The case of Mennonite Church USA v. US Department of Homeland Security raises a question that sits at the intersection of immigration enforcement and religious freedom: when does the federal government’s conduct at or near a house of worship cross the line into a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? On January 20, 2025, the Trump administration rescinded the Department of Homeland Security’s “sensitive location” policy, which had restricted Immigration and Customs Enforcement from conducting raids at churches, mosques, synagogues and schools for over thirty years. In its place, the acting DHS Secretary directed ICE officers to rely on “discretion” and “common sense” when conducting enforcement actions at places of worship. Within weeks of the change, over two dozen Christian and Jewish organizations filed suit against the DHS in deferral court. The case remains active on appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court.
The plaintiffs’ argument is grounded primarily in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. This standard is applied even when the burden results from a facially neutral, generally applicable policy. Unlike a purely First Amendment challenge, RFRA cannot be sidestepped by simply arguing that the rescission was not aimed at religion. The question is whether it substantially burdens religious exercise in practice and if it does, the burden shifts entirely to the government to justify it.
The facts of the case suggest the
answer to the first question is yes. Since the rescission, congregations with
large immigrant memberships reported large drops in attendance, with some
losing up to 100 weekly attendees. Congregations providing food distribution,
soup kitchens, and weekly meals (which the plaintiffs argue is an expression of
their faith not an optional charity) have also reported declining
participation. When congregation members stop attending services because ICE
may enter, or when food pantries become empty because those who need help are
afraid enter, the ability to actively exercise religion as a group is
diminished.
The District Court, in denying the
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in April of 2025, focuses mainly
on standing rather than the merits of the RFRA claim itself. The ruling judge found
that the plaintiffs had not established a credible threat of enforcement
because DHS had not specifically directed agents to target churches. This is an
important distinction because standing doctrine and RFRA’s substantial burden
analysis are separate inquires which will need to be examined by the D.C.
Circuit Court. The attendance declines alone provide significant evidence of
the presence of a substantial burden, even without direct enforcement action at
a plaintiff’s church.
Assuming substantial burden can be
established, the government then faces two additional hurdles: demonstrating
compelling interest and proving it has chosen the least restrictive means of achieving
its goal. On the issue of compelling interest, the government must show a
specific interest that justifies the burden on this form of religious exercise.
The relevant question is not whether immigration enforcement is compelling in
the abstract, but whether there is compelling interest in conducting
enforcement specifically at or near a place of worship rather than somewhere
else. The DHS offered no evidence that the prior sensitive locations policy had
allowed criminals to shelter in churches or meaningfully impeded immigration
enforcement.
Furthermore, the least restrictive means
facet of RFRA is where the DHS’s position is the weakest. The prior sensitive
locations policy itself was a less restrictive alternative to immigration
enforcement as it permitted enforcement actions at houses of worship under
emergency circumstances or written supervisory approval. That framework
coexisted with immigration enforcement for more than thirty years. Replacing it
with nothing more than personal officer discretion is very difficult to justify
as the least restrictive option when a more tailored alternative had already
existed for so long.
In my opinion, the plaintiffs
ultimately have a stronger argument, even if the District Court’s procedural
ruling was defensible on its own terms. What stands out to me the most is the
least restrictive means question. The government is not being asked to totally
stop enforcing immigration law, but rather they are being asked to explain why
it needs to enforce it specifically inside places of worship without any
procedural guardrails. The prior policy answered that question for thirty
years. The rescission of the policy provides no answer at all.
That being said, I do think that this
case exposes a genuine tension between religion and executive power.
Immigration enforcement is legitimate and constitutionally grounded function of
the executive branch, and courts historically have been rather reluctant to oppose
enforcement policies. One could argue that requiring supervisory approval
before entering a church imposes a true operational constraint on time-sensitive
executive action. But under RFRA, the government does not get the benefit of
the doubt, rather it bears the burden of providing sufficient proof. The
complete elimination of a decades-old protective framework, without evidence of
necessity and without considering a less restrictive alternative, does not meet
the burden of proof required.
Ultimately, Mennonite Church USA
v. US Department of Homeland Security asks whether RFRA’s strict scrutiny
standard has any real force when invoked against widespread executive
enforcement priorities. The answer the D.C. Circuit gives will matter beyond
immigration policy. If the government can suddenly rescind longstanding protections
for religious exercise without satisfying RFRA’s demanding tests, the practical
value of the statute and its protections become significantly diminished. The church
has long been understood as a place of sanctuary. Whether that understanding
survives this time of aggressive enforcement is now up to the courts.
Sources:
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11490
https://www.brethren.org/news/2025/general-secretarys-declaration-filed/
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/our-work/defending-immigrants-and-sanctuary-cities/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security/
https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security-u-s-district-court-for-d-c-2025/
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/religious-groups-sue-over-immigration-raids-at-places-of-worship
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