Legal Battle Over Illinois End-of-Life Act

    On December 12, 2025, Illinois Governor Jay R. Pritzker signed into law the End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act which was scheduled to take effect on September 12, 2026. The act would legalize physician-assisted dying for terminally ill adults, and the law contained protections for healthcare providers who declined to participate. However, healthcare providers who declined to participate were still required to inform patients about legally available treatments, and either refer them to alternative providers or provide information about where those services could be accessed. The Carmelite Sisters, a Roman Catholic congregation of religious sisters dedicated to caring for the sick and frail elderly nearing the end of their lives, filed a lawsuit against Illinois state officials on September 3, 2026, (just nine days before the law would become active) on the grounds that it violated their First Amendment right to Free Exercise; the Carmelite Sisters state that they reject participation in physician-assisted dying, including referrals, because it directly conflicts with their religious beliefs and mission. The question is now this: Does the End-of-Life Act violate the Carmelite Sisters’ First Amendment right to Free Exercise by requiring them to provide information or referrals for physician-assisted dying despite their religious beliefs prohibiting participation in assisted suicide?

    So far in the legal process, there has only been a formal complaint by the plaintiffs, which initiates the lawsuit, but no complete briefs from either side— other than the facts and early arguments provided by the Carmelite Sisters. Both parties have also agreed to a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing for no penalties to be imposed on the Carmelite Sisters, and also (since there was no contesting by Illinois government officials) no brief with arguments submitted by the defendants. This case is being argued in federal court, meaning that legal precedent affecting federal issues from the Supreme Court will most likely be applied to the decision. With that in mind, the plaintiffs are arguing points that specifically conform to various tests established in the Supreme Court cases Sherbert v. Verner (1963); Employment Division v. Smith (1990); and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993).

    The first argument that the Carmelite Sisters make is that there is a substantial burden being imposed upon them by the law, preventing them from freely exercising their religion and would trigger strict scrutiny. This stems from the precedent in Sherbert, where the Court developed the Sherbert test of strict scrutiny; if there is a perceived substantial burden imposed on a religious group by a law, then the government must demonstrate a compelling state interest in defense of the law. If the government fails to do so, the law is struck down.

    However, the precedent of Sherbert changed in Smith raising the bar at which strict scrutiny may be activated. Although the Carmelite Sisters feel that their religion has been substantially burdened, they must argue that the End-of-Life Act is not a generally-applicable and/or not a neutral law (these two criteria are additions from Smith). This means that they must refute either of the following 1) The law can be broadly applied with few exceptions (general-applicability); and 2) The law has hostile intent or language against religion (neutrality). The Carmelite Sisters argue that because the law has exceptions for certain healthcare providers who object on religious grounds to providing physician-assisted dying themselves (not including a mandate to refer), that this is not generally applicable. In addition, they argue that the law is aggressive towards religion, encouraging a type of “religious gerrymander[ing]” (67). And because it does not meet the criteria, they believe it must be analyzed with strict scrutiny.

    The application of strict scrutiny from Sherbert was adjusted in the ruling of Lukumi, refining a higher standard for governments to prove constitutionality of original laws in the post-Smith era. In Lukumi, the Court majority confirmed that if either general-applicability or neutrality were violated, then strict scrutiny would be applied. The test would require both a compelling state interest and a showing that the law was applied through the least restrictive means possible; the government must prove that a law was implemented in the least burdensome way possible. The Carmelite Sisters claim that the defendants don’t have a compelling state interest and that the government has not “selected the least-restrictive means of furthering any alleged government interest” (66). Hence, they find the Illinois law completely unconstitutional.

    I agree with the Carmelite Sisters that they shouldn’t be compelled to comply with the End-of-Life Act and that the court should rule the law unconstitutional, however, I don’t agree with all aspects of their arguments. Starting with the Smith test of neutral and generally-applicable. They claim that the End-of-Life Act isn’t either neutral or generally-applicable; I disagree on fully committing to the idea that the law was absolutely hostile towards religion. I think this because it made clear attempts to be inclusive in their language to allow for healthcare providers to abstain from administering the program. And if anything, I think the law was intended, and shown in its language, to be neutral. However, I agree with the Carmelite Sisters that the existence of exceptions makes the law not generally-applicable, advancing it to the next tests established by Lukumi. Looking at strict scrutiny, I think that only one half of the test is satisfied; is there a compelling state interest in providing residents of Illinois with the types of healthcare they require, and in giving them control over their own being? I certainly think so. However, I don’t think that the law was narrowly tailored enough to be seen as the least restrictive implementation; why can’t the state operate the referral program instead of pushing it onto religious healthcare providers? Because I think it fails the second half of the test, I believe the court should rule the law unconstitutional. It falls on the Illinois legislature to come up with valid legislation.

Sources:

https://becketfund.org/case/carmelite-sisters-for-the-aged-and-infirm-v-prince/?section=caseDetail

https://becketfund.org/case/carmelite-sisters-for-the-aged-and-infirm-v-prince/?section=caseLegal

https://dockets.justia.com/docket/illinois/ilndce/1:2026cv10665/507202

Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation vs Shellem

 

Supporters hold signs as they gather outside the US Supreme Court on April 30, 2025, ahead of oral arguments in St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond and Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board v. Drummond cases. (ALEX WONG / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / Getty Images via AFP)	Rachel Laser, president and CEO of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, speaks in front of the US Supreme Court with Rep. Jamie Raskin in spring 2022. (Lena J. Moreno/Americans United)

In National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem, the Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to open a public charter school in Oklahoma and receive state funding. The Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board initially rejected the application, relying on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond, which held that faith-based charter schools violate the state constitution and state law. However, because the board explicitly cited religious grounds for its initial denial, it opened itself up to a First Amendment "Free Exercise" lawsuit.

The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty represented the Ben Gamla Foundation in federal district court, arguing that excluding religious organizations from publicly available educational benefits violates the U.S. Constitution. Becket cited recent U.S. Supreme Court precedents—including Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson v. Makin—which established that states cannot deny public funds to institutions solely based on their religious status. Federal District Judge David L. Russell issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the foundation, ruling that Oklahoma's nonsectarian restriction unconstitutionally discriminates against eligible recipients based on religious character.

Note that in the three above cases, the Supreme Court decided :
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017) The Court held that denying a public benefit to an entity based purely on its religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause. 

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020) The Court ruled that once a state decides to provide aid for private education, it cannot discriminate against religious schools or parents solely because of the school’s religious identity. 

Carson v. Makin (2022) The Court held that excluding religious schools from a tuition assistance program violates the Free Exercise Clause. 

Despite the federal court order, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board subsequently voted 4–3 against approving the charter application. In later votes, opposing board members cited non-religious justifications, such as a lack of demonstrated local parental support. Board Chairperson Brian Shellem acknowledged the legal tightrope, noting that the federal injunction prevents discrimination against the school based on its religious identity. Nevertheless, because the initial denial explicitly hinged on religious grounds, the ongoing dispute is positioned to move through the appellate courts and potentially reach the U.S. Supreme Court.

Religion and Constitutional Law

    The Ben Gamla Foundation argues that its proposed curriculum maintains constitutional neutrality. While the school incorporates Hebrew language instruction—a subject deeply intertwined with Jewish culture and religious traditions—the foundation contends this is no different than a Spanish immersion school teaching students about cultural traditions like salsa dancing or historical events like the Spanish Inquisition. From the foundation’s perspective, denying public charter status because of cultural-religious heritage constitutes unlawful discrimination against an organization offering a secular curriculum.

However, this case highlights a deep tension between two foundational principles of First Amendment jurisprudence: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Under recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits state governments from excluding religious individuals or organizations from public benefit programs simply because they are religious. Conversely, the Establishment Clause mandates that government bodies remain neutral and refrain from funding or endorsing religious instruction and practice.

My Response

I agree with the state’s position that public charter schools should not receive public tax dollars if they incorporate religious instruction or identity. Public charter schools operate as publicly funded government actors, and they have a constitutional obligation to remain strictly secular. If Ben Gamla were seeking to operate as a private school, it would be free to integrate religious tradition however it sees fit. But once an institution seeks public funds as a charter school, it must abide by public constitutional standards.

Allowing state funding for religious charter schools introduces two significant constitutional risks:

1. Preserving Government Neutrality: A core foundation of American religious liberty is the separation of church and state. Isolating government funding from religious institutions prevents the state from favoring majority religions or getting itself in doctrinal matters. When the state funds religious education, public tax dollars inevitably support religious indoctrination.
   
   

2. The Slippery Slope of Selective Funding: If the state begins funding charter schools affiliated with one religious tradition, constitutional fairness dictates it must fund all religious organizations. While supporters may advocate for a Jewish or Christian charter school, public sentiment often shifts when considering a charter school focused on Islamic Shariah law or Scientology. The Establishment Clause exists precisely to avoid forcing taxpayers to fund religious practices they may disagree with, and to prevent the government from picking winners and losers among faith traditions.

Ultimately, cases like Ben Gamla demonstrate how the line between public education and private religious exercise is eroding. While recent precedents like Carson v. Makin have expanded Free Exercise protections for private religious choices, extending those principles to state-created charter schools crosses a critical line. Public charter schools are public schools; maintaining their strictly secular character is essential to protecting both religious freedom and public education. 

Bibliography

1. Brumley, Jeff. "Oklahoma Board Rejects Jewish Charter School Application." Baptist News Global, 19 Oct. 2026, baptistnews.com/article/oklahoma-board-rejects-jewish-charter-school-application/.

2. Eger, Andrea. "AG: Third Vote on Jewish Charter School Would Be Illegal." Oklahoma Watch, 22 Oct. 2026, oklahomawatch.org/2026/10/22/ag-third-vote-on-jewish-charter-school-would-be-illegal/. 

3. Elia-Shalev, Asaf. "Jewish School Becomes Battleground in US 'Church-State Separation' Legal Challenge." The Times of Israel, 22 Nov. 2025, www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-school-becomes-battleground-in-church-state-separation-us-supreme-court-challenge/. 

4. Helfand, Michael A. "The Fight for a Jewish Charter School Isn't a Christian Nationalist Plot." Jewish Journal, 29 Apr. 2026, jewishjournal.com/commentary/opinion/388411/the-fight-for-a-jewish-charter-school-isnt-a-christian-nationalist-plot/. 

5. Martinez-Keel, Nuria. "Oklahoma State Board Again Rejects Jewish Charter School in 'Shocking' Vote." Oklahoma Voice, 12 Oct. 2026, oklahomavoice.com/2026/10/12/oklahoma-state-board-again-rejects-jewish-charter-school-in-shocking-vote/. 

6. National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem, No. 5:26-cv-00582-R, doc. 121, W.D. Okla., 24 Sept. 2026. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/securepdfs/2026/09/Ben-Gamla-v.-Shellem-District-Court-Order-9.24.26.pdf. 

7. National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem. No. 5:26-cv-00582-R, 2026 WL 440274 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 24, 2026). FindLaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-w-d-okl/440274.html. 

8. "National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Shellem." The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, becketfund.org/case/national-ben-gamla-jewish-charter-school-foundation-v-shellem/.

9. Wallis, Beth. "Oklahoma Jewish Charter School Secures Win in Federal Court." KOSU, 24 Sept. 2026, www.kosu.org/ben-gamla-federal-court-ruling.

 

Can the Government Take a Holy Mountain?

Every Good Friday, thousands of people climb a rocky trail in Sunland Park, New Mexico, toward a limestone statue of Christ the King that has watched over the border since 1940. About 40,000 pilgrims make the climb each year. Now the federal government wants to build a border wall along the base of the mountain, and the Catholic Church is fighting it. The case raises a question the Supreme Court has never squarely answered: when the government takes a religious community's sacred land, does that burden its religion? I think the answer has to be yes.

The fight over Mount Cristo Rey

In May 2026, the Department of Justice filed an eminent domain action against the

Roman Catholic Diocese of Las Cruces, which owns the mountain. The government wants about 14 acres along the southern base for a 1.3 mile stretch of wall, plus roads, lighting, and cameras. The diocese responded that the taking would substantially burden the religious exercise of the church and the pilgrims who pray there, in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Source NM).

Judge Kenneth Gonzales allowed the government to deposit payment for the land but ruled that the diocese can keep challenging the taking. The government does not doubt the site is sacred or that the church is sincere, but it says construction will sit more than 1,000 feet from the statue and pilgrims can still reach the top. The diocese says access misses the point. As its chancellor put it, a pilgrim at the summit who turns slightly away from Christ the King would find himself staring at a giant "Keep Out" sign. The church also notes that Homeland Security has made room for secular landscapes like Big Bend National Park but not for Mount Cristo Rey. The court has not yet ruled on whether the taking is lawful.

Why this is a hard case

Under the Free Exercise Clause alone, the diocese would struggle. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Court held that a neutral law that applies to everyone is constitutional even if it burdens someone's faith. A border wall is aimed at a gap in the fence, not at Catholics.

But Congress passed RFRA in 1993 to undo Smith, and RFRA still binds the federal government. If a believer shows a "substantial burden," the government must prove it is pursuing a compelling interest by the least restrictive means. Everything turns on that first step.

That step is where sacred land cases go to die. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the Supreme Court let the Forest Service build a road through land sacred to several tribes, even while admitting it could devastate their worship. The Court reasoned that no one was coerced; the government was simply using its own land. In Apache Stronghold v. United States, the Ninth Circuit relied on Lyng to let Oak Flat, an Apache holy site in Arizona, go to a copper mine, and in 2025 the Supreme Court refused to hear the case over a dissent from Justices Gorsuch and Thomas.

Why the diocese should still win

The diocese can win without overturning Lyng, because this case is missing the fact Lyng depended on: government ownership. Here the church owns the land. The government is not managing its property; it is seizing a church's holy site. If that is not a substantial burden, the phrase means almost nothing.

The government's best reply is that worship can continue. But in Holt v. Hobbs (2015), the Court rejected the idea that a burden is insubstantial just because a believer has other ways to practice, and courts may not decide which parts of a faith really matter. For a pilgrim, the climb and the view are part of the prayer.

The strongest worry on the other side is practical. Lyng warned that if every sacred claim could stop a public project, government would grind to a halt, since so much land is sacred to someone. RFRA already answers that. A substantial burden does not end the case; it only forces the government to justify itself. Border security is a compelling interest, but Gonzales v. O Centro (2006) requires the government to justify burdening this particular claimant. That is hard to do on terrain rough enough to watch with cameras and patrols, and harder still when the government has spared Big Bend. Under Tandon v. Newsom (2021) and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021), granting secular interests exemptions it denies to religious ones also suggests the policy is not truly "generally applicable," which could revive the constitutional claim too.

What the case reveals

Even if the diocese wins, the reason should make us uneasy. A victory based on the deed means sacred land is protected when a church holds the title and unprotected when a tribe lost it generations ago, often to the very government now taking land. That is a rule about property, not religious liberty.

The better rule would treat taking or destroying sacred ground as a substantial burden no matter whose name is on the title, and then make the government prove it had no other choice. Mount Cristo Rey is a chance for the courts to start there. The pilgrims climbing this Good Friday deserve that kind of answer, and so did the Apache at Oak Flat.

Sources

Source NM, May 2026

KOB 4, June 2026, and KOB 4, July 2026

Border Report, July 2026

Maryknoll Magazine, July 2026

Cases: Lyng (1988), Smith (1990), O Centro (2006), Holt v. Hobbs (2015), Tandon (2021), Fulton (2021), Apache Stronghold (9th Cir. 2024)

Religious Freedom or Government Support? The Debate Over Christian Charter Schools

Should a religious organization be allowed to run a public school if it wants religion to be part of what students learn? That is the question in Wilberforce Academy of Knoxville v. Knox County Board of Education, a November 2025 Tennessee lawsuit. Wilberforce Academy wants to open a publicly funded charter school with Christianity in the curriculum. However, Tennessee requires charter schools to be nonreligious. Wilberforce argues that this violates the Free Exercise Clause because religious organizations are being denied an opportunity available to other groups. Opponents argue that public money should not support religious instruction. I think both sides have reasonable arguments, but running a school and teaching religion with taxpayer money are different issues.

According to Wilberforce Academy's lawsuit, the school would serve students from kindergarten through eighth grade. Along with normal academic subjects, students would receive Bible instruction, and assemblies would include prayer and Scripture readings. Wilberforce says students from different religious backgrounds would be welcome and would not have to participate in Christian worship. Tennessee's requirements stopped its November 2025 proposal. In May 2026, a federal judge allowed the main claims to continue, although the court had not decided whether the state's restrictions were unconstitutional.

One thing I agree with Wilberforce about is that the government should not automatically exclude an organization just because it is religious. Tennessee allows private nonprofit organizations to operate charter schools, so why should a Christian organization be treated differently if it follows the same rules? I have a hard time seeing how that would be fair. Government neutrality means neither favoring nor discriminating against religion. Tennessee passed a law in May 2026 allowing religiously affiliated private colleges and universities to operate secular charter schools. I think that makes sense because it allows religious organizations to participate without requiring the schools themselves to provide religious instruction.

This case also reminded me of Carson v. Makin (2022). In that case, Maine offered tuition assistance to families who lived in areas without public secondary schools. However, families could not use that money at private schools that provided religious education. The Supreme Court ruled that this violated the Free Exercise Clause. Wilberforce argues that Tennessee is doing something similar by excluding religious education from public funding. At first, this seemed like a convincing comparison. If Maine could not exclude religious schools, why should Tennessee be allowed to? But the more I thought about it, the more I realized the situations are not exactly the same. In Carson, parents were choosing private schools for their children. Wilberforce, on the other hand, wants to operate a public charter school. Even though charter schools are often operated by private organizations, they are still part of the public education system. I think that difference matters quite a bit.

The ACLU and Tennessee parents and taxpayers opposing Wilberforce argue that public charter schools should not promote a particular religion. The organization is not just asking to have Christians operate the school. It wants Christianity to be included in the education students receive. Even if students are not forced to participate in religious worship, public money would still be supporting a school that teaches Christian beliefs. I can understand why people would see that as a problem under the Establishment Clause. There is a difference between allowing religious education and paying for it as part of a public school.

I also think it matters whether the government is providing direct or indirect aid to religion. In Carson, the money went to religious schools because parents independently chose to send their children there. In Wilberforce's case, Tennessee would be approving and funding a public charter school where religious instruction was part of the curriculum. That seems like more direct government involvement to me. I do not think religious organizations should be prevented from receiving public funding altogether. They can run hospitals, charities, and other programs that benefit everyone. But I think the government has more reason to draw a line when the money is being used to teach a particular religion in a public school.

What I keep coming back to is that Wilberforce is really raising two different issues. One is whether a religious organization should be allowed to operate a charter school. The other is whether that school should be allowed to provide religious instruction. I do not think those questions have to have the same answer. If a Christian organization wants to operate a secular charter school, it should have the same opportunity as any other qualified organization. But if it wants to use public funding to teach Christianity, I think Tennessee should be able to say no. The rule would apply to any religion.

In the end, I think Tennessee has the stronger argument when it comes to keeping religious instruction out of public charter schools. Wilberforce makes a good point about religious discrimination, and I would disagree with Tennessee if it excluded organizations solely because of their religious identity. But that does not mean the state should have to pay for religious education in its public schools. I think religious organizations should be treated equally when applying to operate charter schools, while the schools themselves should still be required to provide a secular education. That seems like a fair way to protect religious freedom without having the government become too involved in religion.

Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools

Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools

Kimberly Polk was a substitute teacher for Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland. The school district had a policy that required staff members to address students by their preferred names and pronouns and to keep students' gender identities private unless students gave permission. Polk refused to agree to the policy and requested a religious accommodation. She believed that using pronouns that did not match a student's biological sex would be dishonest and that parents should know about their children's gender identity.

Polk discussed other ways to continue teaching with a school district employee. One option was teaching in certain elementary classrooms with another staff member available for gender identity situations. The school district denied her request and she was not allowed to work as a substitute teacher for the next two school years. In May 2024, Polk filed a lawsuit against the school district arguing that the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. She also stated that the district failed to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This raises the constitutional question in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools: Does requiring a public school teacher to follow a policy that conflicts with her religious beliefs violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The District Court sided with Montgomery County Public Schools and rejected Polk’s First Amendment arguments. One of the things the court looked at was whether the school district’s policy was neutral and generally applicable. This came from Employment Division v. Smith where the Supreme Court decided that a neutral and generally applicable rule can still be constitutional even if it places a burden on someone’s religious practices. The District Court decided that the policy met these requirements because it applied to all school staff members no matter what their religion was. The court also explained that the school district had a legitimate interest in protecting students and following federal law. Because of this, the court decided that requiring Polk to follow the policy did not violate her right to freely exercise her religion, but they did allow Polk's Title VII claim about religious accommodation to continue.

Polk disagreed with the District Court’s decision and appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. She said that the policy forced her to choose between following her Christian beliefs and continuing to work as a substitute teacher. Polk also argued that Employment Division v. Smith should not control her case. The Fourth Circuit explained that lower courts were still required to use Smith unless the Supreme Court overturned it. The court agreed with the District Court that the school district’s policy was neutral and generally applicable for the same reasons. Even though the court recognized that the policy placed a burden on Polk’s religious beliefs it explained that alone did not make the policy unconstitutional. The court also said there were legitimate reasons for the policy, being to follow federal law and for the safety of the children. Another part of Polk’s case was that the policy violated her freedom of speech by requiring her to use certain names and pronouns. The Fourth Circuit explained that teachers do not have the same free speech protections when they are speaking as part of their official job responsibilities and because addressing students was part of Polk’s job as a substitute teacher the court decided that the school district could require her to follow the policy. As a result, the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Polk’s First Amendment claims.

An important Supreme Court precedent to consider in Polk's case is Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a public high school football coach who was punished for praying on the field after games. The Court decided that his prayers were protected by the First Amendment because they were a form of personal religious expression instead of part of his job responsibilities. The Court said that other employees were allowed to engage in personal activities, but Kennedy was not allowed to pray. This relates to Polk's case because both involved free speech with public school employees whose religious beliefs conflicted with their schools' rules. However, Kennedy's prayer was considered personal expression while using students' preferred names and pronouns was part of Polk's responsibilities as a teacher. Also, unlike Kennedy's situation the policy in Polk's case applied to all staff members.

I agree with the Fourth Circuit's decision in this case. I understand that the policy placed a burden on Polk's religious beliefs but, I do not think that automatically means the school district violated her First Amendment rights. Using students' names and pronouns is part of a teacher's responsibilities and I think teachers should be expected to follow school policies when doing their jobs. I also agree with the court that the policy was neutral and generally applicable because all the staff members had to follow it and no one had an exception. The school district also had important reasons for enforcing the policy to protect students' privacy and safety. Polk does have the right to her religious beliefs but, I do not think those beliefs give her the right to be exempt from a policy that applies to everyone especially when making an exception could affect the students she is responsible for teaching.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1136/25-1136-2026-01-28.html

https://www.k-12legalinsights.com/2026/05/when-faith-and-policy-collide-fourth-circuit-upholds-school-districts-gender-identity-guidelines-over-teachers-religious-objections/

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf

https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/supreme-court-case-library/kennedy-v-bremerton-school-district

The Establishment Clause and USDA Emails

In May of 2026, a group of 7 USDA employees along with The National Federation of Federal Employees filed a federal lawsuit against the USDA and the Secretary of Agriculture, Brooke Rollins. They claimed that she violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by including “religious messaging” in work emails. The employees argue that Secretary Rollins' use of religious language in her emails coerce agency employees into feeling like they must conform to her religion. They also claim that this suggests that the agency as well as USDA employees share in the Secretary’s beliefs, proposing a clear establishment of religion in a government agency. The plaintiffs provided copies of her emails that contained religious language in multiple interviews. They stated that she expressed “gratitude towards God” in a Thanksgiving email, wrote that “God gave us the greatest gift possible” referring to the birth of Jesus, and as part of her Easter message said that “Today we celebrate the greatest story ever told, the foundation of our faith, and the abiding hope of all mankind.” They also added that she refused to acknowledge any other holidays other than those that were part of the Christian religion and frequently sent emails they described as proselytizing. 

While Secretary Rollins argues that this is her right, given to her by the First Amendment, the plaintiffs argue that regardless of this right, with her position of power within the government it is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause to send work emails containing religious material that they allege is intended to proselytize employees. The issue presented by this case is: “Is it a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause for Secretary Rollins to send work emails containing material and language that potentially promotes religion as a government employee?” 

I would argue that yes, this is a violation of the Establishment Clause. While I do believe that the government should protect their employees’ rights to the free exercise of religion, I also believe that there should be some regulations on the time and place in which they can do so in order to prevent a potential breach of the Establishment Clause. I think that there is a difference between a government official expressing their personal religious beliefs and an official using their position to endorse and further a certain religion. With this, I think that the actual content of the emails helps me to determine the difference. As Lamb’s Chapel and John Steigerwald v. Center Moriches Union Free School District determines, there is a difference between religious content and a religious viewpoint. Lamb’s Chapel demonstrates that religious expression cannot be denied simply because it reflects a religious viewpoint or lens. This being said, I believe the religious content of the messages, when considered alongside the Secretary’s position and use of government authority, is what distinguishes the case from Lamb’s Chapel. Where Lamb’s Chapel examined the rights of private religious expression, this case examines a government official using her position to promote religious beliefs. Moreover, I believe that the secretary using work emails to promote Christian content, along with her position of authority is what makes her actions unconstitutional. For instance, if the Secretary explained how her life choices and way she does her job are based upon her religious beliefs, then that would be constitutionally permissible because it is her using her religious viewpoints to explain something. It is the fact that she creates a discussion about Christian beliefs and theology and imposes them onto other agents while actively working in an authoritative position within the government that makes what she is doing an establishment of religion. 

Continually, as established in Engel v. Vitale, the power imbalance she holds because of her authoritative position (most notably in government) creates social pressures to conform and follow the religion she is promoting. Specifically in Engel, the majority held that “the people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government.” Although the case involves state-sponsered prayer in public schools, rather than religious content in work emails, I believe the reasoning of the case is relevant. Because of the schools "authority" over the students, the court ruled that there could be pressure to conform and ultimatley an establishment issue. The secretary's position in this case is similar to that of the schools. By being in a position of power, her religious communications to those who recieve them offer an establishment problem becasuse of her nature as a government official, as well as the problem of social pressures. As Secretary Rollins is part of government by compelling her employees to conform through social pressures it is an establishment. More simply, I argue that because there are social pressures to endorse a particular religion based upon what a person of authority within government said in the workplace and because the secretary’s messages constitute promotion of religious beliefs rather than merely personal expression, there is an establishment of religion.

https://clearinghouse.net/case/48278/

https://abcnews.com/US/lawsuit-accuses-secretary-agriculture-proselytizing-employees-emails/story?id=132926896&utm

https://www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1-NFFE-v-USDA.pdf

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/national-federation-of-federal-employees-v-usda/?meta_key=legal_case_search&meta_value=1&utm

https://www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/securepdfs/2026/07/3-26CV04406_DocketEntry_07-22-2026_26.pdf