Religious Endorsement in the Public Sphere–Where is the Line Drawn?

   Whether religious messaging should exist in the public sphere has been an increasingly pressing concern for religious groups hoping to attract members of their faith to increase involvement and a sense of community. 

    Temple Young Israel of Tampa, an Orthodox Jewish synagogue in Florida, faces this troubling issue. Young Israel has historically hosted events centered around Jewish holidays to unite the surrounding community. One of these events, Chanukah on Ice, consists of "ice-skating, food, music, a raffle, and the lighting of an ice-sculpted menorah." Rabbi Rivkin of Young Israel requested the Hillsboro Area Regional Transit Authority (HART) to post the advertisement along their bus routes to publicize this event. The ad consisted of an image of a menorah alongside the text: "Ice skating to Jewish music around the flaming menorah." Ultimately, HART rejected this proposal based on its policy that "does not allow religious affiliation advertising." Rabbi Rivkin appealed this decision to the HART CEO but was faced with the response to remove the image of the menorah, which Rivkin refused. Upon the first lawsuit filed by Young Israel against HART, the Federal District Court found that HART's ban on religious advertisements, although arbitrary, poses a "discriminatory and standardless" practice and that the banning of religious ads should cease immediately. HART appealed this decision, and the result was a ruling in favor of Young Israel, stating that "HART's religious ad ban is arbitrary" but failed to touch on whether this policy was "viewpoint discriminatory." The failure to address this crucial detail in the case led to the request for a rehearing by Young Israel. 

    The issue is the conflict between HART's refusal of the religious ad on government property and the First Amendment's special protection of religion. Additionally, this case involves the prohibition of religion in the public sphere and the probable outcomes of this. Thus, does the denial of Temple Young Israel's access to religiously advertise on HART's public bus route violate the constitutional rights of Young Israel under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment and discriminate against religious advertisements?

     The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment aims to safeguard Americans' religious expression of freedom as long as it does not disrupt public safety or threaten the state. Therefore, religious expression must be dealt with with care and priority despite conflicting personal beliefs. In this case, it is essential to focus on the Free Exercise granted to Young Israel and the prevalence of religion in the public square and its potential regulation. HART's ad policy reinforces the idea that religion should be separated from the public square by placing religious ads in a group with those endorsing "alcohol, tobacco, illegal drugs, obscenity, nudity, profanity, politics, pornography, discrimination, and violence." As a result, HART creates a grouping of topics that can be interpreted as unacceptable in the public sphere. This may lead to the opposition of religion or its association with these generally unfavored things. Therefore, although HART's policy of banning all religious advertisements is neutral at face value, its result harms religious institutions and their right to Free Exercise. Additionally, justifying an exclusionary rule regarding religion may lead to the enactment of stricter rules restricting religious freedoms. An example may be banning religious speeches in public parks. The outcomes of this case pose an issue to the Free Exercise rights of Young Israel and other religious institutions. Lastly, there is great harm in the failure of the court to address whether the restriction of religious speech was content-based or viewpoint-based, a crucial factor in what is viewed as Constitutional. The question arises when touching on this issue: was Young Israel's advertisement rejected due to its imagery or the religious beliefs presented?

    The separation of religion from the public sphere is an increasingly important issue in society, and studying this case is crucial in keeping this issue relevant. Young Israel has been discriminated against upon the rejection of their advertisements containing religious imagery and sentiment. Although HART contains policy restrictions prohibiting religious affiliation advertising, I view these restrictions as unjust under the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause. Under this clause, religious expression should be permitted as long as there is no societal harm or threats to the state. Young Israel's advertising for their annual Chanukah celebration does not pose a threat. Still, HART is presenting an infringement of Young Israel's constitutional liberties as a religious institution by prohibiting them from presenting their religious values in a public setting. Additionally, the lack of neutrality upon application and the high probability of the infringement of religious freedoms if the court were to rule with HART further leads me to believe that Temple Young Israel's Constitutional rights were violated. 

Sources:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/free_exercise_clause

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/young-israel-tampa-v-hillsborough-area-regional-transit-authority-hart/

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/menorahs-one-sacred-sheep-zero-the-7329422/

The less you know, the better?

  

    On Wednesday, January 31, 2024, Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), a Christian legal interest group, filed suit against Skaneateles Central School District. ADF is claiming that officials at the New York school district began treating a middle-school girl “as a boy” without her mother’s knowledge or consent. The mother of the student, Jennifer Vitsaxaki, whom ADF attorneys are representing, withdrew her daughter from Skaneateles Central near the conclusion of the 2020-2021 academic year upon learning this news.

    Mrs. Vitsaxaki feels that the masculine name and third-person plural pronouns that school officials were referring to her daughter as violate her fundamental parental rights and her religious beliefs. ADF explained that the school district violated Mrs. Vitsaxaki's right to freely exercise her Christian faith, which values the teachings of human nature and gender-sex ties. Christians support this concept of two sexes and heterosexuality from the respective genders. According to Mrs. Vitsaxaki, intentionally representing oneself as a gender not aligned with their sex assigned at birth is thought to disrespect God’s creation and is, therefore, seen as a sin. 

    Skaneateles Central administrators, however, say they enacted this procedure to protect Mrs. Vitsaxaki’s daughter from the ongoing bullying she had received, which had begun to cause strain on her mental health. The school psychologist, who told Skaneateles Central staff to keep their actions unknown, continued to meet with the student throughout the school year - in secret. 

    To protect her daughter from this “social transitioning,” Mrs. Vitsaxaki had removed her from in-person schooling and chose to go remote for the conclusion of the school year. During this time, however, the school officials continued to refer to the girl using pronouns not aligned with her sex. The following school year, Mrs. Vitsaxaki enrolled her daughter into a private school in Syracuse, New York about 25 miles away from their home. 

    Jennifer Vitsaxaki believes that her First Amendment right of “free exercise” as well as Fourteenth Amendment parental rights have been violated by Skaneateles Central School District. As a devout Christian, Mrs. Vitsaxaki deeply upholds the idea of gender and sex alignment, and the course in which the school district chose to handle her daughter’s battle with self-identity does not align with this Christian principle. So, the question is asked:

Did Skaneateles Central School District violate Jennifer Vitsaxaki’s First Amendment right of “free exercise” as well as Fourteenth Amendment fundamental parental rights?

    This case is compelling because it involves a variety of concepts: “free exercise” rights, fundamental parental rights, and societal gender norms. When considering the facts of the case, I believe that Skaneateles Central School District violated Jennifer Vitsaxaki’s Fourteenth Amendment fundamental parental right of direct involvement in her minor daughter’s mental health struggles and treatment. However, I do not believe that Skaneateles Central School District violated Jennifer Vitsaxaki’s First Amendment right of “free exercise.” 

    Parents and/or guardians in the state of New York, obtain the right to “be informed on a regular basis, both informally and through formal progress reports, of their child’s academic and behavior progress in school” (“Parents Bill of Rights”). The issue at hand involves the “behavioral” aspect of this parental right, and as made aware by the facts of the case, Skaneateles Central School District did not inform Mrs. Vitsaxaki of her minor daughter’s experiences with bullying, mental health struggles, and routine check-ins with the school counselor. In fact, Mrs. Vitsaxaki was intentionally withheld this information - information, in my opinion, that is important to make a parent aware of.  

    Mrs. Vitsaxaki’s claim of being violated her First Amendment right of “free exercise”, in my opinion, is invalid. Though it is important to consider Jennifer Vitsaxaki’s religious beliefs, I feel that they are irrelevant to this case. The “free exercise” right, of anyone, that should be taken into consideration is that of Mrs. Vitsaxaki’s daughter. It is understood that the daughter is being raised in a Christian household and could, very well be, conformed to and in support of the Christian teachings. Although, there is the possibility that the young girl does not share the same religious belief as those of her mother, and because of this, she does not hold the same profound position to gender-sex alignment. Similarly, the facts of the case do not provide any context into whether or not the minor girl preferred this sense of identity. So, there could very well be many more routes in which this contemporary case may take. I just expect and hope for some opinion or any clarification to be made by the minor.

Works Cited

https://adfmedia.org/case/mead-v-rockford-public-school-district

https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/2020-pamphlet-minorshealthcarerights.pdf

https://www.schools.nyc.gov/school-life/know-your-rights/parents-bill-of-rights

Refusing Medication for Religious Reasons

  

Judge Susie Morgan

    In early 2020, Bryant Lamont Harris called the chambers of district judge Susie Morgan to complain about the New Orleans Police Department and inquire about Judge Morgan’s security personnel. When pressed to provide a reason for wanting this information, Harris replied, “I need to know how many people I need to take out to get to the Judge.” This was not the first time Harris had made such calls to Judge Morgan’s chambers. Subsequently, Harris was arrested, detained, and charged with threatening to assault a federal judge. During a behavioral health analysis, Harris mentioned that he had received offers of “multiple women and $500k a month contract to join the Illuminati.” As a result of these claims, Harris was found to be delusional and incompetent to stand trial. He was then sent to an institution to receive psychiatric treatment for no more than four months. 

    During his stay, Harris refused to take medication, so it was recommended that he be involuntarily medicated. When the court held a hearing to determine if this was a viable course of action, Harris, a Jehovah’s Witness, raised an objection on the grounds of his religious beliefs. Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not reject all medical treatment, they believe that it is a personal choice to be treated medicinally. The court recognized Harris’s objections, but ultimately ruled that his religious liberty did not outweigh the compelling governmental interest in his prosecution; thus, it was ordered that Harris be forcibly medicated so that he may regain competence to stand trial. Feeling his religious liberties had been violated, Harris appealed. 

    On October 17, 2023, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals noted the compelling governmental interest in this case, but drew attention to other factors that may diminish its importance. According to Sell v. United States (2003), a defendant can only be involuntarily medicated if the government can establish that “important governmental interests are at stake” while also considering that “special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest.” The appeals court cited two “special circumstances” that must be considered: the amount of time Harris has been detained and his religious convictions. By October 2023,

5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

Harris had been in custody for almost 44 months. On top of this, if he were medicated, a psychiatrist remarked that it would be 4-8 months before Harris would be competent to stand trial. If convicted of his charge, Harris would face 37-46 months in prison; Harris will have exceeded this amount of time before he even attends trial. Additionally, the court argued that the “special circumstances” outlined in Sell are all secular. If secular reasons are enough to lessen the importance of government interest, then the constitutional right of religious liberty must be equally, if not more, significant. After taking these circumstances into account, the appeals court voided the previous court’s order, ruling that Harris cannot be forcibly medicated. It is uncertain how this case will proceed, but the government has already filed a motion to involuntarily commit Harris to a psychiatric facility. 

     At the core of this case is the conflict between state interest and religious freedom. Given Harris’s criminal charge and his fragile mental state, does the government have compelling interest to prosecute Harris and does it outweigh Harris’s right to free exercise of religion? Examining the precedent outlined in Sherbert v. Verner and the prongs of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) showcase that a high standard must be met before state interest can trump religious liberty. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist who contested that the denial of her unemployment benefits placed a burden on her ability to freely practice her faith. The court agreed that a substantial burden was imposed on Sherbert and that a compelling state interest could not be found to justify it. As a consequence of this ruling, the so-called “Sherbert Test” is applied in similar cases to determine if a compelling interest to restrict free exercise exists and if this restriction is implemented in the least burdensome manner possible; the RFRA essentially codified the Sherbert Test into law. 

     In my opinion, based on previous rulings and federal law, Harris was justified in appealing the original court’s decision that ordered he be involuntarily medicated. Although Harris’s potential for violent action gave the government compelling reason for his prosecution, the order for forced medication was not the least burdensome avenue. Theoretically, Harris could have undergone non-medicinal psychiatric treatment until he was competent to stand trial without betraying his religious beliefs. Under the Free Exercise clause, Harris has the right to refuse medication if he believes that the act of taking it is contrary to his religion. In other cases, religious exemptions have been provided for a wide variety of medical treatments and services. One can argue that Harris’s case differs because he is possibly a dangerous person, but his potential criminality does not strip him of his right to religious freedom. From my perspective, it is obvious that Harris’s right to free exercise was violated and the appeals court was correct in its voiding of the medication mandate. 

PARENTS SUE CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS FOR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

     On October 12, 2023, a group of Christian-identifying parents filed a lawsuit against the State of California for religious discrimination in publicly funded charter schools. The challenged statute at the center of this legal dispute is a state policy that authorizes the creation of tuition-free charter schools paid for by the taxes collected from California citizens. The charter schools provide opportunities for there to be an "independent study" program in which families can elect for their children to be taught in a classroom-alternate way, such as homeschooling. The families that participate in this program are given access to state funds to purchase materials necessary for the curriculum or extra-curricular activities. The instructors are to be the parents under this policy and it is the job of the charter school to provide support and confirm attendance. The overall goal of this educational policy is to "provide [opportunities] for families to educate their children in a way that fits the families' needs." The state policy makes clear; however, that it is up to the discretion of the parents to select the curriculum. One of the few restrictions that the charter school policy imposes is that participating families are not allowed to use state funds for religious instruction. The schools will even go as far as denying credit for religious instruction. It is these restrictions that the plaintiffs in the case have issue with that form the basis of their legal argument. The groups of parents suing the State of California argue that they should not be discriminated against in their access to public funds simply because they prefer a religious instruction pathway. Their Christian faith is considered critical to their identity and view of the world. With all this in mind, is the educational policy imposed by the State of California a discriminatory violation of the families' First Amendment rights to freedom of religion? 

    This particular case is complicated when keeping in mind the new ideological direction of the predominately conservative Supreme Court. In a 2022 decision, the Justices ruled in Carson v. Makin that "when the government provides a benefit, like parent-directed educational funding, it cannot exclude families just because they chose to use that benefit for religious education." This relatively new decision issued by the Court is the main line of reasoning used by the plaintiffs in this case. However, it is essential to consider the prior historical precedents issued by the Court that have been the law of the land for decades. One example that comes to mind immediately is the  Zorach case. In this particular Supreme Court case, a New York City policy allowing students to be excused from the classroom early for religious instruction per parental consent was challenged on whether it promoted the establishment of religion. The appellants of the case argued that this particular policy undermined the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in that the State was promoting a group of religions by allowing children to be excused from secular educational duties. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York City public schools in that allowing religious instruction in the lives of students was permissible as long as public taxes were not used to support such practice. Since the students were not engaging in religious activity within the public school classrooms, there was no violation of the Establishment Clause per the majority of the Court. Justice Douglas - in his opinion - stated that it was different than the McCollum case in that publicly funded resources were not being used. I believe that these two historical precedents provide ample evidence for the correct outcome from the judiciary in this charter school case. 

    If I were a judge hearing the facts of this case, I would rule in favor of the State of California and assert that there is no evidence of religious discrimination in this particular case. As per the Establishment Clause, "Congress [and the State] shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." (U.S. Constitution). For Congress or the States to respect the establishment of religion, it would require them to authorize the use of tax-payer funds for religious organizations. This would include allowing religious indoctrination to be allowed within the publicly funded educational system of the state. The facts of the case are quite clear: the charter school program is funded using public tax revenue. The resources collected from the general public cannot be used for the promotion of one, some, or any religious faith. The educational system has long been a secular institution and steers clear of religious teachings. It is within the duty of the federal or state governments to ensure a neutrality of religious practices in society. The facts of this case do not insinuate any restrictions on religious freedom. These families and students can practice their religious views within their respective organizations. The State of California is in no way restricting the families' right to worship. The State is simply asserting that public funds cannot be used for the expansion of religious indoctrination. Therefore, the Courts should side with the State of California. 

Case Link for Blog Post: https://firstliberty.org/cases/california-charter-schools/#simple2

*Link to Official Complaint: https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CA-Charters-Complaint_Redacted.pdf

*Also utilized Munioz Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court

Refusing To Sell To Same Sex Couples Okay?

Cathay Miller is a devout Christian who resides in Bakersfield, California. She opened a bakery named Tastries in 2013, where she sells all types of goodies such as cookies, cakes and other baked goods. Another service offered by Tastries is the ability to order custom-designed items for big events like birthdays and graduations. Miller is very outgoing with her religion as her bakery is filled with Christian references. Miller is very vocal about living for god's glory and believes that her bakery is “God’s business.” She has bible verses on her business cards and Christian music playing on repeat. She also reflects these religious beliefs in her bakery items. Tastries will turn down custom items that contain gore, pornographic images, celebrate drug use and violence. 

     One day a same sex couple entered Tastries to purchase a customized cake for their soon to be wedding ceremony. Miller realized she was being asked to create a customized cake for a same sex wedding which is something she was not willing to do. Same sex marriage violates the Christian sacrament of marriage according to Millers Christian faith. She then kindly discussed with the couple she was unable to design their cake as it was against her religious views and that she would be happy to refer them to another bakery if needed. Shortly after news that Tastries had denied a custom cake because the purchasers were a same sex couple flooded into the streets. This led to a wave of furious social media posts, emails and phone calls targeting Tastries. Then to make matters worse for Miller and Tastries the California Department of Civil Rights filed a lawsuit in state court to punish Miller for upholding her religious beliefs. 

    

Six years after California originally started its case against the bakery shop, there was a five-day long trial where it was ruled that Miller cannot be forced to design a cake against her religious beliefs. Kern County Superior Court Judge Eric Bradshaw ruled that “baking cakes is an artistic expression and is protected under the first amendment. The state shortly appealed this claim. Miller recently on January 18th filed her appeal that she should not have to choose between her business and faith. The state is saying that Judge Eric Bradshaw “has ignored evidence of intentional discrimination, wrongly held that referral to another business fulfilled Tastries’ obligations to provide full and equal service, and incorrectly ruled the cake was protected under First Amendment as speech or expressive conduct”. Liberal dissenters bring about a strong argument, “For the promise of freedom is an empty one if the government is powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of one person will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of another.” A precedent which could have influenced the court was the supreme court decision of 303 Creative v. Elenis. In a 6-3 vote the court sided with Lorie Smith, an internet web designer who denied same sex couples her service of creating websites for same sex weddings. 

     The question of whether the court is correct in its ruling is a very complicated one. Is Miller being discriminatory against same-sex couples because of who they are? The ruling is dangerous because the court's majority sends a scary message to members of communities who are under “sustained attack”, says Jenny Pizer. We see this issue highlighted by the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment. Drafted in the First Amendment in the United States Constitution by James Madison, the free exercise clause was constructed to protect religious freedom. There is nothing extremely morbid or physically harming those she refuses. Miller seems to be politely declining and offering alternate bakeries. The Free Exercise Clause protects citizens' right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of a “public moral” or a "compelling" governmental interest. 

  In my opinion I am going to be leaning on the ruling of the court. I believe that Miller was within her right to deny the same sex couple a custom-made cake based on the free exercise clause. I think the way in which she handled it was not in a discriminatory sense but truly based of her relies beliefs. She also politely refused and offered up another solution for the product they wanted.  I think if this was to be reversed it could open a can of worms that would facilitate a lot of religious liberty and individual freedom to be suppressed. Religious freedom in my opinion protects the rights of individuals to practice their beliefs whenever they want including their workplace. 

Sources:

https://www.bakersfield.com/news/tastries-owner-submits-reply-as-case-gears-toward-summer-appeal/article_c5563d22-b728-11ee-9e60-

bf2ff8c90634.html#:~:text=Miller%20previously%20won%20her%20case,protected%20under%20the%20First%20Amendment.https://www.becketlaw.org/case/civil-rights-department-of-california-v-tastries/

https://www.npr.org/2023/06/30/1182121291/colorado-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage-decision#:~:text=By%20a%206%2Dto%2D3,creating%20a%20message%20she%20opposes.

Are Requirements To Remove Religious Coverings A Violation Of The First Amendment?

When Sophia Johnston was pulled over in Wilson County, she did not expect to have a violation of her First Amendment rights. She was more concerned about addressing the outstanding charges she had and was very compliant with the officers to address these issues.

Sophia Johnston was pulled over for a broken taillight in Wilson County, where she then learned about an outstanding driving violation from 6 years ago. She had a misdemeanor from 2017 for driving on a suspended license in Rutherford County. She was compliant with the authorities and was taken into each sheriff’s office to address both of her charges. She first went to the Wilson County Sheriff's office where she asked to remove her hijab for her booking photo. She explained the religious importance of keeping her hijab on and the authorities at Wilson County allowed Johnston to take two booking photos. One without her hijab that would not be publicly displayed and one with her hijab that would act as her official booking photo. When she went to the Rutherford County Sheriff’s office, she had a much different experience. When taking her booking photo, she was asked to remove her hijab. After explaining the importance of the religious reasons for wearing the hijab, the officers stated that she must take it off as some people use religion as an excuse to be someone they are not. The officers also stated she would be detained for an unspecified period of time if she didn’t take the booking photo, which was not an option as she was a mother of 8. She was faced with a difficult decision but ultimately decided that she needed to get home to her family and complied by taking off her hijab for the photo. 

Considering the facts of the case, did Rutherford County’s sheriff's office unconstitutionally violate her free exercise of religion by requiring her to remove her hijab for the photo? In the lawsuit that was filed, claimed that state law was broken due to Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, which denied Johnston the freedom to exercise her religion. 

The key issue at hand was free exercise of Johnston’s religion. It must be determined whether or not asking her to remove her hijab, a symbol of her religion, violated her right to freely exercise her religion. Looking at the precedent case Cantwell v. Connecticut could provide insight into this question. The 3 members of the Cantwell family went to the streets of New Haven to proselytize, which is a religious duty to Jehovah's Witnesses. The court ruled in favor of the Cantwell’s stating that they can regulate conduct, but not beliefs, and this act was not considered dangerous. In other words, religious actions or duties that do not disrupt peace and good order should not be regulated. This case was also the first instance where the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment Guarantees, which should be carried over into Johnston v. Rutherford County, Tennessee. While proselytizing differs from wearing a hijab, they both represent a religious belief. Although the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office stated that they were looking out for safety, they did not offer any other accommodation for Johnston. And given the protocol at the Wilson County Sheriff’s Office, it is evident that there are ways to accommodate religious beliefs and ensure that no one is using their religion to pretend to be someone else.

In my opinion, the Rutherford County Sheriff’s office did violate Sophia Johnston’s First Amendment Right to exercise her religion freely.  It was stated that she attempted to explain the significance and importance of keeping her hijab on at all times. While the officers who were in charge of her case may not share her religious beliefs, they had a duty to respect them. Johnston stated that the act of not following her religious beliefs was incredibly emotional and difficult. In an interview she stated “‘ I’m just trying so hard to not cry, not to break down because I can’t show these people that they broke me. I felt like at that point, that’s what they wanted me to do’” (WSMV). It is also evident that there are protocols in place to accommodate religious accommodations at other sheriff’s offices and that there was an alternative way to handle this situation. 

The case ultimately ended in a settlement, which indicates that the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office did violate her free exercise of religion. They also updated their protocol to which will now accommodate religious beliefs.

https://www.wsmv.com/2023/09/01/muslim-woman-sues-rutherford-county-sheriffs-office-after-she-was-told-remove-hijab-mugshot/

https://horwitz.law/wp-content/uploads/Johnston.Fully_.Executed.Settlement.Agreement.pdf

https://www.wkrn.com/news/local-news/muslim-woman-who-was-required-to-remove-hijab-for-booking-photo-reaches-settlement-with-rutherford-county/

Religious Over Gender Matters?

After refusing to engage in a basketball game with the opposing school, Long Trail, due to a member of the opponent team identifying as transgender, Mid Vermont Christian School is suing state officials. The private Christian school, which offers education from kindergarten to 12th grade, is filing their lawsuit with Alliance Defending Freedom which notes how the school was “irreparably” harmed after they were banned from all athletic play. After refusing to participate in the game in February of 2023, the Vermont Principal’s Association (VPA) noted how Mid Vermont violated its policies to commit to “racial, gender-fair, and disability awareness”, noting further the VPA condemns discrimination and harassment directed towards students at schools or school functions, like a basketball game. Mid Vermont in dispute, claimed that this was an attack on their Christian beliefs to not only condemn their refusal to play but also their ban from all athletic competition by the VPA. Concerning the matter of the canceled game by Mid Vermont, the school simply stated they were abiding by their school’s religious beliefs by not allowing the girl’s basketball team to play against a biological male. The lawsuit officially claims that the state unconstitutionally is forcing private, religious schools, in Vermont to orthodoxy in order to participate in the state’s athletic association. The school continued to argue that it is not constitutional that they are to be discriminated against based on their religious beliefs, which affirm a biological male is a male, and a biological female is a female. The refusal to play in the game against Long Trail, according to Mid Vermont, was only based on religious premises and beliefs. Despite these claims, the VPA continues to oppose such statements, even removing Mid Vermont from the association. The executive director of the VPA responded to Mid Vermont’s claims by noting that if Mid Vermont does not want to follow VPA rules, then they will not participate in the VPA. Vermont is currently one of the 25 states that do not ban transgender students from participating in sports consistent with their gender identity.

The clear issue regarding this case is the freedom of religious exercise by Mid Vermont regarding their education and religious beliefs. Is it constitutional to disallow Mid Vermont to participate in athletics and be removed from the Vermont Principal’s Association due to their refusal to participate in a basketball game involving a transgender student? It is important to consider the “free exercise of religion” clause, but also the power of the VPA, and state laws regarding transgender students in sports. First, the VPA removed Mid Vermont based on the association's beliefs and policies regarding discrimination based on gender, not religious beliefs. The VPA, a voluntary association, which is a democratic government according to their website reserves the right to decide who, and who not will be allowed to participate in their association. Therefore, Mid Vermont does not have the ‘right’ to play in the association, but instead the privilege if they meet such criteria and requirements. On the VPA’s website, they write, "VPA member schools agree to abide by final decisions of the VPA”, therefore if a school does not abide by earlier policies that were democratically created, the VPA has the final decision. Finally, in Vermont, state laws allow transgender students to compete in sports under the gender they identify with, and this right was exercised by such students for Long Trail. In conclusion, the salient issue is concurrent with the constitutionality of removing Mid Vermont from the VPA based on grounds of religious discrimination. Was it constitutional to remove Mid Vermont from the VPA after refusing to play Long Trail? 

 This is a very important, and increasingly prevalent issue in schools nationwide. Considering this case involves the intersecting of religious rights, transgender rights, and constitutional rights, it is hard to decipher the rights that outweigh others. When I was considering this case, I noticed how the concept of neutrality, its impact on children, and why the VPA possibly breached the “free exercise clause”. In my opinion, the VPA is only trying to align itself with state laws regarding transgender students and participation in sports. Additionally, Mid Vermont does not reserve the right to be offended by the participation of transgender students, as it is legal by the state of Vermont. 

 Most importantly, the VPA reserves its right to sanction who and who is not in the association. As the executive director stated, if Mid Vermont wants to follow their own school’s policies and beliefs, which do not align with the VPA, they are welcome to play in another league. Since the school decided to breach such policies of the VPA, they are no longer a member of the VPA. In my opinion, the removal of Mid Vermont was not based on religious discrimination, as they are claiming to the state. The private school has every right to possess and instill Christian values within their students and community, but simply put, they do not possess the right to be in the VPA. The VPA’s intentions of removing Mid Vermont were not based on their religious beliefs, but rather their breach of their association’s policies, which the school agreed to when joining the VPA.

Sources:

https://vtdigger.org/2023/03/13/vermont-religious-school-that-refused-to-play-team-with-trans-player-banned-from-sporting-events/

https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/youth/sports_participation_bans

https://vpaonline.org/about/bylaws/

Should Religious Schools Be Included in a Free Preschool Program?

        The case "St. Mary's Catholic Parish v. Roy" involves the Archdiocese of Denver and St. Mary’s Parish suing the state of Colorado over its new universal preschool program. St. Mary’s Catholic Parish operates a preschool program that prioritizes admission for Catholic families.

St. Mary's Parish

    This year, Colorado is starting a universal preschool program, also known as UPK Colorado. This program was created to assist low-income families in receiving a quality education for their children. The program provides every child 15 hours of preschool per week, free of cost. So far, over 27,000 families have joined the program and accepted a match school. St Mary's Catholic preschool, as well as all other Catholic preschools, are not included in this program. Families who send their children to St. Mary's will not receive tuition reimbursement. The state requires preschool providers to be non-discriminative, accepting applicants without regard to the family's religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. St Mary's requires that families of students must accept Catholic beliefs such as issues like life, marriage, and sexuality. This means the parish considers whether parents are in a same-sex relationship or are transgender.

The lawsuit claims that the state's non-discriminatory enrollment requirements violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of religion and speech for the religious preschools involved. The plaintiffs point to the recent "Creative v. Elenis" case in which the court said, “The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees.”

The salient issue in "St. Mary's Catholic Parish v. Roy" is the conflict between Colorado's non-discriminatory enrollment requirements for its universal preschool program and the religious expression of Catholic institutions refusing to accept applicants without regard to religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Two recent Supreme Court cases, "Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue" and "Carson vs. Makin," created a precedent within the sphere of religious schools. The Espinoza case covered whether religious schools should be included in a scholarship program. The court held that excluding religious schools from this program violated the free exercise clause. The court stated that excluding religious schools discriminated against families based on their religion; thus, infringing on their constitutional rights. The Carson case occurred in Maine. Many towns in Maine lack a public secondary school. In these towns, families can choose to send their children to a different town's public school or private school, in which case the state will reimburse the family. An issue arose when families were told they would not receive reimbursement for a religious school. The court held that the state may not choose to subsidize some private schools but not others on the basis of religious character.

These cases create a precedent that favors St Mary's parish. The Supreme Court has made it clear that subsidizing private schools, including religious ones, is not an establishment of religion, as seen in the previously stated private school cases. Thus, it is unconstitutional for the state not to include Catholic preschools in their universal preschool program. Furthermore, the case, "Creative v. Elenis”, brought into question within the St Mary’s case, created another precedent in which it is acceptable for an institution to discriminate against LBGT people based on their beliefs.

Drawing on these previous cases, it appears that St. Mary's Catholic Parish has a strong argument in calling on its First Amendment right to freedom of religious expression. The Supreme Court's stance on subsidizing private schools, including religious institutions, strengthens the case for the inclusion of Catholic preschools in the UPK program. The precedent, shaped by these recent decisions, provides a strong basis for the argument that the state's non-discriminatory enrollment requirements may infringe upon the religious freedom of institutions like St. Mary's Catholic Parish. Forcing St. Mary's and other Catholic preschools to change their policy would be asking them to change their religious beliefs, and thus, would be violating the Free Exercise clause. 

While I personally believe that preschools should not be permitted to discriminate against LGBT families, personal beliefs are not how judges decide cases. The facts of the case and precedents that exist mean that it is not explicitly unconstitutional for St. Mary's to discriminate based on their religious view.

Sources:

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1195

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1088

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy/

https://coloradonewsline.com/briefs/denver-archdiocese-sues-colorado-over-right-to-deny-preschool-to-lgbtq-families/ 

The Manifestation of Anti-Semitism at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago

    For many individuals, enrolling into a master's degree program represents an era of excitement and new opportunities. However, for Shiran Canel, a Jewish Israeli student, her enrollment into the School of the Art Institute of Chicago (SIAC) represented a long-trend of discriminatory practices on the grounds of her religious beliefs. 

    Prior to her admission into the SIAC's prestigious Art Therapy master's program, Shiran Canel first experienced the school's discriminatory practices during her interview process, and subsequent denial from the school's masters program. After hearing of her rejection from the program, Canel challenged SIAC, claiming her interview and application process was conducted in a discriminatory manner, on the basis of her Jewish beliefs. Following Canel's complaint to SIAC, the school quietly investigated her application process, and subsequently allowed her admittance into the program. 

   Once a student at SIAC, the anti-Jewish and Israeli sentiment that plagued her admissions process became further prevalent within the classroom. Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, anti-Jewish hostility amongst students and professors within SIAC rose, and Canel felt outcasted for both her cultural and religious values. In the hallways and online, slurs and hatred were abound. Within the classroom, Canel also faced discrimination, particularly from Professor Sandie Yi, who altered the final project to endorse anti-Semitism. During the final assignment for Yi's "Material and Media in Art Therapy" course, students were asked to evaluate a "collection of drawings all of which pertained exclusively to the Israeli military and Israeli soldiers engaged in seemingly senseless violence against Gazan families and children." 

    In response to Yi's final assignment, Canel filed a temporary restraining order and subsequently filed suit against SIAC on the grounds of violations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, which specifically condemns anti-sematic hate. Following Canal's actions, Yi subsequently modified the final assignment, yet changed the grading standards to incorporate a peer review element. Since Canal's classmates were also known to discriminate against the Jewish community, Yi's decision to modify the grading parameters severely disadvantaged Canal. 

     Thus, in considering the facts, does the inclusion of anti-Islamic art within the SIAC's curriculum violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act? 

    Within the context of Canal's lawsuit, it is essential to unpack the protections allotted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to this document, the "discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or activity that receives federal funding or financial assistance" is strictly prohibited. Here it is important to note that Canal is duly protected as a student at SIAC under this act for both her religious beliefs and cultural background. While there are several cases regarding anti-semitism in court which are currently awaiting rulings, Owen & United States v. L'Anse Area Schools serves  loosely as precedent. The background on the Owen case follows that both students and staff within Michigan's L'Anse area schools discriminated against Mr. Owen on the grounds of his Jewish religious beliefs. After making an appearance before the court, and subsequently attending mediation, Mr. Owen was awarded $265,000 in damages for the discriminatory hatred he experienced. The Owen case establishes that there is no tolerance for anti-Semitism within academia. 

    With specific regard to the state of Illinois, for which SIAC is located and hence subject to state law, the Illinois Human Rights Act exists to further protect individuals from discriminatory practices. This act ensures "Freedom from Unlawful Discrimination. To secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination based on race, color religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age... in connection with employment, real estate, transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations, including in elementary, secondary and higher education". 

    In my opinion, Shiran Canal has been undoubtedly discriminated against on behalf of her religious beliefs and cultural background. One seeks to

attend higher education institutions to better themself, and the blatant discriminatory acts which Canal experienced evidently served as a hinderance within her educational process. Although SIAC claims that they "strongly condemn[] antisemitism and any discrimination based on religion, nationality or any other aspect of a person's identity", the institution's actions prove the contrary. While this case has yet to be heard, I believe that the implications would be devastating, should the courts rule in favor of SIAC. Canal has the benefit of protections under both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Conversely, SIAC will struggle to find legislation which supports the hatred they have previously endorsed. 

Sources:

https://www.artnews.com/art-news/news/school-of-the-art-institute-of-chicago-lawsuit-antisemitism-allegations-1234692121/ 

https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2266 

https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-summaries 

https://admin.muchlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Canel-12.22.23-Complaint.pdf 

https://www.campusreform.org/article/jewish-israeli-student-sues-chicago-art-school-for-anti-semitism/24692 

https://religionclause.blogspot.com/2024/01/art-institute-school-sued-for.html 

Faith and Fair Housing: Exploring Religious Discrimination in New York's Affordable Housing Lottery through the Lens of the Free Exercise Clause

Abstract 

An Orthodox Jewish family sued two New York City agencies that oversee the affordable housing lottery after being repeatedly denied, alleging that their family of eight have been religiously discriminated against. In the Manhattan federal court lawsuit, the couple, Chaim Katz and Chana Katz, argue that they were religiously discriminated against when they were denied two affordable housing opportunities in Manhattan’s Lower East Side in 2017. Their lawyer contends that the agencies rejected the family for having “too many members.” He argues the agencies should never have denied housing because the Katz’s desire is rooted to their deep-seated Orthodox Jewish beliefs. The plaintiffs implore the court to declare that they were unlawfully discriminated against, in addition to other damages. Along with several other companies, New York City Housing Preservation & Development and The New York City Housing Development Corporation, were named as the defendants. While the Constitution prioritizes civil liberty, we question whether or not the Katz family is protected by the 1st Amendment. This piece examines whether or not the Free Exercise Clause, along with other precedents, can be effectively applied in the defense of the family. 

Free Exercise Clause 

The origins of the Free Exercise Clause trace back to the drafting of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was proposed by James Madison and adopted by Congress in 1789. The clause was influenced by a desire to safeguard religious freedom, stemming from experiences of religious persecution in Europe and early colonial America. Many of the early American settlers came seeking religious freedom, and the framers of the Constitution sought to protect this fundamental right. The exact wording of the Free Exercise Clause was influenced by various state declarations of rights and bills of rights, as well as philosophical ideas about individual rights and liberties. Over time, interpretations and applications of the Free Exercise Clause have evolved through court decisions. Today, there is a well-developed body of law and controlling legal precedent that defines the scope of this important cause in modern times. 

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v. Comer 

In this recent case, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether a state could deny a church participation in a state program providing grants to resurface playgrounds based solely on its religious status. Trinity Lutheran Church applied for a grant to resurface its playground, but the state of Missouri denied the application citing a provision in the state constitution prohibiting public funds from going to religious organizations. The Court ruled in favor of Trinity Lutheran Church, holding that the state’s denial of the grant solely because of the church’s religious identity violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Court found that the state’s policy discriminated against the church and its members based upon their religious status, and that this discrimination was not justified by a compelling governmental interest. The decision has significant implications for the application of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in cases involving public funding and religious institutions. 

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision favoring Trinity Lutheran Church strongly reinforces the family’s stance. Despite its recent conclusion, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer marks a significant victory for religious freedom in the United States. This perspective aligns with an originalist interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, which I find compelling. It reflects a brilliant understanding of the First Amendment, crafted by insightful individuals wary of centralized government power, from which they fought for their liberty. The Supreme Court’s position in favor of Trinity Lutheran Church, serves as an ample precedent in support of the family. While a counter-argument might suggest that Thomas Jefferson believed the government could restrict religion in certain circumstances, such as when it posed a threat to public safety, it is important to note that Jefferson only advocated for such restrictions when there was a genuine risk to public well-being. From my perspective, and I believe many would agree, an Orthodox Jewish family adhering to their faith poses no threat to public safety. Please feel free to share your thoughts on whether you agree or disagree with my analysis. I welcome all criticisms and feedback and look forward to hearing your perspectives. 

References 

https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/orthodox-jewish-couple-alleges-nyc-housing-discrimin ation-over-size-of-their-family/2984907/ 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf

Are religious liberties at stake in times of crisis?

    It may very well be a common opinion that the topics of COVID and its impact on the religious liberties granted by the U.S. Constitution have been exhausted in spheres of debate. However, recent events have made it necessary to resurface these topics to the forefront. The U.S. Court of Appeals recently heard the appeal of Rachel Spivack, a former Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney who was fired after refusing to receive the COVID vaccination on the basis of her Orthodox Jewish faith prohibiting it. The issue at hand is not her refusal to receive the vaccine but rather the refusal of the Philadelphia District Attorney, Lawrence Krasner, to grant Spivack a religious accommodation. After waiting for almost seven months for a response to her exemption request after the implementation of the vaccine mandate, her request was denied by Krasner, and she was fired. Meanwhile, ten unionized employees and one medically exempt non-unionized employee were permitted to continue working without being vaccinated. Krasner denied all religious exemption or accommodation requests because he believed he was not legally required to grant them but allowed others, on separate grounds, to work in the office unvaccinated.

    Thus, does the denial of a religious accommodation for exemption from the District Attorney Office’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate violate the constitutional rights of Rachel Spivack under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and discriminate against her religious beliefs?

    The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects citizens’ right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of “public morals” or a “compelling” governmental interest. Many will argue that in times of crisis, such as the COVID pandemic, there is a compelling state interest to mandate vaccines or other efforts in cases of extraordinary threats to public health. Refer to Jacobson v. Massachusetts for such a precedent, in which the Court held that a law to require residents of Massachusetts to be vaccinated against smallpox was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens. Opinions stand to question the severity of the COVID pandemic and whether or not it warranted such measures – but that is content worthy of a separate blog post! More relevant to the case of Rachel Spivack, the accommodations granted by Krasner to other individuals demonstrate that the District Attorney’s Office vaccine mandate was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest as was the mandate in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. It is also important to note that the aforementioned case did not account for or set a precedent for religious liberties as in later cases. As stated by Lea Patterson, Senior Counsel for the First Liberty Institute, a non-profit legal organization dedicated to defending religious liberty for all Americans, “The District Attorney disregarded the law by treating those like Rachel who requested religious accommodation less favorably than those who requested accommodation for other reasons. As the Supreme Court has already made clear, the government is not free to disregard the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty in times of crisis.”

    More pointedly, under the traditional analysis of free exercise, the vaccine mandate enforced by the District Attorney’s Office, in this case, breaches the U.S. Constitution by providing the opportunity for discretionary exemptions, exempting comparable employees to Rachel for medical reasons, and not applying the mandate to other comparable unionized employees, who received religious exemptions. In more plain language, if a government employer offers any exemptions to a mandatory vaccine requirement, then the Constitution may require that it also offer an exemption for religious reasons. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, also prohibits many private and government employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of religion. Title VII entitles an employee to request religious accommodations from an employer’s directives that would violate the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer. I would argue that because of the less invasive measures that an individual such as Rachel Spivack can take to achieve the common good in this situation, the ‘undue hardship’ on the District Attorney’s Office is not extremely dire, considering other unvaccinated individuals remained free to hold their positions in the office.

    We toe a fine line in allowing the government power enough to supersede our constitutional liberties, especially with respect to religion. Though I am not arguing against COVID-19 vaccine mandates in general. I believe that the circumstance surrounding the case of Rachel Spivack specifically supports a violation of her right to freely exercise her religion without discrimination. The Supreme Court has upheld laws in the face of a First Amendment challenge when the law was neutrally applied, served a compelling state interest, and was the least restrictive means of achieving the state interest (for example, Bowen v. Roy). It is my belief that the decision of Lawrence Krasner to deny Rachel Spivack a religious accommodation for the COVID-19 vaccine mandate breached her constitutional liberties just as the District Attorney’s Office disproved all three of the Court’s requirements for mandates that can trump the U.S. Constitution. Rachel Spivack’s religious liberties can be automatically assumed on the basis of Krasner allowing other exemptions on differing grounds than religion, proving a lack of neutrality and an inconsistent state interest. Additionally, vaccine mandates prove to be one of the most restrictive means to curb the effects of the COVID pandemic, and since Krasner allowed unvaccinated individuals the liberty to take less restrictive measures and still keep their jobs, it is my opinion that Rachel Spivack is rightfully appealing the decision of her case as her religious liberties were jeopardized under the cloak of crisis.

Sources: 

https://firstliberty.org/media/court-hears-appeal-of-former-philadelphia-assistant-da-fired-after-religious-accommodation-rejected/

https://adflegal.org/article/religious-exemptions-covid-19-vaccine-mandates

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/coronavirus-and-the-first-amendment/