Maxon v. Fuller Theological Seminary

Fuller Theological Seminary is a globally leading Christian graduate institution, training its students to eventually become Christian leaders in communities across the world. As part of their religious obligation, Fuller has strict conduct rules that align with Christian moral understandings. One of these moral expectations is based upon the stated Christian understanding that, according to God, marriage must be between a man and a woman and that sexual relations must be saved for this heterosexual, marital union. Fuller requires all potential students to acknowledge and physically write consent to abide by these explicitly stated conduct rules. Two students at Fuller, Joanna Maxon and Nathan Brittsan, took legal action against the seminary after they were both dismissed from the program when each student entered a same-sex marriage. While Maxon and Brittsan argue that Fuller is unconstitutionally discriminating against them based on sexual orientation, Fuller claims that a court forcing Maxon and Brittsan to remain enrolled in Fuller, despite their clear violation of required conduct, would be an unconstitutional violation of Fuller's right to free exercise.

The question here is one of deciding if religious reasoning can constitutionally justify discriminatory acts such as the one against Maxon and Brittsan in this case. In class, we have often discussed that free exercise must have some sort of limit - organizations cannot be permitted to practice their religion any way they want, as it may lead to a slippery slope of defending any and all potentially disruptive or dangerous action with the excuse of religion. Does this clear discrimination against sexual orientation justify a disruption of social good that the courts would need to intervene and protect? In a similar case, Bob Jones University v. United States, the court did ultimately decide that the university's clear discrimination against potential students of color was so disruptive to social justice that it disqualified them from receiving previously granted tax benefits. Can the same sort of thought process be applied here - is the dismissal of these students so disruptive to the greater good that the court can force Fuller to abandon their religious viewpoint and maintain the enrollment of students who blatantly disregard their strict Christian moral code? Or, as the legal team for Fuller argues, would the court's support of Maxon and Brittsan be an act of coercion, forcing religious organizations to abandon their religious beliefs and limit their free exercise by requiring enrollment of all students, despite clear violations of the religious organization's standards. According to Fuller's legal team, this would promote excessive entanglement between church and state due to the state's insertion of their own standards into the ways in which religious groups choose to train their leaders. 

I agree with the argument of Fuller's legal team and believe that, as discriminatory and unjust as I personally believe their moral code to be, Fuller is constitutionally protected in their right to train their religious leaders how they want, and that insertion of the state's standards into this process would be coercive, a violation of free exercise, and would lead to excessive entanglement - a violation of the third prong of the Lemon Test. Additionally, requiring Maxon and Brittsan to remain enrolled would be a violation of ministerial exception, a concept that allows churches to choose their own leaders. The case EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School set a precedent to the concept of ministerial exception, holding that churches have the right to dismiss a minister who violates church teachings, unanimously ruling that religious organizations have the freedom to select their own leaders and ministers. Because Fuller is a graduate institution training future Christian leaders, I believe the same applies here. While a connection to the Bob Jones University case could be argued, I don't believe it is relevant. The court's ruling in that case did not pertain to the ways in which the university operated, as the Fuller case does, but instead the government funding that they were eligible to receive. Additionally in this case, intent is important to focus on. Both Maxon and Brittsan had physically written consent to moral expectations that they were made fully aware of prior to joining the seminary. They admitted to knowingly breaking the rules. While I may have felt differently if these expectations had been hidden to students, the intent of knowingly breaking Fuller's explicitly stated rules further points to the fact that the students' actions should not be protected by the court. This case does not assess whether Fuller's policies are morally sound and should remain unchanged,  but rather assesses if Maxon and Brittsan's actions should be protected by law. Due to the concept of ministerial exception, the intent of the students in question to knowingly break rules, and in the interest of preventing religious coercion as a result of excessive entanglement between church and state, I do not believe that Maxon and Brittsan's should be legally protected. This ruling is important as it points to the necessity of separating personal morality and an understanding of religion and constitutional law. Though I believe Fuller's moral code and discrimination be abhorrent, it is important to separate the two according to constitutional protections in order to preserve individuals' and organizations' rights to exercise their religion, free of government coercion and intervention.