Can Faith Follow You to Work?: Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer

    Cedar Park Assembly of God is a Christian church in Washington that provides health insurance to all of its employees. The issue that they faced was rooted in their powerful belief that abortion is sinful. They refuse to pay for any insurance plan that covers abortion. This is a problem, as Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act states that all health insurance plans that cover maternity care generally must also cover abortion. Does Washington’s law violate Cedar Park’s First Amendment right to freely exercise religion by indirectly connecting church to abortion?

    What happens when an employer’s religious beliefs conflict with employees' personal choices? Religious freedom protects a church from being forced to act against its faith, but does that protection extend to the choices of people who simply work for the church? This is the central issue in Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer, a recent Ninth Circuit case involving Washington’s controversial health insurance laws, religious freedom, and abortion. 

    At first, my mind immediately went to this being a Free Exercise issue. If a church believes abortion is morally wrong, forcing it to purchase a coverage plan that goes against its religious beliefs is wrong, right? Well, not exactly, because that’s not really what Washington’s law does. 

    Washington addresses this issue through a separate conscience statute that protects employers with religious or moral objections. This law allows Cedar Park to claim a religious exemption, allowing the church to opt out of purchasing the abortion coverage. The insurance company is able to offer the church a plan that excludes the abortion coverage. However, the insurance company must still inform employees that the services remain available separately and explain how to access them. This responsibility remains in the hands of the insurance company, not Cedar Park. This is where I had a paradigm shift. 

    Cedar Park argued that this still violates their beliefs and technically still requires their involvement in something they consider immoral. Even if the church does not directly purchase the specific coverage plan, its employees still have access and connections to abortion resources. In the eyes of Cedar Park, they are indirectly facilitating abortion. 

    The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against Cedar Park. The majority believed Washington’s laws are neutral and generally applicable. They do not specifically or intentionally target religion and generally apply across the entire health insurance system. Because the laws were neutral, the court applied rational basis review, meaning Washington needed only a reasonable or legitimate reason for the law. Strict scrutiny, the much harder test requiring a compelling government interest and that the law be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, did not apply. Cedar Park agreed that the law could pass this test, so the court rejected its Free Exercise claim.

    Judge Callahan strongly disagreed, arguing that the laws do burden Cedar Park’s religious exercise and are neither neutral nor generally applicable. She also believed the laws should have faced strict scrutiny instead. Her argument raises an important question: just because a law does not outwardly target religion, does that mean its effects on religion should be ignored?

    Another important concern is how substantial the burden on Cedar Park actually is. Interestingly, the majority did not decide that Cedar Park faced no religious burden. Instead, it assumed that a burden focused more on whether the laws were neutral and generally applicable. The church believes that any connection to abortion goes against its moral beliefs, regardless of how indirect it is. Meanwhile, Washington attempts to separate the two by allowing the purchase of a plan excluding the abortion part. The state tried to balance the church’s religious objections while remaining accommodating to employees and their healthcare plan.

    This disagreement aligns closely with Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not typically receive strict scrutiny simply because they burden someone’s religious beliefs. This approach differs from Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court protected the Amish from a generally applicable school attendance rule because it placed an immense burden on their religious practice. Together, these cases show how the Supreme Court’s approach to determining whether a law is neutral has shifted over time and why considering applicability matters. 

    I can absolutely understand how Cedar Park may believe the line was crossed here. If the church truly and deeply believes that assisting someone in the abortion process is morally incorrect, a court should be careful about deciding the church’s involvement is too indirect to matter. If the government could simply decide which parts of someone’s religious beliefs matter enough to respect, religion would mean less to people. 

    However, I still agree with the majority decision here. Cedar Park is not the only party whose freedom matters in this case. The employees have beliefs and personal choices as well, and those should not be diminished. 

    This is where I think Washington’s solution makes the most sense. Cedar Park is able to follow its religious beliefs by choosing the insurance plan that excludes abortion. They are not being forced to pay for something that goes against their beliefs. Meanwhile, employees can hold their own beliefs and access the healthcare they deem necessary. 

    If Cedar Park could not only refuse abortion coverage but also had the power to refuse separate access, the religious exemption would hold a whole different level of power. This would allow Cedar Park not only to protect its own religious choice, but also to dictate its employees' healthcare choices. I believe that is the most crucial part of the entire case. 

    Religious freedom should protect Cedar Park’s ability to follow its beliefs, but should not give the church control over the independent choices of each person who works there. Washington’s law attempts to protect both sides, which is why I agree with the Ninth Circuit that Cedar Park’s Free Exercise rights were not violated.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-35560/23-35560-2026-09-14.html

https://adflegal.org/case/cedar-park-assembly-god-kirkland-v-kuderer/

City Zoning and Minyans

 

Daniel Grand, a practicing Orthodox Jew, faced a difficult dilemma. His city, University Heights Ohio, has strict zoning laws in place concerning places of worship. This has led to synagogues generally being on the outskirts of town. Grand decided to host prayer meetings in his house in order to fulfill what he sees as his religious duty as well as that of the community. Jewish law requires a quorum, called a minyan, of at least 10 men for prayers, so the practice necessarily requires a gathering of at least a small group of people. It also prohibits driving on certain holy days, such as the Sabbath and high holidays, making it difficult to get to a synagogue to gather and pray with other men. Grand’s plan was to host religious gatherings for men on these days so that neither he nor his community would have to drive to a synagogue on a day on which driving is forbidden.

Before his first gathering took place, a neighbor complained to the city of University Heights about the meeting. This prompted a cease-and-desist letter from the city, prohibiting Grand from using his house as a “place of religious assembly”. His house was not zoned for religious gatherings, which made his planned gathering illegal. The next day, Grand filed a Special Use permit under the University Heights Planning Commission in order to hold religious gatherings in his home despite the zoning restrictions. At a public hearing on his application, Grand faced pushback from neighbors, and the discussion was tabled with a second meeting planned. Grand withdrew his application before the second hearing, but the hearing nevertheless commenced. The Mayor asked community members to report violations of zoning law at this hearing. The police department also starting monitoring Grand’s house for violations of the religious gathering policy.

About 18 months after withdrawing his application, Grand filed a lawsuit against University Heights. This suit was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and then in the United States Sixth District Court of appeals. Among other claims, Grand claimed that the city’s zoning rules had a “chilling” effect on his first amendment practice. The court points out that Grand chose to withdraw his applications before the hearings on his special use permit were concluded. In this way, the court says, Grand was “the author of any chilling effect on his First Amendment interests.” Grand also admitted to convening at least 1 minyan on the Sabbath after the planning commission meetings ended, which the court said “does not sound like chill”. The 6^th district court ultimately ruled in favor of the city on all claims. However, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, who accepted the case and will hear arguments in December. Grand also made a facial claim in his lawsuit. He claimed that the zoning ordinances are unlawful because requiring permission for religious assembly is always unlawful. The court ruled that this facial claim is invalid because Grand couldn't prove that the zoning laws would be unlawful in any context.

The fundamental free exercise issue in this case concerns the ability of cities to create zoning restrictions in regards to religious gatherings. Zoning restrictions have a strong potential to violate the free exercise of religions with specific rules about gathering, as Orthodox Judaism does. Religious rules and zoning laws may directly contradict each other which creates an array of potential constitutional issues.

University Heights is highlighted in orange; blue tags show locations of synagogues in and around the city.

Something that the court did not consider that I think is relevant is whether or not the zoning laws geographically prohibit Grand from getting to a synagogue without driving. University Heights is a small city on the outskirts of Cleveland Ohio with a total area of 1.83 square miles. Google Maps confirms that Orthodox synagogues cluster on the outskirts of town. However, due to the small size of the town, there is at least one Orthodox synagogue within a 30-45 minute walk of most of the town, according to the Google Maps navigation tool. It is unclear which part of town Grand lives in. However, I think that having to walk 30 minutes to engage in religious practice is not overly restrictive on Grand’s free exercise. If the city were much larger, he would have a better case that keeping him from holding meetings in his house has a chilling effect on his religious practice. However, given the small size of the city and relative density of synagogues on the outskirts of the city, the zoning laws don’t necessarily chill the religious practice of Orthodox Jews. 

Overall, I think that Grand doesn't have a reasonable claim that the city chilled his free exercise. By choosing to withdraw his Special Use permit before it was fully processed, he chose to self-restrict his religious practice. Moreover, the city doesn't outright prohibit religious gatherings without any exception; the Special Use permit exists for cases like Grand's where there may be a good reason for having an exception to religious gathering laws. Even if he allowed the application to be fully processed and he got rejected I don't think he has a valid first amendment claim. There are likely synagogues within walking distance that he can travel to in order to fulfill his religious duties. 

 

Sources:

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-3876/24-3876-2025-11-13.html

https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/edit?mid=1TSmrGk8S3Tc0MiSSJx8LYkKoLK_H5Uc&usp=sharing

When Religious Beliefs Conflict with Assisted Suicide Laws

A new Illinois law allowing physician-assisted suicide has created a conflict between the state’s end-of-life policy and some doctors’ religious beliefs. On September 16, 2026, four Muslim physicians, Dr. Akbar Ali, Dr. Asim Babar, Dr. Omar Hussain, and Dr. Umar Shakur (pictured below), filed a federal lawsuit challenging parts of Illinois’ new End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act. The doctors argue that the law forces them to participate in a process that directly violates their Islamic beliefs. It raises the constitutional question: Can the government require doctors to participate in a legal medical process if it conflicts with their religious beliefs? The Illinois’ law, which took effect on September 12, permits terminally ill adults to access medication that they can take to end their lives. In order to qualify, a patient must be an Illinois resident, be at least 18 years old, have the mental capacity to make medical decisions, and have a terminal illness expected to result in death within six months. The medication must also be self-administered by the patient. 

The doctors are challenging the constitutionality of the law under the Affordable Care Act. Their attorneys argue that the Affordable Care Act prevents states that receive federal funding from discriminating against doctors who refuse to participate in assisted suicide. Since Illinois receives federal funding, the doctors argue that they should not be punished or treated differently for refusing to participate because of their religious beliefs.

The Illinois law does not require every physician to prescribe the medication. Illinois' Department of Public Health states that physicians are not required to provide aid-in-dying care. However, doctors who do not want to participate in assisted suicide because of their religious beliefs may still be required to take certain actions connected to the process, for instance, providing information to patients and potentially transferring their patients to another doctor. 

For these four doctors, this difference matters. They believe that human life is sacred and that their Islamic faith prohibits them from assisting someone in ending someone’s life. Their lawyers argue that even if the doctors are not personally prescribing the medication, requiring them to help a patient move toward obtaining it still makes them participate in something that violates their religious beliefs. The doctors are asking the federal court to prevent the State of Illinois from requiring them to comply with the Act in violation of their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion.

The central constitutional issue involves the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which protects the right to practice one’s religion without government interference. The difficult question is whether Illinois is simply regulating the medical profession or whether it is placing an unconstitutional burden on religious exercise. The doctors are not arguing that their beliefs should prevent other physicians from providing assisted suicide or prevent eligible patients from seeking it. They argue that they should not be forced to participate in conduct that violates their faith. 

Both sides make important arguments. Illinois wants to ensure that terminally ill patients are counseled about their legal medical options and can access them. From this perspective, requiring doctors to provide information or transferring patients to another doctor ensures that one doctor’s personal or religious beliefs do not prevent a patient from knowing about or accessing assisted suicide. 

This case also relates to the broader issue of religious neutrality that we have discussed in class. Religious freedom does not necessarily mean religious individuals are automatically exempt from every law that conflicts with their beliefs. At the same time, neutrality should not mean that the government can ignore a serious religious burden whenever it creates a generally applicable policy. The constitutional question becomes especially difficult when protecting one person's religious exercise may affect another person's ability to exercise a right provided by state law.

Doctors who believe assisted suicide goes against their religion should be required to refer their patients to another doctor who can counsel them on all their medical options. This seems fair to both sides because patients would still have access to all of their medical options, while doctors would not have to personally provide advice that goes against their religious beliefs. For example, the state itself or another neutral medical resource could inform patients about participating providers. This would allow patients to still access assisted suicide without forcing a doctor to help them with something that goes against the doctor’s religious beliefs.

Ali v. Vohra demonstrates why conflicts involving religious freedom rarely have simple solutions and shows how difficult it can be to protect religious freedom while also making sure that religious beliefs do not limit another person’s access to rights provided by law. Illinois has chosen to make assisted suicide legally available to qualifying patients, but that does not automatically resolve how much participation the state may demand from religiously objecting doctors. The case asks courts to determine where regulation of medical care ends and where the unconstitutional interference with religious exercise begins. Whatever the court decides could affect other cases where a person’s job responsibilities conflict with their religious beliefs.

https://wng.org/sift/muslim-doctors-sue-illinois-over-assisted-suicide-law-1789669076

House of God or one Built up to Code?

In 2022, Mille Lacs County Minnesota changed their system to obtain a building permit for building new homes and other structures to be a mainly online system. When it was first introduced, no alternative option was given, and the county suggested going to a local library or the courthouse to fill out the online application. Now, for those who wish to fill out the permit application on paper form a $50 fee is required. Moving to all online applications seems like the county modernizing its approach; the online fee greatly impacts a religious minority. 

Within Mille Lacs County is a community of members of the Old Order Amish religion. In their religious lifestyle, they abstain from using many modern technologies, which hinder their ability to fill out electronic forms, such as the permit for building projects. Before the alternative paper form was reinstated by Mille Lacs County, members of the Old Order Amish community decided to build their structures without acquiring the permit. Beyond constructing their homes and other structures without permits, these buildings do not follow the set of building regulations that Mille Lacs County requires. 

Mille Lacs County has set building regulations and rules that are required of new construction within the county, which is commonly referred to as a building being ‘up to code.’ The county puts out these requirements to ensure that citizens and visitors of Mille Lacs County are in safe conditions. Historically, these regulations were updated for communities like the Old Order Amish, to be in compliance with their religious convictions. However, new updates to building code would require these structures to follow modern regulations. The Old Order Amish community claims that this is a direct burden on their religious exercises. They wrote a demand letter addressed to the county outlining a proposal for a compromise that upholds their religious convictions. 

Therefore the question to be asked is if Mille Lacs County's new $50 fee for paper applications and their requirements for building standards hinder the Old Order Amish community from their constitutional right of free exercise of religion guaranteed under the first amendment? In my opinion Mille Lacs County is burdening the Old Order Amish communities ability to freely exercise their religion. 

First I wish to examine the $50 fee for the paper application to obtain a building permit. While the law appears to be neutral, anyone who wishes to fill out a paper application must pay the fine, it has a disparate impact as the Old Order Amish religious practices prevent them from using modern technology. Therefore members of the Old Order Amish community are being faced with a costly burden, namely $50, to exercise their religion. As established in the supreme court case Sherbet v. Verner, we can consult the “Sherbet Test” to determine if the County is infringing upon the Old Order Amish’s right to free exercise of their religion. In my opinion, the $50 fee is a substantial burden on the community that for every structure they intend to build they must pay $50. I also believe that the county's interest in making their permits all digital is not compelling enough to burden the Old Order Amish community.  The county has only put out that policy was made in response to COVID-19, so one could argue that the paper permits could be a health risk. In spite of that, considering they still accept paper versions now I do not find their interest substantially over the burden it places on the Old Order Amish. 

Now I want to take a closer look at the required building codes for the construction of new buildings. The Old Order Amish community claim that there are least restrictive means to allow the Amish to construct their buildings in compliance with their religious convictions with certain exemptions that have been given in the past. However the county's compelling interest in building codes is to ensure safety. Unlike the $50 fee, I do believe that in the interest of safety is a compelling state interest that should hinder these exercises. Yet, there are least restrictive means to protect any neighboring communities that were used in the past. A similar case Mast v. Fillmore County, also in Minnesota, discussed wastewater disposal regulations. This case was brought before the Supreme Court, but ultimately was sent back down to lower courts to be looked at under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). With this precedent I believe it is important for Mille Lacs County to work with the Old Order Amish community to find the least restrictive means possible for the community to build structures in compliance with their religious practices. Thus there may still be a burden in place to ensure safety, but one that is justifiable for everyone's safety. 

Resources;

https://firstliberty.org/cases/minnesota-amish/

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Mille-Lacs-Amish-Demand-Letter-Final_Redacted.pdf

https://www.messagemedia.co/millelacs/mille-lacs-county-receives-demand-letter-on-behalf-of-amish-communities/article_5a24c326-07bc-48f2-bff1-2fcaf22b3ca5.html

https://www.stl.news/minnesota-amish-fight-county-over-building-rules/

https://amishamerica.com/amish-may-sue-minnesota-county-over-50-dollar-fee-lawyers-claim-arrest-warrants-jailing/

https://cbn.com/news/us/amish-man-reportedly-jailed-over-electronic-permit-county-accused-criminalizing-being-amish

https://www.millelacs.mn.gov/2587/Permits

https://www.studicata.com/case-briefs/case/mast-v-fillmore-cnty

Religious Freedom and Vaccination: Perry v. Marteney

A state law in West Virginia requires students attending public and private schools to receive certain vaccinations before they can attend school. The law allows students to receive an exemption for medical reasons, but it does not allow exemptions for religious beliefs. This became an issue for Krystle and Anthony Perry when they chose not to vaccinate their daughter because of their Christian faith.

 

The Perrys believed that receiving certain vaccines would go against their religious beliefs because some vaccines were developed or tested using cell lines that originally came from aborted fetal tissue. Their daughter attended a public virtual school from home, but she was removed from the school after the Perrys were denied a religious exemption. West Virginia law only allows exemptions when there is a medical reason that prevents a student from receiving a vaccine. Since the Perrys were requesting an exemption based on their Christian faith rather than a medical reason, their daughter did not qualify. The Perrys then challenged the law by arguing that it violated their right to freely exercise their religion. This raises the main constitutional question in Perry v. Marteney: Does West Virginia’s refusal to allow religious exemptions from its vaccination requirement violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

After their daughter was removed from the virtual school, the Perrys filed a lawsuit against West Virginia officials. They asked the court to allow their daughter to return to virtual school while the case continued. The District Court sided with the Perrys and granted them a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary court order that is put in place before a final decision is made. To grant the preliminary injunction, the District Court had to consider whether the Perrys had a strong chance of winning their case.

One of the main things the District Court looked at was whether West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. This idea comes from Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court decided that a law that is neutral and generally applicable can still be constitutional even if it places a burden on someone’s religious practices. The District Court decided that West Virginia’s law was not generally applicable because the state allowed exceptions to the vaccination requirement in certain circumstances while refusing to provide an exception for the Perrys’ religious beliefs.

West Virginia disagreed with the District Court’s decision and asked a higher court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, to review the decision. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the District Court and decided that West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. The court saw the medical exemption differently and explained that it was meant for students who could face health risks from receiving a vaccine. Because of this, the Fourth Circuit decided that allowing medical exemptions did not mean that West Virginia was also required to provide religious exemptions. The court reversed the District Court’s preliminary injunction.

Another important part of the Perrys’ argument involves the way West Virginia treats students who are educated outside of traditional public and private schools. Some homeschooled students and students attending microschools and learning pods do not need to fulfill the same vaccination requirements. The Perrys argued that this was important because their daughter was also learning from home through a public virtual school. Even though she was not physically attending a school with other students, she was still required to meet the vaccination requirement because she attended public school. The Perrys argued that the difference in treatment shows that the law is not generally applicable.

Although I understand the Perrys’ argument, I do not think the lack of a religious exemption by itself means that West Virginia’s law violates the Free Exercise Clause. The law does not appear to target religion because students are required to follow the vaccination requirement regardless of whether their reasoning is religious or nonreligious. For example, if parents opposed vaccinations for personal reasons that had nothing to do with religion, their child would still have to meet the vaccination requirement to attend public school. The law does place an indirect burden on the Perrys’ ability to exercise their religion, but I do not think it targets their religious beliefs. The state also has a strong interest in protecting public health among students who attend public schools.

However, the fact that the Perrys’ daughter attended a virtual public school makes this case more complicated. I understand that public schools are run by the government, which gives the state the ability to set requirements for students who attend them. At the same time, the Perrys’ daughter was attending school from home and was not physically around other students. If the purpose of the vaccination requirement is to protect public health and prevent the spread of disease within schools, it is harder to understand why the same requirement should apply to a virtual student. Although I understand why the state has more control over students enrolled in public schools, I do not think being enrolled in a public school alone creates the same public health concern when the student never physically attends the school. Ultimately, I do not think West Virginia’s refusal to provide religious exemptions violates the Free Exercise Clause because the law does not treat religious objections differently from nonreligious objections. My concern is not the lack of a religious exemption, but whether a vaccination requirement meant to protect public health in schools should apply to a student who attends school entirely from home.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-2132/24-2132-2026-04-08.html

https://adfmedia.org/case/perry-v-marteney/

A Water Dispute: Grace Community Church v. Southern Montgomery Municipal Utility District

In August 2023, the Grace Community Church, a non-denomination Evangelical organization, was nearing the completion of its new church in Woodlands, Texas. One of the final tasks for the Church to complete was installing an eight-inch water tap connection to the main Woodlands water line; the water tap was necessary so that the fire suppression system of the church would be active, allowing for church goers to practice in their place of worship. For installation the Church had to use the Montgomery County Municipal Utility District. The District then, alleged by the Church, quoted them a fixed estimate of $24,900 for installation.

However, before installation, the District stated that the “tap fee” would actually amount to $61,500. When the Church protested the new bill and asked for an explanation for the adjusted price, the District said it's because that’s what the installation rate for commercial-entities is. The Church again protested and clarified to the District that they were a religious organization. The District responded with a recalculated bill of $147,938.85, explaining that a new price was the result of the Church being a tax-exempt entity. 

Threatening legal action against the District, the Church said the “new amount was too high,” and the District in response proposed a final quote of $83,780. This new number was reached according to Water Code §49.212(d)(2)(B), which allowed for the district to charge non-taxable entities extra fees to cover the costs of building shared infrastructure, but only if the money spent by the District to build was raised by issuing bonds. It is unclear that the money for the tap installation was from bonds. In September 2023, the Church paid the fee, but claimed it was making the payment “‘under protest and duress.’”

In November 2023, Grace Community Church filed a lawsuit against Southern Montgomery County Municipal Utility District and its Directors. In the 457th District Court, the Church was challenging the local District’s tax as a non-neutral charge that was a disguised tax which imposed a “substantial burden” on the Church’s right to Free Exercise, and that the tax was paid under duress. They invoked two fronts to challenge the tax: 1) The 1999 Texas Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (TRFRA), which used guidelines on religious burden like those in the Sherbert test from Sherbert v. Verner (1963), and 2) 42 U.S.C. §1983, a federal law passed in 1871 to allow Americans to sue state actors in court (this is how the Church would challenge alleged violations of their right to Free Exercise).

The District responded to the Church’s allegations. The District first said, setting just foundations, that the Water Code §49.212 was lawful. In addition, the District argued the way that they charged the Church was consistent with how they charged all other non-taxable entities— the Church was not being singled out because it was religious. 

After the District Court made a decision regarding immunity and jurisdiction (not merits of Free Exercise yet) on April 15, 2024, both parties cross-appealed on May 19, 2025, to the Court of Appeals, Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont. This was an interlocutory appeal, an appeal in the middle of a lawsuit rather than after a decision was made, on issues of governmental immunity which resulted in the Court of Appeals denying immunity of the District or the Directors and remanding the decision back to the District Court. The case is ongoing.

This creates the constitutional question: Did the Municipal Utility District's water tap fee violate Grace Community Church's Free Exercise of religion guaranteed under the First Amendment? I think yes, and I have a chain of reasons why:

Firstly, I think the tax-exempt status of the institution removes additional indirect-taxes levied against the Church. The increased price of $83,780 from $24,900 was justified by the District using Water Code §49.212(d)(2)(B), yet the District has provided no evidence that the project to install the tap had been paid for with bonds. If it wasn’t paid for with bonds, then the price of $83,780 seems more like a hostile action against the church than a neutral application of the policy.

Second, I think the means by which the District went about demanding the money was coercive; the church could not get the water tap that they needed to open, and therefore to provide its religious services to its community unless it paid the disputed charge in full. I think the option of either opening the church’s doors for religious services or keeping them shut imposes a substantial burden preventing free exercise.

Third, I think the non-neutral application of the Water Code policy and the substantial burden on the Church violate both the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and TRFRA.

Fourth, even if someone was to argue that the Church was nonetheless able to pay the fee, I ask, what kind of precedent does that set? Suppose there were a small religious group who needed to also connect their tax-exempt place of worship to a water line. Is the tax-exempt group supposed to be denied their ability to worship because they can only afford installation without a tax?