https://www.courthousenews.com/indiana-county-defends-courthouse-nativity-scene-at-seventh-circuit/
With the Christmas season approaching, an Indiana County is continuing their fight to display its county’s nativity scene. The creche has been featured on Jackson County Courthouse grounds for the past 15 years and has recently been the topic of debate. In December 2018, a lawsuit was issued by the Indiana ACLU on behalf of Jackson resident, Rebecca Woodring, who complained that the creche featured on the front law on Jackson County Courthouse grounds denoted a state endorsement of religion thus violating the Establishment Clause. The overarching question posed by the lawsuit is if the presentation of a creche on Courthouse grounds, government-owned property, demonstrates a state-sponsorship and/or endorsement of Christianity.
After the town heard complaints of the scene, they added a Santa, sleigh, and other non-religious holiday symbols to the scene. However, Woodring further argued that the additions failed to curtail the state’s endorsement of Christianity. The following April, the New Albany District Court ruled in Woodring’s favor assessing that the creche violated the Establishment Clause under the grounds that it lacked a secular purpose and endorses Christianity. Unpleased with the verdict, Jackson County appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court.
This November, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments. The hearing addressed American Legion v. American Humanist Association (2019) as precedent, presented by Jackson County’s attorney Mihet, in which the Court established that a 40-foot cross World War I monument on public-land was constitutional because it has taken an alternative secular significance. Woodring’s attorney Faulk argued that a creche is an overtly religious symbol and that unlike the monument, the display cannot be interpreted as anything other than religious in nature. It was also proposed that unlike the monument, the Jackson County creche is not long-standing. Judge Wood questioned this argument stating that creches have historically been erected around the World and in the United States before it was even the United States. Within the oral arguments, the judges questioned Mihet if the nativity scene could be viewed as culturally distinct from religion. Mihet responded by articulating that the non-religious adornments and other aspects of the holiday demonstrate that the scene is not uniquely religious. Faulk offered the rebuttal that a creche could not be perceived as anything other than religious, and retains an exclusive holy identity. The session concluded and the Judges did not nor did not indicate when they would issue a holding.
I predict that the Court of Appeals will uphold the motion that the creche display is unconstitutional. I believe that the Court of Appeals will apply the subsequent case to Lynch v. Donnely, County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989) as precedent, which ruled that a creche displayed on Courthouse grounds violates the Establishment Clause. The Court in Allegheny decided that because of the location of the display, a government office funded by taxpayer dollars, the creche suggested an impermissible state-endorsement of religion. In Allegheny, the Court decided that the creche will be perceived as an endorsement of the Christian religion to a “reasonable observer”, as a promotion of Christianity. Considering the similar location to Allegheny, I believe that the Court will rule likewise and state that the nativity scene cannot be displayed. Also, I believe that the Court’s analysis of American Legion will aid the conclusion that the creche violates the Establishment Clause. Unlike the World War I monument, the nativity scene lacks a secular purpose and is uniquely a celebration of the Christian faith. Moreover, this case also reminded me of the presentation of the Ten Commandments in the Texan Capitol building in Van Orden v. Perry, but unlike in that case, Jackson County is not providing a sufficient secular justification for their display. Because a creche lacks a compelling secular effect and considering its presence at a government office, I believe that the Court of Appeals will similarly rule with the District Court.
Personally, I believe that the Court should rule the display as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The display is featured outside of a Courthouse, government-owned property, which implies a relationship between state and religion. Although the display also features non-religious holiday symbols, the creche is undoubtedly religious. Because of the creche’s religious significance and recognition, I believe that the display of it at a Courthouse constitutes an establishment violation, professing the birth of Jesus Christ. I believe that observers would reasonably interpret the nativity scene as exclusively religious, without serving any secular purpose. Even though the addition includes non-religious holiday symbols, the symbols are still nonetheless associated with the celebration of Christmas and hold an undoubtful link to Christianity. Therefore, I believe that the creche should not be able to be erect considering the nature of the location. Furthermore, the adornment of a creche shows a preference for Christianity. In my opinion, the forced removal of such a display does not demonstrate hostility towards the Christian religion but rather promotes neutrality. In conclusion, I hold that the creche should not be permitted on Courthouse grounds to prevent the appearance of a state-sponsorship of religion.
4 comments:
I agree with Hannah in that this creche display is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. One main point aiding me in my agreement was Hannah's distinction between this Alabama county situation and that in Van Orden v. Perry. In this case, there is no presence of a valid, compelling secular justification, unlike Van Orden, which provided a disclaimer confirming the secular effect of the Ten Commandments. Additionally, I believe that the addition of non-religious holiday symbols to the scene does not diminish its promotion of Christianity, and the state's subsequent endorsement of this religion. The deeply religious symbols on the creche as well as its location, on government owned property, confirms its favoring towards Christianity.
While the author makes a compelling argument, I do not believe the arguments raised in Lynch v Donnelly were addressed, faithfully or at all. The similarities between these cases are such that they can not be ignored in a comparative analysis. While the creche in Lynch may not have been in such a direct government setting as this case or Allegany County, it was still being paid for by the local government. Given the similarities of the facts between the two cases, I believe it is within the rights of the local governments to adorn their government facilities with holiday decorations that have both secular and religious traditions.
I agree with your argument here and this case reminded me a lot of McCreary County v. ACLU where the Ten Commandments monument was changed until it was more "constitutional" and had a more secular purpose. Although this case didn't involve the Ten Commandments, the crèche was initially on its own and then other secular symbols were added around it. I agreed with the Supreme Court's decision in that case where their argument was centered around the fact that the original monument was of a solely religious nature and thus its whole purpose was to advance religion and only later were more secular elements added.
I agree with Hannah, and especially like her mention of the distinction between hostility and neutrality. It is easy for an individual who practices Christianity to see the removal of the creche as hostile towards religion, but leaving it there creates a hostility towards every other religion because, as Hannah points out, placing a creche on government property indicates a preference for Christianity. Additionally, I do not think it is possible for the creche to hold any secular meaning seeing as the symbolism itself is overtly religious and only used in religious contexts.
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