The Limits to Religious Freedom and Government Power: The Case of Youth 71Five Ministries

    Religious freedom is one of the Constitution's most important protections, but does the religious freedom and importance it holds in the Constitution mean a religious organization should be exempt from the rules attached to government funding? And how much excessive control should the government have over an organization’s religious practices simply because it provides financial assistance? In the case of Youth71 Five Ministries v. Williams, these questions were at the center of a 2025 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

Youth 71 Five Ministries is a Christian nonprofit organization in Oregon that provides mentoring, youth centers, vocational training, and other programs for at-risk young people. While the organization serves youth regardless of their religious beliefs, its primary mission is to share Christianity. As a result, it requires employees and volunteers to affirm a statement of Christian faith. Since 2017, the organization has received multiple grants from Oregon’s Youth Development division. However, for the 2023-2025 grant cycle, Oregon introduced a new requirement prohibiting grant recipients from discriminating in employment based on religion and other characteristics (the state discovered this practice after receiving an anonymous complaint). Although Youth 71Five maintained its Christian hiring requirements, it certified compliance with the new policy, believing its religious practices were constitutionally protected. Oregon initially offered the organization $410,000 in grants but withdrew the money after discovering its hiring practices. Youth 71Five sued, arguing that Oregon had violated its First Amendment rights. In June 2024, the district court ruled against the ministry and dismissed its lawsuit. Later, on August 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit partially reversed that decision: Oregon could enforce nondiscrimination requirements for state-funded grants as that is constitutionally neutral, but this non- discriminatory requirement did not extend to the ministry’s activities receiving no funding from Oregon’s Youth Development Division. The Court did not order Oregon to restore the grants.

Fundamental to this case is the Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious practice from improper government interference. One of the main constitutional debates of this case is: Is the government turning down Youth 71Five because of what they wanted to do with the grant money or because they are a religious institution? In the case of Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld Washington State’s decision to exclude students from pursuing devotional theology degrees from a publicly funded scholarship program, recognizing that the state had a legitimate interest in not funding the religious training of ministers, and this could be considered an overlap between church and state. In contrast, in the case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), it was established that the government cannot deny an otherwise eligible religious organization a public benefit simply because of its religious status. This case established important protections against excluding religious organizations because of their religious status. These two cases show that the government cannot discriminate against an organization merely for being religious, but it can impose constitutional restrictions on how public funds are used; if funds are used to fund a program that has discriminatory practices, that would look as the government endorses that behaviour.

I believe that the Ninth Circuit Court applied this distinction in this case. Oregon did not deny funding simply because Youth 71Five was a Christian organization or because it promoted Christianity. This ministry intended to promote Christianity and accentuate the importance of a relationship with Jesus Christ. The Organization also required all of its employees and volunteers to affirm their Christian beliefs, which was in violation of Oregon’s nondiscrimination requirements. This is an important part of the state's argument. In my opinion, this case more closely corresponds to Locke v. Davey, while in this case it isn't a matter of the state funding a minister, a leader of a religion, this case reiterates that one can exercise their religion freely but the government can decline to subsidize certain activities. Both cases simply drew distinctions concerning funding rather than flat out excluding an applicant, because they are religious, no one told Davey that he can not pursue that theology degree, but the state can not fund it. This notion of funding a religious education also corresponds to Youth 71Five as they both consider government's discretion to fund a religious education. The state is not prohibiting Youth 71Five from practicing and spreading Christianity and even allows flexibility for Christian programs within its grant-funded initiatives. The detail of this case being that the discriminatory hiring practices would make it unconstitutional as the government would be publicly funding and there by endorsing christianity, and the turning away of people who have different beliefs. In both cases, neither government was prohibiting or regulating religious practice, but imposing limits on what they were willing to financially support. The state of Oregon continued funding faith-based organizations, but because of the ministry's failure to apply with the nondiscrimination requirements the grant was pulled.

Ultimately, I agree with the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the basis that it establishes an important balance between protecting religious freedom and allowing the government to enforce reasonable restrictions on taxpayer-funded programs. I believe and agree that religious programs, especially those looking to help troubled individuals, should have every right to practice and spread their beliefs and operate without government interference. However, religious freedom does not mean an organization receiving government funding should not adhere to non-discrimination requirements, and the government should not be funding the spreading a certain religion. The Ninth Circuit wasn’t ruling that these hiring requirements that the ministry had in place had to go away, but the government could not give them financial support while spreading a specific religion and discriminating about who is hired at the location; this is where I see contrast between this case and Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), Youth 71Five is spreading christianity in a discriminatory manner. The First Amendment protects religious freedoms and liberties, but it doesn't guarantee access to taxpayers' money. The ministry was not denied funding because of its religious identity or its mission to spread Christianity- rather because of the requirement of employees to adhere to christian beliefs. I agree with the Ninth Circuit court because the government should be able to enforce neutral requirements when there are public funds involved without preventing religious organizations from practicing their faith. ​