Kumar v. Koester: Regulating caste in the United States

California State University is under a lawsuit surrounding a possible violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment. After updating its anti-discrimination policy, CSU’s policy now states there shall be no discrimination based on, “nationality, race or ethnicity (including color, caste or ancestry)”. The plaintiffs, two professors at CSU, sued the institution as they believe the word choice of ‘caste’ targets members of the Hindu community and faith. Since the new policy uses the term ‘caste’ it singles out certain individuals based on their religion or ethnicity. The plaintiffs also argued that this policy breached the Free Exercise as it ‘ridicules’ their religion, and falsely associates caste discrimination with Hinduism. Therefore, the plaintiffs felt that such a policy was unconstitutional on religious terms, burdening their Free Exercise and Establishment Clause. 

  This lawsuit presents the question; is using the term ‘caste’ in CSU’s anti-discrimination policy constitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses? 

The first half of understanding this case is to determine whether the anti-discrimination policy burdens the plaintiff's exercise of their religion. The Free Exercise Clause forbids any policy that “prohibits the free exercise” of one's faith. The plaintiffs allege that the policy falsely associated the caste system with Hinduism. So, does this policy word choice cause any restraint or burden on their exercise? I would say no, the policy does not burden their freedom to exercise their religion. The plaintiffs are arguing that there is a false connection between ‘caste’ and Hinduism. But, this would imply that the caste system is not practiced in Hinduism. The Hindu American Foundation stated in their lawsuit against CSU that, “Their characterization is incorrect that Hinduism mandates a racist and discriminatory ‘caste system’,” noting the separation between Hinduism and the caste system. Therefore, there can be no burden on the exercise of the caste system in Hinduism, as the two are separate. The plaintiffs can still practice their religion freely and without restraint as the caste system is not apparent in Hinduism, presenting no burden.

Next, the plaintiff's second claim is that the policy’s use of the word ‘caste’ violates the Establishment Clause as it attempts to define Hinduism as a religion including a caste system, singling out one religion in the policy, inherently targeting Hinduism. Ensuring that the government is neutral and does not endorse one religion over others, the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoritism of specific religions. The plaintiffs allege that this breach burdens their religion, as it asserts a stigmatism between Hinduism and the caste system. Further, the plaintiffs themselves are staff members of CSU and members of the Hindu religion, making this case quite personal. But, how does this anti-discrimination policy connect the term ‘caste’ to Hinduism? The plaintiffs claim this policy causes a false stigmatism between the two, but the policy never defines ‘caste’ or refers to any religion or religious practice. In my findings, this policy does not display a relation between ‘caste’ and Hinduism. The term ‘caste’ can have secular and religious definitions, but the policy does not elaborate on either, and instead only uses the word ‘caste’ along with other secular dividers in society. 

Lastly, the plaintiffs claim that the policy is not neutral, as it directly targets Hinduism. Further, this policy is claimed to be coercive, as it shows the government’s disapproval of Hinduism. On the contrary, in my opinion, this policy does not breach the Establishment Clause. The plaintiff's claim that in dictionaries the definition of ‘caste’ often refers to Hinduism, therefore supporting their claim of direct targeting and neutrality. But, there are various definitions of ‘caste’, some of which do not reference Hinduism or any religion. Even if the policy used the word ‘caste’, it does not imply any connection with Hinduism.

    All in all, it can be concluded that the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs have not been violated, and as a result, CSU’s anti-discrimination policy is constitutional in using the term ‘caste’. The case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, presents a similar issue; the word choice and intent of policies concerning the direct targeting of the plaintiff's religious practices and beliefs. But, these cases differ in important ways, as the Supreme Court concluded that the policies enacted against the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. were unconstitutional. The reason why I have sided differently with Kumar v. Koester is due to key details. First, the policy in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah bans the practice of ‘sacrifice’, which according to the religion’s members and doctrines is a part of the religious practice of their faith. But, in Kumar v. Koester, the plaintiffs allege that the caste system is not practiced in their religion. This issue poses the question; how can the policy be unconstitutional if the caste system is not even present in Hinduism, as the plaintiffs claim? Additionally, it was concluded in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that the policies enacted intently targeted their religion. But, in Kumar v. Koester, the policy does not burden the plaintiff's practice of their religion or target Hinduism. Therefore, these cases are different due to circumstantial evidence in the facts. While the decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah is correct, its logic cannot be applied to Kumar v. Koester.

Sources 

https://www.news18.com/news/world/lawsuit-claims-california-state-universitys-anti-discrimination-policy-targets-hindus-by-including-caste-as-protected-category-6194449.html

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/kumar-v-koester/ 

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-cd-cal/115744326.html

When Should the State Intervene in the Spending Practices of a Religious Organization?

James Huntsman, a wealthy businessman and former Mormon, used to dedicate 10% of his annual income to the LDS practice of tithing (the gifting of donations to the church). Known by some within his church as the "Mormon Kennedy", Huntsman's influence was notable within the religious community, yet he felt wronged by the church when a whistleblower exposed the reality of where the tithing funds were being allocated. Huntsman donated to the church with the understanding that his money would not be used to fund for-profit entities, however, in 2019 when a whistleblower within the church's finance office revealed that 1.4 billion dollars worth of tithing funds were being used to build a mall in Salt Lake City, Utah, Huntsman was furious. While this act demonstrated that tithing funds were not being used for strict religious purposes, it also exposed the church's deliberate attempt to hide their financial transactions. As a result of this newfound information, Huntsman privately approached the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and asked for his 5 million dollars worth of tithing funds returned, plus additional penalties and fees. The LDS Church refused Huntsman's demands, and as such, in 2021, he sued the church for fraud. 

The LDS Church maintained that they were not deceptive and that the tithes were never used, nor solicited, for the construction of the mall. As such, when the case reached the District Court, the judge held that the LDS Church was not committing fraudulent acts with tithes, and that they were entitled to keep Huntsman's donations. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the court overturned the initial decision, ruling in Huntsman's favor. Following this decision, an amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Church and a request to rehear the case in front of a full judicial panel in September of 2024 was granted. The courts were coaxed into rehearing the case in September, as a result of the brief's assertion that the courts should not be involved in determining the validity of a church's religious motivations, in this case, the practice of tithing. The separation of church and state that the LDS Church requested is one that is frequently upheld within the court's history, predominately beginning with United States v. Ballard in 1944. 

Thus, is the Church of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints entitled to retain full control over their religious practice of tithing, under the First Amendment's guarantee that the government will not prohibit the exercise of religion? Further, does the government have the power to determine the legitimacy of religious practices? 

Considering these questions, there are numerous precedents which speak to the court's historic stance on this subject. As mentioned, United States v. Ballard stands as a noteworthy starting point in formulating an argument with regard to the actions of the LDS Church. In Ballard, Guy Ballard, a member of the I Am Movement who believed he possessed healing powers, was charged with mail fraud under a regulation which states you may not use mail services with the intent to defraud the citizenry. In court, it was determined that neither a court nor jury can determine "the truth or verity of respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs" (Ballard). As such, regardless of how outlandish a religious practice may seem, all a court can determine is if a religious belief is sincerely held. After a long legal dispute, it was determined that Ballard did not commit fraud, which in the context of Huntsman, bolsters the claim that the LDS Church did not behave fraudulently in their use of tithing money, particularly considering that the LDS Church holds sincere religious values and has existed since the 1830s. 

In addition, this case raises the question as to if the courts should interfere with the religious motives of the LDS Church. As previously stated, the court does not seek to interfere with the practices of religious groups, and more recently, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2012) demonstrates this initiative. In this case, which was predominately concerned with employment policies, Cheryl Perich was fired by the Lutheran Church and School after she became sick in 2004. Under a "ministerial exception" in the law, religious groups are entitled to hire and terminate employees without any repercussions from the legal system. The courts ruled in favor of the Lutheran Church, claiming that it is essential that the lines of church and state are not blurred. The court determined that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment "bar the government from interfacing with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers" (575), since the "church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way" (578, Muñoz). Just as the Hosanna-Tabor case saw the courts rule in favor of the church's ability to run its organization without interference, when applying this precedent to Huntsman, it is clear that the courts will desire to enable the LDS Church to retain complete control of their entity. 

In considering the precedents and the specific facts of Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter-day Saints, I believe that the courts should rule in favor of the LDS Church. According to the attorneys defending the LDS church, "Virtually any person who has fallen away from their faith may view their donations to the church during their faithful years as a waste...but that cannot mean that each of them has a fraud claim that allows them to try and convince a secular jury that they were swindled." I agree with this sentiment, as the church, not the state, must retain the power in determining how the tithing donations are applied. While Mormons are encouraged to contribute a tithing as part of their religious doctrine, it is not the responsibility of the court to determine how the church uses these funds. Additionally, one always retains the option to exit a religious group, should one determine that their values no longer align with the organization. 

Sources:

https://becketnewsite.s3.amazonaws.com/20231002221815/2023-10-02-85-Becket-En-Banc-Amicus-Brief.pdf 

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/huntsman-v-corporation-of-the-president-of-the-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints/# 

https://www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Huntsmans-Complaint.pdf 

https://www.sltrib.com/news/2023/09/21/lds-church-appeals-says-james/

https://www.sltrib.com/religion/2021/03/23/update-james-huntsman/

https://www.deseret.com/opinion/2023/8/21/23840063/church-tithing-funds-reserve-funds-james-huntsman/

Should Religious Charter Schools be Permitted?

     The OKPLAC (Oklahoma Parent Legislative Action Committee) has raised a suit against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board in the case of OKPLAC, Inc. v. Statewide Virtual Charter School Board. The reason for the case is that St. Isidore, a Catholic ministry, was approved by the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School board to open a charter school. A charter school is a school that is managed privately but is paid for through public school funding. 

The question in this case is whether or not the state funding this religious school is an establishment of religion. The issue grows more complex when the policies of the school are examined in detail. St. Isidore plans to follow traditional conservative Catholic standards in regard to marriage and sexuality. Due to these standards, students could be denied access to the school because they or a family member are LGBTQ+, of a different religion, or do not conform to Catholic beliefs. The school plans to provide a Catholic education and indoctrinate its students with religious beliefs. The school has stated that it will incorporate the Catholic Church’s teaching into all aspects, subjects, and activities of the school. 

The school board has used the recent Supreme Court case of Carson v. Makin as a way to defend their opening of a religious charter school. In the Carson case, Maine compensated tuition for students who lacked a local public school, allowing families to use these funds at private institutions, irrespective of their religious affiliation. The Carson case does not apply in this context. In that case, public funds went to families, who could then choose which school to send it to. In the OKPLAC case, public funds are going directly to the Catholic Church. Whether or not families choose to send their children there, the state will be paying the salaries of religious teachers, paying for the infrastructure of the school, and paying for religious teachings. This direct funding is a state sponsorship of religion and is thus a violation of the Establishment Clause. 

Furthermore, there is a compelling state interest in promoting diversity. This precedent was established in the case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. The court said that the CLS must conform to the school's non-discrimination policy in order to be recognized as an official student organization. The club required members to conform to Christian values and thus would discriminate against students who did not, especially LGBTQ+ students. The court said that this discrimination was not viewpoint-neutral and thus sided with the university. In the OKPLAC case, the court should apply this same precedent in order to promote the compelling state interest in diversity and inclusion of citizens who are LBGTQ+ or of a different religion. 

I believe that St. Isidore should not be permitted to become a charter school. They should be free to open a private school and within that sphere, discriminate against whoever goes against their religious values, but if the government is funding it, that would be an establishment of religion. This case also connects to the Bob Jones University v. United States case, in which the government revoked the universities tax exempt status because it did not permit interracial marriage. The government found that there was a compelling state interest to promote racial acceptance and diversity and told the university that they were free to have those practices, but if they did they would not receive public funds. St. Isidore has a constitutional right to open a school that conforms to Catholic beliefs, but they do not have a right for the government to fund it. 

In conclusion, the case of OKPLAC, Inc. v. Statewide Virtual Charter School Board brings up many important debates on the role of funding religious education. Unlike in Carson v. Makin, where tax dollars went to families who then chose which school to send it to, religious or not, the tax dollars in this case would go directly to a religious institution, violating the Establishment Clause. The direct sponsorship of a religion that would also practice discriminatory policies calls into question the state's interest in promoting diversity and inclusion, which the court has prioritized historically, such as in the Bob Jones and Christian Legal Society cases. In order to avoid a violation of the First Amendment, Oklahoma can not open a religious charter school. 

Sources:

https://fedsoc.org/events/litigation-update-okplac-inc-v-statewide-virtual-charter-school-board

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/okplac-v-statewide-virtual-charter-school-board/# 

https://www.aclu.org/cases/okplac-inc-v-statewide-virtual-charter-school-board

Funding Faith: The Controversy Surrounding Youth 71Five Ministries

In the case of Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, Youth 71Five, a religious organization dedicated to serving youth in the Rogue Valley of Oregon, applied for grants from the Oregon Department of Education to support its programs. Despite being awarded the grants initially, they were later rescinded when Oregon officials discovered that 71Five required its employees and volunteers to adhere to its statement of faith, which included affirming basic Christian beliefs. The officials cited this requirement as discriminatory, prompting them to revoke the grants. 71Five attempted to explain that their actions were protected by the First Amendment, but the officials persisted in their decision. In response, Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) attorneys filed a lawsuit in March 2024, mainly alleging religious discrimination by Oregon officials.

Thus, does the rescinding of grants by the Oregon Department of Education to Youth71Five Ministries, based on the organization’s religious hiring requirements, constitute a violation of their right to freely exercise religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

In recent years, debates over the intersection of religion and government funding have sparked many legal battles. This case in particular highlights the fine line between religious freedom and the principles of secularism embodied in the Constitution. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects citizens’ right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of “public morals” or a “compelling” governmental interest. Youth 71Five Ministries argues that their religious beliefs are integral to their mission and that they should be allowed to hire individuals who share those beliefs without facing discrimination in government funding. However, the concerns raised by Oregon officials regarding Youth 71Five’s hiring practices call upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing or favoring any particular religion, ensuring the separation of church and state. By requiring employees and volunteers to adhere to a statement of faith, Oregon argues that Youth 71Five is effectively promoting religious beliefs through government-funded programs, which could potentially violate the Establishment Clause. Additionally, while religious organizations have the right to operate according to their beliefs, they must do so within the bounds of laws that prohibit discrimination and maintain the secular nature of government-funded programs – both of which constitute compelling state interests.

From a constitutional standpoint, and analyzed through a separationist lens, Oregon’s decision to rescind grants awarded to Youth 71Five Ministries is in alignment with the principles of neutrality and non-discrimination according to the First Amendment. While religious freedom is indeed a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, it is not absolute and must be balanced with other constitutional principles, including the Establishment Clause. In the case of Youth 71Five Ministries, Oregon’s Department of Education acted within its authority to uphold neutrality in government-funded programs by enforcing policies that prevent taxpayer money from being used to promote or endorse religious activities. Under separationist ideals, Oregon’s decision to withhold funds from 71Five ensures that taxpayer money is allocated in a manner that respects the diverse beliefs and values of its citizens while maintaining the secular nature of government endorsement and institutions. This decision does not infringe upon 71Five’s right to freely exercise its religion, as the organization remains free to operate according to its faith principles without government interference. Moreover, Oregon’s actions are supported by legal precedent, including the Supreme Court’s ruling in Locke v. Davey. In this case, the Court upheld Washington State’s decision to exclude devotional theology majors from a college scholarship program, emphasizing the state’s compelling interest in separating religious activities from public funding. Furthermore, it remains a compelling argument that providing government funding to an organization with questionably discriminatory hiring practices sets a dangerous precedent that could undermine the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination. By enforcing policies that promote inclusivity and prevent discrimination, Oregon is upholding its obligation to protect the rights of all individuals, regardless of their religious affiliation. The case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez also establishes precedent in favor of Oregon’s actions in the Youth 71Five Ministries case by highlighting the principle of viewpoint neutrality in government policies. The Christian Legal Society challenged the University of California’s refusal to recognize it as an official student organization due to its requirement that members adhere to specific religious beliefs. The university’s decision was upheld due to the school’s conditions for recognizing student groups as viewpoint neutral and reasonable. This heavily aligns with the idea that establishment concerns supersede those of free exercise when the legitimate interest of the government in combatting discrimination is challenged.

In conclusion, this case emphasizes the complex interplay between religion and government funding that we have been encountering in our course week after week, highlighting the need for careful consideration of constitutional principles and precedent cases to ensure that religious freedom is respected while also preventing discrimination in public programs. However, I note that the interpretation of discrimination policies by government agencies is another salient issue at hand. While the Oregon Department of Education aimed to prevent discrimination in its grant program, the interpretation of what constitutes discrimination becomes contentious when applied to religious organizations. Does requiring employees and volunteers to adhere to religious beliefs actually amount to discrimination as suggested in my analysis, or is it a legitimate exercise of the organization’s religious identity and mission? I leave you with this consideration.

Sources: 

https://adflegal.org/article/christian-youth-ministry-denied-state-grants-because-it-only-hires-christians

https://dm1l19z832j5m.cloudfront.net/2024-03/Youth-71Five-Ministries-v-Williams-2024-03-20-MPI.pdf

https://www2.cbn.com/news/us/state-revokes-400k-grants-risk-youth-ministry-due-its-religious-beliefs

Can a City Council Meetings Begin with 'Hail Satan' ?

    Prayer at the beginning of gatherings have long been a hot topic issue in the United States. From instances of community meetings, legislative sessions, school graduations, and more, the Supreme Court has ruled most often that invocations are permitted among adults. They specify that in most scenarios if content neutrality and coercion are properly dealt with, then invocation of deities in these settings are permissible and in the spirit of our history. Each case is slightly different however for the Supreme Court, with cases such as Marsh v. Chambers (1983), Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), Wallace v. Jaffree, and Lee v. Weisman (1992), all resulting in slightly different rulings, as the context of where these invocations took place and whom the audience was mattered so deeply. However, for the case I will discuss in this blog post, Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014) are the most important.

    In the case between The Satanic Temple v. The City of Chicago, the Satanic Temple (TST) is suing over the fact that the Chicago City Council has been denying their ability to give an invocation at their meeting. More than 50 religious groups have given invocations in front of this City Council when TST first inquired about giving this invocation. The Council allegedly ignored the request, and after a period of around three years, Minister of Satan Adam Vavrick decided to file a suit against the Council, which is ongoing, and recently was permitted to move ahead with its motion.
    Vavrick found it important to describe what TST is, and he claims it to be a “... religion [that] is an affirmation that you cannot touch me, because I am happy with who I am” (Block Club Chicago). The Temple does not specifically worship Satan, but they reclaim its symbolism to reject authority. TST does not incite violence nor would Vavrick’s invocation;
“Let us stand now, unbowed and unfettered by arcane doctrines born of fearful minds in darkened times. Let us embrace the Luciferian impulse to eat off the tree of knowledge, and dissipate our blissful and comforting delusions of old. Let us demand that individuals be judged for their concrete actions and not their fealty to arbitrary social norms and illusionary categorizations. Let us reason our solutions with agnosticism in all things, holding fast only to that which is demonstrably true. Let us stand firm against any and all arbitrary authority that threatens the personal sovereignty of one or all. That which will not bend must break. And that which can be destroyed by truth, should never be spared its demise. It is done.
“Hail Satan.”
    To revisit the rulings in Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), they both find that for adults, prayers can be allowed in Government settings. Marsh is most relevant, and specifically found that even specific Christian prayers before the Nebraska legislature is permitted, since they do not coerce members to participate, they allow for any religion to invocate, and they do not specifically call for a renunciation of any specific God or deity. The majority also called directly to historical precedence, and recounted that the constitutional congress used Christian prayer to open their legislative sessions. Another main point was that if someone, like the Senator Marsh were to be offended by any invocation, he could simply remove himself from the session at the beginning or simply not pay attention. While less directly comparable, Galloway was a much more recent case, and affirmed that these prayers may be allowed to open local town board meetings, which are in front of and for the public, which the minority described as particularly disturbing. However, the majority again referenced the historical tradition in our Nation of prayer in public settings, and found it not to be an establishment of religion in that setting as well.
    Using these two precedents, I believe The Satanic Temple v. The City of Chicago case presents an interesting mix of the two. Both previous cases use historical tradition as an argument in the decision, and specifically reference Christian prayer in the historical tradition, and Satan is obviously a direct opposite of Christianity. However, in Galloway, the majority established that they must allow for all religious groups to invoke, regardless of how minority they may be. And, contextually this is in a legislative setting, much less open to the public, which means that there is less chance for coercion according to the Court. Reasonable adults in this situation are deemed to be less able to be coerced, and I agree. And, using the Court's logic in Marsh, anyone who takes offense to this particular invocation can simply leave the room. The crux of this case is a good test for the Court, will they respect the most outlandish religion in our popular culture? (Some might even attempt to claim TST as the antithesis of religion). But, based on the Court's understanding of the Constitution, and Madisons’ Memorial and Remonstrance, the First Amendment’s key purpose is to protect minority religions against the tyranny of the majority. Therefore, I find that the Court must protect TST’s constitutional right to free exercise, and that based on Court precedent, there is not an establishment threat.
  

 In addition, in this setting, it is even more unconstitutional to ban TST since other religious groups were permitted to give invocations and this contextual setting has been deemed to not be coercive, the main threat of establishment clause cases. They are specifically denying a minority religious groups the same right to exercise as majority groups, and this is unconstitutional. Overall, I believe that if this case were to go to the Supreme Court, they should rule in favor of The Satanic Temple, as the City of Chicago is squashing their First Amendment right to hail Satan before the City Council, as outlandish as it may sound. 

Sources: 

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2024/04/satanic-temple-can-move-ahead-with.html 

http://blockclubchicago.org/2023/05/18/satanists-sue-chicago-for-not-allowing-them-to-say-hail-satan-at-city-council-meetings/ 

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2023cv02780/433114/25/0.pdf?ts=1711986779 

The Right to Worship in One's Home?

During the summer of 2023, Pastor Howard Kaloogian opened the church, Grace New England, in Weare, New Hampshire, a plant of Grace Community Church in Texas. Pastor Kaloogian had held various secular gatherings at his home since moving to Weare in 2015, including weddings, backgammon tournaments, a meeting for the annual Pine Tree Riot, and even political rallies, most recently for presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr.. Additionally, he had hosted weekly Bible studies and weekend church services of a smaller scale on his property. Before hosting large gatherings, Pastor Kaloogian’s wife sought approval by the Weare Planning Board, and was informed that as long as the family did not charge fees for admittance into their events, submission of a site plan would not be necessary. It could use its barn for any lawful purpose. 

However, this all changed on August 23, 2023, when Tony Sawyer, the Zoning Officer for the Town of Weare, visited Pastor Kaloogian’s property unannounced, and notified the Pastor that he was prohibited from holding religious assemblies at his estate, given the property was zoned “residential.” . The zoning officer noted that in order to continue holding these assemblies, a conditional use permit would be required, which Mr. Sawyer recognized was unlikely to be approved. Later that day, Pastor Kaloogian sent a letter to the Chair of the Weare Planning Board, Craig Francisco, describing the events, both secular and religious, that he had been able to previously host with no issue. Nearly a month later, Chairman Francisco wrote back informing Pastor Kaloogian that he would need to apply for a site plan in order to continue hosting church gatherings in his barn. The following month, in preparation for the cold winter months ahead, Pastor Kaloogian sought to install an upgraded, radiant heater in the barn, and hired a plumber to acquire a permit from the Town of Weare that would enable a gas line to be connected to the heater. Initially, the town officials began to process the request, but soon refused after finding out the address given was that of Pastor Kaloogian’s barn. During the following months, town inspectors did arrive at the barn to consider granting the permit, but ultimately, final approval was never granted. This occurred two months after Mr. Sawyer had sent a cease-and-desist notice to Pastor Kaloogian, subjecting him to significant fines each day he failed to comply.

On February 9, 2024, after town officials threatened to take legal action to force Pastor Kaloogian to abide by their zoning demands, First Liberty Institute filed a lawsuit on behalf of Kaloogian and the church. The basis of this case pertains to whether the Town of Weare and its officials violated Pastor Kaloogian’s free exercise rights by requiring him to apply for a site plan and conditional use permits, among other restrictions, in order to carry out worship in his home with his congregation of Grace New England. The most salient issues present in this case center around questions of neutrality, as well as concepts such as substantial burdens, compelling state interests, and the implementation of the least restrictive means. 

I believe the Town of Weare violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), § 674.76 of a New Hampshire Statute, the Town’s own zoning ordinances, and Part I, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The RLUIPA prohibits “any government from imposing or implementing a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The wording of this act is similar to that of Part 1, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which has been interpreted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court to require the application of strict scrutiny for any substantial burden on religious free exercise. §17.2.1 of the Town of Weare’s own zoning ordinances allows for religious use of residential property, even explicitly permitting use by a church. Despite this, however, Pastor Kaloogian was being subjected to burdensome requirements in order to carry out worship at his home. In the 1963 case, Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court explained its interpretation of a substantial burden to be something that “forced the adherent to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of her precepts… on the other.” Although the facts of this case are slightly different, this interpretation can still be applied here. The need to apply for a site plan and conditional use permits, in addition to the multiple inspections that were required of Pastor Kaloogian, put him in a position where he felt he had to choose between following his religion, or being subjected to hefty daily fines for non-compliance. Thus, I believe a substantial burden was imposed on his ability to freely exercise his religion.

The stated purpose of the zoning ordinances is to control vehicular and pedestrian movement, protect the public welfare, guard safety concerns, among others. When looking at the “compelling state interest” provision of the RLUIPA, despite these stated purposes, I still do not find these interests compelling enough to justify imposing the burdensome restrictions on Pastor Kaloogian and his Church of New England. As will be described later, the town does not place similar restrictions on secular gatherings of comparable or larger scale, which not only leads me to question the validity of the stated governmental interest, but also whether the Town of Weare was remaining neutral in its decisions. The Robert F. Kennedy Jr. meeting and various weddings hosted by Pastor Kaloogian have held hundreds of people, considerably more than the average of 30 individuals who attend the Pastor’s weekend church services. Therefore, in evaluating sheer numbers, it seems these church services pose a significantly lower risk than other larger secular events. This then raises the question of why the Church of New England’s services are the only events facing these restrictions. Additionally, even if the Town of Weare were able to prove a compelling interest, I do not believe the actions taken represent the least restrictive means to achieving the stated interest. Nevertheless, the zoning ordinances still permit churches in districts zoned “residential,” so the town's actions in this case not only violate the ordinance itself, but also the provisions of the RLUIPA. Additionally, the Town of Weare is violating the New Hampshire Revised Statute § 674.76, which mandates that “no zoning ordinance or site plan review regulation shall prohibit, regulate, or restrict the use of land or structures primarily used for religious purposes.” Therefore, the town’s zoning ordinances violate both the RLUIPA, as well as this New Hampshire statute.

The other salient issue in this case pertains to the concept of government neutrality. The RLUIPA states that the government cannot “impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious institution or assembly.”  It is important to first note what constitutes “neutrality.” The Supreme Court held in the 2021 free exercise case, Tandon v. Newsom, that “government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable ... whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.” Based upon this interpretation of neutrality, it is evident that the Town of Weare has violated the equal terms provision of the RLUIPA by treating religious and non-religious gatherings differently. The town has failed to impose similar restrictions upon comparable secular events held at both Pastor Kaloogian’s home, as well as the homes of other residents. Additionally, the town’s actions are not generally applicable, as these restrictions have not been uniformly applied; Pastor Kaloogian’s home has been assessed on an individual basis.

 The facts of this case largely parallel those of the 2005 case Konikov v. Orange County. In that case, the city of Orange County tried to prohibit a rabbi from holding religious gatherings in his home, while allowing other social gatherings of a more secular nature. The US Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit argued that Orange County’s zoning policy violated the equal terms provision of the RLUIPA, noting that “by applying different standards for religious gatherings and nonreligious gatherings having the same impact, [the town’s enforcement action] impermissibly targets religious assemblies.” Although this case was not decided in the same circuit the Town of Weare would be, and thus the decision is not binding in that circuit, many of the arguments made in that case can also be made in this one. I believe the court ruled correctly in Konikov v. Orange County, and the Church of New England case should be decided similarly.

In conclusion, I believe that Pastor Kaloogian was denied his free exercise of religion. Through the Town of Weare’s violation of the RLUIPA, § 674.76 of the New Hampshire Revised Statute, the Town’s own zoning ordinances, and Part I, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution, it has appeared to target religious gatherings over secular ones, while placing a substantial burden on Pastor Kaloogian’s ability to freely exercise his religion. At the same time, the Town of Weare has failed to justify a compelling governmental interest, and likewise, to implement the least restrictive means to accomplish that compelling interest.

Sources:

https://firstliberty.org/cases/grace-new-england/

https://decisionmagazine.com/town-officials-try-to-shut-down-barn-church/

Denial of After School Satan Club Religious Discrimination?

  The Saucon Valley School district allows several clubs to use its facilities after hours, including The Good News Club, Girls on the Run Lehigh Valley, and the Boy Scouts. But should it allow the After School Satan Club? 

    The After School Satan Club, which provides students an alternative to other religious after-school clubs, was initially approved in February of last year to meet every month at Saucon Valley Middle for the remainder of the school year. The club operates in schools across the country and was created and sponsored by the Satanic Temple. The Satanic Temple filed a religious discrimination suit against Saucon Valley School District after district approval to use the school’s facilities was rescinded. 

The school rescinded approval, the district claims, because the club violated a school board policy stating that groups must “clearly communicate that the activities are not being sponsored by the school district”. The district superintendent claimed that the font on an “advertisement” denying the club’s affiliation with the school district was too small. The advertisement they refer to was posted on a parent’s Facebook account, not a member affiliated with the Satanic Temple. 

The superintendent claimed the policy intended to prevent interference with the educational program of the district. The District claimed the club did, because following the club’s announcement, the school received a threat, and the district closed its facilities for two days to investigate the incident.

The court was faced with the question: Did the District’s invocation of policy 707 to rescind approval of The After School Satan Club constitute viewpoint discrimination, an unconstitutional violation of their free exercise rights?

If this were simply a case of denial based on ‘inadequate’ communication by the After School Satan Club, the decision would be clear. The post in question did not come from a member of the Satanic Temple, it was from a parent, and still included the information that the club was not affiliated with the School District. Furthermore, the district did not equally enforce the policy. The Good News Club, a Christian after-school club, had previously been allowed to send home permission slips in students’ backpacks, and these did not include a disclaimer. The Girls on the Run club frequently distributed promotional materials that included no disclaimer and posted the materials on their official district Facebook page. All of these clubs have been allowed to continue to use school facilities.

In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Supreme Court decided on a case in which a chapel was prevented from showing religious films in a school after-hours, because of the religious content. The Court unanimously ruled the school’s policy was unconstitutional because every viewpoint on family life was allowed, except that of Lamb’s Chapel. In this case, no other club, secular or not, was subject to policy 707, except the After School Satan club. And, preventing the club from ever utilizing the school’s facilities, rather than allowing them to revise any previous communication, is hostile toward this particular group. This, in my view, constitutes an undue burden on the Appellent’s free exercise.

However, Saucon Valley School District claims the policy intends to prevent disrupting the school’s educational activities. I do not want to understate the real psychological harm intimidation poses to the students and families, and certainly, there is a compelling state interest to protect children as well as prevent disruption of their education. Utilizing this policy to advance that interest is still unconstitutional. The policy regards communication about district sponsorship, not educational disruption. The Satanic Temple and its after-school club do not disturb educational activities. And, no evidence suggests that had communication that the After School Satan Club was not sponsored by the school district that the threat wouldn’t have occurred.

The After School Satan Club can not be constitutionally denied use of Saucon Valley school district’s facilities based on policy 707.

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/pennsylvania-school-district-agrees-to-pay-200000-after-discriminatory-decision-to-block-after-school-satan-club-from-school-facilities

St. Dominic Academy V. Makin

        The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment were put in place to protect individuals religious freedoms. However, there are often disagreements and conflicts that emerge due to these differing interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Within the case St. Dominic Academy v. Makin the two religious clauses in the First Amendment come into conflict with each other. 

Education and religion in public schools has been a highly debated topic for a long time. There have been disagreements about if prayer should be allowed in schools, if the Ten Commandments are allowed to be in the classroom, what religious ideas are permitted to be taught and many more issues. Due to these controversies within public schools parents have the option to send their children to private religious schools that correspond with their religious beliefs. However, there have still been constitutional issues regarding private religious schools especially when it comes to financial aid. 

St. Dominic Academy is a private catholic school that is located in Auburn, Maine. The school teaches traditional Catholic beliefs and places emphasis on assisting other individuals. Some examples of how the school has promoted this is through raising money for food kitchens, rebuilding homes that were destroyed by hurricanes and other voluntary acts. Keith and Valori Radonis are farmers who hold deeply Catholic beliefs and hoped to send their children to schools that also promoted their religious beliefs. Within Maine they established a tuition assistance program to help families in rural areas to send their students to private schools when there is no public school nearby. However, in 1982, Maine decided to exclude religious schools including St. Dominic Academy from the financial aid program. This decision to exclude religious schools led to the Supreme Court Case, Carson v. Makin. In this case the Supreme Court ruled that Maine’s law of excluding financial aid to those who attended religious private school was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court Judges referred to Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, which set a precedent that the Free Exercise Clause did not allow discrimination against eligible individuals from a public benefit only because of their religious character. So in this case the Supreme Court ruled that Maine’s law of excluding financial aid to those who attended religious private school was unconstitutional.

Maine officials anticipated the decision by the Supreme Court that their law denying financial aid for individuals attending religious private schools would be declared unconstitutional. So Maine put in place a new law that will provide financial aid to students if they attend a private religious school if the school allows all religious expression equally. This caused schools such as St. Dominic Academy unable to teach according to their catholic beliefs. This law also gives control to the Maine Human Rights Commission to determine what is being taught in these religious private schools and not the administration, teachers, or parents. Ultimately this law accomplishes the same goal of the previous law as it prevents individuals who live in rural areas from receiving financial aid.  

The argument for why this law would be seen as unconstitutional is because it would be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This law puts a prior restraint on parents and their ability to choose if they want to send their children to a private religious school which is an aspect of their Free Exercise rights. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer which was used as a precedent in Carson v. Makin it stated that individuals can not be discriminated against due to their religious beliefs. In this case the law would clearly be discriminating against religious schools as due to what the school is teaching the students do not receive benefits. Ultimately, this law is preferring non-religious individuals over religious individuals as financial aid is provided for students attending private schools and this is not constitutional. Another issue with this case is that the Maine Human Rights Commission will be determining what should be taught and what is allowed. This will lead to excessive entanglement and there will not be separation of church and state. On the other hand the reasons why this law may be seen as constitutional is because without the law in place it may be seen as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The state would be providing individuals with financial aid to send their children to private religious schools. The financial aid is public money and students attending private religious schools may be seen as a form of endorsing and promoting religion. Another argument as to why this is not a violation of one’s Free Exercise clause is that the parents are still allowed to send their children to private religious school they would just have to pay more money. This may provide a financial burden on the families but it does not prevent them from attending religious schools. 

Both of the arguments are compelling for this case but the arguments that this law is unconstitutional is more convincing. I believe that monitoring and controlling what private religious schools are teaching is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This clearly creates excessive entanglement between the Maine Human Rights Commission and St. Dominic's Academy. This would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as there would not be a separation of church and state. Additionally the Maine Human Rights Commission would be discriminating against religious beliefs and this would ultimately lead to the denial of financial aid. This demonstrates the privilege that non religious families would receive if they chose to attend a private school. The argument that without this law there would be a violation of the Establishment Clause is not very convincing. Whether the student chooses to attend a private school or a religious private school they receive the same amount of financial aid. Maine would not be promoting religion over non-religion and if there would be any advancement of religion it would be merely incidental which is not unconstitutional.  St. Dominic Academy v. Makin is one of the many cases that demonstrates the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause come into conflict and in this case the individual's Free Exercise rights should be protected. 

Sources

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/st-dominic-academy-v-makin/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/carson-v-makin/

https://thetablet.org/catholic-family-school-sue-maine-over-exclusion-from-tuition-assistance-program/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1088