Religion and Charity: Can the government decide the sincerity of religious motivations?

The Supreme Court has recently decided to hear the case of Catholic Charities Bureau v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission in their 2024-2025 term. Catholic Charities Bureau, run out of the Diocese of Superior in Wisconsin, provides services to those who are poor and disadvantaged out of religious motivations. The four sub-entities are Barron County Developmental Services, Inc. (BCDS), Black River Industries, Inc. (BRI), Diversified Services, Inc. (DSI), and Headwaters, Inc. The services provided to the poor and disadvantaged range from job training to supporting individuals with disabilities. While the Bishop of the Diocese of Superior oversees CCB, employees and recipients of the organizations are not required to be of any religious faith, and the programs do not include religious training. 

In March of 2024, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled whether or not the Catholic Charities Bureau (CCB) was required to pay the state’s unemployment insurance, or if they could opt to pay the Wisconsin Catholic Bishops' Church Unemployment Pay Program (CUPP). The court ultimately ruled that CCB was required to pay the state’s unemployment due to their services not being “religious enough.” The court argued that their work was largely charitable and not solely religious. Additionally, the court argued that in requiring CCB and its sub-entities to pay the state’s unemployment tax there was no interference with how the church runs itself and was based on neutral criteria. 

CCB argued that this decision infringed upon their religious freedom under the First Amendment due to the Free Exercise Clause. In the court deciding whether or not the services done by CCB are religious (enough) or not, the court is getting involved in determining the structure and mission of a religious group, in this case, CCB. 

The central issue for this case, and what the Supreme Court will be analyzing, is whether or not CCB and its sub-entities are exempt from unemployment tax due to acting primarily on religious motivations. In requiring these organizations to pay the state unemployment tax, they will be separated from the Diocese, which is the district overseen by the bishop. CCB and its sub-entities will not be exempt from paying unemployment tax altogether, rather, they would be paying into the Wisconsin Catholic Bishops' Church Unemployment Pay Program, which would not separate them from the Diocese. The court making a decision on the religious sincerity of CCB and its sub-entities, as CCB argues, will violate their Free Exercise Clause based on the court determining what deems the organization's motivations as religious, more specifically, if they are “primarily” religious.

This case has similar undertones to Cantwell v. Connecticut concerning giving the federal government the power to determine the sincerity of religious practices, a decision that is subjective to the official making the decision. Like Cantwell, public officials are in the position to pass judgment on who can and cannot exercise their religion, something that is not permissible according to the First Amendment. While the Wisconsin court argued that they were not infringing on the practices within the church, CCB, and its sub-entities argue that they are acting out of religious obligation in serving the poor and disadvantaged, putting strict religious motivations behind their actions. 

In order for CCB and its sub-entities to be required to pay the state’s unemployment, the court will have determined their practices to be non-religious. While there is a question of sincerity in who can and cannot say that their practices are religious, the CCB and its organizations will be stripped of their religious autonomy. I think that in looking at how these organizations are not looking to opt out of paying unemployment tax altogether, but rather the CUPP is also of important note. 

This case and the issue of this case is important since it places secular courts answering religious questions. Essentially, it should not be in the hands of the court to decide how religious a practice is. Furthermore, in deciding that these organizations are not “religious enough,” they are interfering with the structure and mission of the church. This would not only violate the organization's First Amendment right regarding the Free Exercise Clause, but potentially question the wall between church and state and the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court ruling for this case will be integral in shaping religious charitable organizations within the United States.

I think that there are valid arguments to be had from both sides. With that being said, what do you think? Given the central issue being whether CCB and its sub-entities are operated primarily for religious purposes, are CCB and its sub-entities exempt from unemployment tax because they are operated primarily for religious purposes? Is their First Amendment Right under the Free Exercise Clause being violated?

https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2024/2020ap002007.html

https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-supreme-court-will-hear-clash-over-religious-exemptions-wisconsin-tax-2024-12-13/

https://becketfund.org/case/catholic-charities-bureau/

Gender Affirming Care: Physician's Assistant Fights for Religious Freedom

     First Liberty Institute, a non-profit legal organization, filed a federal lawsuit against University of Michigan Health-West on behalf of Valerie Kloosterman, a physician assistant fired after she requested a religious accommodation from referring patients for transgender surgical procedures and drugs, as well as using patients' preferred pronouns. 

Ms. Kloosterman is a third generation health care worker and worked in her local clinic for 17 years. During this time, she regularly received appraising reviews from her patients and her supervisors are quoted calling her "professional," "very ethical," and a "pleasure to work with," according to a Fox News article. Then, in 2021, The University of Michigan Health - West (UMHW) took over the clinic. Upon the acquisition, employees at the hospital were instructed to take a Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) module that required her to affirm statements concerning sexual orientation and gender identity which she believes went against her Christian faith. The module itself would not let her choose "No" when asked to affirm these principles, as she was informed beforehand that failure to mark "Yes" would result in termination. She then sought a religious exemption from the module and an accommodation for gender affirming surgery referrals through the human resources department but was denied. According to Ms. Kloosterman, during follow-up meetings, the DEI Coordinator called her “evil,” blamed her for gender dysphoria-related suicides, and told her she could not take the Bible or her religious beliefs to work with her. Less than a month later, she was fired.

    After her termination, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Her attorney's contacted Michigan Health and asked for her reinstatement but they refused. So in October of 2022, First Liberty filed a lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Kloosterman. Then, in September 2023, Federal Judge Jane Beckering allowed her religious discrimination claims to proceed, ruling that there was valid evidence that Ms. Kloosterman's freedom of religion was being threatened by violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 

    During the latest completed trial, Kloosterman's legal team made a compelling case and the court ruled in agreement with them. They argued that the hospital ultimately made her choose between acting against her religious beliefs or losing her job. According to them, forcing this choice upon her significantly burdened her religious beliefs. Additionally, during the final meeting, a hospital administrator allegedly mocked her beliefs, telling her she "could not bring the Bible to work"  and she was “evil” for her refusal to use pronouns. They argued that if decision-makers show hostility toward religious beliefs, their policies may violate the Free Exercise Clause as actions of hostility are not considered neutral. Finally, Kloosterman requested a religious accommodation, proposing to use patients' names instead of pronouns and refer gender affirming patients to other doctors. The hospital denied her request without offering an alternative solution. This violates the Free-Exercise Clause because a law or workplace policy that burdens religious practice must be neutral and generally applicable, meaning it applies equally to everyone without targeting religious beliefs. Kloosterman alleged that UMHW’s policy allowed secular exceptions and targeted religious objections by denying only religious-based accommodations.

    In my opinion, I do believe that terminating Ms. Kloosterman is a violation of her First Amendment Right to the freedom of religion and the Free Exercise Clause. The DEI Coordinator's choice of words and the manner in which they terminated her clearly represents hostility toward religion. As cited in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, with reference to the Free Exercise Clause, she did not deserve to be fired or suspended simply for staying true to her religious convictions, as actions of hostility are not considered neutral. Ms. Kloosterman herself never explicitly expressed hatred towards any of LGBTQ+ individuals in the past, she was simply trying to receive an accommodation and was willing to use their names instead of pronouns. And, in fact, accommodations for doctors treating patients have been made at this hospital for secular reasons. For example, a doctor can opt-out of a surgery or procedure for medical reasons such as an injury to their hand or sickness. In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court ruled that if an employer grants secular accommodations but refuses religious ones, it may violate the Free Exercise Clause.  If opt-outs are already part of the medical system, I don't see why they can't make an exception for religion. This is different from majority rulings in cases like Braunfield v. Brown, in which the majority ruled against an accommodation. The court decided, at least in part, that allowing Orthodox Jewish businesses to open on Sundays would present them with an economic advantage over Christian businesses and problems policing the law would arise. I do not see this being the case here, being that an efficient accommodation system is already in place. Similarly, the dissenting opinion in Braunfield argued that 21 out of the 34 states that enforced Sunday laws had functioning accommodation systems for Orthodox Jews, further disproving the claim that it would disrupt the flow and structural of the system in place. Furthermore, Ms. Kloosterman has lost her source of economic income because of a choice that her employer placed upon her. Forcing a person to choose between their livelihood and religious beliefs, while indirect, places a burden on their ability to practice religion freely. This argument is also very similar to that of the dissenting opinion in Braunfield. They argued that enforcing this choice has virtually the same effect as a tax on religious text would, and this type of tax was struck down in Follet v. Town of McCormick.

    Some may imply that by her refusing to refer gender affirming procedures, as well as refraining from using a patient's desired pronouns, that she is being discriminatory and this would violate discrimination laws. I don't believe this to be true. If she was fired on the basis of her performance or she herself was being hostile towards a LGBTQ+ individual, this would be a different story. Others may say that Ms. Kloosterman took an oath to provide medical attention to anyone in need, no matter how much she disagrees with them. And in theory, if she was accommodated, it could have a slippery slope effect and entice other doctors to refuse treatment for individuals who they disagree with in some way. I don't think this scenario will play out this way. Let's be clear that gender affirming surgery is not an emergency surgery. She is not saying she, nor should anyone, deny any type of emergency service for a member of the LGBTQ+ community, rather she is simply referring gender affirming patients to another doctor who does not have religious obligations.

    Either way, this case definitely has implications for the types of accommodations that will be made in workplaces in the future. As of February 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in the case. Be on the lookout for more actions as Ms. Kloosterman's case progresses. 

Sources:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/christian-physician-assistant-fired-opposition-100049802.html   

https://firstliberty.org/cases/valerie-kloosterman/#simple1 

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Release_Kloosterman_MTD_9.21.23_FNL.pdf 

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Release_Kloosterman_Lawsuit_10.11.22_FNL.pdf 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf 

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/321/573/ 

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/366/599/ 

Conversion Therapy Bans: Are they Constitutional?

A group of Christian counselors, including Pamela Eisenreich and Wyatt Bury, along with Missouri State Attorney General Andrew Bailey, have filed a lawsuit challenging two local conversion therapy bans. The ordinances in question were enacted by Kansas City in 2019 and Jackson County in 2023. These ordinances prohibit the practice of conversion therapy on minors, which is a controversial treatment aimed at changing an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity. With the ordinances in place, practicing conversion therapy can lead to fines or jail time. 

The plaintiffs' arguments center on freedom of speech and religion. They argue that parents often seek their help for their minor children struggling with gender identity and sexual orientation issues, believing that the bans prevent them from having consensual conversations about these matters that should not be intertwined with or censored by the government. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the ban prevents them from sharing beliefs stemming from their Christian faith, thus limiting their freedom to exercise their religion. 

The primary constitutional question is whether local governments can restrict certain counseling practices rooted in religious beliefs without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause, which states that "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise of religion," has been interpreted by courts to protect religious beliefs while also allowing for some regulation or limitation of religious practices when they conflict with important government or state interests.

I argue that the conversion bans are constitutional due to the compelling state interest to protect minors. In Minersville School District V. Gobitis (1940), the Supreme Court ruled that Jehovah Witnesses’ could be expelled for refusing to salute the flag at school, despite the actions going against their religious convictions, because of the importance of national unity and national security. Similarly, there is a compelling state interest in this instance but rather than national unity it is safety. The present case presents an even more compelling state interest of protecting minors from known harm.

Numerous medical and psychological associations have condemned conversion therapy as ineffective and damaging, particularly for young people. Research demonstrates the severe psychological impacts of this practice - a 2022 study revealed that young people who underwent conversion therapy were more than twice as likely to attempt suicide compared to those who did not. These documented, life-threatening consequences demonstrate why state intervention is necessary. The conversion therapy bans can serve as a crucial public health function by protecting all minors, with particular importance for LGBTQ+ youth, who represent an especially vulnerable population. 

Furthermore, the bans are neutral because they apply equally to all those regardless of their faiths. Catholic counselors who see this type of therapy as an extension of their faith may claim that the ordinance does not apply equally to them because it prohibits their free exercise, it is a medical and therapeutic ban rather than a religious ban. Therefore, allowing an exception to a professional standard could be a slippery slope and set a dangerous precedent. If religious beliefs could override professional standards designed to protect public health and safety, professionals might more consistently claim religious exemptions from evidence-based standards of care, which could be dangerous for public health. 

In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Scalia, held that Oregon could deny plaintiff's unemployment benefits, despite claims that it was against the Free Exercise Clause, because the state's laws were "neutral laws of general applicability". This means the laws were found to be constitutional because they weren't specifically targeting religious practice, but rather applied to everyone equally regardless of religion affiliation. Similarly, the conversion therapy bans in Kansas City and Jackson County regulate professional conduct without targeting religious beliefs specifically. Just as the Court found Oregon's drug laws constitutional despite their impact on Native American religious practices, these bans should be upheld despite their  effect on religious counselors.

In conclusion, while religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional right, the conversion therapy bans in Kansas City and Jackson County represent a necessary limitation of that right because of the compelling state interest in protecting minors. Therefore, the conversion therapy bans represent a constitutional exercise of government regulation to safeguard public health while maintaining religious neutrality. This case illustrates the ongoing challenge of balancing religious freedom with the state's responsibility to protect the health and safety of its citizens, particularly vulnerable populations.

Sources: 

• https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/missouri-ag-christian-counselors-aim-to-overturn-conversion-therapy-bans-in-jackson-county-kansas-city 

• https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-library/news/christian-counselors-lawsuit-challenges-ordinances-against-conversion-therapy/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Thai%20Christians%20Respond%20to%20New%20Same-Sex%20Marriage%20Law%20%7C%20The%20Power%20of%20Singing%20Together&utm_campaign=CT%20Daily%20Briefing%20-%2002-18-2025 

• https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2025/02/republican-ag-sues-cities-for-christian-counselors-right-to-turn-lgbtq-youth-straight/ 

Faith vs. Fear: Immigration Raids in Houses of Worship

Recently, 27 religious organizations representing various denominations filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration to stop immigration raids in places of worship. This legal challenge has sparked a substantial debate around the intersection of religious freedom and government action, raising constitutional questions about the First Amendment's clauses on freely exercising religion. At the core of the lawsuit, these religious groups argue that immigration raids within their places of worship infringe on their religious freedom, instill fear, and hinder their ability to gather for prayer and provide services to their communities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defends the raids, arguing that they are necessary for public safety and national security. The key issue is whether the government's need to enforce immigration laws outweighs constitutional protections for religious freedom.

The lawsuit is supported by several religious groups that have been directly impacted by immigration enforcement in places of worship. These organizations argue that raids targeting sensitive locations like churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples interfere with their religious practices. Among the plaintiffs are the National Latino Evangelical Coalition and the American Civil Liberties Union, who claim that their congregants live in constant fear of deportation, which makes it difficult for them to engage in their faith entirely. The plaintiffs argue that these raids violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which is designed to protect individuals' right to practice their religion without government interference. The Trump administration, through the DHS, views these enforcement actions as necessary to ensure national security and uphold immigration laws. While recognizing the sensitive nature of religious spaces, the DHS argues that these raids are an essential part of its broader strategy to combat illegal immigration and safeguard public safety.

The legal question at hand is whether immigration enforcement in houses of worship imposes a significant burden on religious freedom. The plaintiffs argue that these raids violate the Free Exercise Clause by instilling fear and making it harder for congregants to practice their religion without concern for deportation. They also contend that such actions infringe on the freedom of religious institutions, which should remain free from government interference. Additionally, the plaintiffs point to the RFRA, which requires the government to demonstrate that its actions serve a compelling interest and use the least restrictive means to achieve that goal.

To evaluate this case, we can look at prior Supreme Court decisions that have debated religious freedom against government action. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) protected the religious liberty of the Amish community by ruling that the state could not force Amish children to attend school beyond eighth grade, as it interfered with their religious practices. This ruling highlights the importance of protecting religious communities from unnecessary and excessive state intervention. In both cases, the central issue is how far government authority can go before it violates the First Amendment's protections. Wisconsin v. Yoder set a precedent for limiting government overreach when it unnecessarily infringes on religious practices, which plaintiffs in the immigration case are arguing.

If the plaintiffs win, it could set a significant precedent limiting the government's ability to enforce immigration in religious spaces, potentially leading to greater protections for religious institutions. Contrarily, if the government wins, it may extend the ability of law enforcement's reach into sensitive religious settings, raising concerns about the loss of religious freedoms. This case ultimately emphasizes the tension between national security concerns and religious freedom. While the government has a legitimate interest in enforcing immigration laws, it must also balance that interest with the constitutional rights of religious groups to worship freely without fear of government interference. The outcome of this case will shape the boundaries between church and state in the U.S.

Religious institutions should stay independent from government interference, especially regarding worship. The First Amendment protects the right to exercise religion freely, meaning people can practice their faith in the most meaningful ways. Whether in a place of worship, at home, or within their community. For those who do gather in places of worship, it is essential that they can do so without fear of government control or intrusion. When the government steps in through surveillance, strict regulations, or disruptive actions, it invades these sacred spaces and creates fear and distrust. Congregants should never feel watched or judged for practicing their faith. Places of worship should be sanctuaries for peace, community, and spiritual growth, not places where the government’s presence causes disruption or fear. Protecting the free exercise of religion means respecting all forms of worship, whether public or private, and ensuring that people can practice their faith openly and safely. I believe that the government can address national security concerns related to immigration in other ways than invading places of worship. By keeping religious spaces free from unnecessary government intervention, we honor the First Amendment and protect everyone’s right to worship however they choose.

https://www.aol.com/legal-bid-keep-immigration-raids-205515609.html

https://nypost.com/2025/02/12/us-news/legal-bid-to-keep-immigration-raids-from-houses-of-worship-likely-to-lose-at-every-step-expert/

https://ground.news/article/27-religious-groups-sue-trump-administration-to-protect-houses-of-worship-from-immigration-arrests

Baked and Belittled

    Cathy Miller, a Californian Christian bake shop owner, has been challenged by the Civil Rights Department of California for her denial to depict a same-sex couple on their wedding cake in the case of Civil Rights Dept. v Cathy’s Creations. Cathy’s Creations opened in 2013 with stipulations surrounding what she is comfortable decorating cakes with, excluding anti-Christian values such as LGBTQ+ marriages from possible designs. When a couple walked in the store to request such artwork on their own wedding cake in 2017, Cathy refused, sending them to a different bakery in town to have their cake made. However, the Supreme Court is now faced with the challenge of whether it is within Cathy’s religious rights (outlined by the Free Exercise Clause) to discriminate against a customer's design request based on her own religious beliefs. 

To provide some legal context, the Free Exercise Clause serves the purpose of “secur[ing] religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions there by civil authority.” This is a difficult feat, as any set limitations on Cathy’s right to refuse by the law could be considered inappropriate invasions by civil authorities. Her argument is that it is within her constitutional right to operate her business by her own means, including turning down customers whose requests do not suit her personal religious beliefs. However, it can also be argued that this refusal to serve customers for their contrasting religion (or lack of religion) also violates this same clause, which outlaws “penaliz[ation] or discriminat[ion] against an individual or a group of individuals because of their religious views.” Should it be considered constitutional for a same-sex couple to walk into a public American bakery and be denied service for the same beliefs the constitution guarantees them the right to have?

In my opinion, although Cathy is freely exercising her religion through these various refusals of service, the act of discrimination against someone’s religious (or non-religious) beliefs and lifestyles is unconstitutional in itself. This is outlined by the Equal Protection Clause, which serves as a safeguard against discrimination by the government or private entities that provide services to the public, such as businesses. It mandates that laws and policies must treat all people equally and fairly, regardless of personal characteristics. For example, Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in places of public accommodation. This clause has been referred to countless times in similar cases to Cathy’s, such as Bob Jones University v. United States (1983), which ruled that the government’s interest in eliminating racial discrimination outweighs a religious institution’s claim to tax-exempt status when it engages in racial discrimination, even if the institution’s religious beliefs support such practices. This case can set a precedent for Cathy’s case, showing that religious claims should not supersede discrimination on a legal plane, and that there is a standard to which religious exemption has to meet in order to be considered constitutional by the court. 

So, although Cathy can be considered to be freely exercising her Christianity, she is, in turn, denying someone the right to practice their own (legal) secular beliefs in doing so. Her refusal of action that is impartial and unbiased to lack of religion does not only violate the Equal Protection Clause, but also the Jeffersonian mandate to “peace and good order” he established. Any act of discrimination where it is legal and safe to accommodate a request can be considered violent and a direct contrary to this notion. 

If businesses are allowed to reject customers’ requests based on personal beliefs, it could set a dangerous precedent where religious views supersede legal protections for individuals of different identities. The rights of LGBTQ+ couples to have their marriages respected, regardless of the personal religious beliefs of service providers, are also safeguarded by civil rights laws. The law should guarantee that no one is excluded from services based on their sexual orientation, just as it is written into the constitution that there is protection against discrimination based on race, religion, or sex. While respecting religious freedom is important, it cannot risk denying another person their basic human rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution, so Cathy’s business should be shut down (or she should be required to service all customers regardless of religious belief). The Supreme Court must respect both the religious beliefs of business owners and the right of every individual to equal treatment under the law.

The First Religious Charter School? St. Isidore Case Could Reshape Church-State Boundaries in Education

 In a potentially landmark case that could fundamentally alter the relationship between religion and public education in America, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the consolidated cases of Oklahoma Charter School Board v. Drummond and St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond. St. Isidore. These cases call into question whether Oklahoma can open St. Isidore, an online Roman Catholic charter school. If affirmed, St. Isidore would become the first faith based charter school in the United States, blurring the line of the separation of church and state. 

In October 2023, Gentner Drummond, Oklahoma’s attorney general, filed suit against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board to stop the establishment of St. Isidore, arguing that as a fully state-funded institution, the school would effectively represent government-sponsored religion, which would be in violation of state law, the Oklahoma Constitution, and the U.S. Constitution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in favor of the attorney general. The school and charter school board then appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the state court’s ruling takes away the school’s free exercise of religion by disqualifying them from government aid. 

There are two constitutional questions at issue. The first is whether a state-funded school teaching Catholicism constitutes the government supporting an established religion. Drummond argues that because charter schools “bear all the same hallmarks of a public school” they may not promote any religion. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with this notion, the Supreme Court has recently decided some cases which expand the boundaries of aid to religious schools. One such case is Trinity Lutheran Church Of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, Director, Missouri Department of Natural Resources. The 2017 case ruled that a Missouri law violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Trinity Lutheran Church had applied for a grant to resurface their preschool playground, and was denied by The Department of Natural Resources because the preschool was operated by a church. The church sued, claiming that the denial violated the Free Exercise Clause, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the church, stating that the government cannot exclude churches from secular government programs based on their religious identity. 

Another precedent that could apply to this case is Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing. In Everson, a taxpayer challenged a New Jersey law that permitted local school boards to reimburse parents for the cost of school transportation, including to religious schools, stating that this violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it forced taxpayers to indirectly support religious schools. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the New Jersey law did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it was neutral towards secular and religious schools. 

St. Isidore presents a uniquely challenging case that goes beyond previous precedents. Earlier cases that may have decided in “favor” of religious causes did so in a neutral way, primarily giving aid to parents and students rather than religious institutions directly. In this case, St. Isidore is requesting direct funding from the state to operate their charter school, which would explicitly teach Catholicism. In the Trinity case, the church was merely asking for funds to fix a playground, not for funds to go towards the church or its teachings. In Everson, reimbursement funds were going directly to families, and then it was up to these families to decide how they spent that money. Once again, no money was being given directly from the state to any religious institution. Both cases are not strong enough precedents to favor St. Isidore in this case. 

The implications of a ruling in St. Isidore’s favor would be far-reaching. Allowing Oklahoma to fund a public charter school that is explicitly teaching a specific religious view will completely change our country’s idea of the separation of church and state. I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Drummond. Charter schools are fundamentally public schools, funded entirely by state money. This makes St. Isidore a state actor, regardless of any private ownership. Having a state actor teach Catholic doctrine would clearly violate the Establishment Clause. Additionally, the previous Supreme Court cases that may be used as a precedent for this case involved indirect funding and general public benefits that were neutrally applied to both secular and religious clauses. St. Isidore receiving direct state funding specifically to teach religious doctrine would go far beyond allowing religious schools access to generally available benefits. Lastly, I feel that ruling in favor of St. Isidore would set a dangerous precedent for state funding of religious indoctrination. While the Free Exercise Clause prohibits discrimination against religion, the Establishment Clause prevents direct state funding of religious teachings. Religious groups would still be free to operate private schools, so the state of Oklahoma would not be discriminating against religion by maintaining public schools as secular institutions. For these reasons, I believe that the court would not be violating the Free Exercise Clause by ruling in favor of Drummond, and that it is necessary to rule in this way to protect the Establishment Clause. 

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/supreme-court-to-hear-oklahoma-case-involving-nations-first-religious-public-charter-school

https://theconversation.com/can-a-charter-school-be-religious-the-supreme-court-decision-about-st-isidore-a-catholic-school-in-oklahoma-could-redraw-lines-around-church-and-state-in-education-248383

Crisis Pregnancy Centers Face Compelled Speech Law in Delaware

    Pro-life pregnancy centers in Delaware are challenging a recent law mandating a certain disclaimer to be included with advertisements stating that they are not a medical facility licensed by the state of Delaware. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Jennings is brought forth by NIFLA, a charitable organization dedicated to providing legal protection and education to pregnancy centers that offer alternatives to abortions, and A Door of Hope Pregnancy Center, Inc., a Christian non-profit run by licensed medical professionals to provide resources to men and women “making decisions about their pregnancies.” As a religious non-profit, A Door of Hope Pregnancy Center receives no financial aid from the government, but according to Delaware state law is classified as a “limited services medical provider,” which would require them to include the disclaimer as mentioned above.

    The complaint filed states that the new law violates the Freedom of Speech Clause because it forces certain speech and unfairly targets the pro-life viewpoint; and it also violates the free exercise of religion clause because it forces the pregnancy clinics to “present misleading information” and “drown out their religiously motivated messages.”

    The question this case is centered around is this: is it constitutional for Delaware to pass a state law compelling the pro-life pregnancy centers to include disclaimers that work against their religious ideals in order to disclose the state’s classification of the center as a facility unlicensed by the state?

    The answer to this question has actually already been answered in a previous case brought forth in California. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for California to institute a law that forced pregnancy centers to “provide free advertising for the abortion industry.” This was taken as a violation of the Freedom of Speech Clause, but is being repeated in Delaware’s law - known as Senate Bill 300 - forcing particular speech, which is to “take effect in March” and “imposes government-impelled speech.”

    There are multiple aspects of Senate Bill 300 that are shown to directly impact pregnancy care centers more than other facilities. One is the fact that while this law in particular does not label registered nurses as “licensed medical providers,” the nurses working in these facilities are in fact registered nurses, licensed by the Delaware Board of Nursing, they are simply not included in the acceptable list in this bill. The law then classifies pregnancy centers as “limited services medical facility” which includes a lack of a “licensed medical provider on staff who provides or directly supervises, in person, the provision of each service provided at the facility,” which is misleading when every employee who is involved in medical procedures within the clinic is licensed according to law for the scope of their jobs, such as the registered nurses and medically licensed doctors.

    This law is also “not neutral or generally applicable” because it exempts facilities that “are licensed because they perform abortions.” This means that a burden is being placed on an organization that, again, is not funded by the government, nor falsely advertising the services they do provide, while elevating facilities that provide abortions and the world view that comes with their ideologies. Since Senator Bill 300 was created to “regulate crisis pregnancy centers,” which are pro-life in practice and belief, it is a form of control and discrimination against that world view.

    Not only do the pregnancy centers have to “discredit themselves by dishonestly stating they have no licensed medical providers on site,” but the disclaimer also subverts their mission to live out their beliefs regarding pregnancy. Even if they were to send a message regarding only religion and not medical services, such as “Merry Christmas,” they would be forced to include the disclaimer within that announcement. According to Rachel Metzger, the executive director of A Door of Hope, the new law is “an unlawful attempt to restrict our free speech simply because we hold a pro-life viewpoint.”

Exhibit C: Example post from A Door of Hope Pregnancy Center next to post with added disclaimer.

    According to the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” which means that it cannot burden pregnancy facilities with a viewpoint that opposes the majority, particularly when the health and safety of those who willingly choose to utilize them are not at risk. The pro-life pregnancy clinics feel religiously obligated to provide alternatives to abortion for expecting parents trying to make decisions about their unborn children. The government also cannot promote or favor the opposing viewpoint even if it may be the majority opinion, or else that may be taken as an establishment of a belief.

    The goal of the First Amendment is to protect minority beliefs, no matter how unpopular they are. The pro-life clinics do not force families to choose their facilities, and are not endangering lives, and so their right to act on their beliefs ought to remain intact. The compelled speech involved with this new disclaimer is a violation of their constitutional rights and should not be instituted.

Should Oklahoma allow the creation of public religious schools?

     This past Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a bid by Oklahoma City officials to approve the nation’s first publicly funded religious charter school, a move that may signal further weakening of the barrier between Church and State. The case revolves around a dispute between the proposed St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School, which would serve Oklahoma City youth while being officially of the Catholic denomination, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which ruled that the proposed school violates both the State and Federal constitutions. The Court announced that Justice Amy Coney Barrett, whose opinion would otherwise be integral to the ruling due to her religious background and education, would not participate. Although they didn’t announce why, speculation is that this is because her Alma Mater, Notre Dame Law School, is representing the school in the case.

    First proposed in 2023, the plans for the school were drafted by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, and endorsed by the governor, but opposed by the state attorney general, citing claims of religious non-neutrality. As of June 2023, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board has approved the school’s application, despite widespread concerns over the aforementioned case. Following the school’s approval in June of 2023, Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond, a Republican, took immediate action, asking that the Oklahoma Supreme Court intervene and rule the school’s creation unconstitutional. He explicitly cited in court filings that the state constitution mandates that schools in Oklahoma be “free from sectarian control”, and that no public funding should ever be used to support the creation or operation of such schools. The counterargument, which comes from the school and the state board, is that Oklahoma is inhibiting the free exercise of religion under a separate provision of the First Amendment. Because the court’s current composition is 6-3 with a conservative majority, many concerned residents and officials alike are voicing their dissent, stating that using public funds to fund a religious school violates the constitutional neutrality toward religion established in the First Amendment, which Thomas Jefferson notoriously referred to as a “wall of separation between church and state.

    The board is being defended by Alliance Defending Freedom, a notoriously conservative Christian legal group. Some of the arguments to be considered surrounding the case include whether or not the school is to be considered a proxy of the state because it is receiving funding. That is to say, because the school is being funded by the state, and because its operations rely upon public funding, is it effectively a “state actor”, or an arm of the government? This past June, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Drummond’s argument, citing that, “Under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school… As such, a charter school must be nonsectarian… However, St. Isidore will evangelize the Catholic school curriculum while sponsored by the state.” it also found that by receiving public funding, the school would be “acting as be acting as a surrogate of a state”, meaning that it would be considered a state actor. In recent related cases, the court has enabled the funneling of taxpayer money into religious entities, including schools under certain circumstances, further convoluting the case against this particular institution. Comments by Conservative justices on the court have also signaled that government officials have sometimes gone too far in avoiding the establishment of religion, going so far as to be effectively impeding the free practice of religion and thus free exercise of rights at times. In another related case, the court ruled in favor of a public high school football coach, who was suspended from his position for leading students in Christian prayer on the field. 

It is my personal opinion that the Supreme Court should oppose the creation of the Christian school, whose operations depend upon public funds. Because the school is reliant upon taxpayer money to operate, it is considered a public school, and has appropriately been deemed a “state actor”. Because of this, in order to uphold religious neutrality, the Supreme Court should cite that state actors, such as public schools, should remain secular, and have no religious ties or affiliations so as to avoid violation of the First Amendment which states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”. The opposing argument makes the claim that because the school is not being allowed to participate in a state program, it is preventing the free exercise of religion, but this is false as the school’s creation is only being denied on the basis that it relies upon public taxpayer funding. Should the school seek creation on its own private and personal financial merits, the state would have no right to oppose its existence, though because it is explicitly using taxpayer money to endorse the education of a specific religion, this qualifies as a governmental establishment of religion and should be thus ruled against.

Can the Government make Companies Hire Someone?

Aubry McMahon v. World Vision, Inc.

Aubry McMahon was offered a position as a customer service representative at World Vision Incorporated, a Christian nonprofit organization. The nonprofit required employees to engage in many religious actions such as praying with donors and engaging in religious training in order to assist the organization in carrying out their mission as Christians. McMahon had managed to advance beyond the beginning interview stage and had seemed to have made a great impression, however when the nonprofit learned that McMahon is currently in a marriage with another woman, they rescinded their offer. World Vision claimed that the basis for doing so was that McMahon would be violating their Standard of Conduct which, among other religious based policies, prohibited same sex marriage for their employees. 

McMahon subsequently the filed a lawsuit against World Vision claiming that they had violated both Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). World Vision argued that the Church Autonomy Doctrine protected their right to terminate her employment on the basis of her marriage. McMahon countered that the Church Autonomy Doctrine did not protect them because they had violated the laws that were put in place to protect her civil rights. 

The Legal issue here is whether World Vision’s actions to fire McMahon, based on her marriage to a member of the same sex, violated the protections given to her by Title VII and the WLAD or if World Vision has the right to fire her because they were exercising their constitutionally protected religious freedom. 

At the heart this issue is the Free Exercise Clause which protects citizens rights to religious expression, however it does not always extend to the actions that may come along with the beliefs one may hold. Take for example Reynolds V. US [98 U.S. 145 (1878)], James Reynolds was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Later Day Saints who had married two separate women because of his religious obligation to so. However, Reynolds was in direct violation of a federal statute that prohibited polygamous marriages and Reynolds was charged with committing bigamy. When Reynolds fought the case to the supreme court, they decided that; “It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief, and belief only.” [98 U.S. 145 (1878)] This reveals that only beliefs are protected by the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause and as such laws can be made to prohibit certain practices that may pose a danger to societal order. While this case may have been decided in such an early part of American history, it still holds merit in emphasizing that there can, and has been, an extent to which one is able implement their faith into their actions. 

Furthermore, in Everson V. Board of Education [330 U.S. I (1947)] in which it was decided that the New Jersey statute permitting reimbursement of transportation costs to public and parochial school attendees. They cited the fact that; “Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools” [330 U.S. I (1947)] as evidence that the mentioned law was protected by the Constitution. In other words, the fact that the law was religiously neutral protected it under the constitution would imply that laws have the ability to impede on certain freedoms to promote societal durability, as long the law is facially neutral. 

As these two case studies apply to the case at hand, the WLAD and Civil Rights act are both laws that protect certain minorities from discrimination and, because the government is allowed to impede religious freedom in the name of promoting good order, both of the laws should apply against World Vision for firing McMahon. Since the laws were enacted aiming to protect workers from discrimination, without disproportionately affecting any individual group or organization, the constitutionality of these laws should not be questioned. There is ample precedent for such restrictions to religion. If World Vision were permitted to discriminate on the basis that they claim to be religious, where is line as to who they can reasonably deny? Additionally, what is preventing a large swath of business owners from claiming that their religion prevents them from hiring people who were Atheists? Such a situation would cause systematic oppression of a group of people who would now find it quite difficult to find employment anywhere. By restricting employment, one restricts nearly every aspect of an individual’s life, thus cases involving employment should be treated with the utmost care.