FACTS:
In Mirabelli v. Bonta, teacher and parent plaintiffs sued to get an exemption from a California law. This law prevented schools from notifying parents about children's engagement in gender-transition activities. Additionally, this law required schools to use children's preferred names and pronouns, regardless of parental input. The plaintiffs argued that the disclosure requirement for student-consent "violated [parental] rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment", as well as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court provided an injunction that favored these suing plaintiffs. This injunction gave new training directions to state officials, prioritizing parental oversight instead of previously requiring student consent for disclosures. However, The Ninth Circuit Court challenged this injunction on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause.
ISSUE:
Does the state violate the Free Exercise Clause with California law requiring a student's consent before state officials disclose gender-transition engagement to parents?
HOLDING:
The Supreme Court ("SCOTUS") majority opinion held that the Free Exercise Clause protects parental religious exemptions against California law requiring a student's consent for disclosures (of gender-transition engagement).
PRECEDENTS APPLIED:
The SCOTUS used the "four-factor" test from "Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs. (2021)" ("Alabama"). This Alabama precedent established four factors, and the SCOTUS majority applied the following: Likelihood of success on the merits, Irreparable harm, and Balance of equities. For the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of all these factors. In regards to likelihood of success on the merits, the SCOTUS majority argues that California law requiring a student's consent for disclosure(s) is likely to substantially interfere with the right of parents to pass their religion onto their children. Thus, the California law is not likely to succeed on the merits of free exercise of religion.
As established in "Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)" ("Mahmoud"), the SCOTUS deemed that LGBTQ+ storybooks in school without parental consent were sufficiently violative of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the SCOTUS majority argued California's law as greater in violation of the Free Exercise Clause than even the sufficiently violative storybooks from the Mahmoud case. As such, the majority argues the state violates the Free Exercise Clause by requiring a student's consent to disclose gender-transition engagement to parents.
PERSONAL ARGUMENT:
In contrast, Justice Kagan ("Kagan") has three critiques for the SCOTUS majority's argument: based on their use of the emergency docket, their reasoning, and how the absorption of the parental right to pass religion onto children via the Due Process Clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment) is debatable in nature.
First, Kagan admonishes the dismissive decision made using the emergency docket, which precluded usual deliberation and discussion of deeper legal questions that were present in this case. Kagan elaborated that many other cases also have plaintiffs' objecting to school policies similar to the California law seen in the case today. However, rather than waiting to process this case or any others, the SCOTUS used the emergency docket poorly to rule out deliberation.
Next, Kagan argues against the SCOTUS majority reasoning by criticizing the use of the Mahmoud precedent. Kagan addresses the majority's reasoning that California's law "substantially interferes" with the Free Exercise Clause of parents to pass their religion to their children. However, Kagan opposes this use of the Mahmoud decision on the basis that its application is still within infancy, and therefore the precedents' reach has not been refined and/or solidified.
Finally, Kagan argues the case's deeper legal questions extend beyond a free exercise debate: questioning parental oversight against a child’s own religious exercise. Kagan ponders whether the right to pass their religion to children is merely an implied right within the Due Process Clause, as the parental right is not written, which makes it difficult to recognize as definite legal doctrine. Kagan cites "Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022)" ("Dobbs") to illustrate importance, as Dobbs constrains judges from using their own "personal views" for decisions instead of definite written doctrine.
CONCLUSION:
I disagree with the SCOTUS majority that parental rights would supersede student agency because I disagree with the application of the Mahmoud precedent. I believe that equating LGBTQ+ storybooks to interpersonal relationships between children and parents is inadequate, and warrants deliberation (precluded by the emergency docket). Although I am skeptical that the Dobbs precedent would weaken parental rights, my opinion still leans towards prioritizing student rights over parental religious exemptions.
"25A810 Mirabelli v. Bonta (03/02/2024)" : https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a810_b97d.pdf
"US Supreme Court blocks California privacy protections for transgender students" :
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