Monday, February 28, 2022

Religious Freedom in the Face of COVID-19

    The emergence of COVID-19 resulted in an unprecedent situation where democratic leaders were forced to struggle between protecting individual liberties and minimizing risk. In the early stages of the pandemic the former Governor of New York Andrew Cuomo imposed an executive order that limited the number of individuals who could gather in a place of worship. His policies that restricted religious attendance were enacted in areas of New York classified as “red” or “orange” zones. In red zones, no more than 10 people could attend a religious service. In orange zones, no more than 25 individuals could attend a religious service. In response to Cuomo’s policies, The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn appealed his restrictions on the basis that they violated the Free Exercise Clause of the first Amendment. 

In November of 2020, the Supreme Court heard Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Andrew Cuomo and decided whether the church should be awarded their application for relief. In a close 5-4 decision, the court decided in favor of the Church and granted the appellants immediate relief of Cuomo’s restrictions. The court argued that even in a public health crisis such as COVID-19, it is unconstitutional to restrict religious services.  The concurring justice, Justice Gorsuch, sided with the Church because of the 1st amendment’s protection of religious minorities. The appellants referred to the discriminatory nature of gerrymandering that resulted in red and orange zones being predominantly religious communities. The religious communities who felt targeted were religious minorities such as Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews. In his decision, Gorsuch refers to the courts obligation to protect minorities from the rule of the majority, an obligation that outweighs the health risks of COVID. The concurring opinion also interpreted religious services in the context of the pandemic. In this context, they deemed religious services as “essential” and therefore religion should receive the same exemptions as essential businesses and other services. 

The dissent, led by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed with the courts decision to label houses of worship as essential. Sotomayor criticized treating religious services in a similar fashion to banks and grocery stories, citing the role of public health in Cuomo’s policies. The court deemed Cuomo’s policies as discriminatory towards religious communities and therefore not neutral, Sotomayor; however, viewed the policies as an effort to mitigate risk. 

The dissent and concurring opinion disagreed with their constitutional obligation to the 1st amendment in time of crisis. Their interpretation of the neutrality and intent behind Cuomo’s policy was also in contrast. I agree with the dissent; however, I think the concurring justices offered a logical and constitutionally informed argument. Their acknowledgment of Gerrymandering and duty to minorities makes their opinion make sense, yet I think their loyalty to the constitution is not justified in a time of crisis. Cuomo’s policies were codified in a time where New York was the epicenter of the pandemic and hundreds of people were dying each day. I think limiting the number of individuals gathering in an indoor space was necessary to combat COVID and should be elevated over individual rights. I further disagree with the court’s decision because of the availability of zoom and other options for religious service. The state was not restricting individuals right to believe, but temporality restricted their actions. The court once decided in favor of the state over George Reynolds, ultimately allowing him to believe but not allowing him to act on his belief. I think uplifting public health over spiritual endeavors is constitutionally permissible, especially in a time of COVID. 

Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo illuminates the inevitable influence cultural values has on the American court system. The court’s decision was especially important because it marked the first decision of newly appointed Justice Amy Cohen-Barrett. The COVID-19 pandemic became a politicized and polarized phenomena that was interpreted differently on the basis of one’s partisan affiliation. The connection between one’s values—shaped by their partisanship, religious identification, etc. — and COVID is highlighted by the party affiliations of the concurring opinion and the dissent. The concurring opinion, led by republic Justice Gorush, was backed by conservative justice Kavanaugh, Barret and Roberts. The dissent was comprised of liberal justices as such as Sotomayor, Breyer and Kagan. Other recent decisions that address LBGTQ individuals, gender fluidity and abortion show how contemporary, cultural values are being evaluated on a federal and legislative level. Whether something is constitutionally permissible or not is left to interpretation of justices, who all inherently incorporate their own bias and partisanship into their opinions. Our current age of polarization and dogmatic devotion to social constructs results in the court’s deciding the legality of one’s convictions. 


https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1874/roman-catholic-diocese-of-brooklyn-v-cuomo

Cakebakers to Web Designers: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis

Lorie Smith, the owner and operator of 303 Creative LLC, works as a web designer in Colorado. As a result of her Christian religious beliefs, Ms. Smith wishes to have the right of refusal to accept design work for same-sex clients on wedding site commissions. As well, she wants to post a disclaimer on her website stating her refusal. To her, not doing so would provide a tacit approval of gay marriage which conflicts with the teachings of the Old and New Testament. 

    However, in the state of Colorado, refusal to offer services to, among other classifications, same-sex individuals goes against the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The posting of discriminatory statements with the promotion of those beliefs are also illegal under the CADA. Before actually posting any statement or refusing any customers, Ms. Smith challenged this law on the basis of religious free exercise by preemptively filing suit against the state, which the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected in 2021. In the two to one majority decision of the 10th Circuit, "Colorado has a compelling interest in protecting both the dignity interests of members of marginalized groups and their material interests in accessing the commercial marketplace”, granting the government the right to overrule religious beliefs in regards to discriminatory practices. The majority added that should this law be overturned, the material quality of services for LGBT individuals and their weddings would be inferior due to their status as a minority group. In a statement to the Court, the Attorney General of Colorado noted that  “Anti-discrimination laws appropriately apply to prohibit commercial actors from discriminating in commercial transactions, even though those commercial actors remain free to express their view on such laws in public discourse” which delineates the line between business speech and personal speech.

Following the ruling of the 10th Circuit, Ms. Smith's case has now been considered for hearing by the Supreme Court and just recently was chosen to be heard with scheduled arguments in the fall during the next session. They will only be considering the case on a First Amendment basis, with the precise question being considered as "Whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment". Ms Smith will be represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, a conservative Christian nonprofit advocacy group, due to the organization's belief that the law "censors and coerces the speech of creative professionals whose religious beliefs do not conform to state orthodoxy". Their claim comes from the notion that as a religious minority—in regards to religious beliefs on homosexuality—the rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech are being intentionally trampled upon in favor of the state's protection of LGBT individuals. Some, including the Southern Poverty Law Center, classify the ADF as an anti-LGBT organization.


This case may seem familiar, given the subject matter and location. The precedent being looked upon in this is the Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case in which the owner also refused wedding services in the form of making wedding cakes for same-sex weddings on the basis of his religious beliefs and that baking cakes was an expression of the right to free speech. In Masterpiece, the holding rejected the commission as not being neutral towards religion and finding it in violation of the First Amendment, though the Court did not delineate further on the relationship and hierarchy of the Free Exercise clause, free speech. or anti-discriminatory laws due to the difference between the numerous concurring and dissenting opinions on the overall result. To add, Masterpiece Cakeshop was also represented by the ADF, who favor the argument of
the service acts as a supporting endorsement of same-sex marriage which aligns with the notion in both Masterpiece and 303 Creative that the creative product of the artist is free speech.

The end result of this case, given the holding in Masterpiece and other similar anti-discrimination cases, will likely end as either inconclusive or in favor of Smith's argument. As the court has previously accepted the argument that a creative service or product acts as free speech and that Smith owns and operates her own company, they will see her as fitting within the expression of a private citizen definition and that, despite the fact that there is the fear that should this law be overturned the quality and availability of service in a fair manner for LGBT individuals will drop significantly and impact their lives, there are other opportunities and merchants to offer similar services. Likewise, the Attorney General for Colorado noted that there has been no evidence that an LGBT couple has approached Smith in search of a website for same-sex marriage, which will only further distance the slippery-slope argument in this case. One could also note that many see marriage websites as a non-essential service on offer and because of this, the quality of life difference could be considered as negligible.

https://coloradonewsline.com/briefs/u-s-supreme-court-will-hear-colorado-case-over-whether-web-designer-can-deny-service-to-gay-couples/

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110553596.pdf

https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/2016/title-24/principal-departments/article-34/part-6/section-24-34-601

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-case-of-designer-refusing-to-offer-wedding-websites-for-gay-couples

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/us/colorado-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html

Sunday, February 27, 2022

EEOC Sues Minnesota Company for Firing over Fingerprinting: Violation of Free Exercise?

Should Religious Exemptions be Granted for Fingerprint Scans?

A Minnesota company called AscensionPoint recovery Services, requires its employees to be fingerprinted as part of a background check that was being randomly conducted on employee Henry Harrington. He was made aware of this requirement when he received an email in July 2017, while he was under employment by the company. He wrote to the company explaining, “that the fingerprinting requirement conflicted with his religious beliefs and requested an exemption from the fingerprinting requirement as an accommodation.” He attempted to go in to work later that day, and was told that he must comply with the fingerprint requirement. He refused, and was fired, without the company “exploring any alternatives to fingerprinting.”


On behalf of Harrington, The U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is is filing a lawsuit against the company under the notion that the company was discriminating against Harrington due to his Christian faith. The EEOC is appealing to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that prohibits religious discrimination and requires reasonable accommodations to an employees religious practices. The EEOC argues that an exemption could have been given, or an alternative to a fingerprint could have been provided and was not. Attorney Gregory Gochanour states, “An employee should not have to choose between his faith and his livelihood." 


This case addresses two important aspects of “free exercise” arguments. The first being the looming question of whether or not the rejection of the accommodation or exemption from the fingerprint requirement was a violation of Harrington’s right to freely practice his religion and a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964. To address this, we can turn to a case that the EEOC won in 2015. This case involved a coal miner, Beverly Butcher, who was forced to retire early due to his refusal to comply with a newly implemented biometric scanning system that a company used to clock in and clock out their employees. While the company would not grant him an exemption due to his religious observances, the company did however offer an exemption to two employees who could not scan because of injuries to their hands. This past win by the EEOC works in favor of Harrington, as the court ruled against the company’s attempt to force this employee to quit because of his religious duties. This rules that the state has no compelling interest in prohibiting religious exemptions for matters such as scans. It is clear based on this precedent, that an accommodation must be provided.  Despite this, an accommodation or exemption can be justly denied if it causes “undue hardship.” This denial of an accommodation can only be made if it, “is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work.” In order to decide whether or not an exemption causes this “undue hardship”, we can return to Butcher’s case, where in a similar situation an exemption was granted to those in his company who were physically unable to partake in the biometric scan. It was clear that this exemption was of no burden to other employees, or the company. The only difference here is the nature of the request for an exemption. 


According to the ruling of the Butcher’s case, the companies are to address this religious exemption the same exact way they would address the exemption due to a restrictive injury. In this manner, both Harrington, and Butcher’s cases can be seen as addressing the issue of sincerity of their beliefs. Butcher’s case sets the precedent that the court will not be the judge of the sincerity of one’s belief. Although in Harrington’s suit there was no specific description of how the fingerprint scan would clash with his religious beliefs, the court is bound, in some sense, by the ruling of Butcher case. 


Barring the religious aspect of this case, it is important to address the difference between the manner in which Harrington’s company dealt with his request for an accommodation, and how they are bound to deal with accommodation requests according to  the department of Labor. According to Harrington, his company immediately terminated him upon his refusal to comply with the fingerprint scan. This would imply that the company did not make an attempt to reasonably accommodate his request for a religious accommodation or exemption. "When an employer receives a request for accommodation, the best practice is to have the company (usually a human resources person) discuss the need with the employee and try to figure out a way to help that works for both." It was clear that this practice was ignored in Harrington’s case.  

I believe that Harrington and the EEOC are in the right in this case, and any other option would paint the state as an adversary to religious practice. Harrington is not to have the sincerity of his religious beliefs questioned, and this precedent was established through Butcher’s very similar case. Most importantly, a religious exemption should be approved that would allow Mr. Harrington to both be employed and practice his religion freely. 


Sources: 


https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2021/07/22/religious-discrimination-lawsuit-fingerprinting/4641626890053/ 


https://www.justice.gov/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litigation-section#:~:text=Title%20VII%20of%20the%20Civil%20Rights%20Act%20of%201964%20(Title,and%20gender%20identity)%20or%20religion. 

Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, Virginia

In August 2021, Alive Church (located in Prince William County, Virginia) filed a lawsuit against Prince William County for violating their religious freedoms and rights. The church agreed to be zoned as an “agritourism” facility when they stopped holding services at a public school. This was because they did not have the funding, and thus had to hold gatherings at this new property. The congregation chose to grow fruit trees, as well as make non-alcoholic apple cider in order to abide by the fact that they must be using the land for agricultural purposes. The church chose to be zoned as an agritourism property to avoid hundreds of thousands of dollars in changes to the property that the county would have required to be zoned differently. It is important to note that the zoning administrator approved the church as an agritourism facility. However, the administrator said that the church must acquire a liquor license to hold gatherings on the property. Alive Church does not promote alcohol, so they declined obtaining the liquor license. According to Virginia law, agritourism does not require alcohol sales. The suit is that the county is allegedly violating the religious freedoms and beliefs of the church under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The congregation was banned from holding services on the property unless they obtained a liquor license. This is a violation of the church’s religion, which therefore violates their right to free exercise of religion. The county wanted them to obtain a liquor license, however the church does not even use real wine in their Communion events, as well as the fact that they do not serve any other type of alcohol. The church argued that it was being discriminated against compared to farm wineries and breweries, both of which were allowed to hold events and meetings on A-1 (agricultural zoning district) Property. The outcome of the case was that the court rejected the church’s RLUIPA, Free Exercise, Freedom of Assembly, and Equal Protection challenges. However, the ACLJ filed an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals last week to challenge the original decision. 

The main question of this case is: Is Prince William County violating Alive Church’s free exercise of religion by requiring the congregation to obtain a liquor license since they are on A-1 Property, even though they do not participate in activities involving alcohol? The answer decided by the court was no, however there are multiple angles one can take to interpreting this case. To begin, the fact that the church used to worship in a public school and moved to this property, one that that involves agritourism, automatically brings a few things into question. Did the church just grow fruit trees and make non-alcoholic apple cider to be able to worship on this land? Most would assume the answer is yes, but because they were not financially stable enough to worship somewhere else. This point in itself questions the sincerity of the church with regard to growing those goods. 

The church feels that their rights are being violated because their religion does not encourage alcohol. However, since it is an A-1 Property, the point comes into question, is this discrimination occurring just because they are a church? 

I believe there are a few religion and constitutional law topics examined and involved in the case. There is certainly a compelling state interest that can be argued. Some may think that the church should require a liquor license, because the property they are on technically requires it, regardless of the organization. However, since the congregation does not participate in the activities regarding alcohol, I do not see how this would be a problem that negatively affects other people. If people are not consuming alcohol, I do not think the church should have to obtain a liquor license, and therefore think it is a violation of their free exercise of religion. 

Moreover, there is a slippery slope present here. If the church would have obtained the liquor license, this would set the precedent that all other organizations that are established and worship on A-1 Property must obtain a license, even if they do not consume, promote, or sell alcohol. Who do you allow to hold gatherings on this land, and do their religious beliefs matter? The issue lies within the fact that the church does not support alcohol, therefore why should they have to get a license to be able to have it? 

I believe that the rights of the church are being violated by the county requiring them to obtain a liquor license since they worship on “agritourism” grounds. I think their gatherings are harmless, and do not involve alcohol. On the other hand, I do understand that it is tricky because the congregation decided to plant fruit trees and make non-alcoholic apple cider to comply with the A-1 Property requirements. Some people may question what the true meaning behind the trees being planted is, which tests sincerity. I do not think sincerity is threatening or harmful enough in this situation to force the church to get a liquor license. Yes, the land is supposed to be used for agricultural purposes, but the church technically has an agricultural purpose present here. They do not support alcohol, so therefore why should they be forced to obtain the license? I agree with the recent appeal by the ACLJ, since I did not agree with the court’s original decision that the rights of Alive Church were not violated. 

Sources:

Friday, February 25, 2022

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis

    

    Lorie Smith is an aspiring web designer in Colorado. Prior to starting her business, she filed against the state’s anti-discrimination laws that forbid discrimination against same-sex couples. However, given her religious beliefs, Smith feels that by providing her services to same-sex couples, her actions would conflict with God’s will. Smith has proposed posting a message on her website stating that the company will not create wedding websites for LGBTQ+ customers, due to religious beliefs.
The lawsuit was filed against the state because Colorado law prevents discrimination from occurring at businesses that are open to the public. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act “makes it illegal for someone to withhold services based on another person’s race, sexual orientation, disability, or national origin, among other characteristics.” Additionally, statements that promote discrimination are forbidden. Before actively breaking the law, Smith decided to file a case, on the grounds that the law violates her First Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of religion. 



    This case, 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, has previously made it to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, and will be heard by the Supreme Court during its next term, which is set to start in October. At the Appeals Court level, a 2-1 decision sided with the state, as “Colorado has a compelling interest in protecting both the dignity interests of members of marginalized groups and their material interests in accessing the commercial marketplace.” The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act was upheld as constitutional because of the understanding that without the protection of such a law, LGBTQ+ individuals would receive services of inferior quality.
    Smith is being represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, whose claim rests on the argument that the anti-discrimination law in Colorado violates her First Amendment rights, specifically free speech and free exercise of religion. The claim is that Colorado is using their law to silence beliefs with which they do not agree. By mandating that Smith works with same-sex clients, the state forces her to violate her religious beliefs.
    On behalf of the state, Colorado’s attorney general does not feel that there is a concrete issue for which the Supreme Court can decide. Smith has not yet entered business nor has any same-sex couple asked her to create a wedding website, and as a result, Colorado has not yet moved to enforce the law. However, the state feels their law is constitutional given the compelling state interest to protect the rights of marginalized groups in the public economic market.
    The main precedent that individuals are looking to in this case is one that the Supreme Court decided in 2018. This involves a baker, also from Colorado, who refused to create cakes for same-sex weddings because it violated his religious beliefs. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, it was decided 7-2 on behalf of the baker. However, many justices on the court ruled in this case on different grounds, through several concurring opinions. Ultimately it was decided that while the LGBTQ+ community is protected from discrimination, religious beliefs are also protected constitutionally. One key difference in the case is that at the time the refusal to bake a cake occurred, in 2012, some key cases regarding gay marriage had not yet been decided. As a result, the baker was at the time acting in a way he saw as constitutional. However, Smith’s refusal occurred after these critical decisions.
    Ultimately, the key question in this case surrounds whether enforcing an anti-discrimination law, which results in artists having to speak and act in ways that contradict religious beliefs, violates the free speech and freedom of religion clauses of the First Amendment. When considering the facts of the case, I think Smith is likely to win. This is because she receives no state funding of any sort, and ultimately is entitled to both free speech and freedom of religion. Although anti-discrimination laws are in place, I do not think the compelling state interest is strong enough in this case to justify violating the freedom of religion clause. Same sex couples are not guaranteed to have someone work with them, nor is anyone. While violence and hateful acts should not occur, refusing to make a website for a couple because of religious beliefs does not necessarily hurt someone directly. They may be inconvenienced because of the refusal, but they do not face a significant burden since there are likely others willing to make a website for them. Although it might not be of the same caliber, they are not guaranteed the right to work specifically with Smith. Furthermore, Smith seeks to act through a post on her website stating that creating websites for same-sex couples violates her religious beliefs, which is arguably a non-violent way to make this message known. Finally, she is not refusing to work with LGBTQ+ individuals all together, but instead not partaking in wedding planning for them given her religious beliefs.
    The counter argument, siding with the state, would be on the basis that the law is constitutional, and precedent has urged the importance of preserving the rights of same-sex couples. This is seen in Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v. Windsor, both concerning the fundamental right to marry, inclusive of same-sex couples. Similarly, the desire to protect marginalized groups is important, and serves as a compelling state interest to violate the freedom of religion clause in the First Amendment.
    Considering all the facts of the case, I do not think the Colorado anti-discrimination laws themselves are unconstitutional. However, as the court has previously established, both anti-discrimination and freedom of religion are protected constitutionally. Therefore, the situation becomes increasingly difficult. In the end, I think that if the claim is on religious grounds, like Smith’s is, the freedom of religion dominates in this case. If however an artist discriminated against a client based on other claims, the law would be upheld and the artist would be punished. Similarly, if the artist created direct harm against someone, the compelling state interest would out way the freedom of religion.

Sources:





Mays v. Cabell County Board of Education

  On February 2, two homeroom teachers at Huntington High School in West Virginia brought their class to an Evangelical Christian revival at the school.  The teachers brought their entire class and required that students attended.  The principal and assistant principal were present at the assembly. At the event students were told to close their eyes, raise their hands and pray.  They were also asked to turn their lives over to Jesus and to find purpose in salvation.  The leaders of the prayer also told the students that if they did not follow the Bible they would go to “face eternal damnation”.  Finally, students were encouraged to attend a nearby church where they had the opportunity to be baptized. One student who attended the event, who was Jewish, asked to leave and was told that he was required to stay.  The group who held the event, Nik Walker Ministries, held a similar event at Huntington East Middle School the day before.  Last week, students held a walk out, in which one hundred students took part, protesting that the assembly violated the separation of church and state.  Jedd Flowers, a spokesperson for the Cabell County Schools, told the Associated Press that the assembly was supposed to be voluntary, but two teachers made an honest mistake.  

A group of about a dozen parents, with the help of the Freedom From Religion Foundation, are suing the Cabell County Board of Education, its superintendent, and Huntington High School principal Daniel Gleason.  The suit claims that allowing the event to happen during the school day violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The plaintiffs are seeking for the district to be barred from sponsoring any religious events, having any adult-led religious events during the school day, or participating in any religious events with the students during the school day.  

The constitutional issue that is at contention here is if the teachers requiring their students to attend a religious event during the school day violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Further, the Freedom From Religious Foundation argues that the issue is that the school would even hold a religious event on school grounds during the school day.  The students also argue that the event is a violation of the separation of church and state.  

There are multiple cases that deal with the issue of prayer taking place in public schools and whether requiring students to attend such events is a violation of the Establishment Clause.  In Abington Township v. Schempp, the Supreme Court ruled that public schools could not sponsor Bible readings or recitations under the Establishment Clause.  McCollum v. Board of Education looked at a program in Illinois in which students had “released time” where they left class and took part in religious events on school grounds.  The Supreme Court went further on their ruling in Abington Township v. Schempp, ruling that it was unconstitutional to use school property for religious purposes.  Finally, in Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court further upheld their previous rulings on prayer in schools ruling that the state can not hold prayer in public schools, even if attendance is not required.  

I believe that the result of this case is that Huntington High School violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The parents initially argued that the fact that students were required to attend the prayer was the constitutional issue, but I would go further to say that just holding the prayer at all is a clear violation of the students constitutional rights.  Previous rulings have made it clear that public schools are not allowed, under the Constitution, to hold any prayers that take place on public school property.  In this case, the public school did not only hold the prayer on school grounds, but teachers requiring their students to attend is a clear attempt to establish a religion through public means.  Students were asked to participate in prayer and told if they did not accept Jesus, they would “face eternal damnation”.  This is a very transparent effort by the teachers to establish and promote religion.  Students were also coerced into attending, which has been determined to be a violation of students’ constitutional rights.  There is also a clear violation of the separation of church and state.  Holding a religious event on school property creates too much entanglement between church and state and is a clear constitutional violation.  Based on all of these facts, as well as rulings in previous Supreme Court cases involving similar situations, I believe that the court should rule this a violation of the Establishment Clause and disallow the school to hold any future religious events such as the assembly that took place.  


Sources:

https://www.npr.org/2022/02/18/1081678752/west-virginia-school-christian-assembly-lawsuit

https://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/40508-breaking-ffrf-with-students-parents-sues-huntington-w-va-schools-over-christian-revival

https://www.wfxrtv.com/news/regional-news/west-virginia-news/lawsuit-filed-against-cabell-county-schools/



Monday, February 21, 2022

From Helpful to Hurtful: COVID-19 Restrictions and Free Exercise (Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser)

During the beginning months of the COVID-19 pandemic, groups and organizations of all different purposes halted in-person gatherings across the globe to avoid worsening the public health crisis. The mayor of the District of Columbia, Muriel Bowser, announced an order to limit all in-person non-essential business and large gatherings on March 24, 2020, to go into effect the following day. The Capitol Hill Baptist Church, located in Washington, D.C., voluntarily canceled in-person services prior to this order, on March 15, 2020. They wanted to take precautions to protect their congregation and surrounding communities as soon as possible, prior to the rapid spread of COVID-19 in the United States. 

    The Capitol Hill Baptist Church was established 142 years ago and, until the COVID-19 pandemic, religious services were only stopped once for three weeks during the Spanish Flu pandemic in 1918. In June of 2020, three months after stopping services, the Capitol Hill Baptist Church filed for a waiver of the mayor’s order to resume their services outdoors, with policies to wear masks and socially distance, yet they never received a response. 

    After 42 states lifted restrictions on large gatherings, including religious services, the Capitol Hill Baptist Church filed for another waiver in September of 2020, and despite D.C.’s position as an outlier with their remaining restrictions, the request was denied. At this time, D.C. was in Phase Two of lifting their restrictions, opening businesses, and resuming activities; however, the limit for outdoor religious worship was 100 people. During this time, Mayor Bowser not only allowed, but encouraged participation in peaceful protests against racial discrimination and social injustices that accommodated thousands. Both peaceful protests and outdoor religious services fall into the category of “forms of outdoor First Amendment activities”. 

Capitol Hill Baptist Church outdoor worship in compliance with COVID-19 protocols (Washington, D.C. 2020).

    The Capitol Hill Baptist Church filed a lawsuit against Mayor Bowser and the city on September 22, 2020, asking for their constitutional right to free exercise of their religion to be respected in the same way as the protestors’ right to free speech. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest advocating for the Capitol Hill Baptist Church and urging the federal district court to allow these gatherings because they place a substantial burden on religious exercise. Additionally, this case is a proper case to make this decision because they were not asking for preferential treatment, just treatment that is equal to those of non-religious groups and gatherings.

Furthermore, the difference between the restrictions on these activities poses the question: Is Mayor Bowser’s order limiting in-person, outdoor religious worship a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)? This issue is important because the topic of religious exercise during the pandemic has affected religious organizations across the globe, and the extended timing of restrictions needed a decision to look to for either approval or denial.

In October of 2020, a decision was made in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser. Judge McFadden of the U.S. District Court of D.C. ruled that the Capitol Hill Baptist Church can hold outdoor services, despite the mayor’s order because of the substantial burden placed on religious exercise, the allowance of other outdoor First Amendment activities, and the failure to prove a compelling government interest. The Judge protected the free exercise of religion and clarified that the order was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA. This decision was not appealed, and ultimately ended in a settlement to pay the Church’s legal fees and not impose additional restrictions that limit religious exercise.

I agree with the federal district Judge’s decision because of the disparate impact resulting from the order. The order put a substantial burden on religious exercise in D.C., clearly violated the First Amendment rights of religious organizations, and was not neutral between religion and non-religion. Additionally, the Church attempted to solve this amicably prior to filing a lawsuit and did not take legal action until their second request for a waiver was denied. Furthermore, the RFRA requires proof of compelling government interest and that this option is the least restrictive means to achieve the goal. Although the defense attempted to prove that the compelling government interest is the public health crisis, this is undermined by Mayor Bowser’s approval of large gatherings for protests during the same time that she denied the Church’s request. Additionally, the Church stated that they would continue to follow safety protocols and CDC guidelines while remaining outdoors.

Furthermore, the Capitol Hill Baptist Church’s history of compliance and clear effort to follow safety precautions shows that they were not trying to undermine the government or hold religious services illegally. The fact that a city mayor was able to stop the religious exercise of 850 individuals for months while no longer meeting the burden of proof is evidence that a statement needed to be made that those restrictive actions will not be tolerated. If an unconstitutional order of Mayor Bowser in D.C. is approved on such a public stage, what other unconstitutional orders would city and state officials put into effect? A win for Mayor Bowser now would be a loss for the American people in the future.

Sources:

Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser (Becket Law)

DOJ Statement of Interest

Update: Capitol Hill Baptist Wins in District Court (ERLC)

Sunday, February 20, 2022

Abraham House of God v. Horn Lake


In November of 2021 a Muslim organization, Abraham House of God, filed plans with the city of Horn Lake, Mississippi for the construction of a new mosque. The proposed mosque would have been the first of its kind in the entire county. The plans submitted are said to have met or exceeded all necessary rules and regulations that the city’s planning commission had laid out regarding construction and site planning. Additionally, the proposed site was going to be built on land that was specifically designated and zoned for houses of worship. However, when the zoning proceedings took place, Horn Lake’s planning commission voted 5-1 to reject the mosque’s site plan and prevent any construction of a mosque. After this decision was made, a city alderman defended the council’s decision and stated that their religion “says they can lie or do anything to the Jews or gentiles because we’re not Muslims.” Another alderman simply revealed that he denied the site plan because they are Muslims.

The lawsuit, brought on behalf of the mosque and its co-founder, brings up the overall question of this case: Did the city violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by rejecting the mosque site for members of the Abraham House of God.

A U.S. district judge recently made an initial ruling regarding this case in January and ordered the City of Horn Lake to grant approval for the site plan and mosque located in the city. The decision also stated the board of alderman must also “consider, process, and act upon -- without any unusual delays and free from and illegal discriminatory intent or affect -- all other applications associated with the construction and operation of the mosque.”


Since this decision, there has yet to be an appeal of further legal action. However, I believe that if the supreme court were to look at this case there would be many additional laws and precedences available to take into consideration when making the right decision. In 2000, congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The goal of this was to protect houses of worship and religious institutions from being discriminated against in zoning and landmarking laws. In addition to this, the 14th Amendment states that all individuals, no matter what, must be protected by laws in the same manner. Islamic Society of Basking Ridge v. Bernards is a similar local case in which the Township of Bernards denied the Basking Ridge Muslim congregation the right to build a new mosque. As a result, they went to court and the district court ruled in favor of the mosque's right to build citing both free exercise and the right for all religious groups to be treated equally as their main reasoning.


After analyzing this case, it is clear to me that yes, the city’s actions definitely violated the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution along with many other laws. The Constitution clearly states that citizens have the right to practice their religion as they please. Building a mosque as a place of worship allows for the Muslim community with Horn Lake and its surrounding area to do so in a sincere way. The development of a mosque, on land that had already been designated for religious use, in no way imposes any form of a substantial burden on the city or the individuals living in it as designated by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Not to mention the fact that under the 14th Amendment, all citizens of Horn Lake must be treated and protected in the same manner. I find it hard to believe that if the plans submitted were for a religion that was more common in the area, the ruling of the city aldermen would have been the same. Like the similar cases expressed above, religious minorities are discriminated against too often and laws like the free exercise clause are built to protect them. Thus, we should ensure that it fulfills its purpose.


If the situation was different, and Abraham House of God was asking for government assistance or funds for the building of the mosque, I could see how the action of providing direct aid might not be permissible. An action like this would have the possibility of leading to a slippery slope and other religious groups looking for similar aid. The founders and members of Abraham House of God, on the other hand, are doing no such thing. Instead, they are merely practicing their constitutional rights as both members of a religious community as well as individuals in society. I believe this is a case of true discrimination which has no business being tolerated in any capacity. 


https://www.wjtv.com/news/state/aclu-files-lawsuit-against-city-of-horn-lake-over-proposed-mosque/
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2022/01/04/city-horn-lake-must-approve-mosque-site

Religious Questions on the Tennis Court: Chung v. WIAA

 Joelle and Joseph Chung are siblings both competing on their high school tennis team. They are members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Chehalis, WA and in following their faith, the Chung siblings observe the Sabbath, a day of rest and prayer every week starting at sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. 

The Washington Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA) is the organization under Washington law which regulates high-school sports and organizes the state postseason tennis tournaments. To make it to the state championship match, players must compete in two qualifying tournaments and must certify that they are able to participate in these varying levels of competition with exemptions for illness, injuries, and 'unforeseen events.' 

In 2018, as a junior Joelle won the first match on the path to the state championship, but had to forfeit her spot since the following round of competition fell on the day of the Sabbath. The following year during her senior season in 2019, with the prospect of advancing to the championship scheduled on Friday and Saturday, the Chung family contacted the WIAA months prior to the tournaments asking for a religious exemption. The Chungs specifically asked for the WIAA to move the day of the championship or for Joelle to use an alternate for the conflicting Sabbath-day championship while playing in the qualifying rounds- therefore asking to preemptively withdrawal. The WIAA denied these requests stating that withdrawal due to anticipated conflict with the Sabbath violated their rules and disregarded the fairness to other tennis players. They stated that it allowing a withdrawing on the Sabbath is (1) unfair to the athletes who would could have taken the qualifying position from the withdrawing athlete, and (2) advantage the athlete scheduled to play the withdrawing athlete. Due to the WIAA's denial of Joelle's request for an allowed withdrawal, she could not compete in the qualifying and championship tournaments. In hopes of pushing the WIAA to change its rules prior to Joseph's high school tennis career, the Chung family sued the WIAA citing the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause in early August 2019. 

In response in late August, the Association added a 'religious observance' exemption which allows "a player to withdraw from competition without being penalized." But the rule change does not move the day of the tournament or allow adjustments to the schedule due to religious observances. The Chungs filed for summary judgement of the case, but it was denied and the WIAA's rule stands.

The question of the case is: does the WIAA's failure to accommodate the religious observance of the Sabbath day when organizing its state high school championship tournaments violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The Chungs argue this is an issue of the Free Exercise Clause since the WIAA is infringing on their right for the Chung siblings to participate in their religious observance of the Sabbath while disallowing them to play in the tennis championship tournaments. The WIAA's connection to the state is direct since the Washington law grants authority to the Association in matters of high school sport administrations. 

I personally believe that the Court was correct in denying summary judgment and siding with the WIAA, since there is not a clear breach of impeding on the Free Exercise Clause. In fact the WIAA is acting with regards to religious neutrality as its scheduling most likely relies on practical policy decisions. Some of the reasons a tournament might be scheduled on a Friday or Saturday could be to minimize student-athletes and coaches time out of class, to make transportation more accessible, or to maximize attendance to the matches. By accommodating the religious exemption and moving the tennis tournaments, it would end its neutrality of religion and also create a more complex burden for the WIAA and is therefore against the Association and Washington's state interests. 

In potential counter of my point by saying that the tournament is not on a Sunday, which is another religious holy day. But the WIAA could argue that Sundays are secular days to hold make-up competitions or serve as a traveling day to return from competition. This notion of Sundays being make-up and travel-back days is largely practiced all over the US. 

Most importantly, Joelle is not entitled to compete in the postseason tournaments, since she is playing tennis as her choice and there is no specific fundamental right determining engagement and participation in interscholastic high school sports. The Free Exercise Clause does not apply in this situation because she is not entitled through a right or a benefit to play in her high school tennis postseason and it does not directly deny her from not participating in her religious practices. This is further pushed since there was an added 'religious observance' policy, where the WIAA successfully created a fair rule that allowed religious exemption for Joelle and fellow student-athletes without burdening the organization and scheduling of the tournament.

The story of the Chung siblings is a small case in the larger picture of religious exemptions, in this case I argue that there is a line where the state (the WIAA in this scenario) can meet the person in the middle by providing a reasonable accommodation to allow them to freely practice their religious beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause, but the state should not go to far to prioritize and burden other people for the actions of the religious. Of course this sentiment does not and will not apply to all cases of religious exemptions, but I believe this case highlights there is a reasonable balance that the state can take on accusations of impending on the Free Exercise Clause. 

Sources:

Does the Prohibition to Aggressively Discipline Your Children Violate Religious Freedom?

Indiana DCS
    Recently, Cherry and Scott Blattert from Springville Indiana filed a lawsuit against the Indian Department of Child Services after the couple was arrested and the DCS removed their children from their care and in 2019.  The couple had 10 children.  The Indiana State Police department states that they had reason to believe that the parents were harming their children as a form of discipline.  There is video evidence of the father, Scott Blattert, hitting him with a belt, elbowing them in the head, and punching him in the face.  Furthermore, after a round of interviews was done with the children, one stated that their parents often used industrial-grade glue sticks to hit them as a punishment.  These were long, heavy, and skinny and inflicted a lot of pain onto the children.  

    The parents believed that they were just in their punishments as they aligned with what the Holy Bible told them, as seen in The Book of Proverbs in the Old Testament.  They stated many verses in which the Bible did so.  They referenced Proverbs 13:24 - "Whoever spares the rod hates their children, but the one who loves their children is careful to discipline them", Proverbs 23:13 - "Do not withhold discipline from a child; if you punish them with the rod, they will not die", Proverbs 29:15 - "A rod and a reprimand impart wisdom, but a child left undisciplined disgraces a mother", and more.  

These are all direct quotes from the Bible that the couple believes endorses their ability to discipline their children using force, as the Bible not only justifies it, but encourages it.  These quotes, as the couple says, is their duty to follow and discipline their children as such.  It is important to know that Scott Blattert has a criminal history related to previous charges of discipling his children including aggravated battery, multiple felony charges, and multiple accounts of domestic battery resulting in the injury of someone under the age of 14.

    In response to the taking of their children and their arrest, the two decided to sue on the grounds that their religious freedom had been violated.  They refer to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in stating that their kids being taken from them was unconstitutional.  The act, signed in 2015 by the Former Governor of Indian, Mike Pence, "prohibits a governmental entity from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless the governmental entity can demonstrate that the burden is a furtherance of a compelling governmental state interest".  This lawsuit from the Blattert couple seeks declarative and injunctive relief from the Indiana Department of Child Services.  This means that the couple would like to regain sole custody of their children with no restrictions.
Scott and Cherry Blattert
    
The key issues in this case deal with religious freedom and whether or not the state has "compelling interest" and whether or not this was a true "burden" to the couple.  It also deals with whether or not the couple's First Amendment Right to Freedom of Religion was Violated.  I believe that this a difficult case because it also deals with the slippery slope and the care of children.  If we allow this type of discipline, what else will we allow because the Bible says it's okay?  In all cases we must first make sure that children are never being harmed.  With this mindset, my first thought is how can we allow an adults religion be an excuse to harm children?  That child could have completely different religious ideals  from their parents and harm to them should not be collateral for their parents beliefs.  For this reason, I believe that the state has more than enough compelling interest to put the Blattert children into the care of IDCS as these kids should not be harmed due to their parents beliefs.

    Additionally, I believe that asking the parents to discipline their children without aggressive force is not a burden in any respect.  Although those quotes are in fact from the Bible, they are all from a book in the Old Testament entitled "Proverbs".  This title inherently suggests that these sayings are strictly proverbial and most likely metaphorical; not meant to be taken literally.  The state is not taking away the right for parents to discipline their children, they are prohibiting adults from harming children.  This is not a burden to any parent, as they can still instill rules and discipline their children.

    For the reason of this not being a true "burden" and the state having a strong compelling interest of protecting children, I believe that the children should not return to the custody of Scott and Cherry Blattert as this was not a violation of their First Amendment Right to Religious Freedom, nor did it violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Di Liscia v Austin: The US Navy and Beard Restrictions

In many religions, having facial hair is an important symbol of faith. The Muslim and Orthodox Jewish religions both have spiritual requirements to have a beard. In the case of Di Liscia v Austin, this tradition comes into conflict with a naval order to be clean-shaven. Edmund Di Liscia is a Hassidic Jew and a member of the Navy. When he first joined the Navy, he received a “no-shave” allowment, but on April 14, 2021, he was told that he had to shave and would face punishment if he did not. He requested a temporary restraining order that would prevent the Defense Department from forcing him to shave, giving him time to file this case. A group of Muslim sailors joined Di Liscia as plaintiffs - Dominque Braggs, Mohammed Shoyeb, and Leo Katsareas. Many sailors have received exemptions for medical reasons but there are no accommodations yet for religious beards. According to the Naval rules, having a beard “reduces safe and effective wear and operation of protective equipment.” It may pose a safety risk to the job of the sailors. However, Di Liscia view his beard as an “expression of obedience and fidelity to God.” He considers it a crucial part of his community and spirituality. 

The overarching question here is whether the government, particularly the military, is prohibiting the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion by requiring them to shave their facial hair. There is a conflict of interest here between the safety of the sailors and their religious convictions, as well as the fact that other exemptions to this rule have been offered. If Di Liscia cannot receive an exemption, he will be subject to penalties, damaging his career. In this case, he is forced to choose between his job and his religion, which is not a choice one should have to make, especially when one is employed by the government. Religious freedom is a right guaranteed to all citizens, and the ability to put into practice strong religious convictions should not be inhibited by the government unless there is a compelling enough interest that such restrictions would be more beneficial than detrimental. 

I believe that Di Liscia and the other plaintiffs should be given religious exemptions to keep their beards. The traditions in the Orthodox Jewish community and Muslim community in regards to facial hair are well-grounded and sincere. Di Liscia feels as if he has a moral, spiritual, and social obligation to maintain his facial hair. Although there can be a slippery slope here, as sincerity is difficult to judge, in this case, it does help prove that an exemption should be permitted. Also, the state is clearly favoring non-religion over religion as they have allowed exemptions for medical reasons among other cases. While there is a distinction here because these medical reasons are more easy to prove, not providing a religious exemption singles out religion and is a form of discrimination. Furthermore, the state must prove a compelling interest in cases of religious freedom. They have to show that the safety risk behind not being fully clean-shaven is significant enough. One of the plaintiffs, Mohammed Shoyeb, argued that he rarely had situations in which he would have to wear the kind of masks with which the Navy is worried facial hair will interfere. When he did, the beard was inconsequential to the working of the mask. Although this is just one plaintiff’s example, it is evidence against a compelling state interest that being clean shaven will benefit the safety of the plaintiffs. 
It is challenging for the court to rule that these plaintiffs should be exempt because they feel as if their beliefs are sincere. Others may start to argue that they should receive exemptions for their religious convictions that seem more phony, but the court cannot discriminate among religions even if the other cases seem ridiculous. Also, safety is incredibly important, especially in a military context, as this can be a life-or-death situation. However, I believe in this case, there are no significant safety discrepancies between the clean-shaven and bearded sailors in the Navy. Contrary to my beliefs, previous Supreme Court decisions may set a precedent for how a court may rule in this one. In the case
Goldman v Weinberger, an Orthodox Jewish soldier was prohibited from wearing his yarmulke, an important Jewish symbol, while on duty and in uniform for the Air Force. The Court ruled that this regulation did not violate the Constitution, as military operations are unlike general civilian rulings and are subject to harsher review. Regardless, on the grounds that Di Liscia v Austin is arguing, I think the court should rule in opposition to what they have previously ruled. The religious convictions held by the plaintiffs that they need to maintain their beards outweighs arguments against them. The plaintiffs are clearly being denied free exercise of religion by being restricted from practicing a crucial tradition in their respective faiths. This is a governmental violation of the first amendment, as well as religious discrimination.