The salient issue in this case is whether the Idaho Board of
Contractors violated Ricks’s rights to freely exercise religion by refusing to
accept alternative forms of identification other than a social security
number.
I believe that given the circumstances of the case, Ricks’s
Constitutional rights to free exercise of religion were violated. I will break
down this argument by addressing specific details about the case, as well as
interrogating previously established Constitutional precedent related to the
free exercise clause. In doing so, I will also provide counter-arguments and
rebuttals, which ultimately will support Ricks.
It is important to understand specific details about this
case. According to Ricks’s defense, “a federal law dictates that the Board of
Contractors will receive extra funding if it collects contractors’ social
security numbers.” There was a clear financial incentive for the Board of
Contractors to deny Ricks an exemption based on his religious belief.
Additionally, “other licensing laws already grant accommodations to foreign
residents who don’t have social security numbers.” Foreigners residing in the
U.S. should not be given preferential treatment to American citizens,
especially with regards to Constitutionally-protected rights. Ricks was willing
and able to provide any other legitimate form of identification, including his
birth certificate.
There are two cases that come to mind with regard to free
exercise which I believe support Ricks. First is the broad precedent set in
1879 with Reynolds v. The United States. One point made in this case is that
the free exercise clause protects belief, not action. This point does not
support Ricks because he was acting on his religious beliefs. However, the text
in the decision also states that “when the offence consists of a positive act
which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might
escape punishment because he religiously believed that the law which he had
broken ought never to have been made” (Muñoz, 17).
The second case of relevance is the 1990 decision Employment
Division v. Smith. This decision held that the free exercise clause generally
requires no religious exemptions from laws that are neutral and generally
applicable. (Background for this case can be found here.) In
taking up Ricks’s case, the Supreme Court would be forced to revisit this
decision.
The First Amendment begins with the expression “Congress
shall make no law...”. This was amended in Cantwell v. Connecticut, and the free exercise clause was applied to states. Even if the Cantwell decision had not been decided this way, the state should not bar Ricks
from becoming an independent contractor on ethically unjustifiable grounds. No
slippery slope argument can be made with regards to Ricks because there is a
clear way for the government to solve the problem (i.e., obtaining other
legitimate methods of identification). In a circumstance as such, the state
should defer to Ricks’s right to freely exercise religion because this action
does not negatively impact anybody else. Ricks isn’t asking for an exemption to
slaughter a sacrificial lamb at one of his construction sites.
In summary, I presented the basic information regarding the
facts of the case. Then, I identified the salient issue in the case – whether
the Idaho Board of Contractors violated Ricks’s right to freely exercise
religion by refusing to accept alternative forms of identification other than a
social security number. Next, I provided examples of two cases decided in the
U.S. Supreme Court which establish precedent for Constitutional limitations on
free exercise. Lastly, I offered my own analysis and response to the issue at
hand. States should almost always heir on the side of protecting
constituents’ religious freedoms, so long as they do not pose harm or risk to
other individuals.
4 comments:
I really enjoyed reading this blog post. I think it was extremely well written and broken up very well, easy to follow. I agree with your decision on the case of how they should have allowed Ricks to use other forms of identification. If he was able to show any other form, then that should have been enough. Also, if this is not going to harm anyone then I do not think it should have been denied so harshly. The fact that the Board of Contractors receives financial benefits if they receive social security number's is also something that should have effected how Rick's decision was treated.
I completely agree with you That Rick's right to religious freedom was violated in not allowing him to provide alternative forms of identification. It adds even more fuel to the fire when you bring up the fact that they make these allowances under different circumstances which are not religious in nature. This proves that there is an alternative course of action and their decision to extend that courtesy to him can only be seen as religious discrimination. I agree that the government has no place in regulating belief, but do in regulating actions, but in this particular case I think what was really being regulated was Rick's belief in the acquisition of national identity. I do not think it was unreasonable at all to ask them to accept something other than a social security number.
I am not sure if I fully agree with your argument. Firstly, whether or not foreigners should receive better treatment than U.S citizens is an entire different issue within itself, but it does not pertain to this particular law. To become a contractor you have to register with the government, so basically you are working for or in tangent the government. In addition, no religious exemptions should be given to any law that is neutral. This law is neutral due to the applicability it has on all religions, not just one particular religion. The government is not impeding on your right to believe in your religion, but if you want to work for the government, you have to follow its rules.
Great post. The First Amendment's right of freedom to exercise one's religious belief is a fundamental right. The government should not be permitted to infringe on that exercise absent a compelling state interest which cannot be otherwise satisfied in a manner that does not infringe. Here, the blogger makes the point that the state's interest was merely financial and the government could have easily ascertained the contractor's identity in an alternative manner avoiding the infringement. A convincing argument for Ricks.
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