Supreme Court sides with personal worshippers

A new Supreme Court case in a 5-4 decision just recently lifted California’s restrictions on the number of people that could religiously gather in people's homes. Bans on this personal worship, often in the form of prayer meetings and bible study, were deemed unconstitutional, even in this time of crisis with the Coronavirus as prevalent as ever. This decision by the majority stated that California had continuously violated the Constitution by looking down upon prayer meetings, even while they were, “permitting hair salons, retail stores, personal care services, movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and concerts and indoor restaurants.” This unfair treatment by the state was solely to religious gatherings, which often posed even less of a COVID risk than the secular activities that the state was tolerating. However, the dissent states that the majority was comparing the religious worship at home unfairly to public secular activities, and not private secular activities. Things such as house parties are treated with the same disapproval as religious gatherings, and therefore the minority stated that comparing personal religious worship to public secular events is not a comparison that can be made to claim an unconstitutional behaviour. In a separate court case, people were denied the ability to practice personal religious worship with members from more than three households, as the same rule was in place for other non-religious events, and it was seen to be a neutral ruling. Another thing called into question was why large public gatherings were allowed and small private ones were not. The court argued that this was due to the fact that small personal interactions are more likely to be longer than public ones, and that most public areas are larger and more ventilated than homes. However, this calls into question whether a large mall should be treated the same as a small barbershop. This case calls into question many tough predicaments. One of them being of the state can control size regulations simply based on the size and ventilation of the venue at which the event is being held, and if there are likely to be prolonged interactions. In addition to this, it raises the question of whether events such as personal worship at home can be suppressed while larger events are happening in regards to secular activities. The court ultimately ruled that this restriction on personal worship in houses can not be suppressed, under the protection of the first amendment. This sets a precedent for the court standing up for religious worship when secular events are being allowed with much more people than they are. This is a very tough case for me to pick a side on, and in the end I must side with the dissent. While I do not feel that it is right to suppress small personal study sessions when much, much larger secular events are occuring, in the end the religious events at home are being treated the same as the secular events at home such as parties. The dissent claimed that comparing personal to  public events is like comparing apples to oranges, and I agree. However, I do believe that the majority would have a stance if they were defending public worship and gathering in places such as parks, as the state has been allowing mass protests and gatherings for non-secular reasons. In the end, in my opinion it comes down to whether one interprets the first amendment as it protecting the freedom of religion when religious gatherings are being suppressed and public gatherings of the exact same nature are being allowed, or if it protects religious gatherings despite the place, size, or method of interaction by the public side.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/10/us/supreme-court-coronavirus-prayer-meetings.html?searchResultPosition=3

BLinC v. University of Iowa

     In October of 2017, Business Leaders in Christ (BLinC) was kicked off of the University of Iowa campus.  BLinC is a Christian student organization that hosts weekly meetings on campus where they share Bible verses, have group discussions, and pray amongst other group activities.  Their mission is to foster future business leaders and encourage them to incorporate their faith into their future business endeavors.  In order to accomplish this they frequently invite Christian business leaders to mentor students while also engaging in community service where they mentor at risk and low income children in their community.  In order to ensure their values are shared by its members, BLinC asks that leaders share its Christian faith and beliefs.  This policy is what caused the University of Iowa to 'kick BLinC off campus' by removing them as a registered student organization.  Status as a registered student organization entitles a student group to many benefits including: "Official status as a University organization, establishment of a financial account and purchasing privileges, the ability to receive school funding, inclusion in University publications, use of University organizational software, use of the University’s trademarks, use of campus facilities for meetings, use of University fleet services vehicles, use of University . . . staff and programming resources, [ability] once a semester, to use Information Technology Services Mass Mail, the ability to apply for honors and awards granted to registered organizations; and use of office and storage space."  The University of Iowa argued that requiring a Statement of Faith in order to hold a leadership position violated the University's nondiscrimination policies.  Clearly the benefits the University provides to registered student organization are very valuable and in many ways function to legitimize the student organization.  BLinC sought an injunction against the University to maintain their status as an RSO on the ground that this policy has not been applied neutrally and that Iowa was discriminating against BLinC.  Other groups on campus are able to 'discriminate' in a similar way as the University's fraternities are able to only select men and Iowa's Feminist Union can require its members to agree on issues like abortion and contraception.  In 2019, the Federal District Court of Southern Iowa ruled that the way the University of Iowa applied its 'Human Rights' policy was not constitutional due to the way it unfairly and unevenly applied to religious organizations on campus and not to secular organizations.

    The issue here is whether or not BLinC's right to the free exercise of religion was violated by the University of Iowa.  They clearly believe that participation in this group is a part of their sincere Christian mission but the University of Iowa believed that their interest in enforcing a nondiscrimination policy was more compelling.

    It is complicated to establish precedent for the district court's decision.  The case of BLinC v. University of Iowa is nearly identical to the case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)  In that case the court ruled 5-4 that Hastings College of Law was able to apply similar standards to the Christian Legal Society to maintain registered student organization status on its campus.  The CLS could not have similar faith tests for membership in its organization.  The majority opinion explained that applying an all comers policy, "a viewpoint neutral standard", to CLS was appropriate and constitutional.  However, at Hastings College, like at the University of Iowa, other clubs were allowed to discriminate based on beliefs such as the campus Republican and Democrats, as well as student pro-life and pro-abortion groups.  It was only religious groups at Hastings who were being targeted with the 'neutral' all comers policy.  Given this, Justice Alito's minority opinion argued that Hastings College acted unconstitutionally.  Alito argued that such nondiscrimination policies for clubs do not achieve their stated goals of fostering broad and safe debate.  Moreover, even if they did, and if the state had a compelling interest to foster such an environment, "no legitimate state interest could override the powerful effect that an accept-all-comers law would have on the ability of religious group to express their views" (Munoz 565).  This last quotation from Justice Alito is the crux of BLinC's argument, that that activity at their club is religious expression and the government (public university) cannot abridge their free exercise of religion, especially if the standard used to limit their activity is applied unevenly.  The government must be neutral towards religion and secular society.  Despite the powerful dissent, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez still establishes a precedent that public universities can apply nondiscrimination policies to groups that would like to gain or maintain RSO status.

    More recent cases may be friendlier to the Business Leaders in Christ club.  The case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2016) established that "denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion."  Moreover, when rejecting free exercise challenges to neutral laws of general applicability "the Court has been careful to distinguish such laws from those that single out the religious for disfavored treatment."  I believe the Trinity Lutheran case provides hope for BLinC because they are a religious group being denied a generally available student benefit solely on account of their religious identities.  The nondiscrimination policies of the University of Iowa have not been applied similarly to other student groups that require membership to have similar beliefs, and they were singled out for their Christian views.

    I agree with the district court's ruling that the University of Iowa unconstitutionally targeted the Business Leaders in Christ club.  The key issue is that while other organizations had access to the RSO status, BLinC did not because they required their organization's leadership to profess their faith in Christ, which was the essential element of the club.  This nondiscrimination policy is not applied neutrally and is not narrowly constructed to meet the school's interests.  Nor, does the school have a compelling interest in overriding the free exercise rights of BLinC.  As Alito argues in Martinez, students ought to be "free to form and obtain registration of essentially the same broad range of private groups that nonstudents may form off campus" (Munoz 564).  As a public institution, the University of Iowa must be held to the same standard that other government organizations are in upholding the First Amendment.  Given that, I believe Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer is an appropriate precedent for upholding the district courts ruling. BLinC is entitled to a generally available public benefit (RSO status) in this case.  To deny them such violates their right to free exercise of religion.  Moreover, such actions by public institutions make it significantly more difficult for religious persons to exercise their faith.  Hopefully the Supreme Court will continue in a direction that expands religious freedom on and off campus.

Young Israel of Tampa v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority

Young Israel of Tampa is an Orthodox Jewish synagogue that serves the growing Jewish population of Tampa, Florida. In October of 2020 they submitted a request to put an advertisement on a nearby bus route that is operated by the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART). This advertisement was going to advertise for their annual celebration of Chanukah. They have celebrated it with “Chanukah on Ice'' for the last fourteen years, and it is a family-friendly event with ice-skating, food, music, a raffle, and the lighting of an ice-sculpture menorah. HART denied the request to advertise for it due to its religious nature. The advertisement that Rabbi Rivkin of Young Israel of Tampa wanted to use featured a menorah and invited the community members to enjoy “ice skating to Jewish music around the flaming menorah”. HART has a policy that bans any ads promoting alcohol, tobacco, illegal drugs, obscenity, nudity, pornography, politics, and religion. They also want to avoid any advertisements that their riders may view as offensive. The main issue HART had with this advertisement was the clear referral to the menorah. After the denial, Young Israel appealed to HART, and HART’s CEO said it would let them run the advertisement with certain accommodations. HART asked Young Israel to remove the menorah, the central feature of the Jewish celebration, from the ad. Young Israel refused to remove the menorah from the ad because they found those changes to be deeply offensive to their religion, so HART denied the ad from being run. With this denial, on February 5, 2021, Young Israel of Tampa filed a lawsuit against HART in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The main issue being argued in this case is freedom of religious speech and free exercise of religion in a public square. They believe that HART’s refusal to run their advertisement is against their constitutional rights. Young Israel is being discriminated against based on its religious content and viewpoint. There is also no clear standard by which HART evaluates advertisements that they deem “appropriate”, and specifically they have no clear criteria for what makes an ad religious, and therefore prohibited. Without set standards, they argue that there is a clear violation of the First Amendment. HART also discriminates based on religion as shown by their rules on what can and cannot be advertised, in which they establish that religious advertisements are prohibited. This is facially plain discrimination that directly violates the Free Exercise Clause, and HART cannot just avoid First Amendment scrutiny by claiming that its advertising space is not a public forum. They have been very inconsistent with this discrimination, which was shown from 2012 to 2013 when they permitted St. Leo University, a Catholic University, to advertise. They have also allowed Alcoholics Anonymous to run advertisements, even though alcohol is a prohibited ad according to their standards. While Young Israel did not end up being able to host Chanukah on Ice in 2020 due to COVID-19, they intend to hold it in 2021 and the future, so they want to be able to advertise for it.

One key case to look at when deciding this case is Good News Club v. Milford Central School. In this case the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children, sought approval to hold their Club’s meetings weekly after school at Milford Central School. The school denied this request because they reasoned that the content of the Club’s meeting was the equivalent of religious worship, which was prohibited by their community use policy. The Club sued, arguing that their free speech rights were being directly violated. The Court ruled that “When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school’s limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment”. The reasoning the Court used in this case can also be applied to the Young Israel case. HART, like Milford Central School, is denying access to something on the grounds that the content is religious in nature. Just like in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, this blatant discrimination against religion is unconstitutional. HART cannot deny advertisements due to viewpoint discrimination. 

In my opinion, I would have to side with Young Israel of Tampa and say that they should be permitted to advertise for their Chanukah on Ice event. The policies that HART has implemented are clearly discriminatory against religion. As seen by Good News Club v. Milford Central School, clear discrimination based upon religious content is unconstitutional. Also, there are no clear standards set that HART seems to be following. Certain religious advertisements are permitted, like St. Leo University’s, while others aren’t, like Young Israel’s. This clear inconsistency in their decision making makes it seem as though they are discriminating against certain religious groups and not others. The policies they have implemented are not facially neutral and place a burden on the Free Exercise rights of Young Israel. I see no compelling state interest in denying Young Israel advertising space, so the constitutional rights are being violated. If we allow this to occur, it will create a slippery slope that allows for religious discrimination in the future without a compelling state interest. We need to protect the constitutional rights of Young Israel and others by ruling in their favor in this case.

Vermont State School Board Orders Payment Of Tuition To Religiously Affiliated Schools

 On April 21st, 2021 in a re Appeal of Valente the Vermont State Board of Education ordered local school boards in districts without public high schools to pay students' tuition so they can attend religiously affiliated high schools in place of public schools. This appeal is a joint appeal by three families who originally filed separate appeals with the State Board of Education after asking their respective school districts to pay tuition for the 2020/21 school year. In each case, the tuition request was denied by the school districts which resulted in the families paying the tuitions with their own money. The appeals all focused on the same legal issue of if it is constitutional at both the state and federal level for public tuition payments to go towards religious schools when there are no public schools.

  

Vermont law requires school districts that do not have public high schools to pay tuition for students to attend another “independent” private school. However, in 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court in Chittenden Town School Dist. v. Dept. of Educ. placed limitations on the ability of districts to pay tuition to religious schools due to this program being inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. In this case the Chittenden School Board voted to allow tuition reimbursement to MSJ, a religious school, and as a result the Commissioner of Education terminated state aid to education to the district. This is because the Compelled Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution (Ch.1, art.3) does not focus on the establishment of religion and only restricts the state’s support of religious worship, which was a daily activity at MSJ. The court decided that a school board would be violating this section of the Vermont Constitution when it reimburses tuition for a sectarian school in the absence of adequate safeguards against the use of such funds for religious worship, which did not exist. As a result, the court issued its opinion that “tuition payments from a school district to pervasively sectarian high schools, or the parents of the children who attend, would have the effect of a direct subsidy to religious schools in violation of the United States and Vermont Constitutions”. In contrast the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 1st Amendment bars the exclusion of religiously affiliated schools from general aid programs. In order to deal with this discrepancy, the Board of Education announced that “School districts ... could ask all ... schools to certify that public tuition payments will not be used to fund religious instruction or religious worship”. The hope was this would place all independent schools on an equal footing, regardless of religious affiliation, as all independent schools would be required to provide the same reassurance. Furthermore, schools would be allowed to decide whether to accept these tuition payments, so there was only an indirect burden on the schools similarly to the case of Bob Jones University v. United States.

 

The primary family involved with the new appeal case, the Valentes, are residents of Mount Holly Vermont. Their school district the Ludlow Mount Holly Unified Union School District does not have a designated public high school. Due to the lack of a public school their child, D. V., attends Mount St. Joseph Academy (MSJ) which is a religious school. MSJ was the only approved independent sectarian secondary school and was also the school being examined in the Chittenden case. In that case it was determined at MSJ “secular and sectarian aspects of its educational program are intertwined”. Additionally, students are required to start the day with a prayer and attend many other religious activities. As a result, the Valentes were told the district could not send the school tuition money because it violates Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution. After multiple appeals the Valentes request was accepted assuming they followed the safeguards outlined after the Chittenden case. However, because the Board of Education cannot provide any binding direction to school districts the guidance that the Board offered is only guidance and does not settle the constitutional question in this case. The courts will still have to resolve “whether the restriction that Chittenden requires can co-exist with First Amendment requirements”.

 

Overall, this case is important for the interpretation of the Establishment Clause because this is a unique situation where the Establishment Clause needs to be violated in order for students to receive an education while preserving the rights of parents to choose where they send their children, due to the lack of public schools. Additionally, this case could open the door for religious schools to gain access to other public funds they have been restricted from due to the Establishment Clause assuming that the courts are able to resolve whether restrictions such as those laid out in the Chittenden case can coincide with First Amendment requirements. I believe that religious schools should be able to receive aid from this public fund assuming there are safeguards in place to ensure the money was not being used for religious instruction. This is because the schools that would receive the money would have to be approved and accredited making this program neutral to religious and non-religious schools. Furthermore, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 1st Amendment bars the exclusion of religiously affiliated schools from general aid programs, I think it will be hard to justify excluding a school solely because it is religiously affiliated in this situation. However, while I believe that the guidance provided by the Board of Education in the Chittenden case is a good start in terms of resolving the issue of making this program compliant with both the Vermont and U.S. constitutions this guidance needs to be formally codified to ensure there are adequate safeguards for these public tuition payments to religious schools. Assuming an independent religious school is in compliance with the regulations and restrictions enacted by a state, in order to be in compliance with the Establishment Clause, that school should be able to have access to a public tuition fund just like any non-religious independent school in order to preserve the neutrality between religion and non-religion, when there are no public schools.

Young Israel of Tampa v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART)

    Each Year, Young Israel of Tampa holds multiple different religious events to promote and celebrate the Jewish Culture that engages the growing community. These events primarily revolve around Passover and Chanukah that usually take place in the Spring and the month of December respectfully. For the 2020 celebration of Chanukah, Rabbi Rivkin of Young Israel of Tampa wanted to grow interest and popularity for their holiday event of "Chanukah on Ice" through the advertising venue of the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART). HART received the request for the advertisement (included image) from Rabbi Rivkin which they then proceeded to send back with substantial alterations that effectively removed the Jewish and religious nature from the ad. This denial of advertising was due to HART's prohibition against “advertisements that primarily promote a religious faith or religious organization". HART executives refused to run this ad due to this policy that prohibited religious orientated messages placing it in the same category as alcohol, drugs, violence, and pornography. Young Israel of Tampa believed that this policy breached their constitutional rights of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In addition, Young Israel was surprised by the policy due to HART's inconsistent method of regulating its advertisements when it comes to promoting religious messages. HART permitted St. Leo University, a Catholic University, to use their venues to advertise their school. They also approved the Center for American Islamic Relations to use their advertising to promote their #MyJihad campaign. Finally, they ran advertisements for Alcoholics Anonymous that promoted their twelve step program that placed God's forgiveness at the center of their mission. Young Israel thought this advertising strategy would be effective due to the growing Jewish community in Tampa as well as one of HART's bus lines having a major stop at the arena they were going to hold the event. COVID-19 forced Young Israel to cancel their "Chanukah on Ice" for 2020 but they are pursuing the ability to promote their event for 2021. Young Israel filed a lawsuit against HART on February 5th, 2021 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Young Israel Ad

    This case addresses the Free Speech and Free Exercise of Religion Clause in the First Amendment due to the policy of censoring religious messages in a limited public forum. This policy is geared at the protected rights of individuals to express and exercise their religious beliefs and messages. HART's policy is discriminatory and restrictive to religious messaging on government property and the public forum. This case deals with the acceptance of religion in the public forum as a whole and the decision could be critical in the ability for religiously motivated individuals or organizations to share their views and beliefs with the public world. A case that holds precedence in this situation is Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995) where a student asked for funding from the student activity fee to subsidize the publishing costs of a Christian magazine. The court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the University's denial of funding was unconstitutional due to viewpoint discrimination. Reasoning behind this decision was the substantial financial burden that the student was incurring from their religious beliefs similar to the burden that Young Israel is experiencing with this denial advertising space.

    I believe that the HART prohibition policy of religious messages is unconstitutional and Young Israel of Tampa should be permitted to advertise their annual "Chanukah on Ice" event along with the other events they want to promote throughout the year. This policy lacks facial neutrality and is directly discriminatory against religious beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment. Allowing advertisements of religious organizations is not coercive and declining their presence to avoid offense of any riders is not sufficient enough to remove them. This does not provide an endorsement or advancement of views. This places an undue burden on Young Israel with no compelling state interest to deny their group the opportunity to advertise their religious event. These advertisements present no inherent problem or danger to society, rather it promotes unity among a group in Tampa allowing for religious participation. In addition, HART has permitted the advertising of religious organizations along with multiple Christmas campaigns such as "Stuff-a-bus" prior to Young Israel's request exposing the inconsistency in their determination of what is fit and what is not when it comes to their facilities' advertising capabilities. Prohibiting the free exercise of religion solely based on beliefs is never permissible due to the protection that the First Amendment affords individuals. This targeting of religious viewpoints is dangerous towards the presence of religion in the public sphere moving forward. This censorship can bar all individual religious beliefs and must be upheld by the First Amendment rights stated in the Constitution.

Highgrove Estate v. Henderson

North Carolina law states that “North Carolina outlaws discrimination based on religion, color, national orign, age, sex or handicap, sexual orientation and gender identity in public employment, but discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity are not prohibited statewide in private employment.” For years now a North Carolina wedding venue, Highgrove, located in the town of Fuquay-Varina has been denying wedding applications of same sex couples who want to use their venue. The week of April 11th, 2021, Highgrove Estate received severe backlash after denying Attorney McCae Henderson and his fiance Ike Edwards the use of its venue for their wedding. McCae and Ike contacted the estate, stating that they were two grooms who wished to use the Estate’s wedding venue. However, Highgrove Estate’s responded several days later denying the grooms request due to the owners religious beliefs and its policy prohibiting same sex couples from using the wedding venue.

The couple posted the Estate’s response to their request to use its wedding venue on all forms of social media, receiving support from the community, friends and family. This exposure resulted in several bad reviews on the venues google page, attempting to turn others away from using the venue due to its discriminatory policies. The owners of the Highgrove Estate, responded to this backlash in a statement to ABC11: “Highgrove has always welcomed vendors, guests and employees of all orientations and we do not discriminate against a people or group. We believe in the sanctity of marriages as God says in the Bible that marriage is between a man and a woman and we choose to honor Him above what the world decides what marriage should be.” Additionally, Highgrove responded that they have received violent threats regarding their venue policies. Although Henderson is disappointed by the venue’s discriminatory policy and the North Carolina law allowing for these actions to occur, he states that “no one should threaten violence against the venue or its staff.” The bigger problem that is being questioned is the lack of protection of homosexuality and the LGBTQ+ community in North Carolina legislation. 

A similar event occured three years prior in 2018, when Asher McAlonen and his fiance Sarah Riddle were looking for wedding venues. At the time of their search, Asher McAlonen identified as a women, therefore when applying to use the Highgrove Estate venue for their wedding, they were turned away due to their gender identification. Although the actions of the Estate are discriminatory towards the LGBTQ+ community due to religious beliefs, the Estates actions are validated by North Carolina state law as a private institution. 

If the case Highgrove Estate v. Henderson was brought to court, the court would rule in favor of Highgrove Estate due to the Law of Neutrality. This case can be compared to Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which involves the owner of Masterpiece Cake Shop, Jack C. Phillips, refusing to make a wedding cake for Charlie Craig and David Mullins due to his religious beliefs regarding same sex marriage. The majority of the Supreme Court ruled that although “gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Consitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression.” Thus, it was concluded that the creation of caked by the Masterpiece Cake Shop was a form of artistic expression and a part of his religious beliefs. Although Colorado law prohibits discrimination against gay people, the Supreme Court evaluated this case in a neutral matter taking into consideration religous beliefs. The majority of the court ruled that the Colorado Civil Right Commission’s evaluation of Masterpiece Cake Shop’s decision to refuse cake making servie to same sex couples was in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court would evaluate Highgrove Estates v. Henderson in the same manner, that by looking at the case from a neutral perspective the Estate’s wedding venue serves as a form of religious expression. The Law of Neutrality supports Highgrove Estates ability to deny same sex couples to use of their wedding venue due to their relgiious beliefs. 

In my opinion I would agree with the majority ruling of Masterpiece Cake Shop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission due to the Law of Neutrality. I then took this approach and applied it to Highgrove Estates v. Henderson and sided with the actions of Highgrove Estates over same sex couples. The requirement of Highgrove Estate to provide a venue for same sex couples would be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, the North Carolina State law regarding private institutions not prohibiting gender discrimination further supports my opinon regarding this case. Although I do not agree with gender discrimination in general, I still have to agree with the actions of Highgrove Estates through a neutral lens taking into consideration their religious beliefs.      

Emilee Carpenter Photography v. James

In the state of New York, a human rights law prohibiting business owners from refusing service to same-sex couples if they are willing to service heterosexual couples runs a potential fine of $100,000, a revoked business license, and even jail time if violated. Wedding photographer Emilee Carpenter finds herself in violation of this law, as her Christian faith paints a clear concept and image of weddings and marriage in which same-sex couples are not included. Because of this, Emilee declines photo requests from same-sex couples getting married in order to uphold her religious beliefs and obligations. Because of this conflict, Emilee has been forced to face the option of either violating New York's law and potentially becoming imprisoned and losing her livelihood, or to disregard her faith and be limited in her religious exercise. Further, this law prohibits Emilee from explaining her decision from a religious standpoint on her business website in order to prevent individuals from feeling unwelcome or not accepted. Ultimately, this case presents a situation in which Emilee's freedom to exercise her religion, as protected by the US Constitution's First Amendment, is being challenged by the New York state human rights law. 

Emilee's defense team, Alliance Defending Freedom, argues that Emilee is being coerced into supporting a specific view of marriage, different than her own, by the state. Especially due to the severity of the punishment, Emilee feels as though she has no choice but to abandon her own religious beliefs and comply with the viewpoint that the state has deemed acceptable. In doing so, the state is in direct violation with the freedom to exercise religion granted to Emilee by the US Constitution. However, the state emphasizes the need for businesses to provide equal treatment to all individuals in order to respect the human rights of each person, regardless of identity or background. There must be some sort of limitation to the complete free exercise of religion in order to prevent total anarchy, and, in this case, the state believes protecting equality and human rights outweighs protecting the free exercise of religion. In the similar case of Ingersoll & Freed v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., a flower shop owner in Washington was forced to comply with the Washington Law Against Discrimination and provide her services for a same-sex wedding, despite her religious beliefs severely conflicting with this. Though the Supreme Court has yet to issue a decision in this case, or in Emilee's, their holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission sets precedent for where the court may stand. In this case, the Supreme Court sided with a baker who refused to make a cake for a same-sex wedding, citing freedom of both artistic and religion expression, as well as preventing non-neutral hostility towards religion, for their decision.

While I understand and support the compelling interest of the state, and also acknowledge that excusing businesses from already established laws due to religious belief may lead to a slippery slope of individuals being excused from the law under the false guise of religion, I ultimately believe that the state's decision violates Emilee's constitutional rights. In this case, I do worry that the slippery slope may lead to denial of service for certain individuals at any business based on hostility or disagreement towards an individual's identity - an act that I believe is discriminatory and should not be constitutionally protected. However, the distinction in Emilee's case is that her decision has a legitimate religious reasoning and is not simply an act of hostility against a particular identity. The issue is the marriage itself, as she sees facilitating or advancing a ceremony that is unrecognized in her religion as fundamentally limiting her faith and religious practice. When reading the severity of punishment she faces, it is clear that Emilee has no other choice but to adopt a state-approved opinion of marriage and disregard what she believes to be her religious obligations - something that could even be argued to violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as well, due to the state endorsing one, accepted religious viewpoint. Additionally, I do not believe there would be a frequent impact of Emilee's religious decision on citizens. Citizens of New York are not being forced to face Emilee's business on a daily basis or even that often at all, and would have to go out of their way to search and find her online. Because of this, Emilee is not actively preaching her beliefs to everyone possible. It is also troubling that the state of New York's denies Emilee from being able to explain her decision regarding same-sex marriage on her website. If she were able to communicate her decision in more detail, it could serve to prevent miscommunication and potentially leading on customers that, ultimately, she felt she could not serve.

Overall, I believe that demanding Emilee's compliance with one particular religious viewpoint will serve to decrease diversity of thought, conflicting with the intentions of Founding Fathers Jefferson and Madison in their monumental pieces regarding the relationship between religion and the state. Particularly as the nature of Emilee's business is not actively targeting or religiously coercing citizens, forcing her to comply with one, accepted religious viewpoint would violate her First Amendment rights.  

McCullen v. Coakley

In the summer of 2000, Elanor McCullen would stand on the sidewalk right outside of a Planned Parenthood facility in Boston, Massachusetts. She knitted baby hats and lovingly counseled women outside of Planned Parenthood. Those who stood with her claimed that Elanor had “a real gift,” was “a saint,” and acted “like Mother Teresa.” She aspired to see mothers become parents and to see families grow and prosper. She stood outside counseling these women because she was strongly driven by her faith and sought it upon herself to outwardly express pro life values to these expecting mothers going into Planned Parenthood. Her goal was to make sure these women did not feel alone in their difficult journey, and they have a choice to make even if it doesn’t feel like it. She went as far as to provide resources like housing, medical care, sonograms, and food. She even would host baby showers from time to time. Although many appreciated her and what she did for the community, not everyone felt the same way about Elanor’s efforts. Later in the year 2000, the state of Massachusetts started imposing a series of laws that restricted Elanor from speaking freely about her religious pro life viewpoints.

In 2007, Massachusetts imposed what they called a buffer zone around their abortion clinics. This buffer zone took place 35-feet outside of every abortion clinic in the state, and prevented those outside from getting close to those trying to enter the clinics. This law was mainly for the mental and physical health of the women seeking their desired treatment. This is the law that prevented Elanor from having conversations with women on the sidewalk who were possibly seeking help and guidance before making an important decision. She was forced off the sidewalk and away from the clinic, sometimes even being forced into the middle of the street. Elanor brought this case to the Federal Court in 2008 where she was joined by a Catholic priest who also wanted to provide religious counseling and help to women in need, but was banned from doing so by these implemented laws. The first time she brought the case to trial in 2008 she lost. Then in 2009, the case was brought to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, but again lost. In June of 2014 the case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court where they ruled a 9-0 decision in favor of Elanor McCullen, stating that “the government should not deprive people of the right to exchange information, ideas, and support on public sidewalks.” This case can be related to and analyzed through a similar lens as the events that happened in Rigdon v. Perry. In May 1996, the Catholic Church announced a pro life campaignin regards to the President’s veto of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. Here, the Pentagon issued a gag order forbidding military chaplains of all faiths from preaching freely about legislation on important moral issues until the court decided that control by censoring sermons is unconstitutional. Every chaplain must be able to speak freely as their faith requires. This is the same logic that was applied to McCullen's case, it was her constitutional right to speak freely.

Regarding Elanor McCullen’s case, the salient issue regarding religion and constitutional law is deciding whether or not the laws established that required a 35-foot buffer zone around all abortion clinics in the state of Massachusetts was a violation of her First Amendment rights. The imposed laws in Massachusetts create a debatable issue on Elanor’s free exercise of religion. The Court argued that these buffer zones directly restrict one’s religious liberty and constitutional rights. Under the laws that were established, it would have been a crime punishable with possible jail time just for Elanor to stand on the sidewalk and say things as simple as, “good morning, Jesus loves you,” to a woman passing by. This issue importantly touches on the concerns of one's right to freely exercise their religion, as well as freedom of speech and expression regarding their religious beliefs. As for religious freedom, we as American citizens have a right to exchange our ideas and thoughts with others in a peaceful, non-violent manner. Freedom of speech goes hand in hand with freedom of religion and in this situation, Elanor’s rights are infringed upon with such restrictions. The same follows for her individual freedom of religion. She has the right to practice her faith in any way that she chooses without government interference regardless of whether it is in a public or private location.

I do agree with the decision that the Supreme Court made, I think that it is a violation of one’s constitutional First Amendment rights to establish a buffer zone and prevent people from freely speaking outside of abortion clinics. In terms of the court’s reasoning and considerations, I further agree that forming this buffer violates their freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Abortion can be a controversial topic, but our constitution allows everyone to be entiled to their own opinion and speak on behalf of their opinions. Speaking on behalf of your beliefs does not prevent another person from having their own beliefs, they choose to do what they wish with the information they hear. Elanor was a woman offering her own opinion and guidance, not an authority figure attempting to infringe on anyone else's rights. Not everyone has the same religious beliefs, but Elanor should be entitled to speak about hers and offer her insight to others if she wishes. Women seeking treatment are not required to listen or take her advice.

Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser

In March 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic started to affect the daily lives of Americans state and local governments started to implement regulations and restrictions in order to curb the spread of the disease.  In Washington, D.C., Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a stay-at-home order for the district and placed heavy restrictions on in-person gatherings. This restriction on gatherings impacted churches within the district as they were not allowed to hold in-person services if there were more than 100 individuals, even if the worship was held outdoors and everyone wore their masks and social distanced.  Capitol Hill Baptist Church was forced to suspend in-person worship for the first time in 150 years in order to comply with the mandates and out of concern for the safety of their congregation and the wider community.  On September 22, 2020, Capitol Hill Baptist Church filed a lawsuit against Mayor Bowser after they applied for a waiver to hold church services outdoors with more than 100 people in attendance was denied. The church believed that the city would allow them to return to in-person services because 42 states have lifted restrictions on outdoor, in-person services after gaining a better insight on how to migrate the spread of Covid-19; the church also believed they were entitled to this exception as the city had allowed racial justice protest to happen throughout the summer within the district. In their filing the church states, “The Mayor’s apparent encouragement of these protests also implied that the District favors some gatherings (protest) over others (religious services)” in essence they were arguing that protests were deserving of preferential treatment. Capitol Hill Baptist Church wanted their First Amendment rights to be recognized and respected similarly to the protesters.

  

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause protects the rights of American citizens to engage in religious rituals and beliefs and protects them from undue burdens on their religious exercise. The Free Exercise clause allows for religious individuals/organizations to violate some laws as long as the violation is made for a religious sincere reason.  The issue at the center of this case is that religious entities are given special permission over non-religious groups, but in this case non-religious groups, racial protesters are getting special privileges that are being withheld from Capitol Hill Baptist Church that is causing a serve burden on their free exercise.  Similarly, to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, Capitol Hill Baptist Church believes that the Mayor’s regulations are unconstitutional as they are disproportionately targeting religious organizations.  In support of Capitol Hill Baptist, the Department of Justice released a statement stating, “there is no constitutional or statutory basis for allowing protest and rallies attended by thousands of people, while at the same time silencing religious worship…the city bears a high burden of proof to justify its actions”. Many other lawsuits have occurred across the country regarding Covid-19 restrictions placed upon religious organizations such as the lawsuit in Santa Clara County, California involving Calvary Chapel.  The city pursued legal action against the church after they discovered they had violated Covid-19 regulations by hosting indoor church services; the county alleged that the church gathering was massive in size, more than the 100 legally allowed individuals, and was an impending risk of spreading Covid-19.  This case would appear before the Supreme Court during their October 2020 session and in February 2021 the Supreme Court issued their ruling siding with Calvary Chapel and said that the county cannot ban indoor worship services, even as a result of the pandemic. 

A D.C. federal court ruled in favor of Capitol Hill Baptist Church on October 9th, 2020, saying that the district’s Covid restrictions banning church services of more than 100 people violated the church’s free exercise right.  This ruling allowed Capitol Hill Baptist to hold church services outdoors within the city’s limits and having all of their 800 plus members in attendance. The Sunday following the ruling, Capitol Hill Baptist Church has its first outdoor service in D.C., since they closed their doors seven months prior; the church required all congregants to wear their masks and maintain social distance. In this particular case, I agree with the ruling by the court for the simple fact that the district was not being accommodated to the needs of this particular religious group. The city showed that they could make exceptions to ban on outdoor gatherings by allowing Black Lives Matter Protest to occur throughout the city for months; if the district could allow protests with thousands of people to attend, they could allow a church to hold services with more than 100 individuals.  The city was placing a justifiable burden upon the church by denying their appeals to hold their service outside in D.C. and pushed the church to hold their services outside in Virginia forcing congregants to travel all the way to Virginia when a majority of the congregation lives near the church in Capitol Hill.  In this particular case, given the facts, I find it difficult to see how Mayor Bowser’s regulations did not place a substantial burden upon the free exercise of this congregation. They were not requesting the city to allow them to return to worship indoors without social distancing and no masks; they were simply asking for permission to engage in behavior that had been awarded to secular groups.    

Medical Care or Religion?

    

    In early 2017, Abigail Piland was born without any explicitly clear health problems. However, days after her birth, the midwife suggested that Abigail was sick and needed to go to the hospital. Abigail’s mother, Rachel Piland, refused to take her to the hospital due to their religious beliefs. Days later, Abigail was pronounced dead, and the medical examiner confirmed she died from a medical issue that is treatable. Seven weeks after the death of Abigail, the Pilands' two sons were removed from their custody. Last week in connection to this two year long saga, the Michigan Court of Appeals ordered a new trial for the Piland couple who lost all parental rights after failing to seek medical care for a newborn. A new trial was ordered because the Piland parents wanted the jury to be instructed on Michigan Statute 722.634 that stated ““parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian.”

    The resurgence of this case is because of the state statutes use of  “legitimately.” Initially, the trial court withheld the instruction because it interpreted the statue to only have relevance to the practice or belief of a religious organization, not an individual belief. The court of appeals disagreed citing Michigan Statute 722.634, suggesting that the government should have no discretion over the interpretation of “legitimately.” Essentially, the Michigan appellate court held that trial was erred because it refused to give the jury instruction on the Michigan statute granting the Piland’s a new trial. The constitutional question at stake: Does the right to free exercise of religion allow these parents to withhold medical care from their children based upon their sincere religious beliefs?

    While free exercise is a pinnacle of religious freedom, I do not believe that parents should be able to withhold medical care from their children based upon their sincere religious beliefs. First, it is important to recognize that children are often helpless and extremely impressionable in conjunction to religious beliefs. In this case, Abigail bore the consequences of her mother and father religious beliefs, not her own. Their religious freedom infringed on her own personal freedom. One court case that was centered around religious freedom and children was Wisconsin v. Yoder. A Wisconsin law required all children to attend public school until age 16 which was in stark contrast to Amish tradition. The court evaluated if the Wisconsin act violated the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the Amish deciding that the free exercise of religion outweighed the state’s compelling interest in promoting school attendance. Wisconsin v. Yoder is an important precedent because not only does it encompass children like this case, but also it evaluates a compelling state interest. In this case, it is clear that there is a compelling state interest to provide medical care and services to children even at the expense of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Additionally, this case is centered around the use of “legitimately” in the Michigan statute. While I do believe that the government should not have the ability to deficer what religious practices are sincere or legit, there are rare exceptions. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights the role of the government in deciphering religious legitimacy was assessed, “the government has no role in deciding or even suggesting whether the religious ground" for a person's actions "is legitimate or illegitimate." Again, it is a scary thought having the government decide which religious beliefs are lawful, but there needs to be some metric for when religious beliefs invoke harm. I truly believe that any case that involves religious belief in conjunction with individuals being harmed should be subject to evaluation. This is important because without confirming the sincerity of religious practices there will be  potential dangerous ripple effects. Parents could pretend to be religiously affiliated as protection under the law to abuse their children. In my assessment of free exercise, I truly believe that religious organizations and individuals should have the ability to assert a wide range of practices and values, but it is crucial that they are limited when they place any potential harm on others.

Works Cited

https://reason.com/volokh/2021/04/17/religion-and-failure-to-provide-medical-care-for-dying-children/

https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2021/04/19/parents-who-let-baby-die-because-god-makes-no-mistakes-win-major-court-ruling/

Gutierrez v Saenz

In Texas, the issue of whether death row inmates may have a spiritual adviser at the time of execution is quite controversial. Previously, only Christian or Muslim leaders were allowed in the execution chamber, until the important case in 2019, Murphy v Collier. Patrick Murphy asked for a Buddhist spiritual adviser to accompany him to the execution chamber, and the Supreme Court ruled that it was not neutral to “allow Christian or Muslim inmates but not Buddhist inmates to have a religious adviser of their religion in the execution room” (Justice Kavanaugh). So, Texas changed the policy to exclude all spiritual advisers from the execution chamber, regardless of religion. Now, Ruben Gutierrez, a Catholic who has spent more than 20 years on death row for murdering an 85-year-old woman during a robbery, is suing, citing that the policy violates his Free Exercise as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). A federal district court sided with Gutierrez and stayed his execution, but this was lifted by the 5th Circuit. Recently, in June 2020, a day before Gutierrez’s scheduled execution, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of execution, instructing the district court to decide “whether serious security problems would result if a prisoner facing execution is permitted to choose the spiritual adviser the prisoner wishes to have in his immediate presence during the execution.” In November, more evidence was collected, and now, on January 25th, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari, after rescheduling the case nine times. 

    The central question at hand is: does the state of Texas have the right to prohibit all spiritual advisers in the execution chambers, or is such a restriction a violation of Free Exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?

In this case, as with most cases of prisoner’s rights, the central point of argument is that of security and order. Previously, Justice Brett Kavanaugh has contended that states may have “a strong interest in tightly controlling access to an execution room in order to ensure that the execution occurs without any complications, distractions, or disruptions.” The problem is, of course, that Texas previously allowed some spiritual advisers at the time of execution. However, after Murphy v Collier, the courts ruled that they can not treat different religions differently, thus Texas’s solution was total prohibition on spiritual advisers in the execution chambers. So clearly, if Texas previously allowed certain spiritual advisers in the execution chambers, then spiritual advisers did not prove to substantially complicate or disrupt the execution chambers. The timing of this new law in Texas is certainly interesting, as now their main claim of security and order does not hold as much value: as they previously did not see it having substantial burdens when they only allowed Christian and Muslim advisers. 

    Furthermore, in a brief filed on behalf of Gutierrez, the added evidence from November’s investigation found that “the amount of risk involved in allowing non-prison officials into the execution chamber is not so great that prison administration can summarily dismiss that alternative,” and that “adequate processes and security can control the risk.” Thus, I would argue that the state does not have a compelling interest in barring all spiritual advisers in the execution chambers. 

Personally, I believe that Texas has violated Gutierrez’s Free Exercise in this case, given that substantial burdens on religious exercises are only allowed if there is a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. I think that Texas has proved it does not have a substantial compelling interest, given the history of this case, and the only difference between previously allowing religious advisers and now is that the inmate is allowed to choose their religious adviser (ie. all religions are included). This shows Texas’s preference towards certain religions, and is a clear violation of Free Exercise. 

In a very similar case, Dunn v Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Alabama must allow the inmate Smith to be accompanied by his pastor in the execution chamber, following a new law put in place to exclude all religious advisers. Justice Kagan wrote that “..past practice, in Alabama and elsewhere, shows a prison may ensure security without barring all clergy members from the execution chamber.” She is essentially saying that the security risks have proved to not be substantial enough for a reasonable explanation of violating one’s Free Exercise rights. I believe the courts should follow this relatively new precedent set. 

Another case on prisoner’s right was O’Lone v Estate of Shabazz, where the courts ruled that the security restrictions for not allowing two Muslim inmates to attend the Friday Juamu’ah service were valid in light of the setting. Essentially, the court agreed that being incarcerated does place certain limitations on your rights, and the prison administration should evaluate the security risks, not the courts. In this case, if Texas prison administrations were to refer to their own previous evaluation of the security risks, the state would allow (as it did previously) religious advisers in the execution chamber. Further, this case exhibits starkly different characteristics than Gutierrez v Saenz here, in that it was referring to a typical workday and schedule of inmates (including the corresponding security). Now, Gutierrez v Saenz, looks at the time of execution, in which the security risks and order are different than everyday schedules of inmates. One could also argue that here the prison administration needs to accommodate this only once in an inmate's life - not every Friday as in O’Lone (so there is less of a burden on the prison).

Overall, I believe Texas did violate Gutierrez’s Free Exercise and RLUIPA rights, and the state should allow any and all spiritual advisers in the execution chambers.