Brianna Bolden-Hardge is a Jehovah’s Witness and a state employee of the California Franchise Tax Board. Bolden-Hardge began working in 2016 and did not sign the loyalty oath at the beginning of her employment. The purpose of this oath is to ensure that public employees pledge their loyalty to both the United States and the State of California Constitutions. Bolden-Hardge later applied to work for the Office of the State Controller and was offered a higher-paying position. As part of her employment agreement, Bolden-Hardge was asked to take a loyalty oath. Bolden-Hardge claimed that her faith prevents her from “sweaing primary allegiance to any human government” over the Kingdom of God. Bolden-Hardge requested an accommodation to sign with an addendum specifying that her religious allegiance was first in her life, and that she would not take up arms. The Controller’s Office denied her request for accommodation and rescinded the job offer. Bolden-Hardge returned to her job at the California Franchise Tax Board, which then required her to take the oath but permitted her to include an addendum like the one she intended to use with the Controller’s Office.
Bolden-Hardge sued the Controller’s Officer under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and other provisions. Bolden-Hardge v. California State Controller is now in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
The constitutional issue at hand in this case is whether the Controller’s office violated Title VII and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by rescinding its job offer to Bolden-Harge because of her stated need for religious accommodation to the Controller’s Office’s requirement that she sign a loyalty oath.
To conclude whether Bolden-Hardge’s First Amendment rights were violated, I draw on precedents set in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), Sherbert v. Verner (1963), and Employment Division v. Smith (1990).
West Virginia State Board of Education supports Bolden-Hardge’s claim. The key holding of this case was that the government cannot compel individuals to affirm a belief or pledge loyalty that violates their conscience. Like the students in this case who refused to salute the flag on religious grounds, Bolden-Hardge objected to signing a loyalty oath that conflicted with her religious duties. Her objection was not rooted in disloyalty to the United States government, but rather in not being forced to declare allegiance in a way that violated her religious convictions. This case supports Bolden-Harge’s claim that compelling her to sign a loyalty oath without an accommodation for her religious beliefs violates her free-exercise rights.
Sherbert’s ruling supports Bolden-Hardge’s claim, as the case held that the government cannot impose a substantial burden on religious practice without evidence of a compelling interest. The state's refusal to accommodate Bolden-Hardge’s request for an addendum can be seen as a substantial burden on her ability to live out her faith. The state would need to prove that denying the accommodation was necessary and the least restrictive way to achieve a compelling state interest. The state’s compelling interest claim to preserve loyalty and commitment to the constitution and government would be undermined by the fact that another state agency (Franchise Tax Board) granted the same accommodation.
Employment Division could support the state's claim, as this case held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Using this precedent, the state could argue that the loyalty oath is a neutral requirement for all employees and not targeted at any religion. However, because other agencies allowed the accommodation, Bolden-Hardge could argue that the oath is not consistently applied, weakening the state’s defense based on Employment Division.
Considering the facts of the case and these precedents that could be applied, I conclude that the denial of Bolden-Hardge’s request for a religious accommodation to sign the loyalty oath with an addendum to comply with her religious beliefs and the subsequent revoking of her job offer is a violation of her free exercise rights. This is because I believe the state can still achieve its goal of preserving loyalty to the Constitution through less restrictive means, which in this case would be through modifying the oath for religious purposes so Bolden-Hardge can take it in good conscience. In Barnette, the Court held that individuals cannot be compelled to express loyalty in ways that violate their conscience, and Sherbert requires a compelling interest pursued by the least restrictive means. The state’s refusal fails this test, especially since another agency had previously accepted her addendum. Though the state may argue the oath is a neutral, generally applicable requirement under Smith, its inconsistent enforcement undermines that defense. Therefore, denying Bolden-Hardge the ability to affirm her loyalty in a way consistent with her faith was unconstitutional.
Sources:
https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/bolden-hardge-v-california-state-controller/
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15660/21-15660-2023-04-03.html
8 comments:
I agree with your point that Bolden-Hardge’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was violated. Like in Barnette, she should not be forced to say something that goes against her beliefs. Since another state agency let her sign the oath with an add-on, it shows the government can still meet its goals without denying her faith. The state should have allowed the same religious accommodation.
I also agree with your point that this violates Bolden-Hardge's Free Exercise Rights. Since there is evidence that the state/government can achieve its loyalty goal without her signing an oath contract that is directly against her beliefs, she should be able to get an exemption. Bolden-Hardge is not saying she will not complete her job to the best of her abilities and work in the interest of the state, but she simply does not want to sign her loyalty over in contract to a government entity.
I agree that Bolden-Hardge’s Free Exercise Rights were violated. Her request for an accommodation to the oath does not show that she is disloyal or refuses to perform her job duties well enough. Since another agency accepted her circumstances, it is clear that the state can meet its interest without having to force her to choose between her job and her religious beliefs. By denying her accommodation, it seems to be an unnecessary burden that infringes on her right to exercise her religion freely.
I also agree with your conclusion, while the oath may have a theoretical benefit to the state. In other words; the practicality of loyalty oaths, which do little to actually ensure loyalty among employees, is not sufficient enough to override the obvious abridgement of her free exercise.
I agree that there is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause in this case because there is a substantial burden on religion. Also, without signing the oath, there are economic burdens. Therefore, less restrictive means could have been taken to allow a modification to the oath that promotes religious liberty.
I agree with your analysis here. The inconsistency between the state agencies is particularly interesting, because if the Franchise Tax Board could give her a religious accommodation, the Controller's Office doesn't seem to be using the "least restrictive means." The fact that her addendum only clarifies her religious priorities while still not outright refusing state loyalty makes the Controller's Office's position even less defensible. Barnette strongly applies here, as Bolden-Harge merely does not want to express loyalty in a way that violates her conscience.
I agree with your position, Fehr. There is clearly a free of Bolden's free exercise rights in this instance. The state clearly does not have the burdensome duty to deny her request for an accommodation, thus leading to this violation. The state can clearly preserve its workers' loyalty to the constitution with this accommodation in place.
I agree that the denial of accommodation in the form of an addendum is a violation of her free exercise rights. As others have already mentioned, given that another agency granted her this accommodation, it is clear that there are less restrictive means to help accommodate her religious beliefs without rescinding the job offer. By forcing her to comply with signing the loyalty oath, even though it clearly goes against her religious beliefs, and she had sincere intent in not signing this document, I believe that the Court should favor Bolden-Hardge.
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