Chelsey Nelson and the Limits of Free Exercise in Public Business

    In recent years, conflicts between religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws have increasingly appeared in American courts. One case that showcases this tension involves Chelsey Nelson, a wedding photographer in Louisville, Kentucky. Nelson’s story raises an important constitutional question about the limits of the government’s power to regulate businesses when those businesses are connected to religious beliefs and expression.

    Chelsey Nelson runs a small photography business where she primarily photographs weddings. As a Christian, Nelson believes that marriage is a sacred covenant between one man and one woman. Because of this belief, she wanted to operate her business in a way that reflects her faith. She was willing to work with people from many different backgrounds, but she did not want to photograph same-sex wedding ceremonies because she felt that doing so would communicate approval of a view of marriage that contradicts her religious convictions.

    The conflict arose because the city of Louisville has a local law known as the Fairness Ordinance. This law prohibits businesses that are considered public accommodations from denying services on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The ordinance also prevents businesses from publishing statements indicating that they would decline services for those reasons. In other words, Nelson believed that if she publicly explained her religious position on marriage or declined to photograph a same-sex wedding, the city could investigate or penalize her.

    Because of her concerns, Nelson filed a lawsuit challenging the ordinance before any punishment had occurred. She argued that the law violated her First Amendment rights, particularly the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech. According to Nelson, the city’s policy would force her either to create artistic expression that conflicts with her religious beliefs or to remain silent about those beliefs altogether.

    This situation raises several constitutional questions about the meaning and limits of the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has struggled with how to interpret this clause when religious beliefs conflict with generally applicable laws. One important case is Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court ruled that the government cannot burden religious practice without a compelling reason. In that case, the Court sided with a Seventh-day Adventist woman who was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturday, which was her Sabbath. The Court concluded that forcing her to choose between her religious practice and government benefits placed an unconstitutional burden on her faith.

    However, the Court later narrowed this approach in Employment Division v. Smith. In that case, two individuals were denied unemployment benefits after they were fired for using peyote during a Native American religious ceremony. The Court ruled that neutral and generally applicable laws can be enforced even if they incidentally burden religious practices. Allowing religious exemptions from every law would make it difficult for governments to function effectively and create a slippery slope. 

    These precedents show that the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause depends heavily on whether a law is neutral, generally applicable, or specifically burdens religious practice. Nelson’s case falls into this complicated area of constitutional law. The city argues that the ordinance is neutral and applies to all businesses equally. Nelson argues that applying it to her artistic work would force her to act against her faith in a way that burdens her religious exercise.

    In my view, Nelson has the stronger constitutional argument. While anti-discrimination laws serve an important purpose in ensuring equal access to public services, the Constitution still requires the government to respect sincere religious convictions. For Nelson, photography is not a regular commercial service. She uses wedding photography as a form of artistic expression that communicates meaning about an important event. Forcing her to participate in a ceremony that directly contradicts her beliefs places a significant burden on her religious exercise.

    Allowing the government to force individuals to act against their faith in expressive professions could end up weakening the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment. Religious liberty is meant to protect individuals not only in private worship but also in how they live out their beliefs in everyday life. If people must abandon their religious convictions in order to participate in public commerce, then the promise of free exercise starts to dissipate.

    For these reasons, I believe the Constitution should protect Nelson’s ability to operate her business according to her religious beliefs. Protecting religious freedom in cases like this does not mean eliminating anti-discrimination laws altogether. Instead, it means recognizing that in a pluralistic society, the law must allow space for individuals with different moral and religious convictions to coexist while still participating in public life.

https://adflegal.org/article/chelsey-nelson-story/

https://www.fairness.org/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/

Can Secularism Be Defined as a Religion Under the Law?

 In Texas, debate is ongoing regarding what pertains to be “religion” according to the courts and who should be protected by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Current Texas state law allows only certain people to administer wedding ceremonies and sign marriage licenses. These people include “Christian ministers and priests, rabbis, and as well as federal and state judges in Texas”. In McCutchan v. Nicholson, the Center for Inquiry (CFI), a secular humanist group, filed a lawsuit seeking the same legal rights as religious officers to perform wedding ceremonies and sign marriage licenses in Texas. According to the plaintiff, McCutchan, the current criminal penalties in place for anyone who is non-religious discriminates against secular groups. The CFI claimed that their trainees, or as they refer to them “secular celebrants” should be allowed to conduct wedding ceremonies in the same way that religious officials are allowed. The CFI has made it clear that they are in no way a religious organization and in fact quite the opposite, but that nonetheless, their group members should be treated equally under the law. The CFI is based in Amherst NY, and has had prior success in similar aims toward getting their secular celebrants ability to administer marriages in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. 

 The main constitutional question is whether or not the CFI should be allowed to conduct weddings in the same way that religious organizations do. To address this question, it is crucial to consider prior history and how the Supreme Court has determined what qualifies as religion under the law. In Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, he expresses that religion is in part the “the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it”. So from the founding perspective, many felt that to be religious, you must be theistic. Almost two hundred years later, the Supreme Court came up with a more functional definition for religion. In United States v. Seeger, Justices decided that religious protections of the First Amendment encompass theistic and non-theistic beliefs. They determined that despite Seeger not having a traditional belief in God, the role that his belief and practice of religion played in his life constituted a constitutional exemption from military service. 

The CFI argues that the current marriage law in Texas is an example of the government giving preferential treatment to religion. Richard Conn on behalf of the plaintiff argues that “requiring religious affiliation in order to celebrate a marriage in Texas — and imposing criminal penalties on those who would choose otherwise — turns nonbelievers into second-class citizens”. The CFI’s primary argument is that this law violates the Establishment Clause because it fails the Lemon Test: the law has no secular purpose, it endorses/privileges religion over secular interests, and it makes the government excessively entangled in religion. In the district court, the Attorney General actually advocated that under Texas Family Code, the CFI was already a religious group and had access to marriage licensing under the law. However, the CFI disagreed with the Attorney General and assured the court that they are not religious, although they still requested the right as a secular group to solemnize marriages.

The district court in Texas dismissed the case on standing; however, disagreed with the reasoning of the Attorney General and believed that defining the CFI as a religion would set a dangerous precedent by distorting the true meaning of religion. In this particular case, the district court adopted this theistic standard to determine that CFI does not qualify as a religion under the law, disregarding precedents in Seeger and Torcaso which suggest it is possible to have a religion without the traditional worship of a God. The district court also claimed that this is not a matter of privileging religious interests over secular ones because if someone wants to have a secular marriage in the state of Texas, nothing is currently stopping them, it just must be done so by an authorized federal or state judge. The CFI was not satisfied with the district court’s ruling and reasoning and filed an appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where it is currently awaiting a decision. 

The Beckett Organization urged the Fifth Circuit Court through an amicus brief to consider the potential implications of allowing the CFI to be recognized as a religious group. Their primary concern being that if increasingly more secular groups are called “religious organizations” then the term “religion” would become rather meaningless. Then groups like the “Boy Scouts, Sierra Club, Rotary International, Lions Club, or even the Dallas Cowboys” could all technically be “religious”. Furthermore, they point out that CFI does not claim themselves to be religious and is “overtly anti-religious”. In order to safeguard religion and the protections outlined in the First Amendment, Beckett advocates that the Fifth Circuit Court consider the original meaning and history of religion that the Founding Fathers intended. 

Another relevant issue is that of free exercise. The American Humanist Association and the Interfaith Alliance, both advocated through amicus briefs, that the courts consider the implications upholding the district court's ruling that the CFI is not a religion. These two organizations are concerned about the free exercise rights that would be potentially limited for all non-theistic religions if the court denies the CFI. These non-theistic groups include “Buddhists, Hindus, Reconstructionist Jews, and Unitarian Universalists, among others”. As mentioned, the six decade historical precedent set in Seeger demonstrates that non-traditional but still functional religious behaviors deserve the same protections under the Constitution as do theistic religions. The free exercise rights of other non-theistic religions would be at stake if the court rules CFI as non-religious. 

I believe the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should not allow the CFI to perform marriage ceremonies and sign marriage licenses. The Supreme Court case Seeger provides a functional definition for religion that allows for greater protections for non-theistic groups; however, the CFI has repeatedly denied they are a religious organization. Even under the broad definition of non-theistic religion that would grant them the right to solemnize marriages, CFI does not wish to accept a “religious” label. I think courts should only allow secular organizations to solemnize marriages if they are willing to state how their functionality operates similar to religion. Furthermore, I am not convinced that the issue of Establishment of Religion is persuasive enough in this case. The case of neutrality could be made if the state only provided religious weddings; however, they do not. If someone currently wants a non-religious wedding they can do so with a state official.

Mirabelli v. Bonta & Parental Rights - Free Exercise of Religion

 FACTS: 

    In Mirabelli v. Bonta, teacher and parent plaintiffs sued to get an exemption from a California law. This law prevented schools from notifying parents about children's engagement in gender-transition activities. Additionally, this law required schools to use children's preferred names and pronouns, regardless of parental input. The plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirement for student-consent "violated [parental] rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment", as well as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    The District Court provided an injunction that favored these suing plaintiffs. This injunction gave new training directions to state officials, prioritizing parental oversight instead of previously requiring student consent for disclosures.  However, The Ninth Circuit Court challenged this injunction on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause.

ISSUE:

    Does the state violate the Free Exercise Clause with California law requiring a student's consent before state officials disclose gender-transition engagement to parents?

HOLDING:

    The Supreme Court ("SCOTUS") majority opinion held that the Free Exercise Clause protects parental religious exemptions against California law requiring a student's consent for disclosures (of gender-transition engagement).

PRECEDENTS APPLIED:

    The SCOTUS used the "four-factor" test from "Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs. (2021)" ("Alabama"). This Alabama precedent established four factors, and the SCOTUS majority applied the following: Likelihood of success on the merits, Irreparable harm, and Balance of equities.  For the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of all these factors. In regards to likelihood of success on the merits, the SCOTUS majority argues that California law requiring a student's consent for disclosure(s) is likely to substantially interfere with the right of parents to pass their religion onto their children. Thus, the California law is not likely to succeed on the merits of free exercise of religion.

    As established in "Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)" ("Mahmoud"), the SCOTUS deemed that LGBTQ+ storybooks in school without parental consent were sufficiently violative of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the SCOTUS majority argued California's law as greater in violation of the Free Exercise Clause than even the sufficiently violative storybooks from the Mahmoud case. As such, the majority argues the state violates the Free Exercise Clause by requiring a student's consent to disclose gender-transition engagement to parents.

PERSONAL ARGUMENT:

    In contrast, Justice Kagan ("Kagan") has three critiques for the SCOTUS majority's argument: based on their use of the emergency docket, their reasoning, and how the absorption of the parental right to pass religion onto children via the Due Process Clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment) is debatable in nature.

    First, Kagan admonishes the dismissive decision made using the emergency docket, which precluded usual deliberation and discussion of deeper legal questions that were present in this case. Kagan elaborated that many other cases also have plaintiffs' objecting to school policies similar to the California law seen in the case today. However, rather than waiting to process this case or any others, the SCOTUS used the emergency docket poorly to rule out deliberation.

    Next, Kagan argues against the SCOTUS majority reasoning by criticizing the use of the Mahmoud precedent. Kagan addresses the majority's reasoning that California's law "substantially interferes" with the Free Exercise Clause of parents to pass their religion to their children. However, Kagan opposes this use of the Mahmoud decision on the basis that its application is still within infancy, and therefore the precedents' reach has not been refined and/or solidified.

    Finally, Kagan argues the case's deeper legal questions extend beyond a free exercise debate: questioning parental oversight against a child’s own religious exercise. Kagan ponders whether the right to pass their religion to children is merely an implied right within the Due Process Clause, as the parental right is not written, which makes it difficult to recognize as definite legal doctrine. Kagan cites "Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022)" ("Dobbs") to illustrate importance, as Dobbs constrains judges from using their own "personal views" for decisions instead of definite written doctrine.

CONCLUSION:

    I disagree with the SCOTUS majority that parental rights would supersede student agency because I disagree with the application of the Mahmoud precedent. I believe that equating LGBTQ+ storybooks to interpersonal relationships between children and parents is inadequate, and warrants deliberation (precluded by the emergency docket). Although I am skeptical that the Dobbs precedent would weaken parental rights, my opinion still leans towards prioritizing student rights over parental religious exemptions.

    "25A810 Mirabelli v. Bonta (03/02/2024)" :    https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a810_b97d.pdf

    "US Supreme Court blocks California privacy protections for transgender students" : 

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-supreme-court-blocks-california-privacy-protections-transgender-students-2026-03-02/

Texas' New Controversial Bill Allows Chaplains in Schools

 Texas Senate Bill 763 (SB 763) was designed to assist Texas K-12 public and charter schools in staffing their counselor positions. SB 763 allows religious chaplains to provide counseling services and support programs in public and charter schools. A chaplain is a person who provides religiously oriented services for a particular group or organization. These chaplains do not need the same State Board of Educator Certification that school counselors are required to obtain; however they do need to pass background checks to enter the schools. Chaplains are paid via “School Safety Allotment” funds. These funds are intended to be used on things like security and school resource officers, and are now partially being used to pay chaplain salaries.  
There is also a unique aspect of SB 763 that mandates a vote. Schools boards in Texas were required by March 1, 2024, to hold a vote as to whether or not they would allow the chaplain policy in their school districts. The school boards are made up of locally elected officials. The 25 largest school districts, which represent about 1.8 million students, all voted against SB 763, while some of the rural districts did accept this policy. 
SB 763 threatens a violation of the establishment clause, which prohibits the state from establishing a religion. There is a clear case for a violation because the state is sponsoring religious chaplains that are not strictly prohibited from proselytizing to students. However, the argument can be made that this policy fulfills an important state interest, as many of these school districts are understaffed and are compelled to help struggling students. 
Those in favor of SB 763 may reference more recent Supreme Court cases like Kennedy v Bremerton (2022). A high school football coach, Joe Kennedy, was fired for praying with his team after games. This termination was overturned by the Supreme Court. The new standard in this case determined that the establishment clause needs to be understood in terms of  “reference to historical practices and understandings”. As a result, one could reasonably argue the validity of SB 763 due to the fact that chaplains have been a part of the American government for 250 years. Chaplains have been paid to open congressional sessions with prayer since the birth of the nation. 
Opponents of SB 763 argue that the bill creates an establishment of religion due to the allotment of state funds to religiously motivated chaplains. Secondly, the bill creates a lack of neutrality due to its preference for Christianity. The students also potentially do not have a choice as to whether or not they are seen by a chaplain or a school counselor as there is not a requirement to employ both chaplains and secular counselors. A free exercise argument can also be made as students may be coerced into practicing Christianity.
    There is also judicial precedent that can be used to strike down SB 763. In McCollum v. Board of Education the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional to allow the Council on Religious Education to offer religious classes in public schools. Since the Supreme Court ruled that religious instruction is unconstitutional even with parental consent, SB 763 is an even clearer violation of the Establishment Clause because it does not require parental permission at all.
I believe that SB 763 is unconstitutional due to its violation of the establishment clause. SB 763 does not restrict the chaplains in any way from proselytizing to students, making state coercion a genuine possibility. Another very important implication is that this bill results in religious discrimination in hiring practices. A school would be forced to choose between hiring a chaplain or a secular school counselor, resulting in potential religious discrimination if the school is motivated to establish or promote religion. Also, a lack of training requirements for these chaplains creates unequal treatment among hiring practices and hurts those who are qualified counselors. 
    Overall, SB 763 creates a very blurred line between the church and the state. Although chaplains have been paid by the state to read prayers to Congress for nearly 250 years, that is not proselytizing. This historical example is a true example of expression of a tradition, while this bill would be creating something entirely new.

Wedding Cakes and Constitutional Challenges

California Civil Rights Department V. Cathy’s Creations

In California, there are lingering conflicts between religious freedom and anti-discrimination laws. Cathy’s Creations, Inc, known to California residents as Tastries Bakery, found itself in a complex dispute after refusing to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple. In this case, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Unruh Civil Rights Act interact, creating much debate in the ongoing dispute between the California Civil Rights Department and Cathy’s Creations, Inc. 

In August of 2017, Eileen Rodriguez-Del Rio and Mireya Rodriguez-Del Rio visited Tastries Bakery in Bakersfield, California, hoping to order a custom cake for their wedding, as their search for a cake at other bakeries had been unsuccessful. After being set up with an employer at Tastries Bakery, the same-sex couple met with the bakery owner, Cathy Miller, to discuss details of their cake. Miller then declined their request to order a custom wedding cake because she believed that creating a cake to represent marriage between a same-sex couple would violate her profound Christian beliefs about marriage. Miller mentioned that the bakery does serve LGBTQ customers regularly, but draws a line when it comes to selling ordinary baked goods and designing a cake that is made uniquely to celebrate a same-sex ceremony. Miller then provided a nearby bakery, Gimme Some Sugar, as a referral bakery that could accommodate the same-sex couples' needs (Rio had already attended and was dissatisfied with). The couple then filed a complaint with the California Department of Civil Rights, alleging that the refusal to serve them constituted unlawful discrimination in direct violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act requires businesses open to the public to provide equal service to customers regardless of characteristics such as race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. 

The issue in these cases concerns whether enforcing UCRA against Tasties Bakery would constitute a direct violation of Miller’s constitutional right to free exercise under the First Amendment. Miller argues that designing and creating a custom wedding cake is an expressive act that communicates approval of the specific marriage it is made for. Cathy Miller is a devout Christian and has created Tastries Bakery to reflect that, as “she believes that Tastries is God’s business, and that she and her husband work in service to God” by playing Christian music in the store and adding Bible verses to their business cards. Forcing her to create a cake of this nature would interfere with her religious convictions, as within the bakery's policy that will not make a cake in which a “Request(s) that violate fundamental Christian principals [sic]; wedding cakes must not contradict God’s sacrament of marriage between a man and a woman”. 

However, the CCRD argues that all businesses open to the public at large must comply with the anti-discrimination laws in effect in UCRA. The state contends that allowing a religious exemption in a situation like the one at hand would ultimately undermine civil rights protections, leading to a slippery slope and allowing businesses to refuse service based on pure personal beliefs. CCRD views Tastries Bakery’s refusal to serve the same-sex couple not as a protected religious expression but as a direct discrimination in commerical marketplace. 

When analyzing this case, and where to fall in opinion, we can look back to another case involving wedding services and religious objections similar to California Civil Rights Department V. Cathy’s Creations d/b/a Tastrie. In 2017, Masterpiece Cakeshop V. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court ruled on a VERY similar issue regarding a same-sex couple being refused service at Masterpiece Cakeshop because of the owner, Phillips, religious obligations. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop because the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had shown hostility and made inappropriate comments toward Phillips' beliefs, thereby violating the neutral religious treatment guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court acknowledges that at the time when Phillips refused service to the same-sex couple was in 2012, when same-sex marriage laws were more unsettled before important cases such as United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). However, the court did not rule on whether businesses have constitutional rights to refuse such services based on religious convictions. This case then now rests between two important principles. Should Tastries be exempted from anti-discrimination laws in protection of their First Amendment right, specifically the Free Exercise Clause? Or is the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in public commerce, like UCRA, more compelling in the state's interest? 

In my view of this case, I believe the court will side with California. United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges established the precedent that all states must accept same-sex marriage and provide equal treatment to such. When Masterpiece V. Colorado was decided, the idea of same-sex marriage was not as settled and legalized as it is now in 2026.  UCRA’s anti-discrimination laws, as well as the cases mentioned above, proved enough reason and support to enforce that Tastries Bakery cannot refuse a potential client solely based on their sexual orientation. Although Tastries does provide an alternative bakery option, it is not a minimal burden, especially since the same-sex couple had already consulted and disagreed with the flavors of the cakes provided by Gimme Some Sugar. As for the bakery's defense of expression and artistic creation of the cake being a violation of their religious obligations, the cake design (shown below) is one that has been created many times for wedding cakes with a man and a woman, as it is a popular design for the company. 

If the court were to rule in favor of Tastries Bakery, however, I would not be surprised either. The bakery has gone out of its way to display its deep religious beliefs throughout its store. By playing Christian music, displaying Bible verses, and other religious symbols throughout the store, the Millers have a right to refuse not only to create, but to set up and attend the presence of a same-sex marriage to which the burden on their religious beliefs would be substantial. Tastries has been successful in serving various LGBTQ members at their bakery, so a reasonable person could say this is not a full exemption or a violation of anti-discrimination laws. The Millers are only refusing service for a self-designed wedding cake that directly conflicts with their beliefs. 

Resources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/california-civil-rights-department-v-cathys-creations-dba-tastries

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/644/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-307

 

Loffman v. California Department of Education

 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federally funded program that was created to ensure that students with disabilities receive a free public education that is appropriate for their needs. The funding from this pays for resources that are essential to the student's ability to learn, like assistive technology, staff training, special education programs, etc. Additionally, IDEA pays for students to be placed in private schools when public schools can not meet their needs. California also allows this, but with a restriction. They have a limitation in place that says only nonsectarian private schools can participate in this, meaning religious schools are not allowed to participate in the program. 

In the case of Loffman v. California Department of Education, Orthodox Jewish parents and schools argue that the limitation in California unconstitutionally discriminates against religion. They made the claim that not allowing religious schools to receive IDEA benefits makes families choose between receiving adequate services for their children and their religious obligations. In some cases, it forces families to move to a different state in order to satisfy both needs. They argue that California’s requirement that only nonsectarian private schools can receive special‑education funding violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by directly burdening religious families who want their children placed in religious schools. 

In the federal district court, they dismissed the lawsuit in August of 2023. Their reasoning reflected concerns that have to do with the Establishment Clause and how the government should not fund religious institutions. They said that IDEA was meant to aid public education and that California is not required to aid religious private schools; therefore, this did not qualify as discrimination. The court also said that the plaintiffs must show that they have been actually harmed, meaning they tried to use the program, and California’s rule blocked them. Due to these reasons, the court dismissed the case and denied the plaintiff's request. 

The plaintiffs appealed to the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled in their favor. The appeals court said that the Jewish parents and schools were in danger of being discriminated against due to their religion and ruled that the case should move forward. They pointed to several other cases that set precedent for this issue, including Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson v. Makin. In all of these cases, the Supreme Court protected religious institutions under the Free Exercise Clause and held that governmental public benefit programs can not exclude religion solely due to the fact that they are religious. According to the precedent set, they said that California would violate the Constitution due to its rule because it treats religious schools differently than other secular private schools.

The central question in the case is whether California’s requirement that only nonsectarian private schools can receive special‑education funding violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by directly burdening religious families who want their children placed in religious schools. The major discrepancy between the original district ruling and the Ninth Circuit is the question of if it is okay to treat public funding based on status, if it is constitutional for other private schools to receive public funding but exclude religious schools. In my opinion, when the District Court re-reviews the case, they should consider what the Ninth Circuit said and use their logic. The state of California already allows public funds to be used in private schools, so there is no issue surrounding whether this money should only be used in public schools. Additionally, the rule that only religious schools can not use public funding is not one that is being applied throughout the country with the IDEA program. The precedent set by the previous cases clearly highlights how, once a state makes a decision to include private schools, excluding religious schools is discrimination that violates the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court also made the claim that the plaintiffs have not been harmed yet; however, this is not logical as the group would inevitably be harmed if the current law were applied to them. The case also addresses the tension between protecting religious freedom and maintaining a separation of church and state. I agree with the cases used in precedent that Establishment concerns can not be used to justify excluding religions from neutral public benefit programs when the government makes the program available to other private organizations. Allowing religious groups to participate in a neutral public program is not the same thing as endorsing religion. Not allowing disabled students to benefit from the IDEA program just because they have a religious obligation that they believe in would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9_o_yTnSMs 

https://becketfund.org/case/loffman-v-california-department-of-education/

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20230809213959/2023-08-09-50-Order.pdf

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20241029175056/Loffman-9CA-Opinion.pdf)

More Than A Zoning Permit: The Case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett

The case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett, filed in July of 2025, presents a significant constitutional question regarding whether a zoning ordinance violates the US Constitution’s First Amendment Free Exercise Clause when its land use regulation process gives preferential treatment to like-minded organizations based solely on their religious affiliations. The case is an intersection between local municipal powers and constitutional protections pertaining to religious minorities. 

After the Barlett Muslium Society was denied a special use permit necessary to establish a mosque, the American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee filed a lawsuit against the city of Bartlett, a suburban area south of Memphis, TN. According to multiple news sources, as well as court filed pleadings and exhibits, this particular Muslim group is attempting to acquire land to convert into a worship facility, but utilizing the property for its intended religious purpose is specifically prohibited based upon existing local zoning protocols. Such protocols prohibit the existence of religious institutions until permission has been granted through an application process requiring local governmental review and approval.

The Society claims that many of the comments made towards them during the public hearings were anti-Muslim and islamophobic in nature rather than feedback solely regarding land use issues. The city did deny the application for the mosque’s building permit. According to the Society, the way that the city treated other Christian churches with respect to zoning permit applications was far less resistant and hostile. The ACLU of Tennessee has now filed suit in federal court against the city for violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Federal RLUIPA. According to Azya Thornton in the TBA Law Blog, "mosque officials have met permit requirements, including conducting a traffic study have showed no adverse impact." The city still argues that its decision to deny the Muslim Society's permit request was strictly based on legitimate zoning considerations, such as traffic patterns, compatibility with surrounding uses, and ability to accommodate the demand for additional infrastructure. 

Comparative analysis is critical in considering free exercise violations. In this case, the most compelling method is to compare the experiences of other religious organizations in the area with the permit obtainment process. What I feel is most controversial is how many times across the US there have been outright prejudice against Muslims during public hearings regarding construction of mosques, and whether local officials can truly separate their decisions from any possible prejudice. 

To determine if the Free Exercise Clause has been violated, the key question is whether the city’s decision to deny the mosque a permit was in fact neutral, general application of scrutiny, or whether it was discriminatory against Islam. For example, if the city allowed Christian churches to build under the same zoning regulations, but denied a Muslim house of worship, the unequal treatment would be evidence that the clause was violated. In addition to prohibiting the governmental endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from being “hostile” towards any religion (or lack thereof). Thus, if a municipality were to deny a mosque permit due to anti-Muslim values, not only is that a breach of the free exercise of religion, it violates the principle that the government must act neutrally towards all religions.The other law implicated by this case is RLUIPA, which is a federal statute enacted in 2000 to address the concern that local land use regulation was unnecessarily burdening religious entities. RLUIPA prohibits the land use regulation of religious entities, as such regulations impose a "substantial burden" on citizens’ religious exercise unless the government can demonstrate that it is advancing a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means possible.

The importance of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett stems from the fact that the case deals with religious minorities. Historically, disputes regarding land use for mosques have highlighted community bias against them. The First Amendment’s guarantees become most vital when they are used to protect unwelcome or generally marginalized religions. The true test of religious freedom is when the government seeks to protect the most vulnerable, not just the majority.

I believe this case ultimately illustrates the reality of religious freedom in America. Religious freedom is not only the right to faith, but also the right to assemble and build community structures for one’s faith. If local governments use discretionary zoning powers to prevent religious minorities from establishing places of worship, then any and all constitutional guarantees are meaningless.The courts have an obligation under the Constitution to maintain neutrality and apply appropriate judicial scrutiny. If evidence implies that the Muslim Society was denied a zoning permit on the basis of unequal treatment, the refusal must be nullified under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA. In judging whether the zoning denial is a constitutional infringement, the courts should evaluate the objective evidence carefully. For example, did the conducted traffic studies provide adaquate evidence? Were there conditions on other religious places? Were previous practices followed with respect to permit denials?

Case: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/tennessee/tnwdce/2:2025cv02746/106916

Other Sources: 

https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/07/29/aclu-tennessee-sues-city-of-bartlett-for-blocking-mosque-project/

https://www.tba.org/?pg=LawBlog&blAction=showEntry&blogEntry=128836

Apache Stronghold v. United States

 In 2013, the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act was authorized to convert thousands of acres of Federal Tonto National Forest Land to Resolution Copper. The project plan was to construct and operate a world-class mine to deliver sustainable benefits to the community. While promising significant communal and economic benefits, the destruction of the sacred Oak Flat area is of much concern to the Apache people. The Apache are a group of Native American tribes, indigenous to the southwestern states of the US and Northern Mexico. They are considered Native Americans with distinct culture, language, traditions, and rituals surviving in desert-like areas. Oak Flat is located in Pinal County, roughly 40 miles from Phoenix in the Tonto National Forest. The Land is Sacred to Native Americans from the San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation and many other Arizona tribes. Oak Flat is a sacred site where the Apache Tribe go to worship, pray, and administer religious ceremonies. Apache Stronghold, an organization that represents the Apache Tribe, claimed that the transfer of the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper violated the members’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), and a treaty established between the United States and the Apaches in 1852.

Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to override the Supreme Court decision in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) to provide further protection under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the Oregon state agency denied unemployment benefits to two Native Americans who were released from drug counselling jobs because they tested positive for peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. The two men consumed the drug at a Native American religious ceremony as a religious sacrament during prayer. As part of their religion, peyote is seen as medicine for healing rather than a substance for drug use. Justice Antonin, writing for the majority, decided that “generally applicable religious-neutral criminal laws” do not violate the free exercise rights of individuals. The RFRA mandated that the court use strict scrutiny when examining laws that substantially affect religious freedom. After City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the court decided to overturn the provisions of the RFRA as it applied to the States. On a Federal level, though, the RFRA remains constitutional. Federally, the RFRA “Prohibits any agency, department, or official of the United States or any State from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that the government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: furthers a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

Similar to Apache Stronghold v United States, in 1988, the United States Forest Service wanted to pave a roadway that would occupy the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Park in California. They also considered timber harvesting in the area as well. It was well known that the land was historically significant to Native Americans who held religious rituals on the land, and still, the Forest Service decided to pave a roadway. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the court held that incidental effects of government land use, even if they destroy a religious group's ability to practice their religion, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless the government coerces individuals of the group to go against their beliefs. The Apache Stronghold made three claims for their case. The first failed under the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lyng case, as the case details are very similar. The court recognized that the government's actions with public land would interfere with religious privacy and the ability to seek satisfaction as it relates to their religious beliefs, but the government did not coerce anyone into acting contrary to their beliefs. Also similar to Lyng, the transfer of Oak Flat to mining grounds did not discriminate against the Apache Tribe or Stronghold members, nor did it deny them any rights or privileges received by other citizens. The second, regarding the RFRA, was denied as well because the interference with land is not considered a substantial burden to the Tribe. And lastly, claiming the 1852 treaty failed as well. Apache Stronghold claimed that the treaty created an enforceable trust obligation that the interference of land would violate, but the government’s obligation to transfer Oak Flat repealed any opposing treaty obligations. 

This case should be addressed with Lyng as precedent; therefore, the government has the right to convert the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper. Lyng established that although government action may destroy the group's ability to exercise their belief on sacred soil, the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment is not violated unless coercion is involved. Unfortunately, the Apache people will have to relocate and find another place of worship after years of enjoying this sacred land, but they are not protected under the Free Exercise Clause, the Treaty of 1852, nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. This case is much different from what we have seen so far this semester, but looking into Free Exercise rights as it relates to historical sacred land and government enforcement sparked my interest, so I decided to do some research. I am excited to see if the class has any thoughtful responses or comments. Final Question: Does the government's authorization to convert acres of sacred land into a copper mine violate the Free Exercise Clause?

Resources

https://narf.org/apache-oak-flat/#:~:text=The%20process%20would%20destroy%20all,compelled%20to%20join%20the%20brief

https://narf.org/cases/apache-oak-flat/ 

https://www.firstnations.org/stories/apache-stronghold-v-united-states-the-ongoing-battle-to-save-a-sacred-apache-site/ 

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/religious-freedom-restoration-act-of-1993/ 

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/439/

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/03/01/21-15295.pdf