A Bakery Debate: Religious Freedom vs. Discrimination

    Civil Rights Department of California v. Tastries 

    In a fight to keep her bakery in business, Cathy Miller, a baker out of California and a dedicated Christian, fights for her right to deny cake designs that violate her religious faith and morals. Miller started her bakery in 2013, baking cakes, pastries, and cookies as well as designing cakes for special occasions. As a dedicated Christian, she tied her faith throughout her bakery business. She even set guidelines for designs she would not do because of her beliefs, including same-sex marriage deceptions. However, in the case scenarios where she felt her faith was violated by a design, she would direct the customers to another nearby bakery. Until a same-sex couple wanted her to design their wedding cake in 2017, and she directed them to a nearby bakery to do their design instead. The Civil Rights Department of California then filed their case against Tastries and Cathy Miller for her denial of the same-sex couple. 

    The main legal issue here is whether Miller has the right to exercise her religious beliefs and deny customers designs and orders when they do not align with her morals. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states that people are allowed to practice and hold their religious beliefs without interference from the government. This case ties to the U.S. Supreme Court case 303 Creative v. Elenis, which establishes that “business owners have the right to refuse to express a particular message to which they categorically object” (ACLU). Similarly for Miller, she refused the message of same-sex marriage on the wedding cake design which was in her right to do so, according to this case. However, this Supreme Court case also established that it would not allow businesses to refuse customers based on their identity. This differentiation puts Miller against herself, same-sex marriage goes against her beliefs but she is also denying them because of their identity. Did Miller deny the couple because of their identity as a same-sex couple because she was trying to be discriminatory or because she felt they violated her morals and beliefs. 

    In my opinion, Cathy Miller while seeming discriminatory in her action of not contracting with the same sex couple, she was following the moral convictions of her religious beliefs. While she denied giving them service and designing their cake, she recommended another bakery nearby that would contract their cake and designs. She was very clear in her design standards that she would not contract for anything that she was not comfortable with. For example, violence, drug use, same-sex marriage, and inapporiate designs. She had a range of designs that she refused to contract for but was more than willing to recommend a place that would. I do not think she was purposefully refusing identities or ethnicities but that she was following her beliefs that happened to include same-sex couples. This was a case of inaction rather than action, she refused to do the design and directed elsewhere versus doing the design and targeting the couple. With her being so clear on her standards and very up front about her religious beliefs, I do not think that she was being discriminatory in her actions and if she was not being discriminatory she should have the right to refuse to endorse a message on her design/product. I believe that in her case, she should be able to operate her bakery freely with her religious design standards, if customers do not like these standards they can go to the bakery that she recommends nearby. 

    Cathy Miller’s case is now being appealed to be heard by the California Supreme Court following a decision against her on February 11, 2025. Miller continues to fight for her religious freedoms in an effort to be able to operate her bakery fully again. 

Maryland: Inclusion as Exclusion

In October of 2022, Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland mandated the inclusion of “inclusive” LGBTQ+ storybooks for its English Language Arts curriculum. These storybooks, which would be used in pre-k through eighth-grade classrooms, celebrate gender transitions and pride parades, feature characters related to gender identity and sexual orientation, and introduce students to same-sex marriage, pronoun preferences, and gender transitioning. The Supreme Court states “the storybooks themselves are ideological, stressing that “[n]ot everything” about gender “needs to make sense,” that children should be free to use their preferred bathroom, and that “pronouns are like the weather” and may “change depending on how [children] feel.” In mandating these storybooks, the school board promised parents that they would receive notice and have the option to opt their children out of lessons involving these books. This would allow religions that hold beliefs that do not align with these gender and sex ideals, to be accommodated. Historically, this promise has been consistent with Maryland and its school boards' policies. The school board notifies parents and gives them a choice to opt out of their children in sex-ed classes, allowing them to exercise their parental rights. However, in March of 2023, the Board reversed their policy, eliminating, without any explanation, the opt-out option and all notices to parents. Students, therefore, are required to receive language arts instruction that involves storybooks as a part of their education. Despite this, the Board still allowed parents to have the opt-out option of sex education in the state-mandated health classes.

Parents from different religious backgrounds, (Muslim, Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Orthodox), including Tamer Mahmoud, sued the Board under the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Mahmoud v. Taylor, arguing that “the denial of notice and opt-out options violated their religious freedom and parental rights.”  In arguing this, the parents emphasized that they did not aim to challenge the contents of the books nor have them banned. Rather, they argue that they are entitled to the parental right to maintain control over when their children are exposed to beliefs that go against their religious teachings on marriage, sexual orientation, and gender. They reason that children, who lack the mental capacity to understand these sensitive topics, are impressionable and can be influenced by these storybooks.

A district court denied the parent's request for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the parents failed to demonstrate a free exercise burden. They assert that there is no religious burden until the students are compelled “to change their religious beliefs or conduct.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this in a 2-1 decision. However, in the Eighth Circuit, children cannot be forced to participate in activities that violate their religious beliefs.

The constitutional issue in Mahmoud v. Taylor deals with the Free Exercise Clause, which “protects citizens' right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of a "public morals" or a "compelling" governmental interest.” The parents argue that requiring students to participate in instruction on sexuality and gender that goes against their religious convictions burdens their religious exercise. Essentially by refusing to notify parents and not giving them an opt-out option in these lessons, the school board is infringing upon parents’ rights to teach their children religion.

In the Fourth Circuit, there was a 5-1 circuit split over “when” forced public school instruction violates the Free Exercise Clause. To denounce this split, the Board tried to dispute the ruling of Florey v. Sioux Falls School, which is a case that involved “students sitting through activities like a Christmas assembly with a “religious theme.” In the case of Florey, which was brought up in this case, Yoder was cited and it was stated that “forcing any person to participate in an activity that offends his religious beliefs will generally contravene the Free Exercise Clause.” In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the court ruled that Amish children could not be forced to attend public high school past eighth grade, as it violated their right to free exercise. The court ruled that individuals' interests under the free exercise clause outweigh the state's interests in requiring children to attend school beyond eighth grade. Both cases, but more specifically Yoder, recognized a parent's right to guide the religious upbringing of their children. 

When Yoder is applied to the case at hand, there are stark parallels. In both cases, the school policy infringes upon the right of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children. In Yoder, the school had required Amish students to attend public school until graduating. The Amish parents argued that the “values taught there were in marked variance with Amish values expos[ed] the children to a ‘worldly influence,’” and pressure[d] them to “conform” to their peers.” The court ruled in favor of Yoder. In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the school mandated the inclusion of storybooks into the curriculum that contain topics that go against many religious beliefs. In both cases, parents argued that requiring their children to engage in material that violates their religious beliefs without giving them the option to receive notice or opt their kids out, places a burden on the right to freely exercise religion. Notice, however, that in Yoder, parents were not denied their right to freely exercise their religion because their children had not been compelled to change their religious beliefs. Yet in Mahmoud, the court ruled that there was no religious burden until the students were compelled “to change their religious beliefs or conduct.” This ruling seemingly contradicts the ruling of Yoder.

I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Mahmoud. A ruling in favor of the parents, who come from different religious backgrounds, would establish a precedent that further enables there to be a separation between church and state. Despite the Board claiming that the storybooks are “neutral” and therefore don't inflict religious beliefs onto children, there is nothing neutral in telling young children to “let go of doing gender correctly” and that “there is no single way to be a boy, girl, or any gender.” The Free Exercise Clause protects individuals from the government burdening their religious practice. By requiring students to participate in lessons that go against their religious convictions, the government is doing just the opposite. While the state has the role of promoting inclusivity in education systems, it cannot mandate the teachings of ideological views of gender and sexuality to young children. If the Board were to give parents back their parental right to receive a notice and the ability to opt their children out of lessons containing the storybooks, the inclusion of the storybooks in the curriculum would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. It would allow parents to retain their right to guide the religious upbringing of their children.

Ultimately, this case holds huge implications for the future. In Montgomery County, parents of over 160,000 students are cut out of the new policy. If the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is upheld, parents will no longer have the right to control their children's religious upbringing. This case would set the precedent that mandating ideological teachings that go against religious convictions in schools is constitutional. In the future, millions of parents will be unable to protect their young, vulnerable children from ideological ideas that are instructed toward them.

Therefore I ask you all to consider this question. When public schools require elementary school children to participate in instructions on sexuality and gender, are they placing a burden on parents' religious exercise if the instruction goes against their religious beliefs and happens without notice or the option to opt their children out? What do you guys think? Does this violate the Free Exercise Clause?

Classroom Crucifix Controversy: Balancing Religious Expression and the First Amendment

Marisol Arroyo-Castro vs. Connecticut District Court    

In a case that raises important questions about religious expression in public schools, a 7th grade Middle School teacher in Connecticut, Marisol Arroyo-Castro, was recently suspended for displaying a crucifix on her desk. This case, which has not yet reached the Supreme Court, brings to the forefront the delicate balance between the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion and the prohibition against government establishment of religion.

 Marisol has been a Consolidated School District of New Britain employee for more than 20 years, and has hung the same crucifix near her desk for a decade (see image below). She had placed the religious symbol in her classroom as a personal expression of faith, and she would “reflect on the crucifix when things were going well in class and particularly when they weren’t”. She included that “having it there was just natural to me”. Marisol had been told by the district to remove the display after receiving a complaint, and when she failed to do so, the district decided to suspend her, citing concerns over the separation of church and state and the potential for violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Marisol, in turn, filed a lawsuit against the district, alleging religious discrimination. The lawsuit accuses leaders of the district of using the First Amendment’s establishment clause as an “excuse to abridge the free speech and religious free exercise rights” of teacher Marisol Arroyo-Castro. Her legal team contends that the display of the crucifix is an expression of her personal beliefs, and not an attempt to impose religion on her students. The district, however, defends its decision by stating that the display could be seen as endorsing a particular religion in a public school setting, which may run in conflict with constitutional principles. Clearly, it is a complex scenario.

Constitutional Issues: Free Exercise vs. Establishment

This case presents two significant problems with regards to interpreting the constitution and the first amendment: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.

Free Exercise of Religion: Under the First Amendment, individuals are guaranteed the right to freely exercise their religion. This includes the ability to express one's religious beliefs in personal and public spaces. Marisol’s argument is rooted in this right. She claims that displaying a crucifix in her classroom is an act of personal religious expression that should not be prevented by the district. By suspending her for this display, she argues that the district is infringing upon her ability to practice and express her religion freely.

On the other hand…

Establishment Clause: The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government entities, including public schools, from endorsing or establishing a religion. The school district’s argument is based on the notion that displaying a crucifix could be interpreted as an endorsement of Christianity, which could make students or staff from other religious backgrounds feel excluded or uncomfortable. Public schools, as state institutions, are expected to maintain a neutral stance on religion to avoid the appearance of endorsing one faith over another.

Analysis: Balancing Religious Expression and the Separation of Church and State

While Marisol's suspension is concerned with regards to religious freedom, it is also connected to the important issue of religious establishment. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that public schools should not engage in religious promotion. In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Court ruled that prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause, and in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000), the Court found that student-led prayers at football games could not be allowed due to concerns about government-endorsed religious activity. The government has previously established that in the public sphere, religious action has been regulated in order to prevent the establishment of religion. 

However, there are also legal precedents that recognize individual expression in public spaces. A recent, highly relevant case is Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a public high school football coach who was fired for praying on the field after games. The Court stated that the coach’s prayer was a personal act of religious expression protected under the Free Exercise Clause and did not constitute government endorsement of religion. Additionally, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Court ruled (in essence) that students and teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter public schools. 

In this case, Marisol could (and should) argue that her crucifix is within the realm of personal religious expression, and should therefore be protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment.

The challenge, though, is in determining whether the crucifix being displayed within a public school classroom is to be seen as an individual act of religious expression or as an endorsement of Christianity by the school district - raising the question of whether the government has a duty to regulate that religious symbols associated with its educational institutions. I personally do not think the school is endorsing Christianity.

Implications:

The outcome of this case has the potential to impact the future regulation of religious expression in not only public schools, but other public spaces as well.

If the court sides with Marisol, this would expand the rights of government employees to express religion publicly, potentially weakening past rulings that emphasize school neutrality on religion. It might also blur the line between personal expression and government endorsement, allowing more religious symbols and speech in public schools and other public spheres as well.

A ruling in favor of the school district, however, could reinforce the strict separation of church and state, making it clear religious expression must remain in the home. In doing so, it could reveal the unfair restriction of public employees with respect to their personal religious beliefs, leading to both 1) accusations of hostility toward religion rather than neutrality, and 2) inadvertently giving preference to secular individuals and their expression. This doesn't sound very fair to me. The Supreme Court’s recent shift toward expanding religious rights, as seen in Kennedy, leads me to believe that future rulings may favor free exercise over strict church-state separation.

Overall, There is an incredibly fine line between protecting individual rights and ensuring that the government does not appear to endorse or support a particular religion. And so if this case makes its way to the Supreme Court, hopefully this may provide some further information about how courts balance the competing interests of free religious expression and the constitutional requirement for separation of church and state.

To me, Marisol's suspension was an unjustified restriction of her First Amendment rights. While public schools must remain neutral, neutrality should not mean suppressing religious expression altogether. Kennedy v. Bremerton established that public employees retain their right to personal religious expression, and the same principle should apply here. If the courts rule against Marisol, it could set a dangerous precedent of non-tolerance, forcing public employees to hide their faith while allowing other secular ideas to flourish. True constitutional neutrality does not mean eliminating religious symbols - it means allowing all viewpoints to coexist without favoritism or suppression, secular ideas or otherwise.

For those reasons, I believe that Marisol’s lawsuit is justified, and that the court should rule in her favor. Doing so would cement the First Amendment’s protections for religious expression and ensure that personal faith is not treated as a liability in public schools.

Additional link for alternate interpretation of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022)

Connecticut Teacher Sues School District After Refusing to Take Down Crucifix

In a case that highlights the ongoing tension between religious expression and government neutrality, a Connecticut middle school teacher has sued her school district after being removed from the school for displaying a crucifix in her classroom. The school district argues that permitting the Crucifix to be hung would violate the Establishment Clause, while the teacher claims prohibiting it infringes on her Free Exercise rights. This dispute mirrors the legal debates surrounding Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, a controversial Supreme Court decision from 2022 that reshaped how courts approach religious expression in public schools.

This case raises fundamental constitutional questions: Where is the line between personal religious expression and government endorsement of religion? And does the Kennedy ruling suggest that the teacher’s removal was unconstitutional?

After being ordered to remove a crucifix from her classroom and refusing to do so, Marisol Arroyo-Castro was suspended without pay for insubordination by the Consolidated School District of New Britain. The leaders of the school district claimed that hanging the crucifix in a classroom owned by the New Britain Board of Education endorses the religion, which ultimately violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause’s objective to keep public schools neutral in religious matters. The school district maintains that visible religious displays by teachers could make students feel excluded or pressured. Students of different faiths or no faith could be particularly subjected to this. 

Castro recently filed a lawsuit against the School District in response to these claims, accusing them of using the Establishment Clause as an excuse to restrict her free speech and free exercise rights. Castro’s lawsuit suggests that other teachers are permitted to have secular images and items in their classrooms to express their personal interests and beliefs. Castro’s lawyer claims that allowing secular objects in classrooms but not religious objects is not treating religion neutrally. 

Similarities in this Connecticut crucifix case and Kennedy v. Bremerton School District were noted by Castro’s legal team. The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District significantly altered the legal landscape for religious expression in public schools.  The case involved a high school football coach, Joseph Kennedy, who was disciplined for praying on the field after games. The Court ruled in his favor, arguing that his personal religious expression did not constitute government endorsement of religion, and that religious expression cannot be prohibited solely because of its religious nature.

The Kennedy ruling could strengthen Castro’s claim. If a coach publicly praying on the football field was deemed private religious expression, it is arguable that Castro’s choice to display a crucifix is also personal expression rather than an endorsement of religion by the school. The Court’s emphasis on protecting individual religious expression suggests that outright bans on teachers displaying religious symbols might not hold up under scrutiny.

However, a key distinction between the cases is that Kennedy involved voluntary post-game prayer. In contrast, this case involves a religious display in a classroom, which is a space where students are a captive audience. Courts might view a teacher’s in-class religious display as more coercive than a coach’s prayer on a football field.

In my opinion, while Castro may use the Kennedy decision to argue that her crucifix is a personal expression of faith rather than an official endorsement by the school, the school district's argument is more compelling because a classroom is different from a football field in terms of student exposure and potential coercion. Unlike voluntary post-game prayer, a crucifix displayed in a classroom is a permanent, visible symbol that students—a captive audience—see daily. This could create an implicit endorsement of Christianity, making non-Christian students feel uncomfortable or excluded. 

This case has significant implications for treating religious expression in public schools. A ruling for Castro would expand public employees' ability to express religious beliefs at work, ultimately reshaping the balance between personal expression and government neutrality. This could further erode the Establishment Clause’s traditional safeguards, potentially opening the door for more open religious expression by public school employees. On the other hand, if the school district prevails, it would reaffirm the precedent that public schools must remain neutral spaces where teachers cannot visibly promote religious symbols. It would set the standard that personal expression is allowed to public school employees unless it interferes with the educational environment or violates policies such as the Establishment Clause.

Ultimately, the outcome of this lawsuit could have significant consequences for how religious expression is treated in public schools moving forward. Courts must decide whether the teacher’s crucifix was merely a personal expression or an impermissible endorsement of religion—a question at the heart of First Amendment law.

Sources: 

Teacher Booted from Classroom Over Crucifix Sues District, Alleges Religious Discrimination

Court's Excellent Ruling in Coach Kennedy Case

ACLU Comments on Supreme Court Decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

Religious Freedom or Public Safety? Examining the Legal Battle Over Dad’s Place Church

    In March 2023, Pastor David Avell of Dad's Place in Bryan, Ohio, entered into a legal battle with the city. Avell decided to keep his church open 24/7 due to overcrowding in local homeless shelters. In response to Avell’s decision, the city charged him with 18 zoning law violations related to his church's operations. These charges included “lacking proper kitchen and laundry facilities, having unsafe exits, and using improper ventilation” (Brown). Dad's Place was classified as a central business, which prohibited the building from allowing people to eat, launder, or sleep on the premises. Avell pleaded not guilty to the charges and filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against the city. In turn, the city dropped the charges in exchange for Avell halting operations and obtaining a permit. Eventually, Avell was jailed for not adhering to the building's fire codes, based on the fire inspector observing 15 people sleeping in a room without an automated sprinkler system.

    Avell claims this situation is an issue of religious freedom and asserts that he is being unjustly imprisoned. I aim to address the question: does this case revolve around religious liberty? I believe this is not a matter of religious freedom. While Avell is motivated by his faith to keep his church open 24/7 for the homeless to find shelter, that is not the core issue. The building is physically inadequate for the number of people staying there. Being on the streets in sub-zero temperatures is indeed far worse than being in a building that could potentially catch fire; however, that is not a standpoint the government is permitted to take. They maintain that safety codes exist for a reason: to protect the public. Even still, Avell claims that his religious freedoms are being restricted; however, though his actions stem from religious motivations, the city government is not attempting to restrict the free exercise of religion; they are merely striving to maintain public safety. Interestingly, this case resembles the issue with the Orthodox Jewish family from class. The family believes they have a religious obligation to have as many children as possible, but they have socioeconomic challenges and apply for a subsidized housing program, ultimately exceeding the family size limit to qualify for housing. They are then denied and claim it is discriminatory based on religion due to their faith requiring them to have as many children as possible. In that case, we understood that it was an incident regarding an indirect burden, which is "legislation that does not make unlawful the religious practice itself," making this not a matter of religious freedom but one of safety (Braunfeld v. Brown). This very same idea applies to Avell’s situation; the city's justice system isn't persecuting him for being a Christian man; they are addressing his refusal to uphold fire safety laws. In my opinion, the city has every right to shut down Dad’s Place church for building violations, and it is justified to jail Pastor Avell for not complying with the building's fire codes. I believe, that while Pator Avell’s actions were driven by a religious duty to help those in need, the legal battle surrounding the Dad’s Place church is fundamentally not a matter of religious freedom. Instead, this case revolves around issues of public safety and legal compliance. The city never attempted to restrict Avell’s free practice of religion, it only enforced its zoning laws and fire safety protocols to protect the well-being of the public including the homeless people within the church. Like the case of the Orthodox Jewish family, Avell’s situation evokes an indirect burden rather than an infringement on his religious liberty. Although I do acknowledge the fact that it is much safer for the homeless to be inside in sub-zero conditions, it is important to remember that housing that many people comes with rules and regulations. However, these rules and regulations don't encroach on anyone's right to practice religion. What do you think?

Sources: https://www.christianpost.com/news/ohio-ag-backs-pastor-facing-legal-battle-over-homeless-ministry.html?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=The%20Church%20of%20Life%20on%20Death%20Row%20%7C%20What%20Trump%20Should%20Learn%20from%20the%20Visigoths%3A%20CT%20Daily&utm_campaign=CT%20Daily%20Briefing%20-%2002-10-2025

Is Permission Needed to Help the Homeless?

 In the winter of 2023, the Burien Free Methodist Church openly expressed its desire to host an encampment of one hundred homeless individuals for a time of about three months. The city of Burien repeatedly asked the church to file a formal application to use the land as a temporary living space for those in need. Burien City has a clear municipal code (BMC 19.05.030) that expresses what types of land usage do not need approval by the government, “...the Code specifically designates the following land uses in a multi-family zone: townhomes, apartments, family day care homes, daycare centers, mixed-use buildings, public park, and recreation facilities, community residential facilities, nursing homes, religious facilities, schools, assisted living facilities, essential public facilities, government facilities, public utilities, personal wireless services facilities, community gardens, and enhanced services facilities”. Any other utilization of land not described in the Burien Municipal Code requires an application for temporary use. The city tried to make the process more appealing to the Church by waiving the application fee and expressing their support for the encampment. Yet, the organization continued to refuse as they felt the need to apply violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, their First Amendment right of free exercise, and the constitutional right of free speech. 

The Church continued on with their homeless encampment disregarding the city's requests. This resulted in Burien issuing an increasing monetary penalty amongst the church called a “Notice of Violation”, but they nullified these charges when the encampment ended. The fines were a way of establishing law and authority without the actual intent of terminating the encampment. 

The Burien Municipal Code has a similar goal to Thomas Jefferson's to “promote the general public health, safety, comfort, and welfare of the residents of the city of Burien”. Essentially the reason for this code and application process is to maintain the purpose of “peace and good order” just on a smaller scale than Jefferson was describing about the entire nation. The code is facially neutral in the sense that it applies to all religious and non-religious groups who own property in Burien, but who is to say that there is no bias present in the application process? What if certain religious groups are denied permits, while non-religious groups are accepted? Would that be an establishment of religion?

Mark Miller, the pastor of the Burien Free Methodist Church, feels that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment should allow the church to carry out its religious obligation of almsgiving without seeking any permission from the government. He feels that civil magistrates should not be left to decide what religious actions are admissible on their property if no harm is intended.  On the other hand, the Burien city government believes that it is within its jurisdiction to control what usages of city zones are permissible. The city views the code as an unbiased necessity to promote structure and stability. Is this truly a scenario that involves the free exercise clause? If so, to what extent can authority restrict religious free exercise?

What we are truly evaluating here is whether or not the Burien Free Methodist Church’s constitutional right of free exercise is being infringed upon by Burien City’s zoning laws which require the church to obtain a permit before pursuing the homeless encampment? 

The reason I struggled so much to figure out my answer to this question was due to some of the applicable information from the Cantwell v. State of Connecticut case. Mr.Justice Roberts explains in the opinion of the court, “The act requires an application to the secretary of the public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to determine whether the cause is a religious one…” and “Such censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the first amendment”. This demonstrates that civil magistrates should not be able to declare the sincerity of religion. This could apply to the Miller v. City of Burien case in a situation where a religious group applies for a temporary permit and is at the feet of a civil magistrate to decide if they can exercise their religion. Also, there is a risk of establishment if certain religions are given permits to use their property for some form of free exercise whilst others are not. Regardless of these details, I have come to believe that the constitutional rights of the Burien Methodist Church are not being violated. The municipal code is intended to ensure that property is being used in ways that will not threaten the safety and peace of their residents. The church was not prevented from exercising its religious obligations by any means. They were simply asked to apply for a permit that was ensured to be given to them because their intended use of the property had positive effects on the public.  I believe it is within the city’s jurisdiction to oversee and have some control over the usage of the property. Imagine the church was hosting the encampment of registered sex offenders on the basis of religious obligation. The government must be able to restrict this activity for the “peace and good order” of society. Government authority is necessary for the protection of people and truly no individual's right of free exercise is being infringed by this law.

LA Lifeguard Stands up for Religious Rights in the Workplace

    Over time, we’ve seen a continuing legal debate regarding the balance between religious freedom and workplace policies. The case of Little v. Los Angeles County Fire Department provides us with a unique example of the tensions that may occur from this debate. Captain Jeffrey Little is a lifeguard and evangelical Christian, and argues that the county violated his religious freedom by forcing him to be involved in raising the Progress Pride Flag despite his strong religious beliefs. This case raises numerous important questions regarding what length public employers should go to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, it causes us to question why protecting those beliefs is crucial to the constitutional right of free exercise.

    In June 2023, Los Angeles County required all county facilities, including lifeguard stations, to fly the Progress Pride Flag during Pride Month. Captain Little asked to be given religious accommodation, explaining that his Christian faith had instilled in him that same sex relationships and non binary identities do not align with his beliefs. Initially, his supervisors agreed to accommodate him by assigning him to work at locations without flagpoles. However, they later took away this accommodation and insisted that he must be present for the raising of the flag at his work, even if he did not physically raise it himself.

    Little ultimately retaliated, arguing that even managing others who raised the flag would breach his religious beliefs and freedoms. As a result of this, he faced consequences, such as being reassigned, criticized, and allegedly harassed. After this had occurred, Little filed a lawsuit, claiming that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were violated.

    The main legal question that it raised is whether Los Angeles County’s actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This clause protects one’s rights to practice their religion without facing any interference from the government. According to past cases like Sherbert v. Verner and Employment Division v. Smith, the government can only restrict religious freedom if it has an actual compelling reason to do so and the restriction is the option that comes with the least burden.

    Little argues that the county didn’t have a valid enough reason to deny his accommodation. He believes that allowing him to remain unaffiliated with the flag would not present any harm to the county’s mission nor would it lead to chaos in the workplace. On the other hand, the county argues that ensuring all employees follow the flag policy is an essential aspect in promoting diversity and inclusion.

    Another key question raised is whether the county’s policy is a neutral rule that applies equally to everyone or whether it unfairly targets people with religious objections. The court allowed certain parts of Little’s case to proceed, demonstrating that there’s enough evidence to explore whether the county showed any bias toward his religious beliefs.

    Captain Little’s case goes beyond solely one man’s objection to a flag. It’s about protecting the principle that the government cannot force people to act against their religious beliefs unless it is completely necessary. The First Amendment doesn’t just protect religious practices in private spaces like churches, it applies in the workplace too. This especially applies when public employees like Little face policies that conflict with their faith.

    One of the primary points in Little’s favor is that his accommodation request didn’t prevent the county from flying the Progress Pride Flag. He wasn’t asking to stop the flag from being displayed altogether. Rather, he simply seeked an exemption from playing an active role participating in or managing the process. It would have been quite easy for the county to reassign him or find another way to meet its policy goals having Little be directly involved. By taking away his accommodation and punishing him for his religious stance, the county ultimately created a burden on his free exercise of religion that was unnecessary in the end.

    Additionally, this case could set a dangerous precedent. In class we have discussed the idea of a “slippery slope,” where granting one religious exemption could lead to an obligation for courts to provide similar exemptions for cases in the future. However, that logic should work both ways. If the court sides with the county, it could reveal that public employees must comply with every workplace policy, even when those policies conflict with their religious beliefs. This would weaken the protections that come with the Free Exercise Clause and create a terribly negative effect, as it would not allow individuals to seek accommodations without having a fear of retaliation or job loss.

    If Little comes out with a victory in this case, we can be reassured that religious freedom in public workplaces will remain protected. Additionally, it would remind employers that accommodations that are within reason are absolutely required under both the First Amendment and Title VII. For a very long time, courts have recognized that religious beliefs deserve respect, and this case would emphasize that public institutions must think carefully about providing accommodations prior to placing burdens on one’s faith.

    On the other hand, a ruling against Little could make it much more difficult for employees to receive accommodations, especially in situations that involve symbolic gestures such as flags. The effect of this would be extremely unfavorable, where people feel they must suppress their beliefs to keep their jobs.

    All in all, Captain Little’s case is an example that provides us with insight into how far public employers can go in enforcing workplace policies when those policies clash with religious beliefs. Without a compelling reason otherwise, individuals are protected from being forced to act against their faith under the constitution. In this case, the county had other ways to meet its goals without involving Little, and it refusing to respect his beliefs goes against the entire concept of religious freedom. By standing up for his rights, Little is defending his own beliefs while also protecting others from having to decide between their job and faith.

Sources:

https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-06-06/christian-lifeguard-doesnt-have-to-raise-the-pride-flag-but-objects-to-making-subordinates-do-it#:~:text=The%20lawsuit%2C%20filed%20by%20longtime,a%20Pride%20flag%20last%20summer.

https://religionclause.blogspot.com/2025/01/lifeguard-who-has-religious-objections.html

https://californiaglobe.com/fr/christian-lifeguard-sues-l-a-county-fire-department-for-religious-discrimination-over-pride-flag/