Coble v. Lake Norman Curriculum Controversy

             Last Monday, on November 16, 2020, it was reported that the case of Coble v. Lake Norman had made its way to the District Court of North Carolina. After the case had been dismissed without hardly any consideration, by a local judge, earlier on this year, the Coble’s decided to take the case up on appeal. As of yet, there has not been an official statement made public on the status of the case after reaching the District Court. For those unfamiliar, the case was brought to court concerning the curriculum of Lake Norman Charter School. John and Robin Coble filed suit against the school, claiming that the use of a certain book in the teaching plan violated, or rather offended their faith. The Coble’s, in this instance, found that there right to freely exercise their religion had been inhibited, through Lake Norman Charter’s promotion of literature that is hostile to Christianity. The book in question is titled “The Poet X,” by Elizabeth Acevedo, a Dominican writer, poet and former middle school teacher. To my knowledge, the book follows a young girl growing up in Harlem and having to reconcile her more free-spirited worldview with those of her religious family. Her mother is a devout catholic, and the main character, Xiomara, finds the laws of the church to be too overbearing. I presume this causes an escalation in tension between the two throughout the book, naturally leading to some choice words being directed toward each characters beliefs about religion. Other themes touched on in the book include: sexuality, power structures and abuse. All of these ideas, especially when coming from this perspective can understandably be seen as alarming to Christian parents. However, whether this issue concerns a violation of the constitution is altogether a separate matter.

The main point that requires attention in this instance has to do with the application of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. It states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In the United States of America, our people are granted the freedom to observe their religion without restriction based upon traditions, principles and ideals, but with possible restrictions on practiced activities, should the state demonstrate a compelling interest in stopping them. There have been notable cases in which religious establishments and instances of religious exercise have been awarded and denied exception to this rule. Those most relevant to the case at hand include: Stone v. Graham (1980), Lamb’s Chapel and John Steigerwald v. Center Moriches Union Free School District (1993), Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (1995) and Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001).

Stone v. Graham had to do with the use of the 10 commandants that the Christian tradition holds were passed down from God to Moses. These commandments where posted on a wall in every public school classroom in the state of Kentucky. The Supreme Court ruled that it would be inappropriate to allow such an action to occur in state funded institutions. They also stated that there was no convincing, secular purpose in displaying the commandments. An important question that I think is raised by this case, though not directly, has to do with what amounts to education versus indoctrination. What this has to do with Stone v. Graham is that some people saw the posting of the commandments as an endorsement of religion. As we’ll see later, often these types of endorsements are coupled with accusations of coercion into compliance with religious practices. However, if the original intent of the founders of the country was to keep the affairs of the church and those of the government separate, than in what capacity did they intend to do so? What I take this notion to mean is that there can be a relationship between the two entities, but that it wasn’t one of a structural or financial nature. What this means is that there can be a pairing of religious activities and those of government, as can be seen in the Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel cases. There can be accents of religion present in the aesthetics and practices of government. Even Madison and Jefferson made their appeals for state and religious separation, based on principles of freedom that were rooted in religion. To a degree, these two things are inseparable, and should that be the case, that it will always be a matter of contention over which religion the government most favors. What this has to do with the case of Mr. and Ms. Coble, is whether or not the assigned reading at Lake Norman is an objective piece of literature designed to further the schools learning goals; or if it was chosen because it was hostile to religion.

Though I would imagine this to be a tough case to prove, I still cannot say it would completely validate the concerns of the Cobles. I draw my reasoning for this idea from the opinion of Justice Scalia in his decision on Good News Club v. Milford Central School. In the beginning of his opinion, he explains that coercion is an unavoidable consequence of living in a society that no one is free from. This case involved the use of public space for religious activities, of which the court decided was acceptable because it was in an open, public forum that other groups also had access too. What Scalia’s decision essentially amounts to is that people do not have the right to not be coerced and not feel uncomfortable. In fact, given that people cannot avoid coercion and being made uncomfortable, it may actually benefit the students to not be coddled by the school system.

The potential pushback to this may be that the matter, all-together, doesn’t have to do with coercion or toughness, but, more simply, the favoring of one religion over another. A secular worldview could be considered religious in the sense that, just like religion, there is a set of foundational principles that guide a persons behavior and decision-making. As I stated previously, the state will always have the principles of one religion in mind. The reason being that, foundationaly speaking, there must always be some kind of antecedent reasoning behind the decisions of government. This idea may be more properly understood in the context of interpretation. Words have meaning. When something is interpreted, something else must be drawn upon to derive that meaning. In easy cases, it is just a matter of what someone else may have meant when they said something. However, in hard cases, like with ethics, the origin of your interpretation will lie in something else entirely, which I could only describe as religion. Though, when I say religion, I don’t necessarily mean it in the sense of what is ordinarily perceived as organized religion; but more having to do with any sort of code or set of guiding principles, whether personal or shared. Often, what you’ll see are people who can reach the same conclusions from different reasoning on similar issues, but this will not always be the case; and consistency will depend upon which system is more closely adhered to. If this is the case, than the issue that would then be brought to the court would have less to do with the Free Exercise Clause and more to do with the Establishment Clause. 

In all likelihood, the case will be ruled in favor of Lake Norman Charter School. I find it would be very hard to make the argument that the book is directly hostile to religion or that a secular religious effort is being made to combat Christianity.

Religious Anti-Vaxxers

On Thursday, November 12th, 2020 a group of Massachusetts parents decided to sue Governor Charlie Baker saying that Governor Baker’s influenza vaccine mandate for all students older than 6 months and younger than 30 infringes on their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and their general right to parent their children how they see fit. Governor Baker and the state of Massachusetts argues that requiring all students to receive the flu vaccine will release the strain on the healthcare system to combat both a surge in flu cases and a potential surge in coronavirus cases in the winter months. The vaccine mandate does not apply to students who are typically homeschooled but does apply to all students regardless of their choice to continue their education remotely or in person. The parents argue that the flu shot Governor Baker is requiring their students to receive does not actually lower the chances of their student contracting coronavirus or spreading it to other students. They also argue that the vaccine could in fact increase the chance that their children will contract coronavirus because the vaccine would weaken their immune systems. In the complaint filed, the parents do not specifically cite which religious beliefs were violated by the vaccine mandate which may present an issue in determining whether or not they even have standing to bring a suit against the Governor. 

In the suit, the parents acknowledge that Governor Baker and the will most likely cite the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (which is ironic because the same issue is being presented in Massachusetts 115 years later). In Jacobson, the government upheld a fine against a Cambridge minister who refused a smallpox vaccine for his son and himself citing religious concerns during the Smallpox epidemic. In the Jacobson ruling, the court held that “[I[n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand”. In this case, Governor Baker is mandating Massachusetts citizens to receive the flu vaccine because he thinks it is the best way to protect the safety of all state residents and alleviate the burden on an already strained healthcare system. In their complaint, the court uses the circumstances in Jacobson to explain why the current COVID-19 pandemic and the Smallpox epidemic are not the same. In the complaint, they write “Jacobson involved compulsory vaccination in the midst of a smallpox epidemic when there were no other less coercive means available to staunch the outbreak. In this situation, the court believed at that time that a vaccination was a medical necessity to combat the disease. Compare this to vaccinations for sexually transmitted diseases like HPV- a compulsory vaccination is not a medical necessity because individuals can protect themselves through some combination of sexual knowledge, disease screening, safe sex, and abstinence. Likewise, a compulsory flu vaccine is also not a medical necessity, nor has the flu vaccine, which has been around for decades, ever been considered medically necessary”. Presumably, they are arguing that a combination of social distancing and wearing masks is more effective than receiving the flu vaccine and that there is no proven medical necessity in mandating the flu vaccine to stop the spread of COVID-19. They argue that the mandatory vaccination places an unnecessary burden on their rights to free religious exercise amongst other rights such as privacy (in the relationship between parent and child), and a Massachusetts state constitutional right to education. 

Personally, my primary concern is that the group of parents does not even have the standing to bring a suit against a governor. Though they cite “religious concerns” they don’t actually point to anyone religion whose values were compromised by the vaccine mandate. Even if we were to presume that the group of parents does have standing, I completely agree with the ruling in Jacobson there are certain circumstances in which the government must intervene in order to protect the general well-being of students, parents, and overall citizens of the state. The mandatory vaccine policy is both facially neutral and neutral in practice. The only group that is not required to receive the vaccine is the one least likely to interact with students outside of the home. This has a logical reason behind it and therefore the neutrality of the policy still stands.  We’ve seen in many of the other cases that the Court grants wide deference to states when the primary interest is in protecting citizens. In my opinion, the free exercise rights of the parents were not violated nor were any of the other rights cited in their complaint. I am curious to see if anyone else thinks the parents have a valid claim or if they should go along with the state’s plans to preserve the health and integrity of the healthcare system.

Ganja Minister

     The Colorado Court of Appeals Unanimously ruled against a Mesa County resident who claimed he was growing marijuana for religious purposes. As an Ordained Minister in the Hawaii Cannabis Ministry, Aaron Torlines argues that it is his ministry that incorporates the use of marijuana in its prayers, rituals, and sacraments. Torlines was arrested in 2016 when law enforcement spotted him and another person loading garbage bags into the back of a truck from a garage. In the garage, they found 115 plants. As a ‘Ganja Minister’, he provided cannabis for around 30 people in his congregation. Though marijuana is legal in Colorado for recreational use, the state still has the right to regulate its use. Torlines' attorney argued that the charges against him were in violation of his “free exercise rights”. Convicting him as charged, the judges wrote in the ruling that the right to belief will always be protected, while the right to conduct will not always be. Judge Navarro wrote, Colorado law does not penalize such conduct because of its religious character. The Free Exercise Clause does not excuse people and organizations from complying with (marijuana laws).” The appellate judges did not reject Torline’s argument easily, as religious protections are not something the state takes lightly. 

    The question that arises here is, should the free exercise protect this minister's right to grow, distribute and ingest cannabis? Does it matter that the substance is required to be monitored for use within that state? In the 1990 case, Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, where two men were fired for inhaling an illegal hallucinogen, peyote, at their place of work. When denied unemployment benefits, the two men fought the state, claiming that they did it for sacramental religious purposes. The supreme upheld that decision, finding that the court has never excused a person from a valid law because of their religious beliefs. The law is facially neutral, because peyote is illegal for all uses, not just religious ones. The ruling in this case came from the idea that if the court made an allowance for this, it will cause a slippery slope and set a precedent to allow exemptions for other civic obligations. 

    However, in 1993 Church of Babalu v. Hialeah, where a law was made to prohibit the Santeria Church in Florida from practicing animal sacrifices. The Supreme Court ruled that this was unconstitutional because the law was narrowly tailored to restrict the practices done by the church. Slaughtering animals was allowed, but as soon as it became a ritual, there was a problem. Similar to the situation in Mesa County in Colorado the use of Cannabis in Colorado is legal for recreational use, but not for a minister to grow and distribute. For a person 21 years and older, it is legal for a person to possess one ounce of marijuana at a time for recreational purposes and two ounces at a time for medical purposes. The law also allows for a person to grow six plants, three of which can be in the flowering stage. The ‘Ganja Minister’ was caught with 115 plants, each of which contained two ounces of marijuana. There is a major inconsistency with the law in this case and the minister. How can the state restrict him from providing a legal drug to his congregation? Does his religious affiliation give him a pass on the restrictive guidelines predetermined in the state?

    In this instance, I side with the Court of Appeals in Colorado. Unlike the Church of Babalu, Aaron Torlines is breaking a law that is neutrally applied to all people and was not narrowly tailored to restrict the use of cannabis within his church. Similar to the Smith case, if the state makes an allowance for this instance, what’s to stop them from making allowances for all instances. It sets a dangerous precedent with the law and religion. At the end of the day, the law restricts the amount of marijuana a person can have in Colorado and religion cannot be used as an excuse to break that. The state regulates it for religious and secular purposes, making the law facially and inherently neutral. I think that the church is a legitimate religion, and by not allowing Aaron Torlines to grow and dispense cannabis to the congregation, does not prohibit the church from practicing legally. As long as the members are 21 years old, they can legally purchase marijuana from a dispensary where they can then use it for their ceremonies. The law is not stopping the ceremonies from happening, it is simply prohibiting Aaron Torlines from providing it to the whole church. Upholding the law in this case does not restrict the religion or violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.

A Delaware Church and more Covid-19 Restrictions

As we all know by now, the coronavirus and its ties to religion have been quite a controversial topic since the beginning of the pandemic. This particular case takes place in Delaware as Rev. Christopher Allen Bullock filed a lawsuit against Governor Carney’s restrictions in May. He claimed that his restrictions were unconstitutional and discriminatory against his church’s religious practices. However, this was not the view of Governor Carney as one of his representatives stated in a statement, “All of Governor Carney’s actions during this COVID-19 crisis have been focused on protecting lives. COVID doesn’t distinguish between a church, a restaurant, or your living room. Without the right precautions, it will spread. We continue to urge all Delawareans to take this threat seriously heading into the winter” (Delaware Pastor: Governor has Settled Suit Over Virus Orders). 

 

Governor Carney’s restrictions were quite intense and constantly changing. Once the lockdown was imposed, worship services in Delaware were limited to a maximum of 10 people. They once the first round of criticism came about, he altered his restrictions to either having a 10 person limit or having 30% of the fire occupancy for that particular building. The latter option would only be allowed if the churches followed even more requirements and restrictions. According to the article, these restrictions included,  “the use of face masks and gloves and banning person-to-person communion, physical contact during baptisms, and prohibiting the use of choirs, handheld microphones, and holy water receptacles. Churches also were told to deny entry to anyone 65 or older, a restriction not placed on secular businesses” (Delaware Pastor: Governor has Settled Suit Over Virus Orders). These strict restrictions prompted Rev. Christopher Allen Bullock to formulate a lawsuit against Governor Carney, which then resulted in Carney changing his restrictions again. They now stated that worship singers must wear face shields or masks when singing and if they could not comply, they should turn around to face away from the congregation. His next alteration to his restrictions ultimately eliminated the option for worship centers to hold ceremonies if more than 10 people were in attendance and suggested that anyone speaking or singing should do so facing away from the congregation, standing behind a sneeze guard, or standing 13 feet away from the audience. As Governor Carney continued to change his position, again and again, the trial against Rev. Christopher Allen Bullock was scheduled for September. 

 

The trial commenced in September and was ultimately settled. The terms of the settlement require Governor Carney to treat churches and other places of worship neutrally and that the term “essential” would include churches if another shutdown or emergency lockdown occurs. According to Rev. Christopher Allen Bullock’s attorneys, “restrictions that apply only to religious rituals, such as baptism and communion, would be forbidden, as would age-based attendance limits imposed solely on religious worship” (Delaware Pastor: Governor has Settled Suit Over Virus Orders). The state of Delaware also agreed to pay the Rev. Christopher Allen Bullock’s legal fees that totaled to be approximately $157,000. 

 

This case did not go to the United States Supreme Court, but what would happen if it did? One can only speculate what would happen based on precedent set in other cases from the Court. I believe that if a settlement wasn’t reached in this case and it was taken to the United States Supreme Court, they would rule in favor of the state of Delaware. The Supreme Court has recently rejected cases coming from churches located in Nevada and California. In Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Steve Sisolak, Governor of Nevada and in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, the Court voted in a 5 to 4 vote in both cases to reject them. In regards to South Bay United Pentecostal Church’s cases, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the free exercise clause of the First Amendment” (Supreme Court, in 5-4 Decision, Rejects Church’s Challenge to Shutdown Order). Ultimately, I think that the Supreme Court would claim that there is a compelling state interest in keeping these restrictions in Delaware in place. The goal of the state is to protect public health and I think that the Supreme Court would recognize that goal as a priority. Even though these restrictions are strict, I believe that is also important to note that the state of Delaware is not telling them that they cannot meet, they are telling them to limit in-person church ceremonies and activities. Many churches have found ways to meet virtually or live stream their services to a larger audience that would typically attend on a normal Sunday without the threat of the coronavirus. I think that if the state was telling them that they could not hold any form of service, then that would be a direct violation of their right to free exercise of religion, while this is currently an indirect burden. 

It’s The Most Litigious Time of Year

       https://www.courthousenews.com/indiana-county-defends-courthouse-nativity-scene-at-seventh-circuit/      

               With the Christmas season approaching, an Indiana County is continuing their fight to display its county’s nativity scene. The creche has been featured on Jackson County Courthouse grounds for the past 15 years and has recently been the topic of debate. In December 2018, a lawsuit was issued by the Indiana ACLU on behalf of Jackson resident, Rebecca Woodring, who complained that the creche featured on the front law on Jackson County Courthouse grounds denoted a state endorsement of religion thus violating the Establishment Clause. The overarching question posed by the lawsuit is if the presentation of a creche on Courthouse grounds, government-owned property, demonstrates a state-sponsorship and/or endorsement of Christianity. 

After the town heard complaints of the scene, they added a Santa, sleigh, and other non-religious holiday symbols to the scene. However, Woodring further argued that the additions failed to curtail the state’s endorsement of Christianity. The following April, the New Albany District Court ruled in Woodring’s favor assessing that the creche violated the Establishment Clause under the grounds that it lacked a secular purpose and endorses Christianity. Unpleased with the verdict, Jackson County appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court. 

This November, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments. The hearing addressed American Legion v. American Humanist Association (2019) as precedent, presented by Jackson County’s attorney Mihet, in which the Court established that a 40-foot cross World War I monument on public-land was constitutional because it has taken an alternative secular significance. Woodring’s attorney Faulk argued that a creche is an overtly religious symbol and that unlike the monument, the display cannot be interpreted as anything other than religious in nature. It was also proposed that unlike the monument, the Jackson County creche is not long-standing. Judge Wood questioned this argument stating that creches have historically been erected around the World and in the United States before it was even the United States. Within the oral arguments, the judges questioned Mihet if the nativity scene could be viewed as culturally distinct from religion. Mihet responded by articulating that the non-religious adornments and other aspects of the holiday demonstrate that the scene is not uniquely religious. Faulk offered the rebuttal that a creche could not be perceived as anything other than religious, and retains an exclusive holy identity. The session concluded and the Judges did not nor did not indicate when they would issue a holding. 

I predict that the Court of Appeals will uphold the motion that the creche display is unconstitutional. I believe that the Court of Appeals will apply the subsequent case to Lynch v. Donnely, County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989) as precedent, which ruled that a creche displayed on Courthouse grounds violates the Establishment Clause. The Court in Allegheny decided that because of the location of the display, a government office funded by taxpayer dollars, the creche suggested an impermissible state-endorsement of religion. In Allegheny, the Court decided that the creche will be perceived as an endorsement of the Christian religion to a “reasonable observer”, as a promotion of Christianity. Considering the similar location to Allegheny, I believe that the Court will rule likewise and state that the nativity scene cannot be displayed. Also, I believe that the Court’s analysis of American Legion will aid the conclusion that the creche violates the Establishment Clause. Unlike the World War I monument, the nativity scene lacks a secular purpose and is uniquely a celebration of the Christian faith. Moreover, this case also reminded me of the presentation of the Ten Commandments in the Texan Capitol building in Van Orden v. Perry, but unlike in that case, Jackson County is not providing a sufficient secular justification for their display. Because a creche lacks a compelling secular effect and considering its presence at a government office, I believe that the Court of Appeals will similarly rule with the District Court. 

Personally, I believe that the Court should rule the display as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The display is featured outside of a Courthouse, government-owned property, which implies a relationship between state and religion. Although the display also features non-religious holiday symbols, the creche is undoubtedly religious. Because of the creche’s religious significance and recognition, I believe that the display of it at a Courthouse constitutes an establishment violation, professing the birth of Jesus Christ. I believe that observers would reasonably interpret the nativity scene as exclusively religious, without serving any secular purpose. Even though the addition includes non-religious holiday symbols, the symbols are still nonetheless associated with the celebration of Christmas and hold an undoubtful link to Christianity. Therefore, I believe that the creche should not be able to be erect considering the nature of the location. Furthermore, the adornment of a creche shows a preference for Christianity. In my opinion, the forced removal of such a display does not demonstrate hostility towards the Christian religion but rather promotes neutrality. In conclusion, I hold that the creche should not be permitted on Courthouse grounds to prevent the appearance of a state-sponsorship of religion. 

L.B. v. Simpson County School District

In mid-October, Lydia Booth (L.B.), a third grade student in Simpson County School District located in Pinola, Mississippi, was denied the right to wear a face mask printedwith the words “Jesus Loves Me” (see picture below). Plaintiff L.B. was forced to change her mask by school officials because “she could not wear a mask with words on it”. The school district claimed that this was a violation of their Restart Plan originally posted in July that stated: “Masks will be required to be worn by students and all personnel in common spaces”. The plan was later modified shortly after L.B. wore her mask to add “(No political, religious, sexual or inappropriate statements are allowed on mask)”.  However, L.B. and her family observed many students wearing masks with expressive messages on them such as Black Lives Matter. The school also has a Religious Speech Policy in which school officials can censor students from spreading offensive and/or disruptive messages. L.B.’s “Jesus Loves Me” mask does not violate that policy; the mask’s message did not cause any disruptions or distractions or provoke any disputes amongst members of the school. L.B. v. Simpson County School District questions if the mask statement in the Simpson County’s Restart Plan is a violation of students' free speech and free exercise of religion protected under the First Amendment. 

           

L.B.’s mother, Jennifer Booth, was confused by the incident because it did not state anywhere that masks with words on them were disallowed. She contacted Principal Woodall who cited the dress code that prohibits “clothing advertising alcoholic beverages or drug culture, clothing with obscene language or gestures or clothing of any offensive nature”. Needless to say, L.B.’s mask did not violate the dress code by those standards. Booth then emailed Superintendent Sanders in which he cited the statement on masks in the Restart Plan. Booth was confused why she had not seen the portion regarding statements on masks before, and looked into the metadata on the website. She found that the part stating “(No political, religious, sexual or inappropriate statements are allowed on mask)” was added by Sanders less than an hour after receiving Booth’s email. The original version did not prohibit any messages on masks. A letter was sent out to the entire school district and included that this was only applicable to masks. When posed with the question of how masks are different from shirts, Sanders claimed that the message is “right in your face with a mask”.

           

In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines that students in public schools do not forfeit their rights upon entering the school. In this case, students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, and were suspended for their actions. The Court concluded in a 7-2 decision that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”, and that schools are unable to restrict students’ rights of free speech unless it is disruptive. L.B.'s mask was not disruptive in any way, and makes a very innocent statement. If the Court upholds the precedent that students do not forfeit their First Amendment Rights upon entering school, then L.B.’s mask needs to be permitted by Simpson County School District. 

 

In Church of LumakiBabalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993), Hialeah created a city ordinance that specifically targeted the practices of the Church of Lumaki Babalu Aye. The Court ruled that it was unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment for the City of Hialeah to do so; the ordinance was hostile to religion. Simpson County School District’s addition to the mask statement in the Restart Plan is similar to the ordinance of Hialeah because it negatively targets religion directly. Therefore, if this precedent is upheld the Court will view the edited Restart Plan as an attack on religion. 

           

I believe it is perfectly within L.B.’s First Amendment rights to wear a mask that says “Jesus Loves Me” to her public school. Simpson County School District claiming the mask was a violation of the dress code was incorrect; the mask clearly did not reference alcohol, drugs, or anything offensive. Furthermore, the notion that the message on a mask is different from a shirt because it is “right in your face” does not make sense. The compelling interest of a public school is to uphold a successful educational process without disruption. With the pandemic, it is also a compelling interest of the school to ensure students are wearing masks and being kept safe, and L.B. was abiding by those rules. L.B.’s mask did not cause any commotion in the school prior to being forced to change it. Therefore, the compelling interests of the school remain unaffected in this case. Ultimately, the Court needs to uphold the precedents set in similar cases, and allow L.B. to wear her “Jesus Loves Me” mask as it is her constitutional right. 

Official Bible or Official Religion?

 

In January of this year Reverend Randolph Hollerith, dean of the National Cathedral, blessed what is being called the “official Bible for the new United States Space Force.” The U.S. Air Force chief of chaplains, Maj. Gen. Steven Schaick accepted the King James Bible and held it for the religious ceremony. The now officially blessed Space Force Bible was donated by the Museum of the Bible, a private Washington, D.C. institution. 

While the National Cathedral posted a statement describing the blessing of the Bible and explaining that it will now “be used to swear in all commanders of America’s newest military branch,” an Air Force spokesperson denied this remark clarifying that “there is no official religious or other sacred text, nor is there any requirement for a member to use any sacred or religious text, during swearing-in ceremonies.” 

In his blessing, Reverend Hollerith asked that the military “accept this Bible which we dedicate here today for the United States Space Force, that all may so diligently search your holy word and find in it the wisdom that leads to peace and salvation, through Jesus Christ our Lord, amen.” 

The blessing was met with protests from religious liberty activists, particularly the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF), which condemned the ceremony as a “shocking and repulsive display of only the most vile, exclusivist, fundamentalist Christian supremacy.” The group’s founder and president, Mikey Weinstein, expressed concern that the “official Bible” of the U.S. Space Force violates the Free Exercise and Establishment provisions in Air Force Instruction 1-1, which states that leaders “must ensure their words and actions cannot reasonably be construed to be officially endorsing or disapproving of, or extending preferential treatment for any faith, belief, or absence of belief.” 

While initial reports of the Bible’s use for swearing in all officers suggests an issue of free exercise, the clarification given by the Air Force that the use of a Bible during swear-in proceedings is only a direct result of individual choice relieves this case of a question regarding free exercise. Thus, the major question in this case is whether or not the introduction of an official Bible for the U.S. Space Force creates an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 

While this case poses a difficult question, court precedent and a clear understanding of the meaning of an “official” military religious text suggest that the Bible dedicated to the United States Space Force is not an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 

In order to clearly develop a position on the constitutionality of the “official Bible of the U.S. Space Force,” it is necessary to understand the role that the Bible has in government proceedings. Swearing-in ceremonies traditionally use some meaningful text upon which individuals swear their necessary oath; the text most commonly used is the Bible. The Bible that has been dedicated and donated to the U.S. Space Force is thus the specific Bible that will be used during the swear-in ceremonies of those that request it. The title of “official” Bible only indicates that it is the specific Bible that the military branch keeps in its possession for the elected use of its members. Therefore, the “official” label applies only to the role that the Bible plays, and does not imply that the teachings of the Bible themselves are an “official” extension of the United States Space Force. Any other religious or secular texts that might be donated to the military branch for the same purpose would presumably also be given the title of “official,” reinforcing the notion that the acceptance of a donated religious text does not constitute an endorsement of its teachings. Thus, as in Lynch v. Donnelly “when viewed in the proper context” it is clear that the Space Force Bible is not a “surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message” (Muñoz 263). 

 It is possible that perhaps the title given to the Bible could be misunderstood by the reasonable observer as suggesting that the Space Force accepts the teachings of the Bible as its “official” established religion. However, a proper understanding of the role of the Bible within the proceedings of the Space Force and numerous other government institutions would clarify to the reasonable observer that the Space Force’s reception of the donated and dedicated Bible is not an establishment of Christianity as an official religion, but merely a neutral accommodation that is available to all religious and secular texts. Furthermore, this possible misinterpretation from a reasonable observer is only a danger when only one “official” text is possessed by the Space Force, or any other government entity for that matter. If a private Jewish organization, for example, was to dedicate and donate a Torah for the use of the Space Force that was deemed the “official” Torah, a reasonable observer could never assume that the military branch was endorsing its teachings as an official religion at the same time as endorsing the teachings of the official Bible. The temporary nature of this concern therefore weakens the indication that this situation is unconstitutional. 

The existing precedent of religious texts being held by government institutions for use during swearing-in ceremonies and the acceptance of religiously symbolic donations further support that the Space Force’s official Bible is not an establishment of religion. Bibles and other religious texts are used during the oath procedures of U.S. courts, the president, and other elected officials. The previous existence of official, though perhaps not explicitly named as such, Bibles or other texts of government institutions for the voluntary use of its members suggests that the Space Force’s acceptance of an “official” bible should be interpreted no differently. Additionally, Van Orden v. Perry established in 2005 that government acceptance of donated religious monuments does not necessarily indicate an establishment or endorsement of religion. In this instance, the government possession of a monument display of fundamental Christian beliefs, the Ten Commandments, did not suggest government endorsement, rather an example of “the rich American tradition of religious acknowledgments” (Muñoz 528). The Space Force’s possession of Christian beliefs in the form of a Bible is providing the same accommodation to religious ideology as the Ten Commandment monument, and thus should be interpreted equally as constitutional. The court also established in their opinion of Van Orden that the passivity of the monument did not create a coercive environment that would conflict with the establishment clause: “In no sense does the Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to do anything...the mere presence of the monument along his path involves no coercion” (Muñoz 529). The “official” Bible of the Space Force is similarly passive in its role as a symbol of sincerity and honor, and therefore cannot be considered unconstitutionally coercive. 

The lack of coercion created by the “official” Bible is also made clear by the fact that the Space Force does not require any use or reference to the Bible. The voluntary nature of the Bible’s role inherently negates the idea that it places a coercive pressure upon individuals. Unlike school children what are understandably more susceptible to the peer pressures potentially associated with religion, as demonstrated in Wallace v. Jaffree, Stone v. Graham, and Engal v. Vitale, the men and women who would be sworn in as members of the Space Force are intelligent adults who are unlikely to be swayed in their religious and philosophical ideologies. Thus, the mere option of using the dedicated “official” Bible to solemnize their oath is very unlikely to coerce a Space Force member to adopt its teachings. The equally available option of swearing their oath upon another text, religious or secular, or to forego the use of a text at all further removes the threat of coercion and possible religious establishment. 

While the blessing of an “official” Bible of the United States Air Force may initially appear questionable in regard to the First Amendment, an understanding of the Bible’s neutral, uncoercive role and of government and court precedent clarifies that the Bible is constitutional and not an establishment of religion. 

Is a Mandatory Religious Oath on Voter Registration Forms a Violation of the First Amendment?

    On May 1, 2020, an atheist advocacy group of four Alabamians filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division against Alabama’s Secretary of State, John Merrill, asserting that the mandatory religious oath on Alabama voter registration forms was in violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Alabama is the only U.S. state that mandates that citizens seeking to register to vote must swear “so help me God”. Alabama’s Mail-In Voter Registration Form, and all other forms, contain a category titled “Voter Declaration-Read and Sign Under Penalty of Perjury” which encloses the oath stated above and concludes with a disclaimer that one can be imprisoned for up to five years as a result of his conviction for falsely signing the form. Plaintiffs, Randal Cragun et. al are all residents who meet the constitution and statutory requirements to vote in Alabama and fully intend to either seek or remain a registered voter and vote in future elections, however they have been unable to swear to this religious oath with no secular alternative. Mr. Carugan is an atheist and his individual conscience prohibits him from swearing the phrase “so help me God”. According to the claimant, from the time of November of 2019 to now, Mr. Cragun has attempted to register to vote, but has been unable to due to these policies carried out by the Secretary of State. On November 24 of 2019, Mr. Cragun contacted the State of Secretary's Office, inquiring about the an alternative process for registering to vote which omits the monotheistic language, however, Mr. Helms, Director of Elections made clear that “there is not a legal mechanism [for him] to register to vote” (6). The Secretary of State then received a letter from the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), in which they first, asserted that any form of compulsory religious oaths are a “well-settled” violation of the First Amendment and second, urged for an alternative “secular affirmation available for any state resident that does not wish to swear [the phrase]” (7). In response, the Secretary of State falsely articulated that modifications to the registration form would mandate legislative action, when, in fact, they do have the power to amend voter registration forms according to Alabama Code § 17-3-52.

    The fundamental issue in Carugan v. Merrill case is whether or not Alabama’s Secretary of State’s required religious oath on voter registration forms, with no secular alternative, is in violation of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. As stated in the complaint, Alabama’s custom and practice of this mandate violates the Establishment Clause in a number of ways. The claimant asserts how the policy first places preferential treatment towards religion over nonreligion: “ it has the purpose and effect of favoring, advancing, and coercively supporting theistic beliefs and individuals, while disfavoring, disadvantaging, and discriminating against nontheistic beliefs and individuals, including the Plaintiffs” (11). The oath, referencing a God, additionally coerces one’s acceptance and belief in a monotheistic god. In terms of their second claim of relief, the complaint argues that the purpose and effect of this policy is in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Lead plaintiff Carugan argues that the act of requiring nontheists, including the Plaintiffs, to adopt or commit to religious beliefs to which they “do not subscribe” in order to participate in the electoral process is a restriction on an individual’s right to freely exercise their desired religion, or nonreligion.

    I believe that Alabama’s required religious oath on voter registration forms is a violation of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. In regards to the primary claim for relief, a violation of the Establishment clause, the complaint makes reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1943 W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette case. Here, the Supreme Court decided that “no official...can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion...or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein”. From the findings of this case alone, it is undoubted that the Alabama Secretary of State has violated the basic rights of citizens in that they are unconstitutionally demanding all who desire to register to vote to swear “so help me God”. Even more particularly relevant, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the requirement of religious oaths is directly addressed. The Supreme Court deems any mandatory religious oath as a violation of the Establishment Clause, drawing from the principal decided in Everson v. Board of Education and  holding that “neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion…[nor can they] impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers” (2). The FFRF letter likewise cites the settled standard in Torcaso v. Watkins (drawn from Everson v. Board of Education) in urging the removal of the religious oath. Even the district courts of this particular state have already resolved a case involving the form’s unconstitutional required religious oath. Nicholson v. Bd of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar Ass’n, in 1972, involved a Plaintiff’s inability to receive his license to practice law, due to his refusal to swear the religious oath required in order to enter upon the practice of law. Because this requirement has been deemed unconstitutional in the practice of law, it is unquestionable that it also applies to voter registration.

    This policy clearly violates the establishment clause because, by implementing religion into voter registration, the Secretary of State essentially promotes and establishes a religion. The policy, upheld by the state of Alabama, places preferential treatment towards religion over nonreligion in that it endorses and actively advances theistic beliefs and individuals, while being hostile towards non-religion. The policy is discriminatory in that it singles out who will be eligible to vote in the electoral process. In addition, Alabama’s Secretary of State has no valid, compelling reason or interest in requiring all voters to swear a religious oath in order to vote. Its policy has an inappropriate intent in that it promotes Chirsitan Conservatives while inhibiting liberals from voting. In the long run, it would impact social issues beyond religion, such as taxes, military affairs, and foreign policy. Ultimately, religious Conservatives would determine other issues unrelated to religion, a role which politicians and governmental leaders are intended to have. This inappropriate intent is overt, because as of now, Alabama itself “routinely allows attorneys, jurors, witnesses, and many others...to make a secular affirmation instead when they are unable to swear “so help me God” (2). There exists no excuse to prevent an extension of this exception to aspiring voters.

    It is also clear that, in ordering the swearing of “so help me God” in order to register to vote, the Secretary of State of Alabama is coercing a statement of belief in a monotheistic deity onto nontheists. As mentioned in the complaint, the Secretary of State has made no attempt, and even refused, to establish a substitute voter registration form with the omission of religious language for use. They have failed to act upon the many concerns raised regarding the required oath, and present “any guidance to county registrars informing them of how [atheists] may register to vote” and therefore, this act of excluding nontheist citizens from voting is deliberate and coercive in nature.

    This obvious favoring of religion, through requiring nontheists to adopt religious beliefs to which they do not subscribe in order to participate in the electoral process, concurrently violates the free exercise clause. It creates a substantial burden for aspiring voters who aren’t of a certain religion and makes them face a tough dilemma. It obliges citizens who do not aspire to a higher God, or are atheists, to either unwillingly congregate with a religious belief or abandon their ability to vote in elections and actively partake in their country’s political future.  This hostility and preferential treatment towards one group with no valid or compelling interest in mind, and consequent violation of the First Amendment emerges in the 1986 Goldman v. Weinberger case, involving an Orthodox Jew and commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, who challenged, under the First Amendment, an Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of a yarmulke, inside, while on duty. There lies much similarity between the two, and I think that this issue must reach the same conclusion as Congress' overturning of this case by legislation in 1987. In Carugan v. Merrill, Alabama exhibits no valid reason or interest in requiring all voters to swear a religious oath in order to vote, and likewise, in the Court’s overturning of the Goldman v. Weinberger decision, the Court argued that the military’s commitment to infusing manners of discipline and unity into its members through this regulation was too loose and indirect of a justification, failing to specifically address any particular military concern at stake. On behalf of these illegitimate excuses, Goldman is being asked to violate his faith, and Carugan, among the other plaintiffs, are being asked to adopt a religion, both burdens which are larger than most. It is imperative to consider the long term implications of these illogical state positions. In both cases, the plaintiffs are faced with a draconian choice, abandon their religious beliefs to conform or have their rights taken away.  If allowed to stand a state could control religious behavior under the guise of their misinformed reasoning.  This would allow the state to control behavior and social issues by illegally establishing religion.  Ultimately, the establishment clause of the constitution is a check against this sort of inappropriate control of the state.

New Update Regarding Maine’s Private School Tuition Reimbursement Program

    A little less than 2 weeks ago, it was decided in the First Circuit that Maine will continue their tuition reimbursement program. Initially started to support families in rural areas without a public high school, the program uses the residents of Maine’s tax dollars to send children to private schools. However, there is a big catch; parents may not receive tuition reimbursement if they choose a religious school. As one can imagine, such a program has been challenged before; the First Circuit upheld it back in 2004. Yet, the current lawsuit from three sets of parents who wanted to send their children to religious schools was spurred by two recent Supreme Court cases of similar notion. The first was Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (2017), which ruled that a church-run preschool in Missouri could not be denied a state subsidy for resurfacing playgrounds at preschool and daycare facilities. The second was Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), which ruled that a Montana tax program could not exclude those who donate to religious private school scholarships. As a result, the three sets of parents claim that Maine’s exclusion of religious schools is illegal, and infringes on their free exercise of religion. 

    In response, U.S. Circuit Judge David Barron noted the difference between the Maine case and the other two lies within “what the school teaches through its curriculum and related activities, and how the material is presented.” He proceeds to mention that of the two Maine religious schools referenced in this case, one promotes the Bible as “final authority in all matters”, the other provides a “biblically-integrated education”, and both refuse to hire teachers who are homosexual. Using this the same line of thinking, it would make sense that the Supreme Court found withholding of resurfacing from Trinity Lutheran Church to be discrimination due to religious status, since the playground itself was not furthering a religious agenda. At the end of the day, the judges on the First Circuit did not find it proper for the people of Maine’s tax dollars to be used to send children to schools with missions that further specific religious agendas.

    Considering the prior, I do find myself understanding the reasoning behind the judges on the First Circuit’s decision. Allowing religious schools to be part of Maine’s tuition reimbursement program would result in the state indirectly furthering religion. Moreover, I do not recognize this as direct hinderance on their freedom to exercise religion, due to the fact that families are not being prohibited from attending religious school, they are simply being told they will not receive aid to do so. However, it is a failing of neutrality of the law. While it appears to be a facially neutral law on the surface, in practice, it turns away parents of a certain financial status from religious schooling. Therefore, the exclusion of religious schools in Maine’s tuition reimbursement program directly prevents children (from lower-income homes) from receiving an education through the lens of their chosen religion. One father in the Maine lawsuit said, “It’s a financial burden… We live modest, conservative lives. I’d love to be driving the new vehicles like everybody else, but I choose to give my son a good education. I talk to a lot of parents that want to send their kids to do something different, and they just can’t swing it.” Additionally, it furthers non-religious ideals; aid only being provided to those who choose secular private schools serves as a deterrent from religious schooling (for certain families). Not to mention, while not unconstitutional, the initial goal of giving relief to families in rural areas is lost by directly excluding the religious community. For these reasons, I feel as though the state of Maine should either allow all private schools to qualify for the tuition reimbursement program, or enact a new system of reimbursement that does not only benefit secular schools in its place. 

I look forward to reading your opinions, in order to further mine. 

M.K.T.

Political Partisanship, Religion, and the Pandemic: On Fire Christian Center v. Fischer

Prior to the Easter holiday this year, Mayor Greg Fischer in Louisville, Kentucky, made a decision to prohibit all church and worship gatherings within the city. This decision by the Mayor was said to be an attempt to minimize the risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic and an attempt to “save lives.” As a result, the On Fire Christian Center filed for a temporary restraining order claiming that the prohibition attacked their ability to properly celebrate a religious holiday central to their faith and acted as a violation of their free exercise of religion.

Judge Justin Walker of Louisville decided the case. In his court opinion, Judge Walker found in favor of the On Fire Christian Center and against Mayor Fischer. He granted the On Fire Christian Center a temporary restraining order to ignore the Mayor’s prohibitions. The main reasoning behind his opinion was the idea that the Mayor had unfairly targeted religious groups with this prohibition by restricting a holiday so critical to the Catholic faith.

One of the major issues brought up as the basis of the lawsuit at the very beginning of the court’s opinion is the question of whether or not Mayor Greg Fischer’s prohibition of these services acted as a violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Did the mayor’s choice to prohibit all church and worship gatherings during a pandemic violate the rights of religious groups to freely exercise their religion and place an undue direct burden on them?

This issue is important for many other reasons, specifically in regards to how the COVID-19 pandemic will play a role in establishing a precedent for legal intervention during future health crises. The role of COVID-19 in the judicial branch has been approached differently by different courts and different judges so each case carries weight into how this will affect future health crises. It also plays a significant role in judicial treatment of religion and whether or not the courts will begin to stray from a more strict interpretation of the religious clauses of the first amendments or if there will be greater support for separation of church and state in legal decision making.

Overall, I disagree strongly with the decision of Judge Walker in today’s case. I believe that the public health and safety of citizens should always come first before any other concern. Part of Mayor Fischer’s reasoning for his prohibition of services came as a result of the city’s neglect towards the mayor’s neutral emergency orders that he put into place for all citizens. Though the church prohibition was specific towards religious organizations, it was a result of bigger neutral guidance by the mayor towards all types of in-person programming. After multiple recorded instances and witnessed violations of safety guidelines and restrictions at drive-in church services, Mayor Fischer enacted the rule as a direct result of those violations in an attempt to “emphasize again to people that the science behind this is really, really clear and all [he was] trying to do here is save lives and we’ve got to show the discipline to get through this and we can worship again when we're in a safer mode.” Another reason I take issue with Judge Walker’s opinion is that it included the strong language of a religious bias as reasoning, which should not have played a role in his decision-making of the case. By using language in his opinion that directly promotes the role of religion and also directly expresses an interest against a political party in the United States before even beginning to discuss the facts of the case at hand until page seven of his opinion, he expresses a clear disinterest in a ruling based on the legality of the matter and rather on a partisan agenda.

However, I do find some agreement in one specific idea of his argument and that is the idea that church and worship services should not be considered the sole target of this prohibition. This kind of prohibition that singles out religious services and is not a neutral restriction towards nonreligious and religious services. At the time of the mayor’s decision, drive-through restaurants and liquor stores were still allowed to be open. However, with the lack of certainty in the facts of the case that the churches themselves were specifically targeted, we cannot be certain that they were in fact singled out in this type of way. So overall, I find extreme flaws with the opinion and would disagree with the outcome of the case. 

The prior precedent of the courts do not support the decision made by Judge Walker in today’s case and rather support the idea that the government has a right to intervene in religion if it has a compelling state interest to do so. Take the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a case that Judge Walker himself references in his opinion. Jacobson v. Massachusetts established a legal precedent that constraints of constitutional law are not rigidly fixed in times of national emergency. In that case, the courts held that residents needed to be vaccinated against smallpox because it was a health crisis. Other cases that establish a precedent that goes against Walker’s decision are Employment Division v. Smith and Reynolds v. United States. In Employment Division v. Smith, the government was allowed to deny religious organizations the ability to use drug use in religious services and deny those individuals unemployment benefits as it was a threat to the overall national security and well-being of people in the country. In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that a federal law prohibiting polygamy did not violate the free exercise clause in the terms that it was a challenge to the overall compelling state interest. Precedents like these establish that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to government intervention if there is a greater compelling state interest for the health and safety of the citizens. 

The decision made by Judge Justin Walker holds dangerous implications for further cases. If future courts and judges were to agree with the decision made in On Fire Christian Center v. Fischer, the courts would be setting up an unconstitutional precedent that would willingly put the lives of citizens at risk. Now that we are entering a time in politics and government where conservative vs progressive values are constantly being challenged and debated, it is important for legal decisions to be made primarily on the basis of their constitutionality and legality, not in support of one political side or the other. The problem with letting Judge Walker’s decision stand is that it encourages a culture of partisanship within the judicial branch of government, which should be the branch least affected by partisan goals.