Can The Court Decide Who Religious Establishments Can Hire or Fire?

 Kuilema v. Calvin University is a case that began in April of 2023 and is currently awaiting trial with the deciding court, the Michigan Court of Appeals. Calvin University is a private religious institution affiliated with the Christian Reformed Church. Faculty of Calvin University are expected to follow the Christian Reformed Church's standards and implement teachings of good faith into their curriculum. Calvin University makes this commitment extremely clear to faculty, outlining what is expected of them and what is or will not be tolerated. This agreement between Calvin University and its staff is put in place to ensure the university’s religious mission stays strong. 

In 2021, a professor at the university officiated a wedding for a same-sex marriage. Due to this act directly going against the university’s guidelines of what is expected of their staff and for contradicting the Christian Reformed Church’s beliefs, Calvin University raised concerns about the professor’s employment. After trying to settle the issue with the professor but failing to resolve any disagreements, the university did not renew the professor's contract. In response to terminating his employment, the professor sued the university under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. In doing so, the professor claimed that the university discriminated against him due to his involvement in an act, officiating a same-sex marriage, and was liable for firing him due to religious beliefs. 

The university’s defense is rooted in the First Amendment’s free exercise clause. Calvin University argues that not allowing the university to decide who can or cannot work at their institution based upon how their employees uphold their core beliefs inhibits their ability to freely exercise their religion. Given that the university has made it abundantly clear that they do not support same-sex marriage as it contradicts its religious beliefs, the professor not only went against the beliefs of the university, but the agreement made between employees and Calvin University. 

When it comes to matters of faith, the Court has historically sided with religious institutions. The Court has emphasized the importance of the constitutional wall between church and state, yet complete separation is unworkable in practice. The Court has time and time again had to balance the challenge of accommodating religious practices and institutions, while simultaneously avoiding government entanglement. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru is a case that went to the Supreme Court in 2019. This case dealt with the issue of a teacher suing Our Lady of Guadalupe School after being fired for poor performance and not upholding religious beliefs that were rooted in the school's mission. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the school arguing that in determining who can and cannot work at religious institutions the government is infringing upon the institution's autonomy. For religious groups, whether that be religious schools, churches, etc. to have religious freedom, they must be able to freely exercise their religious beliefs without excessive interference from the government. In getting involved in decisions of who can secure their employment at a religious institution despite not upholding the establishment's religious mission and beliefs, there would be excessive government entanglement. This ruling reinforced that religious institutions have constitutional protection to make employment decisions about employees with religious duties.

This case tests the ministerial exception, a legal doctrine derived from the First Amendment that shields religious institutions from government interference in employment decisions involving employees who have religious responsibilities. The purpose of terminating the professor's employment was rooted in upholding the university’s sincere religious beliefs. The professor made a pledge to uphold the university's strong religious beliefs upon deciding to work at the establishment, thus making them responsible for abiding by those rules. By stepping outside of what the university believes to be acceptable for its employees, the professor risked his employment which the university is at liberty to terminate.

This case highlights the ongoing tension between LGBTQ+ inclusion and religious spaces. While this issue is a significant societal concern, it’s important to consider that the university’s autonomy and its ability to uphold its religious mission could be compromised if the court does not rule in its favor. By allowing religious institutions the freedom to hire and fire individuals based on their beliefs, the government is maintaining the essential and constitutional separation between church and state. If the Court were to side with Kuilema, it would set a dangerous precedent, not only expanding government involvement in religious decision-making, but also challenging the many past rulings that have upheld the rights of religious institutions. I think that this case has serious implications that could infringe upon the university’s First Amendment rights protected by the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. I wonder what you all think. Do you think that Calvin University’s right to freely exercise its religion is being violated?

https://www.cccu.org/magazine/religious-freedom-higher-education/

https://becketfund.org/case/our-lady-of-guadalupe-school/

https://becketfund.org/case/kuilema-v-calvin-university/

Should Students be Allowed to Distribute Bibles During the School Day?

    The high school I attended, Mechanicsburg Area Senior High (MASH), made headlines on Fox News  when a Christian student group filed a lawsuit claiming a school policy that prohibited students from distributing Bibles during lunch was unconstitutional. 

        In November, around the time of Thanksgiving, students from the Christians in Action Club requested permission to sit at a table during lunch, have a poster for fellow students to sign and write something they were thankful for, and to offer Bibles to those approaching the table. MASD principal, David Harris, then informed the students by email that they could set up the table and poster, but could not distribute the Bible during the school day. Not only did Principal Harris deny them the ability to hand Bibles out during the school day, but he also required them to submit a formal request before distributing them on school property outside of the school day. If they were to be granted access, they could distribute religious text on public sidewalks outside of the school 30 minutes before or after class. He made it clear that there was not a ban on Bibles, but there was a ban on offering Bibles to classmates during school hours. The school also banned any student religious speech that claimed the "supremacy" of a particular religion. 

    Frustrated with the school's policies, the students reached out to Independence Law Center (ILC) in Harrisburg, PA for help. The ILC then contacted the School Board and requested they alter the language of both policies because it inhibited the students' constitutional right to free speech and freely exercise their religion. The School Board ignored the responses and informally revoked the "club status" for the student group. A lawsuit was subsequently filed.

    The lawsuit claimed the policy restricted the students rights on two major levels. First, the school district allegedly denied official recognition to the Christians in Action Club while granting recognition to other student clubs. This denial limited the club’s ability to meet on school premises, promote activities, and access resources available to other clubs. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the school engaged in viewpoint discrimination by suppressing religious expression. They claimed that denying them the ability to distribute Bibles and outlawing evangelical religious speech was not based on neutral criteria but rather on the religious nature of the club, treating them differently from secular student organizations. 

    The school argued, citing the Establishment Clause, that they have an obligation to prohibit religious speech and the distribution of religious material during the "school day". School is a place for education, not religious indoctrination. While the Christians in Action Club were free to meet and distribute Bibles to their members after school hours, it's in the schools best interest to keep evangelizing Christianity out of the lunchroom.

   The students and their legal team present a very good argument. The policies enforced by the school board are not neutral because they directly restrict religious speech, while giving secular clubs priority during lunch. While the School Board does have a compelling interest in keeping religious worship and teachings out of school, I don't believe this should be applied to student clubs wanting to distribute Bibles during non-instructional hours. This student club does not receive funding from the state, unlike teachers or educational curriculum that are paid for using government money (in reference to cases like Engel v. Vitale (1962)). Therefore the use of the Establishment Clause in this instance seems invalid. 

    There are a number of Supreme Court cases that could set a precedent for a decision in favor of the students in this case. First is Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995), where the Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment by denying funding to a Christian student publication while providing funds to secular student groups. The ruling emphasized that the government (or a public school) cannot discriminate against religious speech based on viewpoint in a public forum, which would validate the student's claim that evangelical speech in public schools are protected under the First Amendment. Another applicable Supreme Court Case is Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001). Here the Court held that a public school engaged in viewpoint discrimination by preventing a religious club from using school facilities after hours while allowing secular groups to meet. The ruling affirmed that religious groups must receive the same access to public school spaces as non-religious groups. Since secular clubs had access to the lunchroom and were allowed to distribute non-religious material, this would indicate the Christians in Action Club were denied equal access.

    With a decision in favor of the students, I recognize that there could be a slippery slope effect. If we let students evangelize during the school day (though it may be a non-instructional time), schools could resemble more of a church than a place of education during these hours. However, judging this case at face value, the policies seem to violate the Free Exercise Clause. What do you think?

Sources:

Independence Law Center. (n.d.). Christians in Action case summary. Retrieved from https://independencelaw.org/christiansinaction/

Oyez. (n.d.). Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. Retrieved from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2036

Legal Information Institute. (n.d.). Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette (94-329), 515 U.S. 753 (1995). Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-329.ZS.html

Oyez. (n.d.). Engel v. Vitale. Retrieved from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1961/468

Brown, L. (2024, March 15). High school’s Bible ban is unconstitutional, students claim. Fox News. Retrieved from https://www.foxnews.com/us/high-schools-bible-ban-is-unconstitutional-students-claim

Independence Law Center. (2019). Complaint against MASD by Christians In Action Club. Retrieved from https://independencelaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1-COMPLAINT-against-MASD-by-Christians-In-Action-Club.pdf

Question of Neutrality in Ricks v. Idaho Board of Contractors

 Ricks v. Idaho Board of Contractors is a case centered around George Ricks, a 59 year old construction worker and father of four from Idaho. Ricks wanted to register as an independent contractor but faced obstacles due to his religious convictions. Idaho law makes it a misdemeanor to work as a contractor without registering with the state, and registration requires providing a Social Security number. However, Ricks’ religious convictions restrict him from providing his Social Security number because of biblical interpretations that prohibit “a governmental universal identification system”. 

Ricks was willing to provide alternate forms of identification, such as his birth certificate, but his registration was nonetheless denied by the Idaho Board of Contractors. The Board's position was motivated by federal funding incentives tied to Social Security number collection. The denial of Ricks’ registration prevented him from providing for his family, which puts him in a place where he has to choose between financial security and religious convictions. 

The primary constitutional question is whether administrative boards must provide accommodations for registration due to religious convictions. This directly engages with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and raises fundamental questions about the balance between neutrality and religious liberty protections. I argue that they must accommodate Rick and should rule in his favor since accommodating him would not seem to undermine governmental objectives and would promote religious freedom. 

This case brings into question whether religious accommodations should be made to neutral generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Employment Division v. Smith (1990) established that the government does not have to accommodate religion when a law is neutral and generally applicable. Native Americans were not allowed an exemption for drug use despite the drugs being ingested in a religious practice. In Rick’s case, I believe the law is neutral in that it applies to everyone. However, the law has disparate impacts on those with minority religious beliefs and the law poses an indirect burden on Ricks’ religious freedom. Therefore, I would argue against the precedent set in Employment Division v. Smith. I argue that the law is facial neutrality, yet has disparate impacts on minority religious beliefs and it is thus unconstitutional. 

This case presents an opportunity to recognize that formal neutrality alone can be insufficient for protecting religious liberty when laws disproportionately burden minority religious practices. Before Smith, Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) allowed for religious exemptions when an Amish family was allowed religious exemptions from Wiscon’s compulsory school attendance laws. Also in Sherbert v. Verner (1963),  a seventh day adventist was allowed unemployment based on their religious convictions to not work on Saturdays. Sherbert parallels Ricks’s case in that there is a choice between religious beliefs and financial opportunities that burdens religious freedom. In my opinion, accommodations for religious beliefs extend government neutrality to fully allow for religious freedom. 

The importance of this issue extends beyond Ricks' individual circumstances. When government regulations force people to choose between following their faith and earning a living, fundamental questions about religious liberty arise. This is especially concerning when, as in Ricks' case, the government could easily accommodate religious objections by accepting alternative identification or obtaining the information through other means. The state's refusal to consider reasonable alternatives creates an unnecessary burden based on religious beliefs, and religious minorities should not face economic exclusion when accommodations impose minimal administrative burden. 

By requiring reasonable accommodations, courts can ensure the protection of religious minorities who face obstacles freely exercising their religious convictions. Furthermore, not accommodating on the basis of religion could set a dangerous precedent that puts convenience over constitutional rights in my opinion. I think this is especially important in Rick’s case because the burden is severe. He is no longer able to practice his profession which is how he makes a living for himself and his family. 

However, I can see the opposite side, that the law is generally applicable and any burdens are incidental and indirect. Since the law is not specifically targeting religion and thus facially neutral, can it be viewed as constitutional despite the indirect burden? Also, there could be a slippery slope in this instance. If the board accommodates Rick, what else could people leave out on registrations due to religious convictions?  What do you think?

Sources:

https://casetext.com/case/ricks-v-state-132 ?

https://www.deseret.com/2019/8/30/20837553/religious-belief-freedom-supreme-court-constitution-bible/ 

https://becketfund.org/case/ricks-v-idaho-board-contractors/

Holy Exemption or Health Risk? The Legal Battle Over College Vaccine Mandates

In 2021, Western Michigan University (WMU) introduced a COVID-19 vaccine mandate requiring all student-athletes to be vaccinated to participate in sports. Several student-athletes opposed the requirement for religious reasons and requested exemptions. They argued that getting the vaccine conflicted with their faith. WMU denied all religious exemption requests but allowed medical and other non-religious exemptions. As a result, the affected athletes sued, arguing that the policy violated their First Amendment right to religious freedom. Dahl v. The Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University raised important legal questions about whether public universities can enforce vaccine mandates in a way that treats religious beliefs differently from other exemptions.

The main issue in this case is whether Western Michigan University (WMU) violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by allowing medical exemptions to its COVID-19 vaccine mandate but denying religious exemptions. This clause protects people from government actions that unfairly target or burden religious beliefs. Employment Division v. Smith (1990) helps explain this issue. In Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that if a law is neutral and applies equally to everyone, meaning it does not specifically target religion, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if the law happens to burden religious practices indirectly. Applying this to WMU’s vaccine mandate, the key question is whether the university’s policy is neutral. WMU allowed medical exemptions but denied religious ones, raising concerns that the policy may not be applied equally. This could be seen as discriminatory if the university reviewed medical exemption requests individually but automatically rejected religious exemptions. The Smith ruling suggests that WMU could potentially defend its vaccine mandate by arguing that it is a neutral, generally applicable rule. The case ultimately asks whether WMU’s policy meets the standard of being neutral or if it unfairly singles out religious exemptions.

This case has broader implications that go beyond just Western Michigan University. It brings attention to the ongoing tension between the government’s role in protecting public health and individuals’ right to practice their religion freely, as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The case raises important questions about whether public institutions can deny religious exemptions to health policies like the COVID-19 vaccine mandate while allowing medical exemptions. This could set a dangerous precedent for limiting religious freedoms under the mask that it is for public safety. If the court sides with WMU, it would give more power to institutions to enforce health policies. However, if the student-athletes win, it could limit how institutions can enforce vaccine requirements in the future. This could potentially lead to legal challenges for other policies that deny religious exemptions. This would affect vaccine mandates and other public health policies, such as mask mandates or future health regulations. 

There are two sides to this case, one focused on religious freedom and the other on public health. From a pro-religious freedom view, WMU’s policy appears biased because it allowed medical exemptions but denied religious ones. This lack of neutrality could be seen as unfair treatment of religious beliefs. Since WMU allows medical exemptions but denies religious ones, this could be considered unconstitutional discrimination against religious freedom. On the other hand, from a pro-public health view, universities should have the authority to impose reasonable health mandates. This is for the “common good” of the students and staff to protect their health. Public health is a priority, and universities must ensure their campus is safe from outbreaks. Granting too many religious exemptions could weaken the effectiveness of vaccine policies and potentially lead to more infections, making it harder to control the spread of COVID-19 on campus. Medical exemptions are also different because they are based on a person's physical inability to get the vaccine due to health problems. Religious exemptions are personal and can not be proven sincere, which creates a dangerous slippery slope that could lead to a situation where people might claim religious beliefs as a way to avoid the vaccine. This creates a challenge in enforcing vaccine mandates fairly.

In regard to the constitutional issue, I agree with the university's stance that religious exemptions should not be granted in this case because public health is more important for the common good. While the First Amendment protects individuals' right to religious freedom, in situations like a public health crisis, protecting the health and safety of the community should take precedence. The vaccine mandate is not about targeting religious beliefs but about ensuring the well-being of everyone on campus. Regarding public health, specific measures like vaccine mandates are necessary to protect the greater good, even if they may indirectly burden individual freedoms in particular situations.

Sources:

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/21-2945/21-2945-2021-10-07.html

https://www.greatlakesjc.org/cases/dahl_v_wmu/ 

https://reason.com/volokh/2021/10/07/victory-for-wmu-student-athletes-with-religious-objections-to-vaccination/

A City of Limited Speech: The Importance of Religious Neutrality within The First Amendment

An Evangelical Christian man, Gabriel Olivier, decided to preach his faith on a public sidewalk next to a city-owned park, near Brandon, Mississippi. He was arrested for the act, as his means of expressing his dedication to God and his religion went against local law. Unfortunately, he was removed from the premises and replaced in a more desolate space, with fewer people who could hear and retain his intended message. Because of this, Gabriel Olivier took it upon himself to move to a different, but more populated location, in order to get his point across. Afterwards, he was arrested for failure to obey the law the first time, and later fined for his crime before being let off. Olivier found this arrest and fine to be against the U.S. Constitution (more specifically, the Free Exercise Clause) and attempted to sue the federal court, who initially dismissed his case. By appealing this decision, although fined and not imprisoned, Olivier put the Supreme Court in a position to reconsider the fine in relation to the First Amendment of the Constitution. 

The salient issues regarding religion and constitutional law in this case are whether or not Gabriel Olivier has the right to preach his faith in a public forum without an established religion, that is property of the city and therefore property of the state. The Free Exercise clause guarantees that a person is able to freely exercise their religious convictions, utilizing methods such as speech, protest, and other various forms of expression. However, the Establishment Clause prohibits public gatherings, funded or otherwise endorsed by the government, should have no specific religion tied to it. This means that no religion should be established, or there should be equal treatment of all religions brought to attention by the organization. 

It is no secret that the tension between complete religious freedom and government involvement (censorship) of such acts is high, especially as the First Amendment offers strong protections on an individual’s rights to exercise and express their own beliefs. However, the fact that it also aims to ensure that no specific religion gets an upper-hand on the others from the government in a public setting must also be considered. In Olivier’s case, the primary concern is whether his religious expression in a public space infringes on the rights of others, or whether his actions could be seen as violating the regulation of separation of church and state.

Unfortunately, I do believe that allowing Gabriel Olivier to impose his beliefs on the public, acting in a state-owned forum in a religiously biased manner. While the Constitution does objectively protect the right to free speech and ability to take on any religion without persecution from the government, that is not to say there is no limit on speech in public spaces. For example, Americans are not given the right to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, or threaten assassination upon the President of the country. Although religious imposition is quite a step down from something this violent or duplicitous, it should be held to the same standard, as preaching one’s religious beliefs to disinterested bystanders (especially in a public space) is an attempt to persuade them to join one’s religion. This can cause unintended consequences for the broader public discourse, violating the notion of “peace and good order” guaranteed by the Madisonian values when emotionally charged factors such as exclusion come into play. 

In order to maintain religious neutrality, Olivier should be prohibited from attempting to teach Evangelical religion in a forum that is publicly owned by the government. Because it is a park owned by the government, this puts the public at risk for lack of separation between church and state. While Olivier has the right to freely express his faith, including in public spaces, the context of this situation poses the question of whether expression could be viewed as imposing a specific religious view on others, particularly in a public setting that may be intended for all members of the community regardless of their faith. Even if the government cannot restrict his speech solely based on its content, it still has the authority to regulate the manner in which speech is conducted in public areas, especially in spaces where large numbers of individuals from diverse backgrounds are gathered within state-owned property. Overall, the case raises important questions about the viability of local laws, and will set a precedent for interpretation of the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech, religious expression, and what constitutes a government-owned space in the future.

Should Religious Organizations be allowed to discriminate in hiring?

    Despite homelessness being something synonymous with many large American cities and metropolitan areas, these areas are not the only places where homelessness continues to grow, in fact, this issue is becoming more ubiquitous throughout the country in small urban centers. One of these urban centers where homelessness continues to grow is Yakima Washington, home to Yakima Union Gospel Mission, a Christian nonprofit that aims to help people recover from homelessness. Founded in 1936, this organization’s main aim is to spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ through its work, while selflessly helping the community. In the 2021-22 year, Yakima Union Gospel Mission provided shelter for over 1,000 homeless individuals, served the homeless more than 130,000 meals, and assisted over 500 homeless people with their outreach missions. More than 85 years after its founding, Yakima Union Gospel Mission continues to operate by serving the homeless through its shelter, addiction recovery programs, meal services, and outreach efforts. Though it’s main efforts are focused on helping the homeless in any way possible, their mission remains clear; to spread the word of Jesus. In order to fulfill its religious calling, YUGM, in accordance with the First Amendment, has historically only hired those who effectively share the gospel which they serve, individuals who identify with and live out the Christian teachings that they evangelize. 

    Since 1949, Washington State’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) contained an exemption for hiring discrimination for religious non-profit organizations, and thus has allowed organizations such as YUGM to hire within these parameters for decades. In March of 2021, a Washington Supreme Court ruling effectively reversed the WLAD’s exemption for religious employers. The court determined that for all positions, religious nonprofits would have to hire people who disagree with, and do not adhere to, their religious beliefs. This led to ADF attorneys filing a lawsuit on behalf of the organization for their right to hire employees who share in its beliefs. After a federal district court dismissed the case, ADF attorneys appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit, to which they participated in oral arguments. Following oral arguments, the 9th Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the organization can challenge Washington’s law, in addition, the federal district court ruled that it is likely unconstitutional for Washington state officials to enforce the law against the Mission while the lawsuit proceeds. Since the lawsuit, Yakima Union Gospel Mission has had to pause hiring for its IT and operations positions because of the exemption removal. The law has also prohibited the Mission from publishing a religious hiring document specifying that all employees must adhere to the Mission’s Christian beliefs.

    In my opinion, religious non-profit organizations should be given exemptions to hire who they please based upon religious convictions of the candidates. Although this is different, for for-profit corporations, as entitled under the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity laws (EEO), these non-profit organizations exist mainly for religious intentions, with their mission being to spread a particular religious doctrine, a purpose that becomes redundant or obsolete when those preaching or acting in accordance with the organization do not legitimately believe in the cause. According to 2023 Supreme Court Case Groff v. DeJoy, “employers must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, unless doing so would result in a "substantial increased cost" to the employer, rather than the previous "de minimis cost" standard.”. This means that, in addition to the U.S. EEO laws, legally, religious discrimination by any organization whether for or non-profit is legally impermissible and thus not allowed. 

    I would suggest that because purely religious organizations are allowed to exercise this form of discrimination in their hiring process in all 49 states outside of Washington, under their First Amendment rights, and the fact that only the WLAD is stopping this organization from following suit, that they should be allowed to challenge the Washington law and employ religious/doctrinal requirements in their hiring practices. Failure to allow YUGM to employ their hiring requirements actively undermines their mission as a religious organization with the intentions of spreading the gospel, by allowing people who do not have a genuine, invested interest in the mission to subvert or undermine their cause through active participation in the mission. Again, because this is a niche example of a non-profit religious organization rather than a small-scale business or large corporation, an exemption should be given under the Washington State Law by virtue of the mission’s free exercise of their First Amendment Rights. 

https://adflegal.org/article/washington-law-threatens-mission-homeless-ministry/

Religious Freedom Meets Antidiscrimination in Crosspoint v. Makin

 In the ongoing case of Crosspoint v. Makin, the state of Maine finds itself at the center of a constitutional dispute that highlights the tension between religious liberty and anti discrimination principles. The case raises the question of when the government can place conditions on public funding for religious institutions, and whether religious schools can receive taxpayer money while maintaining discriminatory policies.

Maine’s education law guarantees free public education to all students in the state. To ensure equal access to all, the state operates a tuition program that pays for students to attend approved private schools in districts where there may not be any public schools. To qualify for this public funding, participating schools must comply with the Maine Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based on various protected characteristics, including religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity. 

Crosspoint, a religious private school in Maine, seeks to participate in this tuition program but wants an exemption from the antidiscrimination requirements. The school wants to continue to discriminate against student applicants based on their religion, sexual orientation, and/or identity. The state of Maine denied this exemption. In turn, Crosspoint filed a lawsuit arguing that requiring them to adhere to the state’s antidiscrimination policies is a violation of their free exercise of religion and free speech rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court denied Crosspoint’s request for a preliminary injunction, stating that Maine’s antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable. The Court also found that the law merely regulates conduct, not speech. Crosspoint has appealed to the First Circuit, where the ACLU, ACLU of Maine, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State have filed amicus briefs supporting Maine’s law. 

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is the central constitutional issue presented in this case. Crosspoint argues that being forced to comply with antidiscrimination provisions substantially burdens their religious exercise. They believe that the First Amendment protects their right to operate according to their religious beliefs, even when receiving public funds. However, Maine has a compelling state interest in ensuring that publicly funded programs do not engage in discriminatory practices, and that schools voluntarily participating in state programs must follow the same rules as other recipients. 

There are a few Supreme Court precedents relating to Free Exercise that are relevant to this case. In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court establishes that laws substantially burdening religious practice must be justified by a compelling state interest. In Sherbert, the Court ruled that a Seventh-day Adventist could not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. In Crosspoint, the school could argue that, like Ms. Sherbert, it faces a choice between following religious convictions and receiving government benefits. However, Maine could counter this argument by stating that unlike in Sherbert, where the state had no compelling interest in forcing someone to work on their Sabbath, the state does have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination in publicly funded education. 

Perhaps the most directly relevant precedent to the Crosspoint case is Bob Jones University v. United States (1983). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS could revoke the tax-exempt status of a religious university that enforces racially discriminatory policies based on religious beliefs. The Court held that the government had a “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education,” which outweighed the burden on the university’s right to Free Exercise. For Crosspoint v. Makin, this precedent strongly supports Maine’s position that its interest in preventing discrimination can justify refusing funding, even if these conditions affect Crosspoint’s religious practices. 

I believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Makin. Bob Jones University provides the strongest precedent to support this outcome. The Supreme Court has already accepted that the government can refuse to subsidize discrimination, even when that discrimination is motivated by sincere religious beliefs. Although Crosspoint’s strongest argument can come from Sherbert, there is a strong difference in reasoning that would weaken that argument. Unlike in Sherbert, where the state had no compelling interest to deny benefits, Maine does have a compelling interest to prevent discrimination in education. 

Maine isn’t forcing Crosspoint to change its religious beliefs or practices, it’s simply stating that if the school wants public funding, it must comply with public nondiscrimination requirements. This is a neutral rule, and a conditional benefit, not a punishment for religious exercise. The school is free to maintain its discriminatory policies if it wishes to, it just cannot expect taxpayers to subsidize those policies. It is possible for Maine to keep the balance between religious free exercise and state interests by allowing religious schools to participate in the tuition program as long as they are willing to follow the same laws that other schools must follow, so that the state can ensure that no public funds are going towards discriminatory practices. 

https://www.aclu.org/cases/crosspoint-v-makin

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/crosspoint-church-v-makin/

Prayer in School: Where's the Line?

On March 18th the Texas senate advanced Senate Bill 11, (SB 11) a bill that would allow school boards to vote on a resolution that would require schools in said district to provide all students and employees with a voluntary time slot, specifically outside of instruction time, for the purpose of prayer and reading religious texts. Additionally, the bill requires districts and schools to collect a permission slip, signed by a parent or guardian, from all employees and students that wish to partake in the religious experience. The permission slip would acknowledge that the student/employee has a right to make a choice about whether to attend, consent to the religious nature of the meetings, and a waiver of the signers’ rights to pursue future legal state or federal action against this policy. Schools must also ensure that these activities cannot be “in the physical presence, within the hearing of, or in another manner which would constitute an injury in fact within the meaning of the United States or Texas Constitution” of anyone who has not signed this permission slip. It specifically outlines that prayer should be held before school, in areas and classrooms where everyone has signed the form, or implemented in any other method recommended by the attorney general or legal counsel for the district or school. Finally, every school board or school governing body would be required to hold a vote on this policy within six months of the act’s enactment.

Senator Mayes Middleton, the coauthor of the bill, claims that the bill is “about providing a space for free expression of our religion in public schools and open-enrollment charter schools” and argues that it is constitutional as it “does not make participation in prayer or reading religious texts compulsory.” However, opposing senators argue that the policy would intertwine religion and state in a way that they believe violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. With that being said, who’s argument is more in line with what the constitution allows? Furthermore, to what extent is prayer permissible in our public schools?

Examining the legislatures motivations is a common strategy of the Supreme Court in addressing issues of establishment to understand the neutrality and intentions behind a given law, one such case is Edwards V. Aguillard. In which the Supreme Court held that a Louisianna statute requiring public schools to give balanced treatment in regards to teaching “creation science” and “evolution science” had the primary purpose of “[endorsing] a particular religious doctrine” and thus “[furthered] religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.” Since they used Senator Bill Keith's Legislative testimonies to come to this conclusion, it makes sense to examine the motivations of Senator Middleton who said; “our schools should never have been God-free zones and our founders never intended separation of God from the government.” When he was questioned further about the constitutionality of the issue, he said “There's no such thing as separation of church and state.” This is even though as early as the 1947 Everson V. Board decision, which has been upheld and reinforced in multiple instances, the Supreme Court has held that; “the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’” Furthermore, the addition of a waiver of rights to pursue litigation against the state in regards to the policy helps to demonstrate that those crafting the law knew that it potentially would violate the Constitution and wanted to avoid being fairly challenged if it does so. Additionally, Senator Donna Campbell said in support of the bill that “There is eternal life and if we don’t expose or introduce our children and others to that, then when they die, they’ll have one birth and two deaths.” A clear reference to the religious idea that nonbelievers will go to “Hell” of some kind, once again reinforcing that the purpose of SB 11 is to advance religion. 

Even though cases such as Kennedy V. Bemerton, in which it was held that Joseph Kennedy’s constitutional right to freely practice religion were violated are referenced to support increasing integration of prayer in school. It is important to remember that Kennedy’s actions took place at an after-school event when there could be no interpretation that his actions were endorsed by the school. SB 11 would allow for prayer during the school day or any other way the attorney general desires, which has ben struck down in a variety of cases, most notably, Stone V. Graham. This is in conjunction with the fact that the school board will make a choice surrounding whether or not to implement the policy, making it the level of integration between church and state impermissible.

In conclusion, while Texas Senate Bill 11 may be seen by some as a constitutional time of prayer during school hours, it is in fact a constitutional violation. I say this as its sole purpose is to further religion, seeks to preeminently prevent any legal action that can be taken because of its constitutional violation, and places far too much power in the hands of elected officials with regards to religious matters. 

https://apnews.com/us-news/joe-kennedy-iii-church-and-state-texas-dan-patrick-donna-campbell-21a2e0674e92ca9ad0dcb8fa32a31fab# 

https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=SB11

https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/texas-legislature/texas-senate-school-prayer-ten-commandments-classroom-bills/269-bd62ead9-9511-4c42-ad88-1e7d6277069c

https://senate.texas.gov/news.php?id=20250318a

https://www.texastribune.org/2023/05/04/texas-legislature-church-state-separation/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-418/#tab-opinion-4601251

Where is the Line Between Education and Parenting? Vitsaxaki v. Skaneateles Central School District

  Parents and teachers can all agree that children should feel safe at school. They should be welcomed no matter what their background is, and when they are struggling they should have a support system. The boundaries and methods in how this is done are often called into question, as in the case of Mrs. Vitsaxaki and her child.

    In Vitsaxaki v. Skaneateles, the Skaneateles Central School District instituted The Student Gender Identity Policy, in which students who wished to be referred to with names and pronouns other than their legal ones could do so without the school notifying the parents. In this particular case, a 7th grade student identified as Jane Doe, was raised in Greece until she was 9 years old. After moving to New York and starting in a public school, she faced difficulties adjusting to the new environment and new language, which led to the development of anxiety. Her problems persisted even after working with the school counselor to create coping mechanisms. Eventually, with the help of the school’s guidance counselor, Christopher Viggiano, school’s psychologist, Vicky Powers, and the school’s social worker, Michele Rogala, a Gender Support Plan was implemented when Doe decided she would like to change her name and pronouns. The plan explicitly avoided the inclusion of Doe’s parents to avoid “outing” her before she was ready. During this time, Rogala would also host an “LGBTQ lunch” for students that Doe participated in, in which they discussed “concepts of socially and medically transitioning one’s gender” and were given information on “local resources such as counselors, pediatricians, surgeons, and a nearby gender clinic.”

    Doe’s grades began to worsen and when her mother, Mrs. Jennifer Vitsaxaki, asked the school if there was anything she should know that could be impacting her daughter’s grades, she was told “nothing out of the ordinary was happening.” In May of 2021, the school principal, Michael Caraccio, called Mrs. Vitsaxaki to inform her of her daughter’s change in name of pronouns, without informing her that Doe was in the room listening to the phone call. At that point Mrs. Vitsaxaki attempted to console her daughter before requesting a separate phone call. After that, Doe was switched to online schooling, during which she continued with school employees to discuss gender identity, without the knowledge of her parents. When her mother tried to talk to school employees to find out more information about what her daughter was going through, they were hesitant or refused to answer her, and later she moved her daughter to a private school. There her “demeanor, morale, health, and outlook” have been observed by her mother to have improved, and there has been an absence of desire to change her name or pronouns. However, there is a dramatic increase in financial burden, with the private school costing over $12,000 a year.

    Parents maintain the right to raise their children as their religious views see fit under their right to Free Exercise. According to Mrs. Vatsaxaki, her free exercise was violated when the school system referred to her daughter with a different name and pronouns without her consent; her free exercise was also burdened when her ability to raise her child was impacted by the school actively teaching her daughter about gender in a way that went against her religious beliefs. This case shows a conflict in public schools supporting a child’s personal decisions and her family’s religious freedom: is it constitutional for the school to hide a child’s social transition from a family whose religious beliefs do not support gender transitions?

    It is one thing for schools to allow children to go by different names and pronouns in general, it is another to encourage children to pursue those decisions while actively hiding those life-changing decisions from the parents. One article revealed that the principal only called Mrs. Vatsaxaki at the urging of a concerned teacher. While schools should want to help children who are having a hard time, this support system should include the parents, and a child should not be expected to make major life decisions on their own without their parents. A public school’s primary responsibility is the general education of its students, other fields breach the realm of parenting, which is a role parents do not relinquish to teachers when they decide to send their children to public school.

    The Supreme Court has been known to overturn cases that have shown schools overstepping their roles in ways that have impacted religious parenting, such as in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette in which it was decided the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer had to salute the flag since it went against their families’ beliefs. Some may argue that gender identity is not a religious issue, but rather a social or health one, which would go against other precedents set by the Court that determined the government does not have the authority to validate particular beliefs and whether or not they are truly religious, such as in Cantwell v. Connecticut. 

    To encourage the transition for Jane Doe, while hiding it from her parents, shows a support of a particular viewpoint of gender identity, and a condemnation of how her mother would choose to raise her. Parents, who are required by law to have their children in the education system, should not then be forced to wonder what the state is doing with their children. It is both an establishment of religion in that case, as well as a violation of free exercise on the part of the mother.