Proof, Power, and Procedure: Taking a look at Arroyo Castro v. Gasper

Imagine a public-school teacher placing a small crucifix on her classroom wall. For the teacher, it is a personal reminder of faith; for others, it may signal a religious message from the school. This tension is central to Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper, a recent Connecticut case that has attracted national attention. It raises a difficult constitutional question: When does a public-school employee’s personal religious expression become government-sponsored religious expression? The answer could have nationwide implications as public schools try to balance respect for individual religious freedom with government neutrality.

In the fall of 2024, Marisol Arroyo-Castro, a seventh-grade social studies teacher in New Britain, Connecticut, hung a crucifix that was one foot tall and six inches wide on the classroom wall near her desk. In December 2024, school administrators instructed her to remove it or place it somewhere students could not see it. They were concerned that a visible religious symbol in a public-school classroom could create the perception that the school was endorsing religion. Arroyo-Castro refused to remove the crucifix, saying it has personal and religious meaning to her. 

The school district disciplined Arroyo-Castro and, in a letter, said the Establishment Clause prohibits public school employees from placing religious objects in a classroom. The school district also said the crucifix had no curricular purpose. Arroyo-Castro challenged the school district’s actions in federal court, alleging violations of her First Amendment right to Free Exercise of religion and free speech. She also asked for a preliminary injunction to reverse the school district’s decision and allow her to keep the crucifix on the wall. In November 2025, the federal district court denied Arroyo-Castro’s request for a preliminary injunction. She appealed to the Second Circuit. 

At the center of this case is a disagreement about how to characterize the crucifix. Arroyo-Castro views it as a form of religious expression protected by the Free Exercise Clause, while the school district views it as a religious symbol in a public classroom that violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on government establishment of religion. This distinction places two First Amendment principles in tension: protecting an individual’s religious exercise while preventing government endorsement of religion.

Arroyo-Castro’s position that displaying the crucifix expresses her religion and should not automatically become government speech simply because she works for a public school draws support from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment protected a public-school football coach’s right to kneel and pray midfield after football games. Arroyo-Castro can similarly argue that her crucifix represented her beliefs, not the school’s. If teachers can display family photographs, sports memorabilia, or inspirational messages, restricting a religious object specifically because it is religious raises concerns about unequal treatment. She also did not require students to pray or teach Christianity as part of the curriculum, making her display seem more personal than governmental.

The school district and Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), however, argue that the issue is not simply whether Arroyo-Castro can practice her religion. Public schools also have an obligation to avoid government promotion of religion. A classroom differs from an ordinary workplace because teachers have authority over students, control the classroom environment, and communicate to students who cannot simply choose to leave. FFRF argues that the crucifix was displayed in plain view alongside classroom-related materials and that Arroyo-Castro’s classroom displays were connected to her official responsibilities. From this perspective, allowing teachers unrestricted religious displays could blur the line between personal faith and government-sponsored religion and make students reasonably perceive a religious message as carrying the authority of their public school.

What makes Arroyo-Castro particularly difficult is that both sides claim to be protecting religious freedom. Arroyo-Castro argues that requiring her to hide a symbol of her faith burdens her Free Exercise rights. The district argues that it is protecting students by preventing a government classroom from appearing to promote one religion. The constitutional question of whether the government can protect against an Establishment Clause violation by restricting an employee’s Free Exercise rights has even drawn the U.S. Department of Justice into the dispute. It argues that the district court incorrectly classified the crucifix as government speech and gave too much weight to Establishment Clause concerns. Ultimately, a lot depends on whether the crucifix is understood as Arroyo-Castro’s personal expression or as part of her official role as a teacher.

I believe Arroyo-Castro has the stronger constitutional argument, though her right to religious expression is not unlimited. The Establishment Clause should not mean that religion must become completely invisible whenever someone works for the government. Instead, context should determine when personal expression becomes government promotion. If Arroyo-Castro had led students in prayer, encouraged them to accept Christianity, pressured them to participate in religious activities, or incorporated her beliefs into instruction, the district would have a much stronger reason to intervene. A personal crucifix near her desk, however, does not necessarily communicate the same message. Equal treatment also matters. If teachers can personalize classrooms with secular objects reflecting their identities and beliefs, but religious objects are excluded specifically because they are religious, government neutrality risks becoming unequal treatment. True neutrality should mean treating religious and nonreligious personal expression equally while still preventing teachers from using their authority to promote or impose religious beliefs.

Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper ultimately asks where public schools should draw the line between preventing religious endorsement and protecting employees’ religious freedom. Teachers should not have to completely hide their religious identities because they work for the government, but they also cannot use their authority to impose beliefs on students. The Constitution should protect personal religious expression while allowing schools to intervene when it becomes promotion or coercion. How the Second Circuit draws that line could influence how public schools approach religious expression by employees of many different faiths.