Monday, September 21, 2020

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski- Appropriate restriction or ban on religious beliefs?

In July of 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam attended Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC) in Lawrenceville, Georgia. While attending GGC, Uzuegbunam began the process of disseminating information about his religious beliefs in the form of leaflets in a plaza on GGC’s campus. He was then stopped by one of the defendants, Shenna Perry, who was a Campus Safety and Security Officer for GGC, who informed him that he was not allowed to distribute his religious materials in that specific location. After being stopped and inquiring further about why he could not spread his materials, he was instructed by Catherine Downey, who served as the Head of Access Services and Information commons at GGC, that he was not allowed to distribute any written material outside of GGC’s speech areas. These speech areas required a reservation before use, represented less than 1% of campus, and was only open for 10% of the week.

After receiving this information, Uzuegbunam made three separate reservations for the speech areas in August of 2016. On one of the days that Uzuegbunam had reserved, he was stopped by Corey Hughes, a Lieutenant for the Campus Police, because they had received complaints about Uzuegbunam’s expression of his religious beliefs. Specifically, Uzuegbunam was told that his speech was considered disorderly conduct because it “he continued to speak, he would be subject to prosecution for knowingly breaking GGC was disturbing the peace and tranquility of individuals in the area” and in violation of GGC’s policy. He was informed that if policy. He then stopped speaking publicly, handing out literature, and left the area.

There were two specific policies in place when the event occurred. The first was the Prior Speech Zone Policy which confined public speech to the permitted speech areas on campus. As mentioned before, these areas required reservation and permission from university officials and were only open for a limited time during the week. The second policy was the Prior Speech Code Policy, which prohibited any behavior that could be construed as “disorderly” and disturbed the peace of individuals on campus.

Uzuegbunam filed a complaint against Georgia Gwinnett College arguing that both the Prior Speech Zone Policy and the Prior Speech code policies were both violations of his first amendment right to free speech and first amendment right to exercise his religious beliefs. After receiving the complaint, GGC amended their Prior Speech Zone and Prior Speech Zone policies. These changes included expanding access to speech zones with the creation of two new “public forums”, expand the times that these areas are available, as well as prohibit any GGC officials from denying a reservation request based on the “content or viewpoint of the expression”.

After reviewing the facts of the case, the district court in Georgia sided with the defendants in saying that GGCs policies did not violate Uzuegbunam’s rights to freedom of speech nor his right to freely exercise his religion. He appealed and the 11th circuit court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. This case was granted a writ of certiorari is now pending oral arguments in front of the Supreme Court. More information about this case can be found here.

After reviewing the facts of the case on my own I have developed my own opinion on the case and will pose questions at the end of my analysis that may encourage you to develop your own opinion.
The fact that GGC has taken it upon themselves to implement their own version of time place and manner restrictions, as the Supreme Court has given states the power to do (see Cox v. New Hampshire), is not up for debate. It is reasonable to expect that an academic institution would take steps to ensure that any speech that happens on their campus, regardless of content, does not disrupt the primary purpose of that institution which is to educate their students. Once they amended their policies, GGC showed that they were making an attempt to expand access to public forums so that more people could share their beliefs in a public manner. Looking through this lens, the Prior Speech Zone policy is not a violation of the first amendment right to freedom of speech or free exercise of religion. The freedom to exercise your religion does not also give you the freedom to impose that exercise on others in a public setting.

As it is within the purview of the university to establish time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, it is my position that as long as someone makes a good faith effort to make sure their speech fits within these restrictions, they should be allowed to express that speech. When reserving the speech-area, all applicants are required to also submit any written materials that they plan to distribute or read from. This gives the Campus Police, Access Services, and anyone else to vet the content of the speech to ensure it will not cause harm to the person speaking or anyone listening to the speech, a criterion listed in the Prior Speech Zone policy. Mere discomfort should not be enough to bar someone else from expressing their religious beliefs. If every time someone was uncomfortable or felt disrupted by the content of someone else's speech, there would be very little room for anyone to express their own personal beliefs, whether they have a religious nature or not. The Prior Speech code policy, and more specifically, the way it was enforced in this case is unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on the ability to exercise your religious beliefs. For many religious sects, evangelization is an integral part of being a steward of the faith. I would urge you to think of other displays of religious stewardship, the kippah, the hijab or burka, or the dastar are all displays of religious faith and commitment to the respective religions. If people who wore these items were told that they could only wear them in certain areas, at certain times, and only if it did not "disrupt" anyone else, the ability to express religious beliefs at all would be compromised.

6 comments:

Lizzy R. said...

I side with both of your arguments. I appreciate that you provided arguments through different lenses. Focusing on the Prior Speech Zone policy specifically, I think that they should have been more specific in what constitutes a “disturbance” or a “disorder” to peace and tranquility to the individuals on campus. Since, Uzuegbunam did make that effort, as you mentioned, to verify that his speech fit within the restrictions, then that sole principal should make him eligible to practice his free speech rights. I believe the policy is unconstitutional, because it seems like they’re monitoring free speech to an extreme in order to avoid the possibility of the disturbance of peace and tranquility. However, I think that a disturbance to peace and tranquility, in regards to free speech and the policy, should be viewed as in terms of whether free exercise to religion causes physical harm to anyone or if it is constituted as hate speech.

Ariel K. said...

I also agree with Jerra's argument in favor of the student in this case. Academic institution cases are always difficult because they involve a mix of students/young people who are susceptible to influences and a difficult definition of entanglement between religion and the state or institution. As in Cantwell v. Connecticut, we learned that we all have the right to speak as we please, even if it makes others uncomfortable; in other words, you do not have the right to not be offended. While I do see the merit in how causing a disturbance can be disruptive to the educational environment, the facts of the case show that it was not in the most highly populated areas and the disturbance did not appear to be so great that it would interfere with education. Additionally, the student made clear efforts to follow the rules put in place by the school after he was told he would need to reserve space and once he was informed of policies, he stopped speaking and handing out pamphlets. Overall, I agree that the school's actions violated the student's free exercise rights.

Anonymous said...

I initially was not entirely sure of where I stood on this case after reading the summary, but I thought Jerra did a really great job of explaining the previsions of the Prior Speech Zone policy. I do agree that students should follow the policies instated by universities in order to prevent any "disorderly behavior" that would distract students from the secular purpose of the school, which is education. As Jerra stated, however, Uzuegbunam did follow the policies put in place by the university, making sure that he reserved the time slots in the areas that he was allowed to distribute his religious materials in. I don't see how Uzuegbunam was creating any disturbance by passing out religious materials, especially when he abided by the Prior Speech Zone policy and made reservations to have the space. I also agree that in this case, the school did infringe upon Uzuegbunam's right to exercise his religion.

Hannah Heinemann said...

I think your argument is very strong and I found the conclusion to be especially compelling. I think it is very valid in your use of the hypothetical comparison of specific zones for one to display religious symbols and adornments. I believe that both policies breach upon the Free Exercise Clause, because they regulate the content and areas on campus in which speeches can be delivered.

J.S. Mill Jr. said...

Jerra,

I find the notions of free speech zones very problematic—especially at a public university like GGC. The First Amendment is very clear in its speech absolutism; only judges have interpreted exceptions for imminent calls to violence. Public universities, being funded by the taxpayers, should be institutions at which constitutional rights are not infringed upon. If someone wants to preach their religion in a public space, they should be allowed to—there is no freedom *from* speech. If an individual stalks or harasses you to get their information across, that would be illegal but for different charges.

Jon R. said...

I agree with all of your points, and I found your argument about wearing a kippah, hijab, burka, or dastar particularly compelling. Can a student who is uncomfortable with someone wearing one of those articles of clothing report that person to campus police for creating a "disturbance"? I would hope that the answer to that question is no, because that would be case of blatant discrimination. As another student said, there is no freedom *from* speech, especially since this man clearly went through the proper channels and did everything accordingly to the way it's intended to be structured.