Cedar Park Assembly of God is a Christian church in Washington that provides health insurance to all of its employees. The issue that they faced was rooted in their powerful belief that abortion is sinful. They refuse to pay for any insurance plan that covers abortion. This is a problem, as Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act states that all health insurance plans that cover maternity care generally must also cover abortion. Does Washington’s law violate Cedar Park’s First Amendment right to freely exercise religion by indirectly connecting church to abortion? What happens when an employer’s religious beliefs conflict with employees' personal choices? Religious freedom protects a church from being forced to act against its faith, but does that protection extend to the choices of people who simply work for the church? This is the central issue in Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer, a recent Ninth Circuit case involving Washington’s controversial health insurance laws, religious freedom, and abortion.
At first, my mind immediately went to this being a Free Exercise issue. If a church believes abortion is morally wrong, forcing it to purchase a coverage plan that goes against its religious beliefs is wrong, right? Well, not exactly, because that’s not really what Washington’s law does.
Washington addresses this issue through a separate conscience statute that protects employers with religious or moral objections. This law allows Cedar Park to claim a religious exemption, allowing the church to opt out of purchasing the abortion coverage. The insurance company is able to offer the church a plan that excludes the abortion coverage. However, the insurance company must still inform employees that the services remain available separately and explain how to access them. This responsibility remains in the hands of the insurance company, not Cedar Park. This is where I had a paradigm shift.
Cedar Park argued that this still violates their beliefs and technically still requires their involvement in something they consider immoral. Even if the church does not directly purchase the specific coverage plan, its employees still have access and connections to abortion resources. In the eyes of Cedar Park, they are indirectly facilitating abortion.
The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled against Cedar Park. The majority believed Washington’s laws are neutral and generally applicable. They do not specifically or intentionally target religion and generally apply across the entire health insurance system. Because the laws were neutral, the court applied rational basis review, meaning Washington needed only a reasonable or legitimate reason for the law. Strict scrutiny, the much harder test requiring a compelling government interest and that the law be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, did not apply. Cedar Park agreed that the law could pass this test, so the court rejected its Free Exercise claim.
Judge Callahan strongly disagreed, arguing that the laws do burden Cedar Park’s religious exercise and are neither neutral nor generally applicable. She also believed the laws should have faced strict scrutiny instead. Her argument raises an important question: just because a law does not outwardly target religion, does that mean its effects on religion should be ignored?
Another important concern is how substantial the burden on Cedar Park actually is. Interestingly, the majority did not decide that Cedar Park faced no religious burden. Instead, it assumed that a burden focused more on whether the laws were neutral and generally applicable. The church believes that any connection to abortion goes against its moral beliefs, regardless of how indirect it is. Meanwhile, Washington attempts to separate the two by allowing the purchase of a plan excluding the abortion part. The state tried to balance the church’s religious objections while remaining accommodating to employees and their healthcare plan.
This disagreement aligns closely with Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not typically receive strict scrutiny simply because they burden someone’s religious beliefs. This approach differs from Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court protected the Amish from a generally applicable school attendance rule because it placed an immense burden on their religious practice. Together, these cases show how the Supreme Court’s approach to determining whether a law is neutral has shifted over time and why considering applicability matters.
I can absolutely understand how Cedar Park may believe the line was crossed here. If the church truly and deeply believes that assisting someone in the abortion process is morally incorrect, a court should be careful about deciding the church’s involvement is too indirect to matter. If the government could simply decide which parts of someone’s religious beliefs matter enough to respect, religion would mean less to people.
However, I still agree with the majority decision here. Cedar Park is not the only party whose freedom matters in this case. The employees have beliefs and personal choices as well, and those should not be diminished.
If Cedar Park could not only refuse abortion coverage but also had the power to refuse separate access, the religious exemption would hold a whole different level of power. This would allow Cedar Park not only to protect its own religious choice, but also to dictate its employees' healthcare choices. I believe that is the most crucial part of the entire case.
Religious freedom should protect Cedar Park’s ability to follow its beliefs, but should not give the church control over the independent choices of each person who works there. Washington’s law attempts to protect both sides, which is why I agree with the Ninth Circuit that Cedar Park’s Free Exercise rights were not violated.
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