On January 16th, 2026, Brant Zeller and his friend visited Woldenberg Park in New Orleans to practice their Christian faith and evangelize by sharing the gospel with pedestrians in Woldenberg Park. They held signs that expressed their beliefs and distributed literature while engaging in conversations to communicate their religious message. Their approach was peaceful and non-disruptive, as they did not use amplification or aggressive tactics. Despite this, they were stopped by New Orleans Police as a result of a complaint from a park employee. The city code prohibits solicitation in public parks, including the distribution of materials such as religious literature. The officers warned them that if they did not leave immediately, they could be removed or arrested. In response, First Liberty Institute, a nonprofit law firm that supports religion cases, sent a demand letter to the City of New Orleans on Zeller’s behalf, arguing that the enforcement of this policy violated his constitutional rights.
The events in Woldenberg Park raise significant constitutional questions involving both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While the City of New Orleans justified its actions by citing a general prohibition on solicitation, the situation is not only about regulating speech in a public space. It raises real concerns about whether a facially neutral law can constitutionally restrict an individual's ability to engage in religious practices, such as evangelism, in a public forum. For Brant Zeller, sharing his faith in a public park is not simply expressive conduct, but a fundamental aspect of practicing his Christian faith. Evangelism has long been recognized as a form of religious exercise, which centers on spreading beliefs through conversations and distributing literature. Restricting this activity appears to impose a burden on Zeller’s free exercise rights. If a law is not neutral or is applied in a way that affects religious conduct, it could be subject to strict scrutiny through courts. The city's prevention of solicitation raises concerns about whether it is being applied in a way that burdens religious activity more than other forms of expression.
At the same time, the City of New Orleans may argue that its solicitation prevention is due to government interests unrelated to religion. The purpose of preventing solicitation is typically to maintain order, protect visitors from unwanted interactions, and prevent heavy traffic in areas such as parks. While these are real concerns that cities often work to prevent, it is important to consider if this broad restriction is actually achieving those goals without unnecessarily burdening religious exercise.
In addition, Louisiana has a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which explains that the government may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Spreading faith is a core religious practice, meaning the city would need a strong justification for the burden and be able to prove that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this interest.
This issue relates to Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), where the Supreme Court held that individuals have a right to engage in religious solicitation and distribute literature, even in public spaces, as a part of their free exercise rights. This case emphasizes that peaceful evangelism is a protected religious activity, especially in public forums.
The constitutional framework was later narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. Here, the City of New Orleans would likely argue that its solicitation rule is neutral and applies to all individuals regardless of the content of their speech. However, this case is complicated by Louisiana's RFRA, which requires courts to apply strict scrutiny when a law substantially burdens religious exercise, rather than the standard in Smith. As a result, the focus shifts away from whether the law is generally applicable and toward whether the City can justify its restriction under a constitutional test. Even if the policy is upheld under Smith, it must still satisfy RFRA’s requirement that the government use the least restrictive means.
I think that the City’s enforcement of the city code against all solicitation and against Brant Zeller is an unconstitutional application of the law because it places a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion. While the city has legitimate interests in maintaining order and preventing unwanted or disruptive actions in the park, those interests do not justify a broad restriction that effectively prohibits sharing religious messages, which is a key religious conviction of Zeller. Under RFRA, the city must show that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. Preventing all types of solicitation is broader than what is necessary. Less restrictive alternatives, such as regulating aggressive conduct or obstruction, could address the city's concerns without limiting Zeller’s religious practice. This issue shows the importance of protecting religious exercise in traditional public forums and ensuring that regulations do not unintentionally prevent constitutionally protected religious practices.
Sources:
https://firstliberty.org/cases/brant-zeller/#simple1
https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?p=y&d=725122
5 comments:
I agree that the total prohibition on solicitation violates Brant Zeller’s free exercise rights. The comparison that you made between the facts of this case and Cantwell v. Connecticut is particularly compelling because Cantwell protected the religious rights of individuals to evangelize peacefully. Given that this is similar to what Zeller was doing in the park, it appears that his actions should be permitted. It is also important to note that a less restrictive policy could be implemented which would achieve the city’s goals while protecting Zeller’s ability to evangelize.
I agree with your analysis of this case, and I think that Louisiana’s RFRA plays an important role. Even though the rule is facially neutral under Smith, RFRA forces the city to justify the burden more strictly. Additionally, the city had other options besides a total ban, so they did not choose the least restrictive option.
I agree with your opinion that the City’s enforcement of the solicitation code places an unconstitutional burden on Brant Zeller’s free exercise of religion. In Cantwell v. Connecticut the court established that an individual's right to religious solicitation is protected by the First Amendment. I do not believe there is a compelling state interest in this case to place a substantial burden on Brant Zeller’s free exercise of religion.
I think that I would disagree with you here Emily. I think that the New Orleans law was constitutionally applied here. The law does not allow for solicitation in public parks. Therefore, I think that this is a neutral application of the law and is not very restrictive, as solicitors have plenty of other space to solicit. I do see a compelling interest here as solicitation definitely has the potential to be burdensome.
I agree with your opinion on this case. I believe this New Orleans law is creating substantial burden on Brant Zeller's religious freedom. The law may have been generally applicable to both religious solicitation and nonreligious solicitation, however, this was not a least restrictive means like you mentioned.
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