Can Secular Courts Interpret Bylaws of Religious Universities?

            Bethesda University, located in Anaheim, California, is a private Christian university that was founded in 1976 on the ideals of Pentecostal theology and was recognized as an accredited institution by the state. Their specific theology uniquely emphasizes a direct, experiential relationship with God through the Holy Spirit, and embodies a more literal interpretation of the Bible. According to the university, these values shape the mission and educational goals of the school. 

In the early months of 2022, an internal dispute arose among the school’s board of directors when the president of the university wanted several board positions to be filled by non-Pentecostal members. Up until then, every university board member had been a follower of the Pentecostal faith. The president, however, had concerns over the accreditation status of the university because they lacked a diverse representation of religion on the board itself. The board then elected the new members to avoid any repercussions. A few months later the board discovered the president’s concerns did not have any legal justification and objected to the appointments of the new directors. After the president refused to remove the new directors from the board or hold another election, the majority of directors voted to fire him from his position and he was subsequently let go. He then filed a lawsuit, and a California trial court conducted a hearing under the Corporations Code to determine which group of board members should lead Bethesda and to protect the jobs of his new appointees.

Under the school’s bylaws, its board retains ultimate power to determine the religious principles and policies governing every aspect of its operations and instruction. Yet somewhere in the official language, the court found that this particular Pentecostal organization permits non-Pentecostals to occupy some of the highest leadership positions despite the school’s religious requirements. Therefore the new appointees who do not share the university’s founding faith cannot be demoted or fired solely because of their religious beliefs or lack thereof. 

The constitutional question at hand is not whether or not the board members can be reevaluated, it is whether or not the court has the authority to interpret and act upon private religious universities’ bylaws and missions, especially when their ruling goes against what the founders had originally intended. The First Liberty Institute, who is defending Bethesda University in this case, argues that allowing the court to interpret the foundational documents of the university is an excessive entanglement of the church and state, as cited under the Lemon Test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and therefore is in violation of the Establishment Clause. They believe secular courts are prohibited by the First Amendment from involving themselves in the mission of religious organizations. If a court can evaluate the religious character of Bethesda University, it can also tell the local church who it must hire to preach their beliefs and allow outsiders to direct the mission of the church, regardless if it is out of step with the religious doctrines of the church. 

The court claims to have acted neutrally towards Bethesda University by judging the bylaws based on face value and technical language, not the religious convictions of the Pentecostal ideology. Also the court could argue that the missions of religious universities have been interpreted, and in some cases challenged, in the past. A primary example of this can be found in Bob Jones University v. United States. Here, the court upheld the revocation of the university’s tax exempt status due to an interracial dating ban that went against the government’s policy interest. By ruling against them, the court clearly decided against Bob Jones and their religious mission. 

            In my opinion, the argument in favor of Bethesda is more convincing. The issue at hand is inherently different from the Bob Jones ruling because there is no compelling reason for the government to intervene in Bethesda University’s hiring practices or their mission as a private religious entity. The Establishment Clause protects religious institutions, including universities, from government overreach and excessive entanglement. There is no reason to treat Bethesda University differently from any other church or organization that holds religious beliefs, especially without a compelling interest motive. If we allow the court to interpret bylaws that are held and written by a religious institution, we are indirectly allowing the government to enforce these privately held laws (many of which are religious in nature) on their authors and supporters who have unique religious convictions and wish to see these convictions represented in their respective schools. While the court may be acting neutrally by interpreting the bylaws through a nondiscriminatory lens, the result of their ruling has negative implications for the future of religious freedom in a variety of religious institutions.

Sources:

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/lemon-test/

https://firstliberty.org/cases/bethesda-university/#simple1

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-3

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Bethesda-Petition_Redacted.pdf

https://firstliberty.org/cases/bethesda-university/#simple2

Should religious schools receive special education services?

    The case of Loffman v. California Department of Education reveals Jewish parents in California who have a religious obligation to send their children to a religious school that reflects their beliefs. Parents like Chaya and Yoni Loffman, Fedora Nick and Morris Taxon, and Sarah and Ariel Perets are put in a difficult position due to their children’s disabilities. While top Jewish schools like Shalhevet High School and Yavneh Hebrew Academy offer high-quality, faith-based education and are eager to serve children with disabilities, California law has excluded religious schools from receiving state and federal special education funding. This exclusion forces religious families to choose between their faith and essential disability services for their children, a choice not required of families sending children to secular schools. The plaintiffs argue that in rejecting funding for special education in religious schools, their First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion is being violated. 

    The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is designed to ensure all children with disabilities can access an equal and sufficient education. This includes funding for special education services. California’s “nonsectarian requirement” rejects religious schools from participating in these programs. This policy disproportionately affects religious communities and parents unable to fully support their students and children, along with lower-income families, who are more likely to have children with disabilities. In implementing this, the government is putting parents in the position to choose between their faith and their children’s needs. This decision parents are forced to make places a direct burden on their religious freedoms that are protected under the First Amendment. As the plaintiffs have argued, they feel as though excluding religious schools from receiving funding for special education is discriminatory while also violating their First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion. 

    While this case is awaiting its return to the district court for trial, the case went to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 28, 2024. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously found that California’s law fails to be neutral by providing necessary beneficial services to secular schools, but not to religious families and schools. This ruling reveals that California cannot deny special education funding to religious schools, as a failure to do so would be unconstitutional. 

    In analyzing this case, there are similarities to the recent Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020). Espinoza reveals the issue that stemmed from Montana passing a law that offered tax credits to donations for private schools, including religious ones. Montana’s Department of Revenue created Rule 1, prohibiting this aid from being received by families attending religious schools. This was in line with Montana’s Constitution, implementing their no-aid policy. Mothers of children attending religious schools wanted equal access to these donations and challenged the rule in court. The Montana Supreme Court struck down the entire program because of Rule 1, but the U.S. Supreme Court later found that this was unconstitutional. The Court argued that in granting aid to all private schools, including religious ones, there is no advancement of religion. While religious schools may receive indirect aid, the aid is directly benefiting the families of the children who attend these schools, not advancing religion. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of Espinoza, stating that in not doing so, they would be upholding unconstitutional practices and violating their First Amendment rights to freely exercise their religion.

    Similar to Espinoza, the case of Loffman deals with the exclusion of religious schools, students, and families from public benefits. Excluding religious schools from receiving the public benefit of state funding for special education lacks neutrality, as secular schools can benefit from these programs while religious ones do not. This is an important issue to address as it directly affects the families seeking an education that meets both their children’s unique needs and their religious beliefs. This case is significant as it has broader implications, potentially influencing how other states handle special education funding for religious schools.

    I feel as though the Court should rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Given the direct burden that is placed on the families who are negatively affected by this law, and the direct burden on their religious freedoms, it seems unconstitutional to uphold the case made by the California Department of Education. The lack of neutrality of this law is also extremely apparent. Secular schools, more specifically, the families of students who attend secular schools, are granted the public benefits to receive special education, a genuine need. States should not be at liberty to single out religious schools or families for exclusion from generally available public benefits based on the sole reason that they are religious. While I can see how there may be counterarguments rooted in the significance of the wall between church and state, I do not think that ruling in favor of Loffman advances religion. Neutrality towards religion is a key part of the Constitution, in ignoring the implications these laws have on religious families would directly go against that.

    With all of this being said, I invite you to share your opinions on this case. What do you think? Are the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freely exercise their religion being infringed upon?

Sources:

https://becketfund.org/case/loffman-v-california-department-of-education/

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/10/28/23-55714.pdf

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1195

Loe v. Jett

Minnesota law had a Post Secondary Enrollment Options (PSEO) program to allow highschool students to take college courses free of cost. Melinda Loe, Mark Loe and Dawn Erickson are Christian parents whose children have used PSEO funds in the past for courses at religiously affiliated universities, such as the University of Northwestern and Crown College. In 2023, the PSEO was amended to exclude religious institutions because they required a statement of faith from students. Therefore, parents filed suit that Minnesota's amended law violated religious freedom, believing faith should be at the forefront of their lives, which includes education.  

The constitutional question is if the exclusion of religious institutions from Minnesota’s PSEO program violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This brings into question if neutral and generally applicable laws can function as religious discrimination. There is also the constitutional question of if the programs funding of religious education is a violation of the Establishment Clause. I argue that there is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause because of the substantive and discriminatory impact on religion; further, I believe there is no violation of the Establishment Clause because the program has a secular purpose that does not directly aid religious institutions. 

Regarding the Free Exercise Clause, this case has parallels to Locke v. Davey (2004) where Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program that excluded degrees in theology was found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court. However, in the dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia cites Everson v. Board of Education, noting how generally available public benefits should not discriminate based on religion. These programs are to educationally benefit society, and excluding religion from these public benefits imposes burdens and is discriminatory towards religion. 

The dissent in Locke also discusses that although being facially neutral, the law has disparate impacts that burden religion. Further, the funds are going to the child, rather than the institution, so there is no direct aid of religion.  I agree with the dissent that Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program violates free exercise, similarly seeing Minnesota's law as unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Minnesota law seems to go further than the program in Locke because it excludes entire institutions rather than specific majors of study, making it an even clearer case of religious discrimination.

Furthermore, In Carson v. Makin (2022), the Court ruled that Maine could not exclude religious schools from a tuition assistance program. The Court emphasized that "But a State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise". Therefore, free exercise can be hindered even when a state is trying to protect against establishment. This extends to Minnesota’s law where educational funding programs that excluded religious institutions based on their religious character violate religious liberty. 

Regarding the Establishment Clause, In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) Ohio’s scholarship program was brought into question because Ohio taxpayers feared that the programs’ funding going to majority religious institutions was unconstitutional. The court held the program to be constitutional because of a secular purpose to educate low income children while remaining neutral in regards to religious and secular interests. Furthermore, the government is helping the child, rather than the institution, so the government is only indirectly aiding religion. Also, parents have the choice of secular options, yet are choosing religious education based on their faith. In terms of Minnesota’s program, I do not think there is a violation of the Establishment Clause for parallel reasons, seeing true neutrality as allowing religion because allowing and establishing are not the same. 

This case also brings into light the question of parental rights in education. The Minnesota PSEO program interferes with parents’ ability to exercise their rights by preventing them from using generally available educational benefits that align with their religious convictions. The parents want their children to have equal educational opportunities while being able to have a community that shares in their faith. This puts parents in a position to choose between their child’s education and their religious upbringing. Since parents have the right to parent their children, I believe the PSEO program's exclusion of religious institutions impacts parental, as well as religious, rights. 

In conclusion, I believe the amendment to Minnesota's PSEO program that excludes religious institutions violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment while posing no Establishment Clause concerns. Government programs cannot exclude public benefits because of religious character, and religious liberty requires that people of faith have equal access to public benefits without having to sacrifice their religious convictions. However, the opposing side may see issues with public funds indirectly aiding religion. What do you think?

Sources:

• https://becketfund.org/case/loe-v-walz/ 

• https://www.jns.org/parents-back-in-court-after-minnesota-pre-college-program-exlcudes-faith-based-schools/ 

Religious Beliefs Shouldn't Get You Fired

 Religious Beliefs Shouldn't Get You Fired

Religious freedom is protected in the United States, even in the workplace. But sometimes, people lose their jobs for standing up for their religious beliefs. That’s what happened to Charlene Carter, a longtime flight attendant at Southwest Airlines. She was fired after posting anti-abortion content on her personal Facebook page and sending messages to her union president criticizing the union's support of abortion rights. 

Charlene Carter is a Christian who believes abortion is wrong based on her faith. In 2017, she sent Facebook messages to union president Audrey Stone after learning that Stone and other union leaders had participated in the Women's March in Washington, D.C., an event supported by Planned Parenthood. In those messages, she shared videos of abortions and strongly criticized the union’s actions. She also posted this content on her personal Facebook page. Although Carter had resigned from formal union membership in 2013, she was still required to pay partial dues for union representation which is a common practice in many unionized workplaces. She did not want her money, directly or indirectly, supporting causes she found morally wrong, like abortion. After receiving the messages, President Stone reported her to Southwest Airlines. The company soon fired Carter, claiming she had violated their social media and harassment policies.

Carter believed she was fired for expressing her religious beliefs, so she sued Southwest under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against someone because of their religion. It also requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” for religious beliefs, unless doing so would cause the business significant difficulty or expense. In 2022, a jury sided with Carter, finding that Southwest had violated her rights.

To better understand this case, we can look at Groff v. DeJoy (2023). In that case, Gerald Groff, an evangelical Christian, worked for the U.S. Postal Service, which originally allowed him to keep Sundays as a day of rest. When the USPS later started requiring Sunday shifts, Groff requested a religious exemption. The Supreme Court ruled that employers cannot deny religious accommodations just because they cause a minor inconvenience; they have to prove that the request creates a substantial burden. This case clarified that religious rights must be taken seriously in the workplace. If Groff deserved an accommodation for not working Sundays, Carter deserved protection for expressing her beliefs. She wasn’t asking to skip work or be treated differently on the job. She was simply expressing her religious views on her own time and objecting to how her union dues were being used. Unlike in Groff’s case, Carter was not asking for anything, just to be allowed to speak freely.

This raises some big questions. First, was Carter treated the same as other employees who expressed different or secular views about abortion? If others posted strong opinions without facing punishment, Carter’s firing could be seen as religious discrimination. Title VII does not just protect religious people from direct mistreatment, it also prevents employers from holding them to different standards. Second, what actual burden did Carter’s posts place on Southwest? Her actions did not involve skipping work, changing duties, or disrupting the workplace. Everything she did was on her personal time. If the only issue was that her views made someone uncomfortable, that is not enough to justify firing her, especially when those views come from sincerely held religious beliefs. At the heart of this issue is the idea of “reasonable accommodation.” What does it really mean? When must employers respect religious beliefs, and when can they say no? What is the line between maintaining workplace order and violating someone’s rights?

This case is about more than just one employee. It is about balancing religious freedom with workplace rules. Carter’s messages reflected her religious beliefs. Southwest claimed they were disruptive, but Carter said she was simply living out her faith. So the bigger debate is this: can an employer punish someone for expressing controversial religious views, even if those views are shared outside of work hours? And if they can not show how the speech hurt the business, was the firing fair? Southwest did not have to agree with Carter. But they should have respected her right to speak about her beliefs, especially when that speech was personal, faith-based, and did not disrupt her job.

I believe Charlene Carter was wrongfully fired. She had a right to express her religious beliefs, and she didn’t hurt anyone or ask for special treatment. She just spoke up about something she deeply believed, on her own time. Religious freedom and free speech are core American values, and they apply not only to popular opinions. They protect all voices, even those with which people disagree. That is what makes them rights.

Sources:

• https://apnews.com/article/southwest-airlines-judge-religious-speech-training-b643395cf72c076ded60770d31156f91

• https://apnews.com/article/judge-religious-liberty-training-southwest-airlines-2a3d963671446da26f53bdc511bca58f

• https://www.nrtw.org/newsletter-articles/carter-fifth-circuit-nl-11152024/ 

• https://www.eeoc.gov/religious-discrimination 

Cash Kept from Charities: Deception of the Church of Latter-day Saints

    A former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (known commonly as Mormons) decided to come out with a claim that stated the organization misrepresented how they used tithing funds, or religiously obligatory member donations. Because James Huntsman had donated millions of dollars to the organization, he was disappointed to find out they were not going to charitable causes, and made claims that the funds were being used on material items at shopping centers and for a life insurance company that was close with the church. He was especially angered because of how the church allegedly reassured its members that the funds were only being used toward morally upright and important causes in the community, that align with Christian values and were his duty to give to. These reassurances were delivered through sermons, official statements, and internal communications, claiming a divine purpose behind each donation. Members were led to believe their contributions would fund humanitarian aid, disaster relief, educational initiatives, etc. The betrayal felt especially heavy for donors like Huntsman, who viewed his financial support as a sacred act of devotion. Because of the perceived deception of the Church of Latter-day Saints, Huntsman sued them and the issue was raised to the Supreme Court level, where he is currently trying the church for fraudulent use of donations. His argument centers on the idea that the church not only mishandled the funds but did so under a false pretense, thus violating the trust of its members and misusing its religious authority for material benefit.

This case is interesting as it questions the implications of the Free Exercise Clause, and especially as it applies to the use of religious funds. If these funds were being used toward secular and non-religious reasons, could the value or sincerity behind the religion be questioned, as even its own leaders do not take it seriously? Or, does the only inherent religious value behind the act of giving a donation lie within having the loyalty and trust to make the donation itself? This debate also brings into question how far religious protections extend when money and legal obligations are involved. The Free Exercise Clause states that every human has the right to freely express their religious convictions without the interference of the government, with the exception of when peace and good order are in jeopardy. The claim that a religious organization is using tithing funds, which are being drawn out of members of the church due to appeals to their morality and religious obligations, not to mention consistently reassured as valuable and upright, is enough to prove a disruption of peace and good order. This level of deception in a long-running religious organization that has a rapport built up with its members, who trust in its convictions so deeply that some donate millions of their own dollars, is a complete violation of the Madisonian principle. In James Madison’s vision for the separation of church and state, religious institutions were to be protected from interference—but not exempt from accountability. This case puts that principle to the test in a very modern context.

A case that reminded me of this one was U.S. v Ballard, where similarly, the sincerity of a religious mailing movement that consistently collected funds from patrons was questioned for its uses and true intentions in obtaining this money. While the court ruled, in this case, that the truth of religious doctrines could not be evaluated, religious leaders could be evaluated for whether or not they sincerely believed what they preached (with the right evidence). Therefore, deception is not blindly accepted under the guides of religion, despite governmental neutrality to unconventional religious beliefs in general. So, under this precedent, if Huntsman has evidence against the Church of Latter-day Saints that supports his initial claim, the sincerity of the religious movement, and therefore the presence of fraudulent behavior, can be evaluated. 

The broader implication is that if the court rules in Huntsman’s favor, it may signal a shift in how religious organizations are legally expected to manage the use of their donations, especially those whose members are being reassured that they are going to a certain moral or religious cause. It could lead to greater financial scrutiny of religious institutions and raise overall expectations for transparency within these institutions, which were not being closely monitored enough in their actions before despite holding the trust of many faithful members. This could create more room for eliminating insincerity and deceit within both long-standing and minority organizations, and aligns with neutrality and lack of bias if all institutions are monitored by the same standard.

Should the Clergy be Mandated Reporters?

The Washington state senate recently passed Senate Bill 5375, which would force all members of the clergy to report any abuse or neglect of minors that they suspect throughout the carrying out of their clerical duties. This iteration of the bill is the third attempt the Washington legislature has made at requiring mandated reporting for religious ministers, however, the newest version differs in one key aspect; it does not provide an exemption for confession, nor any form of penitential communications. Many legislators felt that the exemption for penitential communication watered the bill down too much and gave leeway for the clergy to withhold information that may be necessary in helping to protect a child from abuse or neglect. Supporters of the exemption claim that forcing religious leaders to report information that is required by their religion to be kept secret is a significant burden upon their free exercise. One state senator, Leonard Christian, claimed that; “It is forcing somebody who’s given their entire life – raised their hand, made an oath with God almighty – to choose between God’s law and man’s law,” which demonstrates how important the exemption is to those who believe in different forms of penitential communication. Alternatively, Senator Noel Frame, the bill’s prime sponsor, claims that; “religious leaders should have a responsibility to report abuse so the state can step in and take action” and “They need to know that if they tell somebody they’re being abused… that they can trust that that person will make it stop.” Frame also pointed out that “Washington is only one of five states where clergy aren’t mandatory reporters.” Whilst the proposed law makes it obligatory to report any mistreatment, it still prevents the state from compelling the clergy member to testify in any criminal proceedings that may derive from the report. 

The issue at hand in this circumstance is whether forcing religious leaders to become mandatory reporters, even in the case that reporting may violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, is constitutionally permissible. Thomas Jipping, a legal scholar at the Heritage Foundation, wrote an article in The Daily Signal in which he cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah as evidence that “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs” is impermissible due to the lack of neutrality or general applicability. This view misses a few key aspects in the Church of the Lukumi case, most notably among them being that the city of Hialeah took specific actions with the sole expressed intention of criminalizing specific actions performed by the Santeria faith. With Justice Kennedy reasoning in the majority opinion that the laws were not generally applicable, saying; “It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of Santeria Church members.” The law that Washington is attempting to implement has various other intentions beyond suppressing faith, nor is it narrowly tailored to target specific groups, as the ordinances in Lakumi had. The Washington law applies to any “ordained minister, priest, rabbi, imam, elder, or similarly situated religious or spiritual leader of any church, religious denomination, religious body, spiritual community, or sect,” which is both intentionally neutral and broadly applicable to every religion. 

Furthermore, while the law at hand does impose a minor imposition on the religious freedoms of those who engage in confession, the government has an interest compelling enough to justify said infringement. Protecting children from all kinds of abuse is a goal that any reasonable person will likely see as both noble and valid however, previous court decisions on free exercise infringements have examined if the action taken is the least restrictive means to go about achieving the state’s goals. An exemption would be the obvious compromise to remove the burden, however implementing such an exemption would require the government to determine what qualifies as penitential communication. Having the government weigh in on this would give the government the ability to unfairly apply these qualifications, Washington state avoids having to make such a decision by extending mandatory reporter status to confession. 

In summary, I believe that there is little precedent to suggest the law Washington’s legislators seek to enact is unconstitutional in any manner. Since the law differs from the Lakumi case, in terms of generally applicability, facial neutrality, and there is a substantial government interest in regulating this conduct with no other means to go about doing so, I believe that Washington will face no constitutional obstruction if this law is enacted. 

https://www.dailysignal.com/2025/03/02/washington-state-is-attacking-religious-freedom-and-it-wont-stop-there/ 

https://www.investigatewest.org/investigatewest-reports/washington-legislature-passes-bill-to-make-clergy-mandatory-reporters-of-child-abuse-17864136 

https://washingtonstatestandard.com/2025/02/28/washington-senate-passes-bill-to-make-clergy-members-mandatory-reporters/ 

Religious Liberty Behind Bars: The Fight for Ramadan Accommodations in Prison

 Imagine being forced to go without food for 15-16 hours when your religious practice only requires 12-13 hours of fasting. This was the reality for Marvin Owens, a Muslim inmate at Jackson County Jail in Michigan during Ramadan 2024. His case raises important questions about religious liberty for incarcerated individuals and the remedies available when religious freedoms are violated.

Marvin Owens, a 34-year-old practicing Muslim incarcerated at Jackson County Jail in Michigan, made multiple requests for dietary accommodations before Ramadan 2024. According to Islamic law, Ramadan observance requires Muslims to fast from dawn until sunset, eating only a pre-dawn meal (suhoor) and a sunset meal (iftar). Despite Owens’ requests, jail officials allegedly failed to provide adequate and timely meals during the holy month. According to a federal lawsuit filed on March 3, 2024, by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Michigan Chapter, Owens wasn’t provided pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramdan. Even when meals were eventually provided, they were reportedly delivered up to two hours late, extending Owens’ fasting period from the normal 12-13 hours to 15-16 hours. It is important to note that Islamic teachings “prohibit a Muslim from extending their fast beyond the moment of sunset, and require that an adherent Muslim hasten to break their fast during Ramadan,” according to the lawsuit. 

The quality and quantity of food were also at issue. The lawsuit alleged that Owens received only 1,300 to 1,900 calories per day, which is well below the 2,500 calories recommended for an adult man. Owens was reportedly served inedible food that had been left out, unwrapped and unprotected. On one occasion, the food was so inedible that a deputy advised Owens not to eat it, but also did not provide a replacement. 

County Officials reportedly acknowledged the lack of accommodations, but put the blame on their food service provider, Tigg’s Canteen Services. Nevertheless, the lawsuit named Sheriff Gary Schuette and two other sheriff officials, as well as Tigg’s Canteen Services, as defendants. The original lawsuit was filed in federal court in March 2024, but after preliminary motions, the case was dismissed in November 2024. On April 10, 2025, Notre Dame Law School’s Religious Liberty Clinic, alongside CAIR attorney Amy Doukore, filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, requesting a reward of monetary damages to Owens, since he has been transferred from Jackson County Jail and therefore a change in policy now would not remedy the harm that has already occurred. 

This case centers on two legal frameworks that protect religious liberty, the First Amendment Right to Free Exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). RLUIPA is a federal statute that provides heightened protections for religious exercise in institutions including prisons, prohibiting the government from imposing substantial burdens on religious practice unless the burden serves a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. This case recalls O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), where the Supreme Court ruled against Muslim inmates who sought accommodations for Friday prayer services. However, RLUIPA was later enacted specifically to provide greater protection than the constitutional standard established in cases like O’Lone.

This case presents the ongoing tension between religious liberty and governmental interests. Similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), where the Court recognized that seemingly neutral regulations can impose significant burdens on religious practice, Owens’ case asks whether administrative convenience can justify substantial burdens on religious exercise. This central question parallels the issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) where the Court considered whether otherwise neutral policies that disproportionately affect religious practices deserve heightened scrutiny. It is important here to determine whether Jackson County’s failure to provide timely and adequate meals constitutes a substantial burden on Owens based on his religious beliefs and practices. The jail claimed to have a policy for accommodating Muslim inmates during Ramdan, but the implementation appears to have been inconsistent. So, if the jail did have a policy in place, but failed to enact this policy for whatever reason, the question becomes: does administrative difficulty or resource constraints qualify as a compelling governmental interest? I would say no.

I would argue that this case should be ruled in favor of Owens. The evidence clearly shows that Jackson County Jail officials placed a substantial burden on Owens’ religious exercise. By failing to provide pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramadan, and then providing inadequate meals thereafter, prison officials effectively burdened Owens’ ability to practice his faith. Also, there was no compelling government interest to serve delayed and inadequate meals. This is proven by the fact that there actually was a policy in place to accommodate fasting Muslims, which the jail just failed to fulfill. Therefore, Owens should be entitled to the monetary damages outlined by RLUIPA. This would not only provide justice for Owens but also deter future violations of religious liberty in incarceration settings. By ruling in favor of Owens, the Court would affirm that RLUIPA means what it says: incarcerated people have a right to meaningful religious accommodation, and violations of that right must have meaningful remedies. 

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2024/03/28/muslim-inmate-sues-jackson-county-over-handling-of-ramadan-accommodations/73129733007/

https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/notre-dame-law-schools-religious-liberty-clinic-represents-prisoner-denied-ramadan-accommodations-in-federal-appeal/

https://www.wilx.com/2024/11/01/lawsuit-over-ramadan-meals-jackson-county-jail-dismissed/

https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-act

Where Is The Line Between Authority and Religious Freedom Within The Affordable Care Act?

 Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, requires private insurers to include preventive care and treatments without cost sharing, which involves the out-of-pocket fees such as deductibles. The preventive care methods in this list are graded as either A or B by 3 agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and these are the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), the Advisory Committee in Immunization Practices (ACIF), and the Health Resources and Services Administrations (HRSA). Within the list of preventive treatments are a variety of cancer screenings and statins, as well as contraceptives, emergency contraceptives, and HIV prevention drugs. Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is medication designed to help prevent HIV infections in those at risk, and is included in the list of preventive measures.

 Truvada Pills Used for PrEP

 Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

These requirements are now being challenged in Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. due to the belief of Braidwood Management along with a few other individuals that the recommendations violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  RFRA, passed in 1993, prevents one’s free exercise from being substantially burdened even by generally applicable policies unless the government can prove both that there is a compelling state interest involved and that the law is the least restrictive means of accomplishing it. The plaintiffs, Christian-owned businesses in this case, have stated that the mandatory coverage for certain preventive services makes them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” They have cited both economic harm for unwanted yet enforced health plans, as well as religious harm for being forced to include services they believe combat their religious beliefs.

In 2022, the District Court decided that the preventive services requirement did in fact violate RFRA, and also appointing members to the USPSTF violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Appointments Clause requires all officers of the state to be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate, yet is not entirely clear on who all falls under that category or how much authority they must have in order to be considered an officer. Judge O’Connor cited Hobby Lobby in his argument that since “the government did not show that it could not simply provide PrEP to those unable to obtain it from a plan due to an employer’s religious objection…it is not the least restrictive means of reducing the spread of HIV.” The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2024 that the decisions in this case only applied to the plaintiffs and was not a “nationwide remedy.”

The Supreme Court has actually decided to narrow its focus on this case to whether or not the structure of the USPSTF violates the Appointments Clause since members are not appointed by the president, and will not be examining whether or not the ACA violates the First Amendment. 

There are some precedents playing into how this case will be determined, one of which is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. That case determined RFRA prevented the HHS from requiring closely held corporations provide coverage for contraceptives that contradict their owners’ beliefs. It also set the standard for closely held corporations to be classified as persons, as RFRA was originally written to apply to persons. 

This case shows an overlap between the authority of government agencies, the right to free exercise of religion, and issues regarding public health. There is a compelling state interest in providing access to many health services, as well as preventing the spread of infectious diseases. Challenging the ACA leads to a genuine concern on the impact to cancer treatment as well as preventive treatments for HIV. It can also lead to questioning who has the authority to determine what takes top priority and will be legally enforced, and what means may they take in order to impose such regulations. 

The plaintiffs are only arguing against the treatments that directly violate their religious beliefs, so while there is risk of a slippery slope to further requests, it is not enough to negate the exemptions they are looking for. The government has not proven that the requirements within the ACA for private insurers are the only way to ensure people have access to treatment, nor has it clarified how the USPSTF has the constitutional authority to implement such regulations; therefore, the Supreme Court should follow the precedent set by Hobby Lobby and side with the plaintiffs. While the government may have the “desire to promote public health and gender equality…the government has provided exceptions for churches, non-profit religious organizations… and businesses that employ 50 people or fewer.” The right to free exercise allows exemptions in policies where possible, even if alternatives still need to be found.

Sources:

https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/aca-preventive-services-supreme-court-kennedy-braidwood/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-316

https://fedsoc.org/events/courthouse-steps-oral-argument-kennedy-v-braidwood-management-inc

https://www.statnews.com/2025/04/17/kennedy-v-braidwood-affordable-care-act-challenge-could-upend-preventive-health-care/

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-10326-CV0.pdf

https://ncdoj.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Kennedy-v.-Braidwood-Mgmt.-IL-Merits-Amicus-PDF-A.pdf

https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/court-holds-key-aca-preventive-services-requirements-unconstitutional

https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/scotus-preview-braidwood-and-the-fate-of-preventive-services-under-the-aca/

https://affordablecareactlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/gov.uscourts.txnd_.330381.92.0_1.pdf

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/

https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/hiv-prevention/using-hiv-medication-to-reduce-risk/pre-exposure-prophylaxis

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308 

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C2-3-1/ALDE_00013092/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ 

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/closely_held_corporation