Ricks v. Idaho Board of Contractors is a case centered around George Ricks, a 59 year old construction worker and father of four from Idaho. Ricks wanted to register as an independent contractor but faced obstacles due to his religious convictions. Idaho law makes it a misdemeanor to work as a contractor without registering with the state, and registration requires providing a Social Security number. However, Ricks’ religious convictions restrict him from providing his Social Security number because of biblical interpretations that prohibit “a governmental universal identification system”.
Ricks was willing to provide alternate forms of identification, such as his birth certificate, but his registration was nonetheless denied by the Idaho Board of Contractors. The Board's position was motivated by federal funding incentives tied to Social Security number collection. The denial of Ricks’ registration prevented him from providing for his family, which puts him in a place where he has to choose between financial security and religious convictions.
The primary constitutional question is whether administrative boards must provide accommodations for registration due to religious convictions. This directly engages with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and raises fundamental questions about the balance between neutrality and religious liberty protections. I argue that they must accommodate Rick and should rule in his favor since accommodating him would not seem to undermine governmental objectives and would promote religious freedom.
This case brings into question whether religious accommodations should be made to neutral generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Employment Division v. Smith (1990) established that the government does not have to accommodate religion when a law is neutral and generally applicable. Native Americans were not allowed an exemption for drug use despite the drugs being ingested in a religious practice. In Rick’s case, I believe the law is neutral in that it applies to everyone. However, the law has disparate impacts on those with minority religious beliefs and the law poses an indirect burden on Ricks’ religious freedom. Therefore, I would argue against the precedent set in Employment Division v. Smith. I argue that the law is facial neutrality, yet has disparate impacts on minority religious beliefs and it is thus unconstitutional.
This case presents an opportunity to recognize that formal neutrality alone can be insufficient for protecting religious liberty when laws disproportionately burden minority religious practices. Before Smith, Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) allowed for religious exemptions when an Amish family was allowed religious exemptions from Wiscon’s compulsory school attendance laws. Also in Sherbert v. Verner (1963), a seventh day adventist was allowed unemployment based on their religious convictions to not work on Saturdays. Sherbert parallels Ricks’s case in that there is a choice between religious beliefs and financial opportunities that burdens religious freedom. In my opinion, accommodations for religious beliefs extend government neutrality to fully allow for religious freedom.
The importance of this issue extends beyond Ricks' individual circumstances. When government regulations force people to choose between following their faith and earning a living, fundamental questions about religious liberty arise. This is especially concerning when, as in Ricks' case, the government could easily accommodate religious objections by accepting alternative identification or obtaining the information through other means. The state's refusal to consider reasonable alternatives creates an unnecessary burden based on religious beliefs, and religious minorities should not face economic exclusion when accommodations impose minimal administrative burden.
By requiring reasonable accommodations, courts can ensure the protection of religious minorities who face obstacles freely exercising their religious convictions. Furthermore, not accommodating on the basis of religion could set a dangerous precedent that puts convenience over constitutional rights in my opinion. I think this is especially important in Rick’s case because the burden is severe. He is no longer able to practice his profession which is how he makes a living for himself and his family.
However, I can see the opposite side, that the law is generally applicable and any burdens are incidental and indirect. Since the law is not specifically targeting religion and thus facially neutral, can it be viewed as constitutional despite the indirect burden? Also, there could be a slippery slope in this instance. If the board accommodates Rick, what else could people leave out on registrations due to religious convictions? What do you think?
Sources:
https://casetext.com/case/ricks-v-state-132 ?
https://www.deseret.com/2019/8/30/20837553/religious-belief-freedom-supreme-court-constitution-bible/
https://becketfund.org/case/ricks-v-idaho-board-contractors/
5 comments:
I agree with Emma's stance on this issue. The court should rule in favor of Rick because the ruling would not prevent the government from identifying him and it would allow him his religious freedoms. However, if the outcome of the case prevented the government from properly identifying him, the court should rule against him. In this case, the logistical concerns of the governments processes would take priority over religious convictions. However, since neither side would be negatively impacted by ruling in favor of Rick, it would make more sense to just allow Rick to not submit his social security number.
I feel that the court should not grant this exemption for Rick. Having a social security number as identification for a contractor's license, I feel is in the state interests that outweighs his religious convictions. Not being able to identify a contractor that created liability issues and harmed someone's home and possibly person is a considerable disruption of peace and good order. While this law is facially neutral and it has a disparate impact on Rick and his religious beliefs, without having this identification aspect, it could cause a huge harm to the peace.
While I understand Emma's concerns here, I would argue that the government has a legitimate and compelling interest in using a Social Security number for contractor identification. The Social Security number requirement most likely serves a lot of purposes, like taxes, and Rick's alternative methods may not fit with the existing systems that are put in place. It would be logistically difficult for the government to make an exception just for Rick, and therefore I do not think he should be granted the exemption.
Logistic difficulties, while complicated, should not be the reason why George Ricks faces a burden on his religious exercise and ability to work. This does not create a serious security issue, and he went through the effort of trying to work with the system in providing other forms of identification. It's not as though he'd be going rogue. Beyond that, systems are in place for people, and if they don't work for people then changes, or at the very least exceptions, ought to be considered.
I think the court should rule in favor of Rick and grant him exceptions for filing at the required forms. The state could've let him use other forms of identification, and Rick was willing to show other forms of identification. Rick deserves to be able to practice religion and shouldn't be burdened by his career goals. I agree with what you said, Emma, about how not being accommodating creates a dangerous precedent that places convenience over constitutional rights. It would be unfair to place convenience above protecting individuals' rights. Creating reasonable accommodations establishes a balance between ensuring peace and good order and protecting the rights of minority groups to practice their religion freely.
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