitimate state interest in ensuring that participation in the programs is not religiously cohesive. While I agree that the Constitution protects religious liberty from coercion, it does not guarantee exemptions to public funding based on religion. 

However, the court was correct in limiting the state of Oregon’s authority beyond public grant programs.  If the state could expand its conditional grants on the condition of abandoning its faith-based hiring practices across all operations, it would have significant financial leverage to reshape religious identities. The doctrine previously mentioned of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine exists to prevent that type of government overreach. 

Ultimately, this case illustrates tensions between expanding religious institutions' ability to obtain public funds while maintaining neutral regulations. It will be interesting to see if and when this case is ruled on by the Supreme Court, as public funding surrounding religious institutions continues to be a relatively constant issue being brought up.

See Primary Article & Resources Here

Trueblood v. Valley Cities Counseling and Consultation

Trueblood v. Valley Cities Counseling and Consultation

In the state of Washington, Dorothy Trueblood was terminated from Valley Cities Counseling and Consultation (VCCC) as a 'WISe Program parent partner’ on July 19, 2022. Trueblood, a Christian woman, was hired in 2012 and signed onto VCCC’s Staff principles, acknowledging that they would govern her work. She openly expressed her Christian faith and stated she felt her views were respected until her termination. On June 29, 2022, Trueblood requested workplace accommodations from Human Resources based on ‘religious beliefs and freedom of speech’ to not work with clients with preferred pronouns, not include pronouns in her introductions and email signatures, and to use clients' and coworkers’ names rather than their preferred pronouns.

Trueblood previously expressed to the WISe Program program manager that her religious beliefs conflicted with VCCC’s policies of using clients' and staff’s preferred pronouns. Trueblood and the manager discussed the potential harm that can be done to clients when they’re not referred to properly following inciting incidents with two non-gender-conforming clients. She was informed that Washington regulation 162-32-040 states that intentional misuse of an individual’s name, form of address, or pronouns is prohibited in places of employment and public accommodation. As a result, her accommodations were denied, and her employment was terminated.

VCCC is described as a nonprofit mental healthcare provider that offers support with anxiety, depression, substance use, gender dysphoria, and more, and operates the WISe Program to help with family mental health support. The program stated that youth clients have “complex behavioral health issues, some of which relate to sexual orientation and gender identity.” (Google Scholar) Youth Clients would have a peer or a parent partner, but VCCC stated that the youth is the client at all times, not the parent. VCCC also advised services to accommodate mental health needs with the parental and clients’ consent.

Trueblood was assigned two non-conforming gender youths in 2022. Despite the first client having preferred pronouns, Trueblood told the client’s mother her intention of using their assigned pronouns at birth, which was agreed upon by the client’s mother and a WISe team facilitator, as she was a parent partner and not a peer counselor. The second client’s parent requested that their child’s preferred pronouns be respected due to discrimination against their gender identity, and Trueblood offered to leave the client’s care team, raising her religious beliefs as the reason. Trueblood continued to engage with clients in ways that violated VCCC policies and was told that three out of five accommodations were discriminatory based on gender identity, i.e., using the correct pronouns only when people’s biology matched, but refusing to use preferred pronouns any other time.

While Trueblood claimed to have never refused cooperation with a client or co-worker due to gender identity, VCCC fired her on the basis that employees are required by state and federal laws to abide by gender identity, and refusing to use proper pronouns is discrimination. Trueblood cited that her accommodations stemmed from the freedoms of speech and exercise of religion, but since VCCC is a non-profit, amendments don’t apply in the same manner as a government institution. She denied her termination being a mutual agreement and filed a lawsuit against VCCC, accusing them of failing to accommodate her religion under Title VII, “the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it made good faith efforts to accommodate that employee's religious belief,” unless it would bring about an undue hardship on the employer, and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.

In Groff v. DeJoy, Groff requested Sundays for religious reasons, but USPS continued to schedule him. Groff was disciplined, resigned and then sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the employer forcing other employees to work would not constitute an undue hardship on business, and undue hardship shouldn’t be based on employee animosity or perceived inconvenience towards religious accommodations.

In Trueblood's case, while there was an argument made that VCCC failed to give Trueblood a reasonable accommodation alternative, VCCC argues three of the five accommodations would have caused hardship as it risks violating state and federal laws on gender discrimination, stating that neither Title VII nor the WLAD can accommodate a discriminatory practice. The District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Trueblood’s claim with prejudice.

I agree with the court’s ruling because even though Trueblood sought the protection of the First Amendment, VCCC being a private institution means that it doesn’t apply directly. Trueblood signed off on VCCC's principles, which required staff to accommodate clients’ mental health needs and identities, which she failed to do. Finally, she put undue hardship on VCCC as discrimination based on gender identity in a place of accommodation is a liability for a place that's meant to provide mental health care tailored to individuals of all ethnicities, sexual orientations, religions and gender identities.

The Constitutional Tension: Government Neutrality vs Free Exercise Protection

     In 2020, Colorado voters approved a proposed program that would provide funding for voluntary, universal preschool in the State. The program was later created in 2022, when Colorado's Department of Early Childhood established the “universal” preschool program that allows prekindergartners to have 15 hours of school time per week. The only requirement was compliance with an equal opportunity agreement that prohibited discrimination against students or their families based on race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, or disability. This would guarantee that all children and their families would be free from facing any stigma or discrimination. The program was advertised as universal and was offered to all public, private, and religious institutions on the condition that they agreed to the equal opportunity requirement. Two catholic institutions were excluded from the program due to their refusal of the requirement and brought the case, St. Mary Catholic v. Roy, to court, alleging discrimination in violation of the free exercise and the free speech clauses of the First Amendment.

       Does the equal opportunity requirement, by requiring religious schools to accept policies that conflict with their doctrine, infringe upon the church’s religious exercise? Is the equal opportunity requirement a neutral policy in its effort to provide universal preschool?

       If we refer to previous cases, we can see that decisions vary on what neutrality is when it comes to the church’s rights to religious establishment. In a case like Carson v. Makin, Judges ruled in favor of the families. The government’s requirement was ruled against because it barred families from using funding for any religious institution. The difference between these two cases lies in the restriction it places; in St. Mary Catholic v. Roy, the restriction placed was that funding would not be given without a formal agreement to the equal opportunity requirement. It still allows institutions of both secular and religious backgrounds to apply and get the funding, thus giving a neutral opportunity to all parties. In Makin, the restriction was that no religious institution could be funded at all, and this was an exclusion of religion as a whole. Ultimately, violating the family’s right to free exercise under the First Amendment.

       Similarly, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, Justice Thomas found that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment was clearly created to prohibit laws that discriminate against religion. If the courts found that the state's requirement was an infringement on the church's free exercise clause, then the case would be handled differently. In Comer, the issue held was the states’ singling out religion itself and was ruled unconstitutional. However, in Roy, the law is seen as neutral because it doesn’t single out a specific religious faith or institution. Instead, it is willing to fund all preschools that sign up as long as they agree to the equal opportunity requirement, which many religious and secular schools have done.

        Furthermore, in the Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue case, Judge Ginsburg states that the precedent set by the court established that neutral government action is not unconstitutional solely because it doesn’t benefit religious exercise. This ultimately implies that Judge Ginsburg is conveying that the government does not owe or have to give special benefits, such as allowing exemption from equal opportunity policies, to religion, and as long as a law remains neutral and treats all religions the same, then it is constitutional. The case also found that the government cannot deny public benefits solely because an institution is religious, but is that really what is occurring in this case?

        I believe that the ruling should be in favor of the state, the requirements provided by the state, and the program itself are neutral and do not favor or pressure any religion. The state's actions in this case cannot be seen as targeting religion due to the fact that the separation of church and state in this case is already breached, as they allow all preschools of varying religions to receive funding. The state is not banning religious participation but conditioning funding on compliance with a neutral equal-opportunity policy.

        The focus of the issue is neutrality and the exclusion of one religious group due to an unwillingness to sign the equal opportunity requirement. In the case that it is not a law that the church must agree to the requirement, they can choose not to, but they would have to forfeit receiving the funding. The program presented by Colorado’s DOEC should and does fund all schools, as the program was presented to the community as a universal program. While the exclusion of some churches is upsetting, it has been promulgated that the requirement is necessary to receive funding. 

Crucifix Controversy: Marisol Arroyo-Castro and the Establishment Clause

    Marisol Arroyo-Castro, a teacher from New Britain, Connecticut, was placed on leave by the Consolidated School District of New Britain in mid-December of 2024 after refusing to remove a crucifix displayed near her desk. The school’s vice president claimed he had received complaints from two individuals and asked Arroyo-Castro to move the crucifix under her desk, out of public view. She complied for a day. She was approached again and asked to move it, but refused. The next day, Arroyo-Castro was asked not to come back to the classroom. 

    Arroyo-Castro has been a teacher for 32 years and has had the crucifix up for the last 10 years. She was suspended without pay for two days before being placed on paid administrative leave. According to her legal team, Arroyo-Castro was instructed to remove the crucifix or be charged with insubordination. Her legal team also sent a letter to the school district, “Ms. Castro’s treatment is a clear violation of her constitutional right to freely exercise her faith under the United States Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution," the letter reads. "But the District’s actions also violate several other of Ms. Castro’s constitutional and statutory rights, under both state and federal law.”(Fox News) The school asserts that the display of religion in this way violates the rights of students and parents in the district by incorporating Arroyo-Castro’s personal beliefs into neutral ground–a school. 

    In March of 2025, after months of paid administrative leave, she was sent to work in an administrative office–not the school classroom. Arroyo-Castro felt that the tasks assigned to her in this position were demeaning. She also seemed to compare the display of her crucifix to other staff’s items, “They have pictures of their family, and to me, Jesus is my father,” she said. “Pictures of their dogs. The Patriots sign. The Yankees sign. They even have Christmas trees.” (NY Post) In November of 2025, a federal judge ruled against Arroyo-Castro and upheld the school district’s punishment. The judge based his decision on Arroyo-Castro’s behavior, “...acted pursuant to her official duties when she posted items on the classroom wall that students would see during instructional time. The classroom wall decorations are thus speech pursuant to Ms. Castro’s official duties and subject to the District’s control.”(WFSB) 

    A separate, independent investigation done in September found that in addition to displaying her crucifix, Castro also made religious comments to students like, “I hope papa God helps you with your lies,” or “Go find God.” (WFSB)

    Arroyo-Castro’s legal team believes that the action taken against her by the New Britain school district is a clear contradiction to the precedent set by a similar case ruled on by the Supreme Court in 2022: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. Joseph A. Kennedy of the Bremerton School District sued his school district after being asked not to pray with students during and after football games. Kennedy, a football coach, adopted the practice of praying in the middle of the field after games, and eventually, students began to join him. The school board, nervous that Kennedy’s actions would be seen as violating the separation of church and state, attempted to negotiate with Kennedy to pray privately. Kennedy continued to pray after the game publicly and was put on paid leave by the district superintendent. He did not return to the school. The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 vote, found that the school’s actions violated Kennedy’s First Amendment rights of Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. 

    At the center of this case is the controversial question of whether or not a teacher’s actions in their classroom are protected speech or subject to the school’s control. Since public schools are supposed to remain neutral in all matters concerning religion, the crucifix displayed in a classroom could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular religion. In my opinion, I believe that Arroyo-Castro’s behavior demonstrated a clear violation of school policy in addition to potentially infringing on the rights of her students. Arroyo-Castro was asked first to remove the cross from public view, NOT remove it from her classroom. She purposefully disregarded the request from her supervisor and was suspended. In addition, since the walls of a public school are owned by the school, not Arroyo-Castro, religious objects cannot be displayed in the classroom to the students. Arroyo-Castro was made aware of the Establishment Clause and informed that it does, in fact, extend to teachers as they are employees of the school, and the display of her crucifix on the walls, owned by the Consolidated School District of New Britain, could be perceived as the endorsement of a religion by the district, therefore violating the Establishment Clause. I believe that Arroyo-Castro's actions were in violation of the Establishment Clause, and therefore, the action taken was appropriate. 

 References: 

https://okcfox.com/news/nation-world/connecticut-teacher-on-leave-for-refusing-to-remove-crucifix-from-classroom-marisol-arroyo-castro-consolidated-school-district-of-new-britain

https://nypost.com/2025/08/02/us-news/ct-teacher-put-on-leave-for-refusing-to-remove-crucifix-has-still-not-settled-lawsuit/

https://www.wfsb.com/2025/11/04/federal-judge-rules-against-new-britain-teachers-placed-leave-refusing-remove-crucifix-classroom/

https://www.wfsb.com/2025/09/20/report-released-teacher-put-administrative-leave-having-crucifix-classroom/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-418

https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/supreme-court-case-library/kennedy-v-bremerton-school-district

https://ecf.ctd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025cv0153-88

Testing the Boundaries of “Voluntary” Prayer in Public Schools

    On March 1, 2026, an important deadline looms for public school districts in Texas. A law enacted last year on June 20, 2025, known as Senate Bill 11, orders that school boards must vote on whether to implement a designated period for prayer and religious reading during the school day. While proponents frame these measures as a victory, there has been a unanimous rejection of the bill by San Antonio’s North East Independent School District (NEISD) and New Braunfels ISD, highlighting a constitutional showdown. 

    Texas Senate Bill 11 allows school boards to institute voluntary daily prayer and Bible-reading periods. In order to participate, parents must give their children written consent to participate in prayer or Bible-reading time. This action shifts the burden of religious initiation from the student to the parent. In addition, parents also must waive their right to sue. The law mandates strict physical and auditory separation between students participating in prayer and non-participating students.

    While Texas is the first to impose a hard deadline for implementation, it is not the only state to implement prayer in public schools. Tennessee has introduced a nearly identical bill and Florida is considering a constitutional amendment to allow student-led prayer over loudspeakers. At the federal level, legislation has been introduced to withhold funding from schools who do not adhere to the voluntary prayer. These legislative efforts are an attempt to test the limits of the Supreme Court’s long-standing ban on school sponsored prayer, a precedent established in Engel v. Vitale.

    The primary issue at stake is the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Proponents, such as Tennessee Representative Gino Bulso, argue that the traditional separation of church and state departs from religious liberty. He states that it is the right time to bring prayer back into the public sphere. Proponents view these laws as protecting a student’s right to freely exercise their faith without government interference.

    However, critics of the bill argue that these voluntary prayer periods violate the Establishment Clause by involving the state in religious instruction. Rabbi Gideon Estes notes that there is currently no legal barrier preventing students from praying privately on their own time. Therefore, creating a state-sanctioned period for prayer is a solution for a problem that has yet to exist. The constitutional question at hand is whether a school-organized, school-timed, and school-supervised religious period constitutes state endorsement of religion, even if it is optional.

    In my opinion, while these bills are carefully crafted with voluntary labels and opt-in forms, they fundamentally undermine the principle of church and state separation by introducing a subtle but powerful form of state coercion. 

    The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton, which protected a coach’s right to engage in private prayer, has clearly emboldened these state legislatures. However, in my opinion, there is a vast difference between a coach’s personal devotion and a school board carving out a specific period of time in the academic schedule for religious practices. As Rabbi Michael Schulman noted, when a state institution promotes specific religious behaviors the meaning of voluntary changes greatly. 

    The issue of coercion is important for religious minorities. In a school setting, teachers and coaches hold all authority over students’ grades and lives. If a student chooses to opt-out of the prayer period, they may feel as if they are not remaining in good standing with their teachers. Furthermore, the physical separation required by the Texas bill, effectively segregates the praying students from the non-praying students. This segregation leads to alienation by making students who do not choose to pray feel othered from the rest of students.

    Ultimately, these laws represent an attempt to bring back a Christian-oriented America that the Engel decision dismantled. By inviting the government into the business of organizing religious expression, states such as Texas and Tennessee are threatening the rights of families to instill their own religious beliefs without state coercion or interference. The rejection of these policies by districts like NEISD suggests that even in conservative-leaning states such as Texas, there is a strong historical recognition that religion belongs at home and in places of worship, not state-funded classrooms. As the legal challenges to these laws inevitably arise and move toward the Supreme Court, our truly pluralistic democracy is threatened.

https://www.sacurrent.com/news/san-antonio-news/san-antonios-neisd-and-new-braunfels-isd-both-veto-designated-prayer-time-in-schools/

https://forward.com/news/803668/school-prayer-engel-vitale-supreme-court-tennessee-texas-florida/

Judge Halts the Instillation of Religious Statues on Government Building in Quincy, MA

            In October 2025, a Massachusetts judge ordered the City of Quincy to hold off on the installation of statues of Catholic saints outside their new public safety headquarters. In May, a multifaith group of Quincy, Massachusetts, residents and taxpayers filed a lawsuit in Norfolk Superior Court stating that this project violates the principle of the separation of church and state. More specifically, the lawsuit argues that the placement of these statues on government property violates Article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by imposing religious imagery and symbols upon all of those who work in, visit, or pass by the building. The plaintiffs believe that these proposed statues send a message that the City of Quincy is a Catholic community and excludes non-Catholic citizens and devalues them. The current ruling ensures that the Catholic saint statues of St. Michael Archangel and St. Florian will not be erected while this case proceeds. Additionally, the court has denied the City of Quincy’s right to dismiss the lawsuit. 

Mayor Thomas Koch plans to appeal the decision and believes that the statues are recognized as neutral figures that are not intended to promote or advance a singular religion. Mayor Koch explains that the proposed statues depicting St. Michael the Archangel and St. Florian are recognized as universal symbols of courage and sacrifice in police and firefighter communities. In court, the City’s lawyer acknowledged that the statues have religious connections, but that they are secular icons as well. The City of Quincy has already bought the statues for nearly $1 million, and Mayor Koch continues to stand behind these statues as the case continues to be ongoing.

The main issue present is whether the City of Quincy is allowed to display religious imagery and symbols outside their new public safety headquarters. This case is especially important because it calls into question whether the implementation of these religious statues outside the public safety headquarters in Quincy, Massachusetts, violates the establishment clause in the First Amendment that prohibits the government from establishing religion. Thankfully, this is not an isolated incident, as similar cases have already been resolved, and thus help provide insight into what could transpire in this case against the City of Quincy.

In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky (2005), part of the issue that the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the Ten Commandments displayed in public schools violate the First Amendment’s establishment clause. In a 5-4 majority opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause and that a neutral observer would have concluded that these displays of the Ten Commandments by the government would be perceived as advancing religion. This decision follows the same logic and rationale that the plaintiffs laid out in their lawsuit, that these actions violate the separation of church and state and that the government established religion. 

In Van Orden v. Perry (2005), the issue being examined in the case was whether a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violates the First Amendment’s establishment clause. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol building, and that the monument is more aligned with American tradition and history than its religious connotations. This latter portion of the Court's decision is similar to Mayor Koch’s rationale regarding the proposed statues in Quincy, as he views them as secular icons associated with tradition and history rather than for religious purposes. Ultimately, these two precedents provide strong arguments for both sides in the current case regarding the constitutionality of implementing statues of Catholic saints outside the new public safety headquarters in Quincy, Massachusetts. 

While there are strong arguments and previous precedents that support Mayor Koch and the City of Quincy in their endeavor to erect statues of Catholic saints outside their new public safety headquarters, I side with the plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit against the City of Quincy. I think these statues violate the principle of the separation of church and state because these statues support and promote Catholicism over other religions. This is an instance of a combination of church and state rather than a separation of them. Similar to what was described in the Supreme Court’s opinion in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky (2005), I think a neutral observer would be more likely to associate these statues with their religious connotations rather than their secular connotations. I believe government buildings have an obligation to maintain a neutral image, and that starts with avoiding the implementation of clear religious symbols like St. Michael the Archangel and St. Florian. Hypothetically, if these statues were to be permanently displayed, I think this would lead to a slippery slope of all religious groups clamoring for their own religious statues to be displayed outside the public safety headquarters, which would, in turn, lead to possibly more public money being spent on religious statues and further arguing among groups. In the end, I think Mayor Koch will be left with two very expensive statues that he just spent $1 million on without a place to put them. 

https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/quincy-religious-statue-building-update/3827156/

https://www.aclum.org/press-releases/massachusetts-court-blocks-religious-statues-on-government-building-in-quincy/

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/residents-sue-city-of-quincy-to-stop-plan-for-religious-statues-on-public-building

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1693

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1500

Vaccinations for Online School?

In West Virginia, many public schools are facing challenges mediating the clash of personal religious beliefs with the state compulsory vaccination law (CVL). Last week, Perry v. Marteney appeared in the Fourth Circuit courts in West Virginia to determine if the state has compelling interest to not grant the Perry family a religious exemption from the CVL. Krystle and Anthony Perry sued on behalf of their child, K.P., as administrators of the school unenrolled K.P. for not complying with the state vaccination requirements. K.P. was enrolled in the Upshur County School District as a virtual student, and only ever physically entered the school for test taking purposes. The state of West Virginia’s compulsory vaccine requirement is aimed at protecting students against diseases such as polio, chickenpox, measles, meningitis, and whooping cough. The Perry’s are suing the state on the grounds that the CVL is in contradiction with their free exercise of religion because “using vaccines that scientists researched, tested and developed through the use of aborted fetal cells is at odds with their religious beliefs”. 

The main issue present in this case is whether or not the compulsory vaccination law is generally applicable to all people regardless of their religion, and if it isn’t, if the state still has a compelling interest to enforce the law. The law of compulsory vaccination is applied to all students who go to Upshur County School District, in person or online, so in that way it seems to be neutral. However, the state of West Virginia has made two exceptions: those with medical exemptions, and those who are homeschooled. This is far from the norm, as stated in the brief, as West Virginia has been an outlier in vaccine exceptions, “forty-five states (plus the District of Columbia) currently offer religious exemptions to their school vaccination laws.”

One of the most salient dangers to allowing a religious exemption to the law is the threat to public health. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, measles cases spiked from 285 nationwide in 2024 to 2,255 in 2025.” Stacy Marteney, on behalf of the defense, explains how even if the compulsory state vaccination law infringes on the families religious beliefs, the law can do so because of a greater interest in protecting children from deadly diseases. Above all, parents who send their children to school should not have to worry about their children being exposed to a variety of potentially deadly contagious diseases. Defendants also argue on the basis that medical exceptions are very different from religious ones in that they are oriented directly toward the state's interest in maintaining public health. 

The Perry family believes the law is not applied equally because there are some students who are able to obtain medical exemptions and others who are homeschooled who also do not have to comply with the CVL. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue that based on the precedent set in the Supreme Court decision, Fulton v City of Philadelphia, strict scrutiny should be applied to interpret their free exercise rights. Strict scrutiny means that the judges must show the state has a compelling interest for infringement on religious beliefs and the laws are narrowly tailored toward that interest. According to the West Virginia Legislature, a recent law states that strict scrutiny must be applied if religious rights have been burdened. So in this case, judges would have to provide a convincing argument that K.P. not being vaccinated poses a dangerous threat to the health and well-being of other students. While the state has claimed the vaccination policy is essential for building herd immunity within its schools, the plaintiffs have argued in their appellate brief that online students such as K.P. pose minimal risk to the in-person students saying “infectious diseases do not spread over the internet”. Furthermore, since exemptions to the law have been made on non-religious grounds, there are already students within the school who are unvaccinated that pose a greater risk to spread those diseases than K.P. learning from home. Because the coordinator of Upshur County School District unenrolled K.P. from the school, the parents now face additional indirect burdens of having to find other options to avoid penalties for not sending K.P. to school; homeschooling was not a reasonable option for them.

I believe that due to West Virginia’s medical and homeschooling vaccine exemptions that the law at hand is “facially” neutral, but not generally applicable. If the state allows some students with medical reasons to have an exemption to the law but not others for religious reasons, they are privileging secular interests over religious ones. While the secular interests of public health are of utmost importance, I do not think the court has enough of a compelling interest to argue in favor of K.P.'s vaccination. I think an especially relevant fact that should be considered is how being an online student means there is little opportunity to expose other students. There seems to be no clear and present danger to the public, especially while the state is continuing to allow other non-vaccinated individuals into the school for secular reasons.

John Doe Case & "Ministerial Exception" - Free Exercise of Religion

FACTS: 

    In the case “John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services”,  John Doe (“Doe”) claims that Catholic Relief Services (“CRS”) practiced discrimination based on sexual orientation. Doe claims this discrimination violated the Civil Rights Act, which protects historically oppressed demographics, including sexual orientation. In 2016, Catholic Relief Services hired this employee (anonymously referred to as John Doe) who worked until 2024. Doe was hired as a “Program Data Analyst”, and took additional roles later. Doe only worked on computer systems and managerial roles, rather than preaching Catholic doctrine. From Doe's employment, his same-sex spouse got CRS provided health benefits starting in 2016, as CRS would provide health benefits to its employees’ spouses within the first month of work. However, CRS stopped providing benefits for Doe’s same-sex spouse in 2017. CRS argued that, under the free exercise clause, the organization should have the right to express their faith in defiance of homosexuality by not providing spousal health benefits to Doe’s spouse. However, Doe argues that an employer’s religious exemption only allows discrimination if the employee’s job function directly contributes to religious matters for the organization. This means that, despite how CRS is a religious organization, not every employee is required to be a devout Catholic. Therefore, the ACLU argues that Doe’s employee role did not require Catholic faith, and makes any religious exemption unlawful if used to deprive his same-sex spouse of health benefits. The U.S. District Judges ruled in favor of Doe for his spouse’s entitlement to health benefits.

ISSUE: 

    The issue is: Does the free exercise clause protect CRS’s right to have religious exemption from fulfilling their employer duties toward homosexual employees? Without a religious exemption, CRS legally has to violate their religious condemnation of homosexuality.

PRECEDENTS APPLIED:

    To answer this issue, it is important to know two case precedents. The first case precedent will discuss how the “ministerial exception” allows Churches to discriminate against employees to ensure that their religion survives by being taught by credentialed ministers. Next, the second case will create a definition for a “minister”. CRS’s argument uses the “ministerial exception” of the Civil Rights Act, as the organization argues that Doe’s job function at CRS was religious in nature and therefore CRS had the First Amendment right to discriminate based on the free exercise of the Catholic religion. This rule is meant to be used by religious organizations to only hire their own denomination as clergy: priests can only be hired if they are Christian, rabbis can only be hired if they are Jewish, and imams can only be hired if they are Muslim. In the landmark case “Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC”, a teacher at a religious elementary school was determined to be a "minister" because she taught daily religion classes. Thus, the Hosanna-Tabor case shows that the “ministerial exception” applies to jobs defined as serving a core religious function. 

    The decision in the Hosanna-Tabor case was unanimous, but the Justices would soon find their definitions of “minister” to differ. As such, in the case “Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru”, the definition of “minister” was determined by whether an employee is educating young people in the employing entity’s religious doctrine. Therefore, when applying the “ministerial exception” rule to the case “John Doe v. Catholic Relief Services”, Doe should not be defined as a “minister”. Doe is not a minister because his job function was focused on computer systems (and occasional training employees in computer systems). Overall, Doe’s job did not require educating others on religious doctrine, and so Doe would not be classified as a minister. This is the reason why CRS would not get a religious exemption if this case went to the Supreme Court.

PERSONAL ARGUMENT:

    My argument is that ministers are determined by having official clergy title, training, and specialty in religious preaching. My opinion differs from the case precedent, as my definition of a “minister” is more narrow than the definition in the Morrissey-Berru case. The Morrissey-Berru case establishes that ministers “educate” others in religious doctrine. However, I am concerned about possible arguments that working for a religious organization, even on computer systems, helps organizations with any ultimate “mission” of educating others in religious doctrine. To make sure Doe and other secular job positions are not classified as “ministers”, I agree with the dissenting opinion in the Morrissey-Berru case: “ministers” require substantial religious titles and training, and must be devoutly religious. This would strictly define ministers by their clergy position, as opposed to ministers being defined by any casual aid in teaching religious topics.

When Private Faith and Public Roles Collide

  In 2020, Florida State University was put in the spotlight for a consequential free-speech and religion case. A student named Jack Denton was removed from his position as president of the Student Senate after private messages he sent in a Catholic student group chat were made public and widely criticized.

    Denton, a devout Catholic and an active student leader, had been elected by his peers to run the student senate, which is a position that, at a public university, carries official duties and recognition. In late May 2020, during a GroupMe chat among members of the Catholic Student Union, another student shared a video raising money for different causes, including organizations associated with racial justice. Denton responded by expressing his view that some of those organizations advocated for positions that contradicted what he believed were core Catholic teachings on issues like abortion, gender identity, and the “common good.”

    Although this exchange took place privately, someone took screenshots and shared them outside the chat. Outrage spread quickly on social media and on the FSU campus, and a petition calling for Denton’s removal received thousands of signatures. The student senate initially held a vote of no confidence, which ended up failing; but later voted again and removed Denton as Student Senate President solely because of his remarks. 

    Not satisfied with internal appeals, Denton filed a federal lawsuit against the university and student senate officials, arguing that his removal violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. He claimed that he was punished for expressing deeply held religious beliefs that were unpopular. Federal courts eventually sided with Denton. A judge agreed that his claims were likely to succeed and ordered the university to stop withholding his salary. The student university Supreme Court also ruled that his removal violated his constitutional rights and reinstated him. Florida State later settled the case, compensating Denton and publicly affirming its commitment to students’ First Amendment rights.

    Denton was punished because of what he said, which was religiously and politically motivated. Even though this was private speech, the argument is that public institutions cannot penalize speech just because others find it offensive or disagree with it. If the state, which includes a public university, penalizes someone because of religiously grounded beliefs, that raises a free-exercise concern. 

    The Supreme Court has emphasized that public institutions must protect speech, including religious speech, even when it discomforts others. If student government bodies can remove leaders for speaking on controversial but constitutionally protected topics, then participation in public life will become artificial and less genuine. This issue matters because student governments are a strongly influential part of universities. They are also part of the government structure at public universities, which often work with budgets, influence, and official recognition. If members must hide their beliefs to serve, then it sends a message to students that your voice is acceptable only if it aligns with other people’s beliefs.

    At the heart of the Jack Denton case is a difficult constitutional question that is at the intersection of free exercise of religion, free speech, and state action: Can a public university, acting through its student government, remove an elected official because his religiously motivated speech conflicts with prevailing campus values?

    No, I believe that public universities have a constitutional obligation to protect speech, including religious speech, even when it’s unpopular or uncomfortable. Student governments function as part of state institutions, so they must operate within First Amendment bounds. From a policy perspective, universities should prioritize dialogue and debate over looking to seek out a punishment for it. Our constitutional tradition recognizes that free and open discourse, especially on matters of religion and morality, is central to democratic life. Conditioning student government participation in agreement with particular viewpoints based on other people’s opinions undermines that ideal. 

https://adflegal.org/article/jack-denton-story/

https://www.ewtnnews.com/world/us/catholic-florida-man-sues-university-over-religious-freedom?utm_source=chatgpt.com&redirectedfrom=cna

Can Cities Ban Religious Messaging at a Public Festival?

   David Hoffman and a small group of associates are seeking the ability to share their religious beliefs and literature at the Winterhaven Festival. Every winter, this light festival occurs in the historic Winterhaven neighborhood in Tucson, Arizona. The festival is a popular holiday event that takes place on these public streets and sidewalks. The event is from December 13th to December 27th in the evening. It is open to the public, with no ticket entry fee, and participants can walk through the streets to enjoy food, drinks, and light displays. On the very first day of the festival this year, Saturday, December 13, 2025, David Hoffman and a few of his associates entered the festival to share their religious beliefs, as Christians. The group was not trying to sell anything, ask for donations, or create a disturbance, they were simply there to share their Christian faith. However, Tucson police officers informed Hoffman of the city's solicitation policy, which barred “political, religious, or commercial materials or messaging” (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). Due to this, the officers claimed that the group violated the policy and ordered them to relocate to a fenced-off area outside the festival that was a “Designated Space for Peaceful Messaging and Literature Distribution” (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). If the group failed to comply with the officers, they threatened to arrest them for trespassing, as that was what the solicitation policy demanded as consequence. Hoffman complied with the officers, but he wanted to come back to the festival and continue his preaching the rest of the days and in future years (Hoffman Demand Letter 2025). 

This case involves free speech and implications on the free exercise of religion, but for the purposes of our class, I am focusing on the latter. Many Christians believe that spreading the “word of god” is extremely important to their religious practices. The question is whether the Tucson policy and enforcement on Hoffman put a burden on that religious practice and if the city violated the constitutional right of free religion. Part of the key legal issue is whether the area is public space or private space because courts treat government property differently depending on the type of forum. In this case, the streets and sidewalks of Winterhaven are still considered traditional public forums, where viewpoint-based restrictions are prohibited (Religious Speech and Advertising 2019). Even in cases where the government is able to restrict speech in a nonpublic forum, it still cannot be viewpoint discrimination. This is important because it gives the city no right to control speech based on religion at the Winterhaven festival, especially since it occurs on public streets and sidewalks. 

The Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment requires that the government acts neutral in accordance with religion and the policies that surround it. The policy around solicitations at the Winterhaven Festival may appear to be neutral because it forbids several forms of messaging, not just religious. However, while the policy is facially neutral, it is not neutral in impact. Hoffman was not engaging in casual speech; he was practicing his religion in a way that is important to his faith. Forcing him and his associates to relocate outside of the festival takes away his ability to carry out his religious duties. Meaning, the city is interfering with the practice of their religion in front of the intended audience. In my opinion, this policy is therefore not neutral in its impact on religious communities. When the government is able to interfere with religious exercise, there must be a compelling state interest, and it must be the least restrictive means to achieve that compelling state interest. The Tucson city may argue that this policy against solicitation is necessary for peace at the festival, but in my opinion, the policy and forced removal are not the least restrictive means to achieve this. The city could have addressed these concerns by enforcing rules against harassing attendees, but instead, it imposed a sweeping rule that banned all religious messaging.  

Based on the judicial precedent of religious neutrality and the free exercise clause, I expect that the courts will rule in favor of Hoffman. In my opinion, Tucson’s enforcement against Hoffman is a violation of the free exercise clause in the First Amendment. While regulating solicitation in a public space is okay for cities to do, categorically excluding religion in the public space goes against the Constitution and the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The city’s policy was not used just to regulate disruptive behavior and it instead singled out religious practices. The First Amendment exists to protect religious beliefs, even if they do not align with other people's beliefs. It is the government's role to remain neutral and allow people to participate in their religion without discrimination. 

This case is important because it highlights how religious expression can be viewed as something that is controversial and needs to be regulated, even though the Free Exercise Clause protects religion. The implications to consider if the courts side with the city of Tucson is that this would create a precedent that cities can treat religion unfairly in public events on public property. Meaning, that anything hosted on public space would have the ability to ban religious practices, with the claim of preserving peace. This would especially unfairly impact those whose faith requires public outreach. Allowing this kind of policy would have disproportionate effects on minority groups, as they may be pushed further away from public spaces. If religious expression can be removed from public spaces that are supposed to give citizens equal rights, then the Free Exercise Clause would be much weaker. Due to this, I believe that Tucson’s policy surrounding solicitations during the Winterhaven Festival is unconstitutional and does not reflect neutrality.

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Hoffman-Demand-Letter-12.16.25_Redacted.pdf

https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB10383.html 

After School Satan Club?

    In February 2023, The Satanic Temple (TST), a recognized church and sponsor of various After School Satan Clubs (ASSC) throughout the nation, applied to use the facilities of the Saucon Valley School District (SVSD) for monthly after-school gatherings. Initially, the SVSD approved the TST's use of their facilities, but after immediate backlash and what appeared to be a policy violation, they revoked all access to the ASSC. In response, The Satanic Temple filed suit against the Saucon Valley School District in Pennsylvania due to this direct infringement of their First Amendment rights that explain “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” 

    The Saucon Valley School District has authorized the use of facilities after school hours for various “civic, educational, and recreational activities,” provided that such activities comply with the “Rules and Regulations for the Use of School Building, Facilities, and Equipment” Policy. Various organizations have used and been approved to use the SVSD facilities in the past such as the Good News Club (a Christian group sponsored by a local church and Child Evangelism Fellowship), privately operated sports camps, youth sports associations, the Scouts, Girls on the Run, the Lion’s club, etc. On February 1, 2023, TST applied to sponsor an After School Satan Club at Saucon Valley’s Middle School. It is important to note that TST met all qualifications at that time for the use of District facilities and was approved to hold their monthly ASSC meetings on February 16, 2023. 

    On February 20, 2023, an email was sent to all parents of students in SVSD regarding the opportunity to attend the ASSC with parent permission after school hours, by SVSD Superintendent Vlastly, including important reiterations that the school district does not endorse any groups or content affiliated groups that use their facilities after school hours, and that by law the district cannot discriminate among groups wishing to use their facilities. Soon after this message was sent, the school received a violent message threatening students and staff, referencing the decision of the district to allow the ASSC to meet. This threat was later traced back to a male in North Carolina with no affiliation to TST. Following this threat, the district closed all schools on the evening of the 21st. On the morning of February 22, 2023, the superintendent of Saucon Valley School District sent an email to all district parents stating that the ASSC’s application would be reviewed due to the disruption and threat to safety it had caused. Shortly after this announcement, the SVSD revoked The Satanic Temple's use of school facilities for a policy violation. The school district claimed there was no clear communication that the activities being sponsored are not sponsored by the school district due to the font sizing within the ASSC flyer that stated “our club is operated by The Satanic Temple and we do not operate under any specific school or school district” being too minuscule to read. I note that this school policy provides no specific guidance on what would or would not constitute a violation of the requirement to “clearly communicate that the activities are not being sponsored by the school district.” 

    The Satanic Temple then sued the SVSD in court for violating the First Amendment by denying the club EQUAL access to the school’s facilities, after initially approving them. The delayed exclusion of the ASSC imposed on The Satanic Temples' free exercise rights, as they had already met all criteria (were previously approved), and similar religious groups, such as the Good News Club, were allowed to use district facilities.  TST argued that the district’s decision to revoke facility access for the ASSC effectively allowed public opinion to determine whether or not a religious group could meet, which is referred to as a “heckler’s veto.” Which under the First Amendment “protected speech or religious exercise does not readily give way to a 'heckler’s veto'”. The full outline of this case, in greater detail, is available here. 

On May 1, 2023, the Federal court ordered SVSD to allow the ASSC to meet in district facilities. By November 16, 2023, SVSD settled the lawsuit with TST and agreed to pay $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs to TST’s attorneys. 

    The question I will address concerns the School District's authority to revoke access to the ASSC for a policy violation identified upon review of the TST’s application. Superintendent Vlastly would argue yes, but was this really because of a tiny font, or the backlash and threats received by her and the school district in reaction to this minority religious group, The Satanic Temple? 

    In the case The Satanic Temple V. Saucon Valley School District, I side with The Satanic Temple; the School Board demonstrated unequal treatment of religion within their after-school facilities. If they allow a Christian group, or another group such as the Scouts, to gather on their premises, they must also allow religious or morally grounded organizations to use the space, even if they are in the minority. The First Amendment’s free exercise clause protects this very concept of picking on minority religious groups like The Satanic Temple. This was never an argument about a policy violation; this was an attempt to exclude a minority based on “heckler’s veto.”