In the Spring of 2019, Mayor De Blasio of New York City began addressing the recent outbreaks of measles, a highly contagious and sometimes deadly disease, by placing vaccination requirements in multiple neighborhoods. The outbreaks had resulted in 329 infections, 25 hospitalizations, and six patients in intensive care. Concerned for the health and safety of his city, Mayor De Blasio urged individuals to update their vaccinations against the disease, ultimately releasing a mandate requiring the MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella) vaccination.
Many of the outbreaks in the NYC area seemed to stem from the large Orthodox Jewish community and their low levels of vaccination. The community had suffered disproportionately from outbreaks of other infectious, yet preventable, diseases like chickenpox and pertussis in the past, and was known to have lower vaccination rates among their young populations. While in the interest of health, the mandatory vaccination statute was problematic within the ultra-Orthodox community, as certain individuals claimed religious exemption to the requirement. Such individuals explained that it goes against the biblical teachings of their religion to endanger their children, and cited unsubstantiated accounts of side effects and a scientifically disproven link of the MMR vaccine to the development of autism as reasons why vaccinating their children would place them in harm’s way.
An overwhelming portion of Orthodox leadership, however, supported and encouraged vaccinations, explaining that placing your children at risk to contract a deadly illness was the true endangerment. Rabbi David Niederman stated, “From a religious point of view, people have to vaccinate...Anything that causes harm— you have to do whatever you can to [avoid] that.” Consistent with the suggestions of religious leadership, most of the Orthodox community had no objections to vaccinating their children and had already met the state requirements prior to the mandate.
Therefore the question arises from this case of whether mandatory vaccinations infringe upon the free exercise rights of certain members of the Orthodox faith given by the First Amendment despite the inconsistencies among the religious institution.
It is clear that there is a compelling state interest in requiring all individuals to be vaccinated against measles. The disease has had detrimental effects on the community in the past, including death, and its highly contagious nature makes it a continual threat to the health and safety of New York City. However, despite such a compelling interest, the state is not entitled to permanently infringe upon the free exercise rights of those individuals who cite vaccinations as conflicting with their religious beliefs. The health and safety of society may be considered a strong justification for partial or temporary restriction of free exercise, but it is not sufficient to justify a complete and irreversible breach of religious liberty. Unlike the recent case heard by the Supreme Court, South Bay United Pentacostal Church et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, et al, which decided that “although California’s [COVID-19] guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the free exercise clause of the First Amendment”, the forced vaccination proposed by Mayor De Blasio is in direct conflict with certain individuals’ religious practice. The directly conflicting and irreversible nature of vaccinations therefore make the state mandate an unconstitutional infringement upon the free exercise clause.
Though the portion of Orthodox individuals who have rejected vaccinations is very small compared to the rest of their community, and the fact that the Orthodox leaders have plainly stated that religion requires compliance with the city’s mandate suggest that the religious objections to vaccinations are false, the application of First Amendment religious liberties cannot be dependent on the supposed verity of religious beliefs. As established in United States v. Ballard, “when the triers of fact undertake [the task of finding the truth or falsity of religious doctrine], they enter a forbidden domain” (Muñoz). Thus, the difference in religious interpretation between those Orthodox individuals who refuse vaccinations and the rest of their religious community is insignificant to the question of whether or not free exercise is being encroached upon.
All that considered, many individuals, including those of the Orthodox tradition, invoke a reasoning to object to the vaccine mandate that is not founded in religious principle. In these cases it does not follow that they should be granted exemption from the requirement. Similar to United States v. Seeger, in which the court upheld that “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely a personal moral code” (Muñoz) does not grant conscientious objector status from a program meant to benefit the safety of the common good, non-religious and personal beliefs about the potential dangers of vaccines cannot justify exemption from the mandate. While a religious objection to vaccinations is protected under the free exercise clause, the state interest in protecting the health and safety of the community is sufficient to overpower secular objections that are not specifically protected.
Unfortunately, providing religious exemption could potentially allow for non-religiously motivated objectors to fraudulently use religion to receive exemption from the mandatory vaccinations. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such fraud would be likely to occur, as only 0.25 percent of students in New York public schools and 2 percent of students attending Orthodox private schools have claimed religious exemptions. To permanently and directly infringe upon the free exercise rights of members of a community only to avoid an unlikely misuse of religious exemptions is unjustifiable. While the vaccination mandate serves the interest of the state to maintain a safe and healthy community, it is within the free exercise rights of individuals with religious reasoning to receive exemption from such a requirement.
3 comments:
While I agree with your assessment in this case I believe more consideration should have been given to one point. In the end of the second to last paragraph you contrast religious and secular objections to mandatory vaccinations. I believe this distinction is not one that can be easily made, and contributes to your reasoning in this case.
I strongly agree that there will be groups of people who claim religious exemption when they are simply manipulating the system to avoid a vaccine. This scenario can be true for many situations. The issue arises of whether or not the government has authority to say whether a religious practice is legitimate. It is certainly clear that the government knows there are some religions that are established and others that are not. That is why they use the term "an establishment of religion" in the First Amendment. If we find a legitimate religious practice of avoiding vaccines does protecting that religious practice outweigh the public good? I would argue that protecting the religious freedom in this case would outweigh the argument for a mandatory vaccination.
I agree with your appraisal of the issue. Going off Ryan's argument, the question revolves around if the plaintiffs have a valid religious objection to the vaccination and if so, if they are entitled to practicing this conviction. Although the plaintiffs argue that the vaccination policy breaches their Free Exercise, it becomes a question as to if they should be exempt from this mandate. I believe that the court will use US. v. Seeger as precedent and declare the mandate to be constitutional, since the program is intended to protect public health. Furthermore, although the state can't regulate a person's beliefs, they can regulate their actions.
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