Sunday, March 1, 2026

More Than A Zoning Permit: The Case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett

File:Bartlett TN Welcome to Bartlett.JPG - Wikimedia Commons

The case of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett, filed in July of 2025, presents a significant constitutional question regarding whether a zoning ordinance violates the US Constitution’s First Amendment Free Exercise Clause when its land use regulation process gives preferential treatment to like-minded organizations based solely on their religious affiliations. The case is an intersection between local municipal powers and constitutional protections pertaining to religious minorities. 

After the Barlett Muslium Society was denied a special use permit necessary to establish a mosque, the American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee filed a lawsuit against the city of Bartlett, a suburban area south of Memphis, TN. According to multiple news sources, as well as court filed pleadings and exhibits, this particular Muslim group is attempting to acquire land to convert into a worship facility, but utilizing the property for its intended religious purpose is specifically prohibited based upon existing local zoning protocols. Such protocols prohibit the existence of religious institutions until permission has been granted through an application process requiring local governmental review and approval.

The Society claims that many of the comments made towards them during the public hearings were anti-Muslim and islamophobic in nature rather than feedback solely regarding land use issues. The city did deny the application for the mosque’s building permit. According to the Society, the way that the city treated other Christian churches with respect to zoning permit applications was far less resistant and hostile. The ACLU of Tennessee has now filed suit in federal court against the city for violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Federal RLUIPA. According to Azya Thornton in the TBA Law Blog, "mosque officials have met permit requirements, including conducting a traffic study have showed no adverse impact." The city still argues that its decision to deny the Muslim Society's permit request was strictly based on legitimate zoning considerations, such as traffic patterns, compatibility with surrounding uses, and ability to accommodate the demand for additional infrastructure. 

Comparative analysis is critical in considering free exercise violations. In this case, the most compelling method is to compare the experiences of other religious organizations in the area with the permit obtainment process. What I feel is most controversial is how many times across the US there have been outright prejudice against Muslims during public hearings regarding construction of mosques, and whether local officials can truly separate their decisions from any possible prejudice. 

To determine if the Free Exercise Clause has been violated, the key question is whether the city’s decision to deny the mosque a permit was in fact neutral, general application of scrutiny, or whether it was discriminatory against Islam. For example, if the city allowed Christian churches to build under the same zoning regulations, but denied a Muslim house of worship, the unequal treatment would be evidence that the clause was violated. In addition to prohibiting the governmental endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from being “hostile” towards any religion (or lack thereof). Thus, if a municipality were to deny a mosque permit due to anti-Muslim values, not only is that a breach of the free exercise of religion, it violates the principle that the government must act neutrally towards all religions.The other law implicated by this case is RLUIPA, which is a federal statute enacted in 2000 to address the concern that local land use regulation was unnecessarily burdening religious entities. RLUIPA prohibits the land use regulation of religious entities, as such regulations impose a "substantial burden" on citizens’ religious exercise unless the government can demonstrate that it is advancing a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means possible.

The importance of Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett stems from the fact that the case deals with religious minorities. Historically, disputes regarding land use for mosques have highlighted community bias against them. The First Amendment’s guarantees become most vital when they are used to protect unwelcome or generally marginalized religions. The true test of religious freedom is when the government seeks to protect the most vulnerable, not just the majority.

I believe this case ultimately illustrates the reality of religious freedom in America. Religious freedom is not only the right to faith, but also the right to assemble and build community structures for one’s faith. If local governments use discretionary zoning powers to prevent religious minorities from establishing places of worship, then any and all constitutional guarantees are meaningless.The courts have an obligation under the Constitution to maintain neutrality and apply appropriate judicial scrutiny. If evidence implies that the Muslim Society was denied a zoning permit on the basis of unequal treatment, the refusal must be nullified under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA. In judging whether the zoning denial is a constitutional infringement, the courts should evaluate the objective evidence carefully. For example, did the conducted traffic studies provide adaquate evidence? Were there conditions on other religious places? Were previous practices followed with respect to permit denials?

Case: https://dockets.justia.com/docket/tennessee/tnwdce/2:2025cv02746/106916

Other Sources: 

https://tennesseelookout.com/2025/07/29/aclu-tennessee-sues-city-of-bartlett-for-blocking-mosque-project/

https://www.tba.org/?pg=LawBlog&blAction=showEntry&blogEntry=128836

Apache Stronghold v. United States

 In 2013, the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act was authorized to convert thousands of acres of Federal Tonto National Forest Land to Resolution Copper. The project plan was to construct and operate a world-class mine to deliver sustainable benefits to the community. While promising significant communal and economic benefits, the destruction of the sacred Oak Flat area is of much concern to the Apache people. The Apache are a group of Native American tribes, indigenous to the southwestern states of the US and Northern Mexico. They are considered Native Americans with distinct culture, language, traditions, and rituals surviving in desert-like areas. Oak Flat is located in Pinal County, roughly 40 miles from Phoenix in the Tonto National Forest. The Land is Sacred to Native Americans from the San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation and many other Arizona tribes. Oak Flat is a sacred site where the Apache Tribe go to worship, pray, and administer religious ceremonies. Apache Stronghold, an organization that represents the Apache Tribe, claimed that the transfer of the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper violated the members’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), and a treaty established between the United States and the Apaches in 1852.

Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to override the Supreme Court decision in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) to provide further protection under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the Oregon state agency denied unemployment benefits to two Native Americans who were released from drug counselling jobs because they tested positive for peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. The two men consumed the drug at a Native American religious ceremony as a religious sacrament during prayer. As part of their religion, peyote is seen as medicine for healing rather than a substance for drug use. Justice Antonin, writing for the majority, decided that “generally applicable religious-neutral criminal laws” do not violate the free exercise rights of individuals. The RFRA mandated that the court use strict scrutiny when examining laws that substantially affect religious freedom. After City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the court decided to overturn the provisions of the RFRA as it applied to the States. On a Federal level, though, the RFRA remains constitutional. Federally, the RFRA “Prohibits any agency, department, or official of the United States or any State from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that the government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: furthers a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”


Similar to Apache Stronghold v United States, in 1988, the United States Forest Service wanted to pave a roadway that would occupy the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Park in California. They also considered timber harvesting in the area as well. It was well known that the land was historically significant to Native Americans who held religious rituals on the land, and still, the Forest Service decided to pave a roadway. In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the court held that incidental effects of government land use, even if they destroy a religious group's ability to practice their religion, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless the government coerces individuals of the group to go against their beliefs. The Apache Stronghold made three claims for their case. The first failed under the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lyng case, as the case details are very similar. The court recognized that the government's actions with public land would interfere with religious privacy and the ability to seek satisfaction as it relates to their religious beliefs, but the government did not coerce anyone into acting contrary to their beliefs. Also similar to Lyng, the transfer of Oak Flat to mining grounds did not discriminate against the Apache Tribe or Stronghold members, nor did it deny them any rights or privileges received by other citizens. The second, regarding the RFRA, was denied as well because the interference with land is not considered a substantial burden to the Tribe. And lastly, claiming the 1852 treaty failed as well. Apache Stronghold claimed that the treaty created an enforceable trust obligation that the interference of land would violate, but the government’s obligation to transfer Oak Flat repealed any opposing treaty obligations. 


This case should be addressed with Lyng as precedent; therefore, the government has the right to convert the Oak Flat land to Resolution Copper. Lyng established that although government action may destroy the group's ability to exercise their belief on sacred soil, the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment is not violated unless coercion is involved. Unfortunately, the Apache people will have to relocate and find another place of worship after years of enjoying this sacred land, but they are not protected under the Free Exercise Clause, the Treaty of 1852, nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. This case is much different from what we have seen so far this semester, but looking into Free Exercise rights as it relates to historical sacred land and government enforcement sparked my interest, so I decided to do some research. I am excited to see if the class has any thoughtful responses or comments. Final Question: Does the government's authorization to convert acres of sacred land into a copper mine violate the Free Exercise Clause?


Resources