On December 28, 2020, Damon Landor was transferred to the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center (RLCC) to serve the last three weeks of his five-month sentence. Landor was a practicing Rastafarian and had taken the Nazarite vow, which, among other things, prohibited him from cutting his hair; a ritual he upheld for over two decades. Because of his beliefs, Landor had been permitted to keep his long dreadlocks at the other two correctional facilities he had been held in prior to the RLCC. However, upon his arrival at the RLCC, Landor, preemptively providing documents that should have permitted him to keep his dreadlocks as they had at the other two facilities, was shackled and his head shaved. The prison officials ignored his arguments that their actions were a violation of his First Amendment right to Free Exercise of Religion, even claiming judicial precedence, and proceeded to forcibly shave his head.
Upon his release, Landor immediately filed a lawsuit against the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers on grounds that his rights granted by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) had been violated. Additionally, Landor claimed that there was judicial precedence from a case brought before the Fifth Circuit Court in 2017. The case in question, Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, was a case almost identical to Landor’s. In this case, Christopher Ware, just like Landor, was a Rastafarian who had taken the Nazarite vow and had dreadlocks at the time of his incarceration. Unlike Landor, however, Ware was permitted to keep his dreadlocks because the Louisiana DOC “failed to satisfy its burden to show the policies are the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest.” Therefore, Ware was permitted to uphold his vow throughout his incarceration. Given the result of this case, Landor argued before the cutting of his hair that he should be able to practice his beliefs and that the RLUIPA protected his practices. As it has been mentioned, the prison officials disregarded these arguments and presentations of evidence and proceeded to cut his hair. In doing so, Landor has claimed his liberties were breached and is in fact pursuing a recovery of monetary damages. However, when Landor’s case reached the Fifth Circuit Court, as did Ware’s, the court overruled his plea and stated that the RLUIPA did allow for monetary damages to be recovered from the prison officials who had violated his rights.
While, admittedly, the primary question before the Court is whether the RLUIPA allows monetary damages to be recovered from individual officials, it is important to note that what we are discussing is whether Landor’s religious liberties were violated by the prison officials. While Landor believes that they have been, an argument could be made that the prison officials were in fact attempting ensure the greater peace and good order of the facility. I believe that it is safe to say that the prison officials believed that they were adhering to Department of Corrections grooming guidelines and, therefore, that they were recognizing and enforcing a compelling state interest in the matter. While the Ware case had in some ways rewritten grooming policies (which should have protected Landor), there was still a loose guideline that required inmates to have short hair (no dreadlocks) and typically required a buzz cut upon entry into federal correctional facilities. It is argued and understood that these policies were established to preserve the greater peace and good order of the facility, and if put up to the Sherbert Test would regularly be recognized as the compelling state interest in most matters involving the free exercise of religion. In this situation, it is clear to see that the officials deemed Landor’s actions to be a threat to this peace and good order; it just becomes a question of whether or not they were applying restrictions in the least restrictive manner as instituted by the Sherbert Test.
While this case, unlike many regarding free exercise of religion, has a semi-clear answer when it comes to the question of whether religious rights were violated, it is still valuable to realize the complexity of compelling state interests and claims of religious rights violations. While the true question before the Court is concerning whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in its ruling that the RLUIPA does not allow for monetary damages to be recovered from these prison officials, that to me is not the primary question we need to be discussing. I believe that even though it is highly likely that the Supreme Court will rule that Landor’s appeal is unconstitutional, it disregards the fact that Landor’s rights to uphold the Rastafarian Nazarite vow were violated in this sense. If the question before the Court was whether or not the officials violated Landor’s religious liberties, I think the outcome would be very different.
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2025/23-1197
3 comments:
I agree, as the Constitution protects Damon Landor’s religious vow to retain his hair. Landor’s correctional facility (“RLCC”) could argue its staff were justified to cut his hair with a compelling state interest to maintain “peace and good order”. However, the Sherbert test only justifies encroaching Landor’s convictions if all reasonable alternatives are absent. “Orderly” hairstyles could have ensured safety, only needing to last three weeks of Landor’s sentence. Instead, the RLCC violated Landor’s rights.
I agree with the opinion shared in this article. Not only is it a clear violation of his ability to exercise his religion, but there is no clear reason as to state interest that would justify forcing Landor to have his head shaved. Essentially, I do not see why the state would be compelled to have Landor's head shaved considering his religious considerations he received elsewhere.
I agree with this, and I think that the highlighted inconsistency between Ware and Landor is super important. If it had already been established that the haircut policies did not meet the "least restrictive means," then this clearly violates Landor's free exercise. This inconsistency shows how the prison officials did not respect established religious protections.
Post a Comment