All fifty states have laws that require schoolchildren to receive certain vaccinations and most of them permit religious exemptions. New York allowed religious exemptions until 2019, when following a major measles outbreak the policy was changed to only allow medical exemptions. Regardless, three Amish schools did not implement vaccine requirements because school families held sincere beliefs against vaccinations leading New York’s health commissioner to issue financial sanctions against these schools.
In response, the schools, an elected representative of state Amish schools, and two parents sued the state claiming that this law violated the Free Exercise Clause and that their case mirrored the parental and Free Exercise rights of the Amish protected in Wisconsin v. Yoder. In district court, the group filed for preliminary injunction and this was dismissed, so they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which upheld this decision.
The court ruled that the law was facially neutral as it applied to all schoolchildren who did not qualify for a medical exemption, but the plaintiff maintained that the law’s application favors a secular purpose. Nevertheless, the court held that the application is acceptable because medical exemptions only apply to a small group for specific vaccinations while religious exemptions could apply to a much larger group and cover all vaccinations, thus increasing transmission risk which is a compelling state interest. Lastly, the court considered if the plaintiff should be protected under Yoder as the immunization law forces them to either vaccinate their children or not educate them in a group setting which are both central to the exercise of their religion. However, the court disagreed with this, explaining that the burdens posed in this case do not create the same existential threat to Amish life as compulsory school attendance did in Yoder.
The plaintiff appealed this to the Supreme Court, arguing in part that the recent Mahmoud v. Taylor decision clarified that the principles of Yoder do not exclusively apply to mandatory attendance and can be applied to other facts. The Supreme Court granted this request and sent the case back to the Appeals Court for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud. A new decision on Miller v. McDonald has not yet been made.
The central issue that the Appeals Court will reconsider is: Does a New York State law which mandates schoolchildren to be vaccinated and permits medical, but not religious, exemptions violate the Free Exercise clause?
In my view, the appeals court should uphold the decision that it previously reached. Like how elements of the Sherbert Test were used in Yoder, that framework can be applied to this case to determine whether a religious exemption should be made. Under this doctrine it must first be considered if the law imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of one’s religion. In my view, this policy does inflict a burden on the Amish community because they do not believe in vaccinating their children and want them to be educated in a group setting; however, I agree with the appeals court that this burden is not substantial as it does not interfere with the day-to-day practice of their religion. There is also a significant compelling state interest for the law because it is meant to protect the general public from diseases that are preventable and this interest was heightened following the measles outbreak that led to the stricter policy. Lastly, there is no other equivalent way to minimize the spread of these diseases aside from attempting to immunize the majority of the population, so this is the least restrictive way to achieve this.
It is also important to consider the law’s neutrality. Given that this statute applies to all schoolchildren regardless of their religion, it is facially neutral, but whether its application is neutral is less clear and is the subject of immense debate. Because medical exemptions are being granted, but religious exemptions are not, the policy does not seem to be applied neutrally as exemptions for a secular cause are allowed but exemptions rooted in religion are not. However, as explored above, because this addresses a compelling state interest of immense importance, I still believe that this law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause as it is the least restrictive way to achieve this critical state goal.
The Appeals Court will also need to consider the clarification made to Yoder in the Mahmoud decision when reevaluating this case. Nevertheless, in my view, making clear that Yoder is not a fact specific decision does not change that the threat to Amish life posed by compulsory education laws is far more significant than that posed by mandatory vaccination laws which protect the safety of the general public. Therefore, even when considering the Mahmoud decision, I believe that the mandatory vaccination law in the State of New York is constitutional.
References:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-681/24-681-2025-03-03.html
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-133/368571/20250731170404791_25-%20Petition.pdf
https://fedsoc.org/events/litigation-update-miller-v-mcdonald
https://lawliberty.org/on-the-front-lines-of-religious-freedom/
https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/08/supreme-court-covid-vaccine-mandates/
11 comments:
Thanks Grace, you make a compelling argument for why the NY appeals court should uphold their decision. I agree with your analysis that the law is indeed neutral on its face. However, similar as in the Yoder case, the law clearly has a disparate impact on the Amish community. For this reason, I think other relevant facts need to be considered. I could see if the Amish community are mostly solitary, and their kids have little interaction with other students, then forcing them to get vaccinated would be quite burdensome. On the other hand, I see no greater compelling state interest than to protect children from potentially fatal diseases. I think this case is a good example of how difficult it is when religious beliefs directly clash with secular state goals. I ultimately agree with your constitutional reasoning that the state has a right to burden religion in an effort to keep people safe from diseases; however, I can see how if you are Amish, this decision would feel very restrictive of their beliefs.
I agree with Grace's analysis here. The law is facially neutral and the state interest is extremely compelling and significant. Grace also made a good point that there is really no other way to stop the spread of a disease like this without a vaccine. Although one could argue that the children who are not vaccinated for religious purposes could stay isolated from others, I think that has a strong negative impact on their school life and is difficult to maintain.
I agree with both Grace and Ethan’s analysis of the situation. While the law, as we have discussed, is facially neutral and might not allow for religious exemptions, I feel that the compelling state interest plays a major role in this ruling. The fact that diseases such as the one(s) being prevented by these vaccines don’t apply exemptions to who they affect, the state must ensure that it is safeguarding as many of its population as possible. With this in mind, the administering of vaccines with limited exemptions is, I believe, the least restrictive means applied by the state.
I agree with your analysis, especially with how this is a facially neutral law, but also that the state has a compelling interest to protect the general public from contracting dangerous diseases. In my opinion, mandatory vaccinations are a much smaller burden on the Amish than the compulsory school-attendance laws that were the main focal point in the Yoder case.
I agree with Grace on this case. I think that there is compelling state interest to mandate vaccinations, especially due to the rising concern after the measles outbreak. Additionally, I agree with the fact that this is the least restrictive means, because there is no other effective way to stop the spread of diseases, especially if entire communities are granted permission not to be vaccinated.
I agree that the vaccination requirement is not enough of a substantial burden on religious exercise compared to health safety. While the Amish families may feel pressure because of the vaccination rules, it does not prevent them from practicing their religion. There is compelling interest from the state because of the health risks shown by the measles outbreak. This outweighs the burden on free exercise and it is being done in the least restrictive way.
I think the ultimate reasoning of protecting public health provides significant enough evidence for a compelling reason for the state to require vaccinations to prevent the outbreak of measles. While this may force Amish families to participate it vaccination, it ultimately does not restrict them in practicing their religion. Due to those reasons I am compelled to agree with Grace's opinion on the case.
I agree. Protecting children's lives is 1000% a compelling state interest, and one could argue an absolute. While the Amish could view this as restrictive, as in Yoder, lives are not at stake. Fatal diseases do not discriminate based on religion and, therefore, the law is constitutional.
I agree with this analysis. On the point of neutrality and allowing medical exemptions but not religious, if people have a medical exemption from receiving a vaccine it may be because they are immunocompromised or have an allergy to a specific vaccine. By the rest of the population being vaccinated, people who cannot receive the vaccine are also protected by herd immunity. If one group is allowed to claim an exemption from vaccinating because of religious reasons, it may be a slippery slope that leads to an unvaccinated population, especially given that much of the US population is religious in some sort of way.
I agree with your perspective. Although it feels somewhat wrong to mandate administration of a drug into one's body, the state's interest here is clearly compelling and neutral. The mandate applies to everyone equally, and does not prevent any group from practicing their religion. If you look at this situation by means of weighing benefit to burden, the state has fair reason to enforce this law. Preventing severe illness and possibly death, especially among the youth, is compelling.
I think that the most convincing argument in this case is that of compelling state interest, where it is the state's responsibility to protect public health. Vaccine regulations are implemented to apply to everyone (with the exception of medical reasons) to protect everyone. The Amish community may feel that there is an unequal burden placed on them because of the vaccine mandate, but if groups are not getting vaccinated for religious reasons, there is then a burden of heightened health risk placed on other students. However, I do think that the neutrality of these mandates is still debatable, as it undoubtedly disparately impacts certain religious groups.
Post a Comment