Religious Liberty Behind Bars: The Fight for Ramadan Accommodations in Prison

 Imagine being forced to go without food for 15-16 hours when your religious practice only requires 12-13 hours of fasting. This was the reality for Marvin Owens, a Muslim inmate at Jackson County Jail in Michigan during Ramadan 2024. His case raises important questions about religious liberty for incarcerated individuals and the remedies available when religious freedoms are violated.

Marvin Owens, a 34-year-old practicing Muslim incarcerated at Jackson County Jail in Michigan, made multiple requests for dietary accommodations before Ramadan 2024. According to Islamic law, Ramadan observance requires Muslims to fast from dawn until sunset, eating only a pre-dawn meal (suhoor) and a sunset meal (iftar). Despite Owens’ requests, jail officials allegedly failed to provide adequate and timely meals during the holy month. According to a federal lawsuit filed on March 3, 2024, by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Michigan Chapter, Owens wasn’t provided pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramdan. Even when meals were eventually provided, they were reportedly delivered up to two hours late, extending Owens’ fasting period from the normal 12-13 hours to 15-16 hours. It is important to note that Islamic teachings “prohibit a Muslim from extending their fast beyond the moment of sunset, and require that an adherent Muslim hasten to break their fast during Ramadan,” according to the lawsuit. 

The quality and quantity of food were also at issue. The lawsuit alleged that Owens received only 1,300 to 1,900 calories per day, which is well below the 2,500 calories recommended for an adult man. Owens was reportedly served inedible food that had been left out, unwrapped and unprotected. On one occasion, the food was so inedible that a deputy advised Owens not to eat it, but also did not provide a replacement. 

County Officials reportedly acknowledged the lack of accommodations, but put the blame on their food service provider, Tigg’s Canteen Services. Nevertheless, the lawsuit named Sheriff Gary Schuette and two other sheriff officials, as well as Tigg’s Canteen Services, as defendants. The original lawsuit was filed in federal court in March 2024, but after preliminary motions, the case was dismissed in November 2024. On April 10, 2025, Notre Dame Law School’s Religious Liberty Clinic, alongside CAIR attorney Amy Doukore, filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, requesting a reward of monetary damages to Owens, since he has been transferred from Jackson County Jail and therefore a change in policy now would not remedy the harm that has already occurred. 

This case centers on two legal frameworks that protect religious liberty, the First Amendment Right to Free Exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). RLUIPA is a federal statute that provides heightened protections for religious exercise in institutions including prisons, prohibiting the government from imposing substantial burdens on religious practice unless the burden serves a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. This case recalls O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), where the Supreme Court ruled against Muslim inmates who sought accommodations for Friday prayer services. However, RLUIPA was later enacted specifically to provide greater protection than the constitutional standard established in cases like O’Lone.

This case presents the ongoing tension between religious liberty and governmental interests. Similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), where the Court recognized that seemingly neutral regulations can impose significant burdens on religious practice, Owens’ case asks whether administrative convenience can justify substantial burdens on religious exercise. This central question parallels the issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) where the Court considered whether otherwise neutral policies that disproportionately affect religious practices deserve heightened scrutiny. It is important here to determine whether Jackson County’s failure to provide timely and adequate meals constitutes a substantial burden on Owens based on his religious beliefs and practices. The jail claimed to have a policy for accommodating Muslim inmates during Ramdan, but the implementation appears to have been inconsistent. So, if the jail did have a policy in place, but failed to enact this policy for whatever reason, the question becomes: does administrative difficulty or resource constraints qualify as a compelling governmental interest? I would say no.

I would argue that this case should be ruled in favor of Owens. The evidence clearly shows that Jackson County Jail officials placed a substantial burden on Owens’ religious exercise. By failing to provide pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramadan, and then providing inadequate meals thereafter, prison officials effectively burdened Owens’ ability to practice his faith. Also, there was no compelling government interest to serve delayed and inadequate meals. This is proven by the fact that there actually was a policy in place to accommodate fasting Muslims, which the jail just failed to fulfill. Therefore, Owens should be entitled to the monetary damages outlined by RLUIPA. This would not only provide justice for Owens but also deter future violations of religious liberty in incarceration settings. By ruling in favor of Owens, the Court would affirm that RLUIPA means what it says: incarcerated people have a right to meaningful religious accommodation, and violations of that right must have meaningful remedies. 

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2024/03/28/muslim-inmate-sues-jackson-county-over-handling-of-ramadan-accommodations/73129733007/

https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/notre-dame-law-schools-religious-liberty-clinic-represents-prisoner-denied-ramadan-accommodations-in-federal-appeal/

https://www.wilx.com/2024/11/01/lawsuit-over-ramadan-meals-jackson-county-jail-dismissed/

https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-act

Where Is The Line Between Authority and Religious Freedom Within The Affordable Care Act?

 Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, requires private insurers to include preventive care and treatments without cost sharing, which involves the out-of-pocket fees such as deductibles. The preventive care methods in this list are graded as either A or B by 3 agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and these are the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), the Advisory Committee in Immunization Practices (ACIF), and the Health Resources and Services Administrations (HRSA). Within the list of preventive treatments are a variety of cancer screenings and statins, as well as contraceptives, emergency contraceptives, and HIV prevention drugs. Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is medication designed to help prevent HIV infections in those at risk, and is included in the list of preventive measures.

 Truvada Pills Used for PrEP

 Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

These requirements are now being challenged in Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. due to the belief of Braidwood Management along with a few other individuals that the recommendations violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  RFRA, passed in 1993, prevents one’s free exercise from being substantially burdened even by generally applicable policies unless the government can prove both that there is a compelling state interest involved and that the law is the least restrictive means of accomplishing it. The plaintiffs, Christian-owned businesses in this case, have stated that the mandatory coverage for certain preventive services makes them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” They have cited both economic harm for unwanted yet enforced health plans, as well as religious harm for being forced to include services they believe combat their religious beliefs.

In 2022, the District Court decided that the preventive services requirement did in fact violate RFRA, and also appointing members to the USPSTF violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Appointments Clause requires all officers of the state to be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate, yet is not entirely clear on who all falls under that category or how much authority they must have in order to be considered an officer. Judge O’Connor cited Hobby Lobby in his argument that since “the government did not show that it could not simply provide PrEP to those unable to obtain it from a plan due to an employer’s religious objection…it is not the least restrictive means of reducing the spread of HIV.” The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2024 that the decisions in this case only applied to the plaintiffs and was not a “nationwide remedy.”

The Supreme Court has actually decided to narrow its focus on this case to whether or not the structure of the USPSTF violates the Appointments Clause since members are not appointed by the president, and will not be examining whether or not the ACA violates the First Amendment. 

There are some precedents playing into how this case will be determined, one of which is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. That case determined RFRA prevented the HHS from requiring closely held corporations provide coverage for contraceptives that contradict their owners’ beliefs. It also set the standard for closely held corporations to be classified as persons, as RFRA was originally written to apply to persons. 

This case shows an overlap between the authority of government agencies, the right to free exercise of religion, and issues regarding public health. There is a compelling state interest in providing access to many health services, as well as preventing the spread of infectious diseases. Challenging the ACA leads to a genuine concern on the impact to cancer treatment as well as preventive treatments for HIV. It can also lead to questioning who has the authority to determine what takes top priority and will be legally enforced, and what means may they take in order to impose such regulations. 

The plaintiffs are only arguing against the treatments that directly violate their religious beliefs, so while there is risk of a slippery slope to further requests, it is not enough to negate the exemptions they are looking for. The government has not proven that the requirements within the ACA for private insurers are the only way to ensure people have access to treatment, nor has it clarified how the USPSTF has the constitutional authority to implement such regulations; therefore, the Supreme Court should follow the precedent set by Hobby Lobby and side with the plaintiffs. While the government may have the “desire to promote public health and gender equality…the government has provided exceptions for churches, non-profit religious organizations… and businesses that employ 50 people or fewer.” The right to free exercise allows exemptions in policies where possible, even if alternatives still need to be found.

Sources:

https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/aca-preventive-services-supreme-court-kennedy-braidwood/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-316

https://fedsoc.org/events/courthouse-steps-oral-argument-kennedy-v-braidwood-management-inc

https://www.statnews.com/2025/04/17/kennedy-v-braidwood-affordable-care-act-challenge-could-upend-preventive-health-care/

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-10326-CV0.pdf

https://ncdoj.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Kennedy-v.-Braidwood-Mgmt.-IL-Merits-Amicus-PDF-A.pdf

https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/court-holds-key-aca-preventive-services-requirements-unconstitutional

https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/scotus-preview-braidwood-and-the-fate-of-preventive-services-under-the-aca/

https://affordablecareactlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/gov.uscourts.txnd_.330381.92.0_1.pdf

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/

https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/hiv-prevention/using-hiv-medication-to-reduce-risk/pre-exposure-prophylaxis

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308 

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C2-3-1/ALDE_00013092/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ 

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/closely_held_corporation

Fraud or Faith? The Establishment Clause in Religious Financial Disputes

 

Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

James Huntsman, a former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, claimed that the Church fraudulently misrepresented how it used tithing funds. Tithing funds are donations that members are religiously or morally obligated to give, typically amounting to ten percent of their income. Huntsman claimed that he had donated millions of dollars over years under the impression that those funds would go only to charitable or religious purposes. However, he alleged that the Church used portions of these funds for profit ventures, including the City Creek Center, a high-end shopping mall in Salt Lake City, and for a bailout of Beneficial Life Insurance Company, which was affiliated with the Church. He argued that the Church repeatedly made statements assuring members that their tithes were used only for religious purposes, and that these statements were knowingly false. Huntsman argued that these actions were fraudulent and sought to recover his donations from the Church for their deception. The Church argued that decisions regarding the management and use of donated funds fall under the Church’s constitutionally protected religious autonomy. The Church found that any attempt by a court to evaluate its financial decisions would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by interfering with their religious practices. In response, Huntsman filed a lawsuit against the Church in the federal courts of California. 

Does allowing a court to evaluate a fraud claim against a religious organization based on its use of donated funds violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by allowing judgement of internal church affairs and use of their funds? 

This case dips into both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, however, the Establishment Clause is the larger issue. The Establishment Clause states that the government cannot establish an official religion or get entangled in religious affairs, in order to create separation of Church and State. A previous case that can be applied to this is Lemon v. Kurtzman which establishes the Lemon Test in helping evaluate Establishment Clause violations. This test has three prongs, there needs to be 1) a secular purpose 2) a primary effect that neither promotes or inhibits religion and 3) does not have excessive government entanglement with religion. In this case, there is a secular purpose to protect individuals from financial harm and deceit from the Church. If the Church is lying about the use of the funds they are collecting, this harms individuals who are donating based on religious obligation. This donation causes individuals who believe they are donating for a good cause to lose about ten percent of their income based on fraudulent statements. Furthermore, the primary purpose of fraud legislation is neutral in effect. This legislation holds every entity accountable for fraudulent actions and claims, regardless of its religious affiliation. The primary effect of this lawsuit is also not directed at their spiritual practices, but at how the Church decides to use the religiously donated funds. The laws are not targeting the Church’s practices, but rather how they are deceiving individuals based on their stated use of the funds. Finally, the last prong of the Lemon Test is whether there would be excessive government entanglement. Determining if the donated funds were used deceitfully would have required the Court to analyze the internal affairs of the Church and its priorities for its tithing funds. Since these funds are religiously obligated, determining how the Church uses them and how it allocates them would require the Court to evaluate every action of the Church. I find this to be the Court overstepping into entanglement with determining whether the use of the funds is a valid religious use or not. 

In my opinion, I believe that determining whether the Church has used funds fraudulently would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In terms of the Lemon Test, it only passes the secular purpose prong but fails the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs. Deciding on the validity of donated funds used by the Church, I feel, oversteps too much into the Church’s religious practices and validity. Especially since these funds are donated due to a religious obligation as a member of the Church. In conclusion, I feel this case violates the Establishment Clause. 

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/huntsman-v-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-church-autonomy-is-a-threshold-structural-bar-that-must-be-reckoned-with 

https://becketfund.org/case/huntsman-v-corporation-of-the-president-of-the-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints/ 

Are Universities responsible for the actions of their students?

    Political division is nothing new to college students, one could say that on-campus ideological differences are almost second nature, and certainly something that Bucknell isn’t spared from. This particular case, Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. revolves around exactly that, political dissension on the campus of UC Berkeley, specifically, regarding Jewish students and hostilities toward them that have taken place in recent months. The plaintiffs, The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, a national civil rights legal advocacy organization that focuses on protecting the civil and human rights of Jewish people, and Jewish Americans for Fairness in Education (JAFE), a nonprofit based in California that supports Jewish students' rights assert that Jewish students and faculty have been subject to widespread and systemic discrimination, creating a hostile on-campus environment that violates constitutional and federal statutory protections. The central claims of the plaintiffs revolve around several key points and events. Firstly, the plaintiffs allege that at least 23 student organizations at UC Berkeley’s School of Law adopted bylaws or statements explicitly or effectively banning speakers who hold pro-Zionist views. These groups include The Queer Caucus, Women of Berkeley Law, Law Students of African Descent, and The Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice. The bylaws of these groups allegedly claim that speakers who “hold views in support of Zionism, the apartheid state of Israel, and the occupation of Palestine” would not be invited or welcomed, which the plaintiffs argue amounts to systemic exclusion of Jewish students and faculty who identify with or support Israel. 

    Secondly, the plaintiffs claim that there have been several on-campus incidents Jewish students allege that they were subjected to antisemitic slurs, and even threats of violence. Jewish students were reportedly harassed at an on-campus location known as Sather Gate, which is a common protest site on campus. One student was allegedly shoved during a counter-protest when they were attempting to film anti-Israel protestors, a campus bulletin board was vandalized with swastikas and anti-Zionist literature, and campus Jewish groups have reportedly received threats of violence on several occasions and had their messaging ripped down by oppositional groups. According to the plaintiffs, these incidents are not one-offs, but rather part of a broader, institutionally tolerated pattern of hostility that has left Jewish students feeling both unsafe and marginalized on campus. Perhaps the most troubling accusation is that University administrators have refused to take substantive action against these discriminatory behaviors despite several repeated reports from students and advocacy groups. 

    The plaintiffs claim that UC Berkeley administrators have either dismissed the concerns as mere “political disagreement”, or released public statements that fail to address the issue. UC Berkeley has pushed back against these allegations, largely on First Amendment grounds, claiming that student organizations are independent actors who have the right to adopt their own ideological stances, even if they are interpreted as controversial. Additionally, the University has added that it does not endorse or support these viewpoints, nor exclusions and so it cannot constitutionally penalize students for political speech, stating that disciplinary action could amount to infringement of free association and freedom of expression. In April 2025, U.S. District Judge James Donato allowed the case to proceed. Ruling that the plaintiffs “plausibly allege disparate treatment with discriminatory intent” under Title VI (“prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance”). The broader implications of this case raise questions such as “To what extent can public universities be held responsible for the discriminatory conduct of student groups?” and “Can ideological exclusion equate to racial discrimination (when applied to Jewish students)?”

    It is my personal opinion that the court should rule in favor of the Plaintiffs, as the University’s response largely misses the mark that Jewish students have been subject to repeated instances of discrimination, including physical violence and threats. Although the University has no basis to regulate the thoughts or ideologies of its students, its hesitance to discipline students for their actions because the issue is contentious has allowed for acts of physical violence to occur without reconciliation. The University essentially fails to understand that this issue goes beyond pure ideology and involves the perpetuation of a hostile environment for a demographic of students on campus, leading to them feeling unsafe and under threat. Rather than a Supreme Court case, I would defer to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, and because UC Berkeley is a public school it is especially subject to this law.  

Land, Liberty, & Copper?

Introduction

 This term, the Supreme Court will hear Apache Stronghold v. United States, a case that asks whether destroying a sacred site for mining violates religious freedom. For centuries, Western Apaches have worshipped at Oak Flat (Chí’chil Biłdagoteel) in Arizona. The federal government long protected Apache rituals there, but after copper was found beneath the site, Congress transferred the land to Resolution Copper. That transfer will destroy Oak Flat and end the Apaches’ sacred ceremonies. Facts of the Case

In response, Apache leaders sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause. They argued that destroying Oak Flat imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise by making their most important rituals impossible. A Ninth Circuit en banc panel, split into two separate 6–5 majorities, rejected both claims. The court said the destruction does not substantially burden religion under RFRA, relying on Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988). And although the court agreed that singling out Oak Flat for destruction is not “generally applicable,” it nonetheless refused to apply heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, again finding no substantial burden.

Constitutional Questions
An key issue is how to read RFRA’s “substantial burden” test and whether the Free Exercise Clause itself requires strict scrutiny when a law targets a sacred practice. Under RFRA, the government may only “substantially burden” religious exercise if it shows the law furthers a compelling interest by the least restrictive means. The Apaches say that destroying Oak Flat is the ultimate restriction—ending their rituals altogether—and that no mining interest can be so compelling. Resolution Copper and the government argue that RFRA does not cover land transfer decisions and that any burden on religion here is too indirect or speculative to qualify.

The Free Exercise Clause question overlaps: does singling out a religious practice for destruction trigger strict scrutiny—even without RFRA? After Smith, neutral laws of general applicability no longer require strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. But here the court below admitted the law is not generally applicable to religion, which traditionally should trigger heightened review. Yet the Ninth Circuit declined to apply it, again pointing to Lyng, which held that the government could build a road through a sacred site without violating the First Amendment.

Historical Background: The Proto‑Smith Era and Lyng
An article by Stephanie Barclay and Matthew Krauter reveals that Lyng was part of a “proto‑Smith” era in which the Court dismantled strict scrutiny for religious accommodation even before Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Justice O’Connor’s papers show that earlier decisions like Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) had set a high bar for laws burdening religion—compelling interest and least restrictive means. But in the 1980s, the Court, influenced by arguments from the Solicitor General’s office, grew reluctant to grant accommodations to “odd ball” or “squeaky wheel” faiths. Lyng thus marked a reversal: justices acknowledged they might have ruled differently if the government had acted at an earlier stage, but they refused to extend strict scrutiny to protect a sacred grove against forest service plans.

Barclay and Krauter argue that RFRA was Congress’s response to restore the Sherbert‑Yoder standard by mandating strict scrutiny for any substantial burden on religious exercise. Their research suggests Lyng should not be read as compatible with Sherbert but rather as a step toward Smith’s neutrality rule. This history is crucial for understanding why Apache Stronghold now asks the Supreme Court to choose between Supreme Court precedents that even the lower court struggled to fit together.

Analysis: Why the Case Matters
Apache Stronghold forces a clear choice. If the Court holds that destroying a sacred site is not a substantial burden, it will cement Lyng and Smith as barriers to protecting land‑based religious practices. That outcome would mean Native American rituals tied to geography have no special constitutional protection, even if Congress once promised protection. On the other hand, if the Court recognizes a substantial burden here, it would affirm RFRA’s promise that religious exercise deserves protection from government action that destroys its foundational practices.

The case also tests whether RFRA can fully override Lyng’s legacy. RFRA applies to all federal actions, so if the Court accepts the Apaches’ RFRA claim, it will confirm that Congress can restore strict scrutiny for free exercise. But the broader Free Exercise Clause question remains, will the Court revisit Smith’s neutrality rule and require heightened scrutiny for laws that target religion, especially with recent signals from Justices expressing interest in free exercise doctrine’s original meaning?

Conclusion
Apache Stronghold v. United States is more than a fight over land; it is a turning point for American religious freedom. The outcome will determine whether the First Amendment and RFRA protect sacred ceremonies tied to the land or leave them vulnerable to mineral claims. It will also signal whether the Court will continue down the Smith/Lyng path or reclaim earlier commitments to strict scrutiny for substantial burdens on religious exercise. For Western Apaches, the stakes are paramount: the right to worship their Creator in a place they have honored for generations hangs in the balance.

Sources

https://reason.com/volokh/2025/02/20/one-more-first-amendment-case-to-watch/

Faith vs. Force: The Constitutional Clash Behind a Shaved Head

In 2020, Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, was sentenced to prison for 5 months for drug possession. While serving his term, he vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow.” Landor had been growing his hair for nearly two decades per his religious Nazarite vow and exclaimed, "during the entire period of one’s Nazarite vow, no razor may be used on one’s head." While serving his term, he had first been incarcerated at two facilities, both of which respected his vow and allowed him to keep his hair in a “fast cap.” In the final 3 weeks of his sentence, he was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center (RLCC) and told prison officers that he had been practicing Rastafarian. He provided them with state and federal forms that outlined his prior religious accommodations for his hair and a copy of the Supreme Court decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. Upon receiving the copy, an intake officer threw it in the trash and summoned Marcus Myers, the Warden, who demanded documentation from his sentencing judge. Landor told Myers that he could request the documentation from his lawyer to which Myers said “it was too late for that. He then proceeded to bring him to another room, handcuff him to a chair, and shave his hair while holding him down. 

After being released from prison, Damon Lander sued the Louisiana Department of Education under the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, arguing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) -a federal law created to protect the religious rights of inmates who lose rights while incarcerated- was violated. Though this act is statutory, it was created as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause to address burdens on religious exercise that are not fully guaranteed by the Constitution. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. Landor argues that neither of these premises were met and therefore he has the right to freely exercise his religion, which includes his dreadlocks as a religious practice. To receive relief, he sought to recover damages against state government officials.

The constitutional issue in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections deals with the Free Exercise Clause, which “protects citizens' right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of a "public morals" or a "compelling" governmental interest.” This clause prohibits the government from enacting policies or laws that interfere with an individual's ability to freely practice their religion. However, the scope of this clause becomes complicated in prisons, where restrictions on religious practice can be justified. Nevertheless, the central issue is whether the Louisiana Department of Corrections and its prison officers violated Landors right to freely exercise his religion when they forcibly cut his dreadlocks off, despite him making it clear that he is a practicing Rastafarian. Landor argues that by forcibly shaving his hair, RLCC put a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

When Holt v. Hobbes is applied to the case at hand, there are stark parallels. In Hobbes, Gregory Holt, who was an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections, had been practicing Salafi Muslim. While serving his term, he sought an injunction and temporary relief from the correction facility grooming policy, which allowed for only quarter-inch beards and mustaches for diagnosed medical purposes. Holt argued that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to grow a bird, which was essential to the practice of his religion. This policy, he contended, therefore violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In a 9-0 majority opinion, the Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violated the RLUIPA, undermining the Free Exercise Clause, by preventing Holt from growing a one-half-inch beard per his religious beliefs. They exclaimed that the RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of one's religious beliefs, and if they were found to be science, an accommodation can be made. In this case, Holt's religious beliefs were found to be sincere, and therefore he met the standard of accommodation. Further, the Court argued that prison officers failed to meet the burden of proof. They had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards constituted a compelling government interest and that this interest was the least restrictive means of interference, however, they did not satisfy this burden. This landmark case, which defines an inmate's religious rights in prison, can be compared to Landor. In the case at hand, Landor had been a devout Rastafarian who made a vow to not cut his hair for religious purposes. He made it very clear that he was sincere in his beliefs of not cutting his hair through both practice and telling prison officers that he had received religious accommodations in other facilities. Given that Hobbes was allowed to receive a religious accommodation for growing his beard under the RLUIPA, Landor should have received the same accommodation. 

I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Landor. It is worth noting that the government can limit inmates' constitutional rights (freedom). However, they still must act in accordance with the Constitution. In analyzing many different prisons across the United States, Congress found significant evidence of religious discrimination, especially against “non-mainstream” faiths.  For this reason, the RLUIPA was created to protect inmates' religious rights and practices when the First Amendment cannot do so in prisons. It primarily serves as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. If the religious practices are sincere and these premises are not met, the government may not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. In taking the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA into account, I believe that it is clear that the prison officers violated Landor’s right to freely exercise his religion in a stark manner. After asking the officers for a religious accommodation, they first threw out the piece of paper that contained a court case holding that Louisiana's policy of cutting hair violated the RLUIPA in front of Landor. They then pinned him down and shaved his head. After the fact, the officers failed to provide a compelling governmental interest in denying Landor's accommodation and consequently shaving his head. Rather than acting neutrally, it appears these officers acted hostile toward religion. The mere fact that two other facilities recognized the sincerity of his religious beliefs and allowed him to grow his hair makes it seem that officers at RLCC took punitive measures rather than security measures.  Additionally, they failed to explore any alternatives for Landor and instead immediately resorted to physical force, and therefore, neither of the premises of RLUIPA were met. Ultimately, the officers unlawfully put a substantial burden on Landor's religious rights.

Therefore I ask you all to consider these questions. When the prison Warden shaved Landor's hair, did he unlawfully burden his right to freely exercise his religion? Does the RLUPIA extend constitutional protection toward religion in this case? What do you guys think? Should religion be accommodated in prison and if so to what extent?

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/st-dominic-academy-v-makin

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30686/22-30686-2023-09-14.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/us/supreme-court-prison-rastafarian.html#:~:text=Damon%20Landor%20is%20a%20Rastafarian,fell%20 nearly%20to%20his%20 knees.

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/22/22-30686-CV0.pdf

https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/first-amendment-and-religion#:~:text=The%20Free%20 Exercise%20 Clause%20 protects,a%20%22 compelling%22%20 government%20 interest.

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827

Religious Freedom vs. Neighborhood Regulation

     Morris v. West Hayden Estates First Addition is a legal case that involves a homeowner who went exceptionally far in expressing his faith on his private property. This dispute ultimately raises significant questions regarding the balance between religious freedom and neighborhood regulations. In 2015 Jeremy Morris, a lawyer and self proclaimed “Christmas Lawyer,” made himself known for displaying an array of Christmas decorations outside of his home in Hayden, Idaho. His exhibit consisted of hundreds of thousands of lights, real animals, and buses full of guests. Upon moving into a new neighborhood, he attempted to repeat the event, at which point the homeowners associations (HOA) objected. Following this was a battle between Morris and the HOA as to whether he was being discriminated against for being a Christian, or if he was simply being held to the same rules and standards that apply to everyone.

Prior to purchasing his home in West Hayden Estates, Morris informed the HOA of his intentions to host a Christmas celebration similar to the year before. The HOA advised him not to, warning that this would likely break the rules involving lighting, noise, and the use of homes in the neighborhood. Morris proceeded anyway and went ahead with the show. 

The HOA sent him a formal letter saying the event would likely violate three parts of its community rules, called CC&Rs: 1) using the property for non-residential purposes, 2) creating noise that disturbs neighbors, and 3) using excessive outdoor lighting. In one version of that letter, a board member added that “some of our residents are non-Christians or of another faith,” which Morris took as proof of religious discrimination.

Photo of Jeremy Morris’s 2015 Christmas display, with thousands of visitors. Image via Instagram / @thechristmaslawyer.

After hosting the event anyway in 2015 and again in 2016, with buses, characters, a live scene, and huge crowds, Morris filed a lawsuit claiming the HOA had violated the Fair Housing Act by targeting him because of his Christian beliefs. A jury agreed, awarding him $75,000. But a judge later overturned the decision, saying the issue was not a religious matter, rather, it was a violation of neighborhood rules. As Judge Winmill stated, “the case wasn’t about religious discrimination, but rather the Morris family’s violation of neighborhood rules.”

Morris appealed, and in 2024 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave a mixed decision. They argued that the HOA had not clearly violated the law in its original letter, but there was still enough evidence to justify a new trial over whether the HOA’s actions were partially motivated by religion.

Now, we must determine the bigger issue in this. Did the HOA’s actions violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act by targeting Morris’s religion? Or was the HOA simply enforcing its rules fairly?

A useful comparison is Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court ruled that neutral, generally applied laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they place a burden on someone’s religious practice. In this case, two people were denied unemployment benefits because they used peyote during a religious ceremony. In the end, the Court ruled that the law wasn’t targeting religion, as it applied to everyone. The same idea can be seen in Morris v. West Hayden Estates. The HOA’s rules about lighting, noise, and traffic were applied to all residents, no matter their religion. Just because Morris’s event was religious doesn’t mean he was permitted to break those rules. Similar to Smith, the key question isn’t whether someone was practicing their religion, it’s whether the rules were applied fairly and equally.

Morris asserts that the HOA attempted to cease his Christmas display not because it was size or disruption, but solely because it was Christian. He claims he was unfairly singled out and that other events wouldn’t have received the same treatment. In one Fox News interview, he argued the case is about “the right to celebrate Christmas in accordance with our family’s faith traditions... [and] the right to use our property to express that Christian faith tradition.”

However, the HOA claims it had strong reasons to object. According to court records, the event caused noise, traffic, trash, and even complaints of public urination from visitors. HOA board members were also worried about safety and the disruption to a generally quiet residential neighborhood. As one court document states, “This display/event... will produce in excess of 900 additional vehicles traveling through the neighborhood.” Judge Tashima, who agreed with much of the district court’s ruling, wrote that the HOA was “concerned about the Morrises’ holiday events because of the size and scale of the events, not because of the Morrises’ religion.”

There’s a reasonable argument to be made on Morris’s side. The Ninth Circuit admitted that a jury could find the HOA’s behavior was influenced “at least in part” by the religious nature of the event. The draft of the HOA letter that mentioned “non-Christians” shows that religion may have played some role in their decision. And religious displays, such as Christmas decorations or public nativities, are protected forms of expression, especially when done on private property.

Regardless, there’s a key difference between this instance and others. In Morris’s case, religious expression doesn’t allow someone to break neutral rules that apply to everyone. The HOA would undoubtedly have objected to a secular event of the same size. Nothing in the HOA’s history suggests it treated Morris differently just because of his faith. It is clear that the issue was the crowds, the lights, and the noise, not the nativity scene or the caroling.

All in all, Morris v. West Hayden Estates demonstrates how tricky it can be to draw the line between religious freedom and community rules. Morris sees the HOA’s actions as an attack on his faith. But from the evidence, it seems more like the HOA was simply carrying out its duties, protecting the rights and peace of everyone in the neighborhood. The First Amendment provides all Americans with the right to worship freely. However, it does not give them the right to disrupt an entire community in the process. When religious expression starts to impact hundreds of neighbors, it’s fair to ask whether it’s an issue of faith, or a different matter.

Works Cited:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/17/19-35390.pdf

https://nypost.com/2024/12/24/us-news/christmas-lawyer-jeremy-morris-files-for-supreme-court-review-in-holiday-light-show-fight-with-hoa/

https://firstliberty.org/media/u-s-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-sides-with-religious-freedom-in-christmas-lights-case/

Parents V. Education.

 The Supreme Court is set to decide a pivotal case, Mahmoud v. Taylor, highlighting the growing tension between parental rights grounded in religious beliefs and the enforcement of state-mandated curricula in public schools. This case arose when Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) removed parents' opt-out rights for certain educational materials, leading to significant questions about who ultimately holds authority over the education of young children—parents or the public education system. A diverse group of parents, including representatives from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities, has challenged the curriculum changes made by MCPS. The updated curriculum now includes "Pride Storybooks," with some parents claiming that these books promote a singular perspective on gender identity and same-sex relationships. These parents assert that such materials contradict their religious beliefs and are inappropriate for elementary school students. Initially, they sought notifications when controversial materials would be introduced and the ability to opt their children out, which were previous practices under Maryland law and MCPS guidelines. After MCPS denied the opt-out requests, parents filed a lawsuit on May 24, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for Maryland. The Court ruled against them, and on May 15, 2024, the Fourth Circuit upheld this decision, stating that parents have no constitutional right to be informed or to opt out of public school curricula, even if such materials conflict with their religious beliefs.  

This case centers on significant constitutional issues regarding the Free Exercise rights of parents and their children, particularly how these rights intersect with educational mandates. Key inquiries in this context include: Can the state compel children as young as four to engage with ideologically charged materials about gender and sexuality that conflict with their parents' religious beliefs? When parents enroll their children in public school, do they necessarily relinquish their constitutional right to influence their spiritual and moral upbringing? These inquiries build on established precedents, notably Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), which affirmed that "the child is not the mere creature of the state," underscoring the fundamental right of parents to govern their children's education and upbringing according to their beliefs. Nevertheless, the recent ruling by the Fourth Circuit in Mahmoud seems to create exceptions to this long-standing principle, permitting public school curricula to include sensitive topics such as gender identity without requiring parental consent, thereby raising profound concerns regarding the implications for Free Exercise rights.  

Mahmoud v. Taylor extends the Supreme Court's recognition that religious liberty protections must go beyond congregational spaces. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that Amish parents could withdraw their children from public schooling due to conflicting religious beliefs. While Mahmoud does not involve complete withdrawal from school, the opt-out provision serves as a more focused means to uphold religious conscience within the framework of pluralistic education. The implications of Mahmoud v. Taylor are significant. Suppose the Supreme Court supports the school district's decision. In that case, it may establish a precedent that undermines religious conscience in public education, especially on topics where state narratives clash with traditional spiritual perspectives. Such an outcome could significantly limit parents' constitutional rights to raise their children according to their beliefs, particularly as progressive educational content becomes more widespread.  

Conversely, a judgment favoring the parents would affirm the accountability of public schools to the diverse communities they serve and clarify that inclusivity does not necessitate the exclusion of conscience. It would recognize religious liberty as the freedom to hold beliefs and guide children to adhere to them without governmental interference.  

Mahmoud v. Taylor underscores the crucial issues of parental authority and religious liberty in an increasingly secular society. As the state seeks to influence children's knowledge and values, preserving parental rights to nurture their children's spiritual and moral foundations becomes ever more vital. Religious freedom transcends personal belief; it encompasses the ability to transmit these beliefs to future generations without governmental intrusion. If public education becomes a domain where only a singular worldview is sanctioned, we risk undermining the diversity essential to democratic governance. The First Amendment protects not only the right to diverge in belief but also the right to live by those beliefs, fostering an environment where parents guide their children in the teachings of their faith, even amidst state opposition. 

Considering the case facts and relevant precedents, I conclude that the Montgomery County Board of Education's refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of reading assignments conflicting with their religious beliefs violates their parental rights and the Free Exercise Clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court recognized parents' fundamental right to direct their children's education. At the same time, Wisconsin v. Yoder emphasized that the state cannot override parental authority in religious matters. Here, the state's interest in promoting inclusivity does not justify the complete denial of opt-out accommodations, especially when parents seek limited relief to protect their children from conflicting instruction. While the school district may argue its policy is neutral under Employment Division v. Smith, its abrupt shift from a previously accommodating stance suggests otherwise. Following Sherbert v. Verner, the state must pursue its interests through the least restrictive means, and allowing limited opt-outs would still permit curriculum function while respecting religious conscience. Thus, the school board's denial of opt-out rights constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on religious freedom and parental authority.

Sources: 

https://becketfund.org/case/mahmoud-v-taylor/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-110

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us510