Oregon Religious Schools Face a Higher Standard to Reopen

In October of 2020, Hermiston Christian School of Oregon filed a lawsuit in federal court against the State’s Governor Katherine Brown citing her uneven treatment of public and private schools with regard to the state’s reopening of K-12 education.  Most of the state of Oregon did not start the 2020-2021 school year with in person education.  However, the governor made exceptions for small public schools that had 75 or fewer students.  Despite meeting the state’s health and safety protocols, Governor Brown refused to extend such exemptions to private and private religious schools of equal size.  The Governor threatened to punish schools that reopened against these orders with 30 days jail time and $1,250 in fines.  A spokesperson for the governor openly noted that Brown favored public schools because she feared an exodus to private education.  In their suit, Hermiston Christian School argued that the governor’s preference for public education does not allow the state to discriminate against private religious schools that meet the standards for reopening that public schools did. Hermiston Christian School dropped their lawsuit recently when Governor Brown extended openings to private schools. However, their arguments against the governor remain valid as they were subject to unequal treatment for several months of the school year. Hermiston Christian School believed that the governor was violating their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.  Likewise, they felt that state was unfairly holding religious schools to a higher standard, showing clear discrimination “against parents who choose to provide a religious education for their children.”  When inspected by the Oregon Department of Education, the department noted that, the “facility is very clean and organized. [Staff] were very well prepared and are following the Health and Safety Guidelines.”  Hermiston Christian felt that since they met the health standards set by the state they should have been afforded an equal opportunity to open classrooms.  The only thing that appears to differentiate the schools Governor Brown had opened and closed in this case is the nature of the institution: Public (secular) versus Private (mix of secular and religious). 

In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947) the majority ruled that “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.” In Oregon it is apparent that the power of the state was being used to favor public schools. While meeting the same standards as public schools, private religious schools were unable to reopen in person to teach their students. Moreover, in Zorach v. Clauson (1952), the majority makes it explicitly clear that although the establishment clause of the First Amendment creates a wall of separation between church and state, it does not create or allow a state “philosophy of hostility to religion.” In a similar case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the Supreme Court established that the government could not force children to attend public school instead of private or religious schools that meet secular standards. To do so would violate American’s liberty, particularly their religious liberty. With such a long and well established precedent that the state must be neutral towards public and religious/private education, it is surprising Governor Brown failed to treat schools in her state neutrally.'

While reviewing this case, the violation of the First Amendment rights of Oregonians is not immediately obvious. It seems that the government had preferred public education to private education in expedited re-openings amid the COVID-19 pandemic. However, once it is understood that much of the private schools operating in Oregon are in fact religious schools, there is an understandable tension with the First Amendment right to free expression of religion and the way the Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted establishment clause cases. By favoring public schools to resume in person classes it limited the ability for families to send their children to religious schools. The state was clearly penalizing children that did not choose secular schools by delaying their return to in-person instruction. This decision harmed private religious schools who were operating at a disadvantage. Supreme Court rulings like Everson v. Board of Education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Zorach v. Clauson established that purposefully disadvantaging religious liberty is unconstitutional. This issue is important to every American, religious or otherwise, because the danger of the government protecting liberties unevenly to select groups is both dangerous and unconstitutional.

COVID Restrictions vs Our Religious Freedoms

On Monday the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the request of Calvary Chapel in Dayton Valley, a rural Nevada church who sought to legally battle the ability of the government to limit the occupancy of churches during the COVID-19 pandemic after they had recently been victorious in an appeals court that had ruled this limitation to be unconstitutional, citing the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appeals court saw it unjust that the church was being held to stricter standards than casinos and other places of public gatherings. While most churches and places of worship have been capped at fifty people, other places of public gathering like casinos received a cap that took into account a percentage of their fire capacity limit. Attorneys were seeking to receive some uniformity as recent court rulings have wavered, some favoring COVID safety precautions, and others the freedom of religion. The current capacity of most businesses are mandated to be held at 25%, a limit the church has so far been able to avoid. Although the health and safety of the citizens of this country is expected to be a top priority for the government, the attorneys made it clear that our first amendment rights should never be put on hold. Places of work have been running at full capacity, with the rule of social distancing, so placing a limit of places of religious worship seems to go against the rights of the religious parishioners. 

 The main issue at hand is whether or not the First Amendment rights of the prisoners at this church are being compromised. At a hard cap of 50, or even a percentage based limit, may impose upon a given person's ability to worship, and may in fact result in them being unable to worship. On the other hand, the other issue of the safety of everyone during these times of the Covid pandemic also looms large. Although the supreme court has refused to receive this case, it still is very interesting as it pits against each other new precautions and roughly two-hundred and fifty year old rules that are the framework of our nation. 

In the event that this church has enough parishioners that a number restriction causes some people to be unable to worship during the hours of the day possible, I do believe that this is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. No law set forth by our government should restrict the religious worship of any person. However, if the parishioners are able to spread out their times of worship throughout the day so that all are able to worship and a number limit is held, I do believe that this is the safest compromise. It is also important that the danger of this virus is understood, as places of religious worship are also normally places in which people come into very close proximity with each other, and often make physical contact. If too many people are allowed in the place of worship, it might make it unsafe for the elderly, who are way more likely to be seriously affected by this disease. This could be something that would then prevent them from being able to worship. While this issue is one that is not very common as a big part of it happening is due to the COVID virus that is only a little over a year old, it does relate to other cases in the way that it reflects upon the free exercise clause in the first amendment, which clearly states that there can not be any restrictions placed by the state on ones religious worshipping. There are many implications for if this case eventually is heard by the Supreme Court, as a ruling that the church must obey the COVID restrictions could suggest that further suppression of our First Amendment rights could be subject to oppression during any future pandemic or national emergency. However, if ruled in favor of the church, this would surely open the gates for other groups to claim that they do not have to obey the limit laws by stating that they are too undergoing religious practices. This is surely a slippery slope. I do however see the importance of this case being that the main goal of this case is to ensure that there is no precedent ever for the government to suppress our religious freedoms. In order to keep our First Amendment rights intact and protect ourselves as citizens against our government , a ruling in the favor of the church seems to be the best option.

Religious Discrimination of Orthodox Jewish Summer Camp

The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on nations, societies, and individuals all around the world. More specifically it has resulted in many shutdowns, restrictions, and precautions from many. It has resulted in many local entities having to reduce occupancy and capacity percentage of their facilities as well as having to implement mask usage in public spaces to prevent the further sprerad of the virus. Within the limitations imposed on local entities, the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted religious groups around the world. Health officials have ruled it unsafe in many states for religious groups to gather at full capacity. Some states have even ruled it all together unsafe for religious groups to gather at all, while others have reduced religious gatherings to only 25% capacity. Additional restrictions on religious groups that have been taken include the prevention of singing and chanting due to its risk of further spreading the virus. However, these restrictions have raised concerns from many religious groups stating that these restrictions are violating their Constitutional right of the Free Exercise of Religion. The Oorah inc., a non-profit Orthodox-Jewish organization that hosts boy and girl summer camps as well as family retreats during Jewish holy days, is an example of a religious group that faced huge financial damage due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With this case in particular, there exists a slippery slope in regards to the motive behind the restrictions placed on their camp and their ability to operate. Oorah camp is located in the county of Schoarie New York and as a result of the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the camp was fined $65,000 and shut down for the Summer 2021 for COVID-19 regulation and code violations until Oorah met all of Schoarie County officials demands. Over the past decade, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Oorah inc. has been discriminated against for being a religious minority. The discrimination of Oorah inc. dates back to 2008 where “the complaints veered into anti-Semitism, such as the time in 2008 that officials mulled hanging a sign with swastikas to deter Oorah staff” (Hamodia). Although this act of discrimination is considered a part of a separate court case, it still helps explain the true motive behind shutting down the campgrounds of Oorah inc. These “unproved” COVID-19 violations placed on the Oorah camp are in violation of the Due Process clause. New York health officials failed to allow Oorah inc. to attend hearings as well as failure to re-inspect the camp grounds, and failure to renew the Oorah’s temporary residence permit. The Scholarie County officials issued a complete shutdown & refused to communicate with Oorah camp owners, which ultimately serves as a discriminatory action against the camp. It has prevented the camp from gathering and celebrating many of their religious holidays, including Roshashana & Sukkoth, and has restricted these Orthodox Jewish camp members from having an area of worship & retreat with their families & friends.

During this time the governor of New York, Andrew Cumno called for the closure of all summer camps due to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many camps, including Oorah, re-structured their programs to bypass this restriction by instead running day & family camps. During the restructuring, Oorah assured that their family retreats met and followed all New York COVID-19 safety protocols, and as a result during the first few weeks of their opening had no positive cases on their campgrounds. The county of Scholarie ultimately violated Oorah’s Constitutional right of the free exercise of religion by using excuse of the camp breaking COVID-19 regulations to shut the camp down. 

The County of Scholarie later admitted that they have been trying to shut the Oorah camp down for months. Oorah inc. faced discriminatory treatment by the county due to being a religious minority. In recent Supreme court cases regarding constitutional religious violations and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme court has stated that even in a pandemic the New Jersey recently issued restrictions on religious groups, reducing their gatherings to 25% capacity in order to prevent the spread of  Coronavirus. A priest and Rabbi challenged these restrictions stating that small minority religious groups were negatively affected and were being treated unequally compared to other secular groups & local entities. The Supreme court ruled that this was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and that religious groups had to be treated as equally with other secular local businesses. In a California case, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of California could not put restrictions on indoor religious gatherings, but approved of the restrictions on singing and chanting because that contributes to the spead of the virus whereas large religious gatherings are proven indifferent to other secular gatherings. The Supreme Court concluded that individuals should listen to state health officials guidlines, but there is a limitation on the policies health officials can put into place regaring the health and safety of individuals & communities. 

In my opinion, I agree with the set by these other Supreme Court Cases. The state, and more specifically Counties do not have the authority to prevent religious groups from gathering even in the midst of a pandemic. Especially in Oorah’s case, the County authorities cannot use the pandemic as an excuse to shut down their Orthodox Jewish camp just because they don’t agree with their values & practices. However, the county does have the authority to limit the capacity of the camp, but not shut down the camp all together. The actions taken by the County authorities and health officials prove to be discriminatory against Orthodox Jewish individuals and ultimately is a violation of their Free Exercise clause given that they have proceeded to act in alternative ways with other secular activities similar to Oorah inc. within the New York area. 

Lydia Booth v. Simpson County School District

Schools are supposed to be a place for students to grow and learn to be themselves. Yet, on October 13, 2020, Lydia Booth, a third-grade student in Jackson, Mississippi  was told she can’t express her beliefs on a mask. She went to school in a mask that read “Jesus Loves Me” and was told by school officials that she could not wear it. If she refused and continued to wear it she was told she could face disciplinary actions and possible suspension because the school claimed it was against their policies. The school district allows students to wear other masks, such as college logos, “Black Lives Matter”, and more, but decided that Lydia Booth’s mask was inappropriate. When Lydia’s mother challenged the school districts actions, they said that it was against their schools policies outlined in their handbook. Two days after prohibiting her from wearing her mask the school administrators released a statement that messages on masks that are “political, religious, sexual or inappropriate symbols, gestures or statements that may be offensive, disruptive or deemed distractive to the school environment” are prohibited from being worn. They had just added that statement to the handbook to support their decision of prohibiting Lydia from wearing her mask.

 

The Alliance Defending Freedom attorneys filed a federal lawsuit on Lydia Booth and her parent’s behalf. They are claiming that the school district is violating the First Amendments right of free expression of religion.  The school districts original handbook had policies protecting freedom of speech under the Mississippi Student Religious Freedom Act and no policies regarding censorship of religious expression. They are contesting that the school’s recently revised version of the student handbook that was updated for COVID-19 and included the new policies prohibiting religious and political expression on masks is unconstitutional. Lydia’s wearing of her mask did not cause a disturbance or conflict with fellow classmates or school faculty, so there was no preach of peace. As long as her mask isn’t interfering with other’s ability to learn, why shouldn’t she be allowed to wear it?

This case relates to a previous Supreme Court decision in 1969 in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District where it was decided that schools cannot silence students’ right to free expression just because they dislike it, or it is controversial. The Court stated that “in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression”. Their decision shows that public schools cannot take away the constitutional rights of their students. This case sets the precedent that as long as Lydia Booth’s mask isn’t disruptive, she has the right to wear it. If the Supreme Court uses the decision of this case as a precedent, then the school district will have to give Lydia the right to express her religion on her mask.

 

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press…”. In Lydia Booth v. Simpson County School District, I believe there is a direct violation of her First Amendment right to freedom to exercise her religion. Lydia wearing her mask to school is not causing a disruption to other students or inciting conflict. She is peacefully expressing her religion and for the school to censor that is unconstitutional. She also was not doing anything against the schools’ original policies, and the new policies for censorship of mask wearing are unconstitutional. Students were allowed to wear college logos, sports teams, and Black Lives Matter masks to express their beliefs, so religion should be no different. If the Supreme Court allows the state the right to determine what is a free exercise of religion and what isn’t, it will open the door for many more issues to come. The schools can’t be allowed to just arbitrarily censor what students can or can’t express. Schools are a place where students are supposed to grow up and learn who they are, and a big part of that is being able to freely express their beliefs. There are many other expressions of religion that we see in schools such as students wearing crosses around their neck and students coming to school with ashes on their head for Ash Wednesday. If we allow schools to censor something like a mask saying, “Jesus Loves Me”, who is to stop them from prohibiting these other free exercises of religion in the future based off of the decision of this case. The Supreme Court should rule in favor of upholding Lydia Booth’s constitutional right to freedom of expression on a mask.

Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Bobrin

    Just last week, February 16th, The Universal Life Church Ministries (ULCM) filed a Federal suit against Bucks County, Pennsylvania claiming that the county had placed a burden on their minister’s free exercise of religion. This is because their ministers had been denied the right to perform legally binding religious wedding ceremonies by officials at the county’s Clerk office. Specifically, this case is headed by one of the ordained ministers of the church who claims that County officials told him he could not officiate legal weddings because he was ordained through the internet. In their suit, ULCM and a few other unnamed plaintiffs “ask the court to confirm that ULCM ministers may solemnize legal weddings under Pennsylvania law” and prohibit the Clerk’s office from discriminating against ULCM ministers.

    The Universal Life Church Ministries is one of the largest religious organizations with more than 20 million ordained individuals. One of the defining features of this organization is its provision of religious ordinations over the internet. Ministers from this church, who were ordained online, have performed thousands of legal marriages in Pennsylvania, and regularly do the same in many other states. ULCM Ministers can and have performed weddings, baptisms, funerals, other types of spiritual ceremonies, and conduct general church services similarly to any ordained official of any faith. Furthermore, in 2008 a judge in Bucks county found “that ordinations from the Universal Life Church were legal and the marriages performed by its ministers valid”. In Bucks county, at least, this ruling has held strong, but this newest suit aims to get stronger affirmation for the previous ruling and extend its affirmations to a statewide level.

    The Bucks County, Pennsylvania Clerks office has taken the position that ministers who were ordained online cannot sanctify marriages under Pennsylvania law. This is because the Pennsylvania law 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1503 attempts to codify who in the state is authorized to solemnize marriages between persons. The law primarily focuses on secular officials that can ordain a marriage such as justices or mayors, but also has a small section at the end stating, “Every religious society, religious institution or religious organization in this Commonwealth may join persons together in marriage”. Additionally, there is an extra section of the law which establishes that those getting married must obtain an official marriage license before anyone, religious or secular, officiates the marriage. The reason the Bucks County Clerk’s office has taken its stance is that in the law it says one must be of a “regularly established church or congregation” in order to solemnize marriages and the county officials claim those who are ordained online are not clergy of a “regularly established church or congregation”. In this case, the state appears to have a compelling interest because marriage is a legal contract within the state, however, the law still requires an official marriage certificate and only effects who can perform the religious aspects of a marriage. Due to this I argue the state does not have a compelling interest because those seeking to be married still have to go through the state. Therefore, the state’s interests have been met and the state should not be allowed to interfere with who an individual desires to perform the religious ceremony as this infringes upon an individual’s free exercise without there being any state interest to do so.

    There are two underlying constitutional issues in this case. The first asks has the Bucks County Clerks office violated ULCM’s Free Exercise by discouraging ULCM ministers from exercising their rights to solemnize marriages, which had been afforded to ministers of other religions. The second, focuses on the church’s claims that the counties policy unconstitutionally prefers certain religions over others violating the Establishment of Religion.

    In regard to both questions, I believe that ULCM’s is in the right. It is clear that by denying ULCM ministers the same right as any other faith based on the method these ministers are ordained is a violation of Free Exercise of religion because it is discriminating against who can perform certain actions based on the internal workings of the organization. Additionally, this denial of the rights of these ministers by state officials is a violation of the establishment of religion because it puts the burden on the state to decide what is a “regularly established church or congregation”. In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, the court ruled that instances that “determination by state authorities as to what is a religious cause” is unconstitutional because it lays a forbidden burden on Free Exercise, and that is what is happening in this case. One aspect of this case that stands out to me is the fact that this case is not challenging the law itself but instead is challenging the interpretation of the law by Bucks County officials. Additionally, ULCM already won this case at the county level and this newest suit is only affirming the previous ruling and attempting to expand its influence to the state level. These two factors make this case different from many of the others we have looked at because there already is a ruling and this case is not a challenge to the ruling but is seeking to affirm the ruling at a higher level. So in a sense this case is not debating a question and instead is debating if the answer to the original question was reached for the right reasons, and if the ruling should be applied at a higher level or would applying this ruling at a higher level violate something else.

Bell & Chamberlain v. Manchester Veterans Administration Medical Center

     The presence of a bible on the "Missing Man Table" at the Manchester Veterans Administration  Medical Center (MVAMC) in Manchester, New Hampshire is a source of contention for numerous veterans as they believe the bible breaks the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Two Airforce veterans, Sandra Bell and James Chamberlain, filed a
federal lawsuit to the District Court of New Hampshire, supported by the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF) who fights for the separation of religious influences and military organizations. Initially in January of 2019, president of the MRFF Michael Weinstein, asked the MVAMC director Al Montoya, to remove the bible based off the complaints of 14 veterans at the medical center which was promptly executed by Montoya to honor the views of those that served. Consequently, floods of complaints from an opposing group of veterans demanded the bible to be put back on the table in addition to a mandate by the Department of Veterans Affairs in February of 2019. The Department of Veterans Affairs then announced that religious symbols are permitted at all VA facilities prompting the challenge seen here. The initial lawsuit submitted by Chamberlain, a Christian himself, was challenged on its legal standing referring to Chamberlain's ability to sue the federal government. The court claimed that a Christian believer could not experience injury by law in this case because it was his religion that was present with the display of the bible. This is how Sandra Bell, former Christian now Atheist, gave concrete ground for this case to stand on based on the fact that she felt unwelcome by the presence of the bible on the table. The federal judge deciding this case believes that it will make its way to the Supreme Court.

    The issue at hand in this case is whether or not the presence of a Christian bible at a government-run facility is an establishment of a religion. The presence of religious symbols in government is not a novel aspect of modern American society as the relationship between government and religious affiliations are often seen intermingling over the "wall of separation between church and state" that Thomas Jefferson portrayed. Even more so, the military often uses religious symbols and worship as a part of their education and training. For example, in the Supreme Court decision of McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), the dissent provides numerous instances at the both the United States Naval and Military Academies of military chaplains and opportunities for religious worship on property that is entirely run by the government. In addition, this case is coming off the Supreme Court decision of The American Legion v. American Humanist Organization (2019) where the court decided in a 7-2 majority that a cross-shaped display at a veterans memorial park in Bladensburg, Maryland was constitutional based off the fact that the Christian symbol served a secular purpose.

    I agree with the Department of Veterans Affairs in this case that the display of the bible on the "Missing Man Table" is constitutional and is not an establishment of religion. This is because of the common presence of religious symbols and ideas already present in today's society upheld by the Supreme Court decisions and non-coercive nature that the "Missing Man Table" has. The presence of this bible does not force religious action or religious practice rather its secular use is to honor the soldiers that have made the ultimate sacrifice. Reasoning used to justify the cross memorial in Maryland applies to this situation as well. Taking offense to a religious symbol does not hold ground in having it removed, inhibiting the free exercise of another individual. Society is not devoid of religious symbols as one is freely allowed to practice their faith. Similar to the cross memorial, the bible on display holds historical significance as it was used by a soldier in WWII while escaping a German POW camp. The presence of religious symbols in American society do not represent an establishment of religion, rather they honor the spiritual nature of the people of this country. The bible being present on this table does not establish a state church, offer aid to any religion, or advance the instruction of any teachings. In precedence, the Supreme Court has supported the use of religious symbols to honor the sacrifices of United States veterans by stipulating connection between the American people and religious affiliation. The bible on the "Missing Man Table" at the Manchester VAMC should indeed receive the same treatment as the symbols before it.

Dalberiste v. GLE Associates

For Mitche Dalberiste, honoring the Sabbath by resting from work and practicing his religion is of utmost importance to his faith of the Seventh-day Adventists. So important, in fact, that Mr. Dalberiste made sure to alert his new employers at the engineering and consulting firm, GLE Associates, of his practices. Due to Title  VII of the Civil Rights Act, stating that employers must “reasonably accommodate” the religious practices of their employees, Mr. Dalberiste knew it was well within his rights to be excused from work on the Sabbath day in order to respect his religious beliefs. The firm, however, responded by rescinding Mr. Dalberiste’s job offer the next day. Even further, an old Supreme Court decision that allowed employers to refuse employees such accommodations caused both the district court and appellate court to be unable to rule in favor of Mr. Dalberiste.  In light of this, Mr. Dalberiste and his legal team are hoping to have their case heard by the US Supreme Court so that they may reevaluate their past ruling and, subsequently, remain aligned with the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause detailed within the First Amendment of the US Constitution. 

In this case, potential violation of both religious clauses within the First Amendment are brought into question. The Establishment Clause prohibits the establishment of religion by neither being allowed to promote religion nor inhibit it. In this case, does GLE Associates’ decision to rescind Mr. Dalberiste’s job offer due to his requested accommodations inhibit Mr. Dalberiste’s religious beliefs, establishing a preference for no religion, or for religions that don’t require Sabbath day rest? Or, conversely, does GLE Associates’ decision make sure to not establish religion by refusing to promote the religious beliefs Mr. Dalberiste holds? Secondly, the Free Exercise Clause allows citizens to practice their religion however they want, unless the practice directly clashes with government’s interest or the greater social good. In Dalberiste v. GLE Associates, does GLE Associates’ decision violate Mr. Dalberiste’s right to practice his religion as he pleases? Or does Mr. Dalberiste’s need to be excused from work on the Sabbath day conflict with the greater social good by disrupting the workflow at GLE Associates? Finally, it is necessary to revisit the prior Supreme Court case upon which this case was built – Trans World Airlines v. Hardison. In this case, an airline worker (Hardison) with seniority status was accommodated by being allowed to take off Saturdays in order to observe the Sabbath. However, when Hardison began a new job in which he had low seniority, the company (Trans World Airlines) was no longer able to accommodate his religious practices. As a result, Hardin brought his case to court, similarly claiming violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Ultimately, the court ruled against Hardin, claiming that TWA should not be required to violate the company rules of seniority and, due to their previous attempts to accommodate Hardin, had satisfied the “reasonable accommodation” outlined in Title VII. Does this case provide necessary precedent to indicate how the court should rule in the case of Mr. Dalberiste?

I believe that the decision of GLE Associates is in direct violation of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and I also believe that TWA v. Hardison should be reconsidered as it does not provide appropriate precedent. By refusing Mr. Dalberiste work due to his religious practices, GLE Associates are essentially establishing religion by attempting to coerce Mr. Dalberiste to forfeit his religious beliefs and conform to the company’s religious expectations in order to make a living for his family. Secondly, the decision serves to inhibit Mr. Dalberiste’s right to practice his religion any way he wants, as this action would not be putting anyone in society at harm or destroying the practices of GLE Associates. Further, TWA v. Hardin is a poor ruling by the court and, as I believe TWA’s actions similarly violate the clauses regarding religion within the First Amendment, should not serve as the standard for ruling in Mr. Dalberiste’s case. But even further, the Hardin case more readily meets the reasonable accommodation requirement as stated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. While I believe TWA’s decision does violate both religious clauses, TWA did, in fact, aim to accommodate Hardin initially and were even able to do so for a period of time. The only time in which the accommodations were called into question were when they were at risk of violating other company policies, risking a disruption of company functions. In Mr. Dalberiste’s case, GLE Associates failed to even attempt accommodating Mr. Dalberiste, further proving their violation of his constitutional rights. Ultimately, this case is crucial to understanding the potential of legal restriction of religion (particularly minority religions) in the workplace and subsequent coercion of beliefs when individuals must question their ability to make a living for survival, as well as understanding the link between precedent set by prior cases and the constraining impact that this may have a on a court’s ruling. If simply changing shifts to accommodate Mr. Dalberiste is considered "unreasonable" by the current precedent set by TWA v. Hardin, what form of accommodation would ever be considered "reasonable" and therefore permissible?

Religion on College Campuses

For many students, college offers an opportunity to learn and experience new things. With a variety of campus clubs and organizations, students have the ability to explore new avenues and form their individual passions and ideals. Religion is one area of campus life that students may be exposed to for the first time while at college and it is not uncommon for students to encounter people on campus speaking about their beliefs. Chike Uzuegbunam, a former student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), was silenced twice in 2016 while attempting to share his Christian faith with other students. First, officials of the college told Chike he must reserve a campus “speech zone” to speak in public. After Chike reserved a “speech zone,” he was still told by campus police that he must stop sharing his faith because of complaints. Chike was threatened with expulsion if he did not cease speaking and comply with officers.

Not long after, Chike and Joseph Bradford (who was hesitant to share his faith because of college policies) sued the university for violating their constitutional rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. With the assistance of AllianceDefending Freedom, Chike and Bradford sought an injunction preventing the enforcement of the policies and requested nominaldamages for the violation of their rights. While this case was pending, the college revised its speech policies and filed a motion to dismiss the suit as moot. In the context of the law, moot refers to a case that has no open legal question or has been resolved because of some occurrence. Because the college had changed its policies to be constitutional, the motion was granted by district court and was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On January 12th, this case was heard by the supreme court to decide the legal doctrine of mootness, which limits the on-going jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases and to decide if pursuing nominal damages can avoid mootness. 

 

Michael and Jonathan Whitehead, a father-son religious liberty attorney team from Kansas City, discussan interesting aspect of the case when Michael says, “The government never disputed that Chike and Joseph’s rights were violated. But the state claims it should be able to avoid all accountability for these violations if it changes its policy after the lawsuit is filed.” Jonathan also brings up an important point saying, “That would permit the same or a future government official to restore the old policy as soon as the lawsuit is over.” If revising policy is all that must be done to moot a case, there would be nothing stopping those sued over unconstitutional policies from terminating policy prematurely and not addressing the violation of rights. I argue this grants too much control to large entities and should be of concern to individuals.  Because of this loophole, the individual’s American rights are not protected. The loophole ultimately acts like an “insurance policy” to colleges and other organizations: they can continue to have unconstitutional policies, and then if questioned in court, can merely change the policies, have the case dismissed, and dodge any severe legal consequence. 

 

Similar to this idea is the case Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, where the Whiteheads were counsel of record.  Here, the supreme court ruled that “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not moot a case unless ‘subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Using the Trinity case as precedent, GGC should not be able to moot the case. Because there is not clear evidence that the wrongful behavior will not occur again, the trial for nominal damages should continue with GGC being held accountable for violating the rights of Chike and Bradford.

 

I firmly believe that pursuing nominal damages in a suit is enough to avoid mootness. I also believe that a change in policy should not moot a case where a party’s rights have been violated. While debates over mootness may not appear important to the common person, they hold the government accountable – serving as proof that rights were harmed. This case is an important example of protection of the First and Fourteenth amendment rights on college campuses. While colleges and universities may be large and powerful, it is important that the law prevents them from avoiding consequences when they violate the rights of individuals. It is also important that students are not intimidated and will follow the example of Chike and Bradford and know their freedoms to practice speech and religion. When these freedoms are violated, students should stand firm in pursuing justice and protecting their rights. College campuses are great for students to expand their beliefs and to interact with others who have differing beliefs, but they need to remain an area where this can freely occur. After hearing about Chike and Bradford’s experience, what do you think about religion on college campuses? Do you think you are able to freely exercise your religion on your campus? Do you think the college revising its policy should be enough to moot the case and avoid the lawsuit?

 

Dunn v. Smith

On February 11, 2021, a prisoner by the name of Willie B. Smith from Alabama was scheduled to face execution for his crimes. Smith was convicted for the robbery, abduction, and murder of Sharma Ruth Johnson in 1991. During his trial, prosecutors argued that Smith approached Sharma Ruth Johnson at an ATM, held her at gunpoint while stealing her money, proceeded to kidnap her and brought her to a nearby cemetery where she was brutally shot in the back of the head. Johnson was 22 years old at the time, and would have been in her 50’s if she was here with us today. On the intended date of his execution, merely hours before, Smith requested for his pastor to be present during the time of the death, physically in the execution chamber with him. He has been seeing Pastor Robert Paul Wiley, Jr. for years, repented his sins, and developed a strong personal faith all while in prison. Smith was denied his request by the state of Alabama in accordance with their new discriminatory policy. 

  

This new policy was implemented in response to a Supreme Court ruling in Texas, Murphy v. Collier. On March 28, 2019, Patrick Murphy of Texas was scheduled for execution by lethal injection for his crimes. Murphy, like Smith, had found faith and spirituality in prison. Rev. Hui-Yong Shih was Murphy’s spiritual advisor in which he practiced Buddhism. This particular faith believes that the presence of his spiritual advisor in the moments before his execution is necessary to assist him to maintain the focus required to be reborn into the Pure Land after one’s death, therefore he requested his advisor’s presence. Despite years of permitted visitation with Rev. Hui-Yong Shih, the state of Texas denied his religious request, which was then taken to the Supreme Court where they issued an order halting Murphy’s execution. The court then ruled that Texas could not proceed with this execution as it violated his Free Exercise of religion, and acted as discrimination against people with different religious beliefs. This is when Alabama carried out its law that “banned all clergy members from the execution chamber,” the cause of Smith’s denied request. Alabama appealed to the Supreme Court on the morning of Smith’s scheduled execution and ruled that Alabama must allow Smith to be accompanied by his pastor in the execution chamber.

 

Regarding Smith’s case, the salient issue regarding religion and constitutional law is deciding whether or not denying an inmate’s request for a pastor in the execution chamber to accompany them at the moment of their death violates one’s First Amendment rights, even if it is against the state law. This is a matter that concerns one’s right to freely exercise their religion. The denial of Smith’s request imposes a debatable issue on his free exercise of religion. Is the denial of Smith’s request unconstitutional? Do any matters change because he is a convict? Denying a prisoner access to their religious necessities or requests still violates the law. Not only is the Free Exercise of religion an important matter, the government is required to treat every religion equally, never promoting or praising one over another. In other instances similar to this one, clergy members have been allowed in the execution chamber from different religions. A 13 out of 20 majority of prisoners executed in the United States over the past year were allowed to have a clergy member of their choice present in the execution chamber, and under equal treatment, if the federal government has been able to make these accommodations for other religions, so too should Alabama. And finally, it is important to consider that a law that prevents clergy members from being in the execution chamber may account for some religions, but not all. Not every religion believes in the same practices, and creating a preventative law like this one in Alabama, therefore establishing a law arguably creates an establishment of religion. 

 

I do agree with the Supreme Court’s decision here, I believe that it is a violation of one’s first amendment rights to be denied an accompanying pastor, or other clergy member, at the time of their execution. I also agree that it was the best legal decision to allow Smith to have his pastor with him during the execution. All Americans, including prisoners, should be accommodated in their religious exercises whenever it is possible. It is important to consider that the terms of the constitution still apply even between the walls of a prison. These people are still Americans and it is important to still allow them access to their constitutional rights. Denying a prisoners request that would accommodate their religious beliefs is preventing them from their free exercise of religion. But with this in mind, I think decisions regarding religious requests in prison should be made on a case by case basis. If a convicted murderer claims that it is against their religious beliefs to sit in a prison cell alone for the rest of his life, I’m not sure the decision would follow similarly to Mr. Smith’s path. But then again, who are we to tell one another what religious requests should be accommodated for? It is our constitutional right to practice our own religious freedom equally without establishment.

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship v. Wayne State University

 For many students in college, clubs are a great avenue to meet and engage with people of similar interests. For those students who are religious, gathering with other people of faith on campus can be a fundamental aspect of their college life. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship USA, more commonly known as InterVarsity, is an organization that has clubs across various college campuses, aiming to provide students with a community of faith, in their case, inter-denominational Christianity. One such campus is Wayne State University, where InterVarsity established a chapter in the 1940s, and which is a predominantly commuter campus, meaning clubs are even of greater importance to encourage students to feel connected.

In 2017, Cristina Garza, the president of the InterVarsity chapter at Wayne State University at the time, applied to renew InterVarsity’s student organization status and was denied on charge that their chapter’s constitution was unacceptable. The Dean of Students’ office argued that InterVarsity’s expectation that its leaders are of Christian faith was discriminatory, so did not meet Wayne State’s club requirements. InterVarsity’s student memberships are open to all, and it is worth noting that Wayne State recognizes more than 400 student groups, and allows 90+ clubs to select leaders who agree with their views. For example, the Students for Life club is allowed to require its members to be pro-life, all fraternities and sororities can limit membership by sex, and the Secular Student Alliance is allowed to require leaders to be secularists. Thus, InterVarsity claims they were discriminated against for their religious beliefs by Wayne State University. 

On March 6th, 2018, the group sued Wayne State University in violation of the First Amendment, as well as Wayne State’s own policy against religious discrimination. Wayne State University relented and reinstated the InterVarsity chapter on campus; however, recently the university conferred with a federal court to seek the power to kick the group off campus in the future. In October 2020, the groups in the case filed motions for summary judgment, and oral arguments will be heard in March 2021. 

The issue at hand is with regards to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Does Wayne State University have the right to interfere with InterVarsity’s appointments of leaders, or is the religious club protected by the 1st Amendment to freely elect their own leaders, without interference by the university?

I do not think that Wayne State has the right to interfere with InterVarsity’s appointments of leaders, as this selection is an important practice of any religious organization, even on a college campus. The Free Exercise Clause protects InterVarsity in this sense, especially as InterVarsity specifically lists on their website the qualities that all executive members should possess in accordance with 1 Timothy 3:1-13. Their religious beliefs are guiding their appointments, and as such this is an aspect of the Free Exercise of religion. Furthermore, while there are 90+ other clubs that Wayne State University allows to select their leaders meeting criteria, Wayne State University has still set this precedent and expectation of individual club rights in this selection. While political and social clubs are protected by the university in requiring certain viewpoints of their members and leaders, how are religious groups not?

Another complication to the case is that while Wayne State University did not recognize InterVarsity as a student organization, and all of the benefits with such, under the ruling of Widmar v Vincent, universities who create public forums for student groups can not exclude those groups that meet and speak for religious purposes. As such, InterVarsity has been able to rent rooms in the student center, but at a cost to date of $2,720. Recognized student clubs are able to reserve free meeting rooms, host free tables for interested students, apply for funding available to organizations, and appear on the school’s website for students interested in getting involved on campus. While InterVarsity is still able to physically gather (at a cost), this is not the equivalence of being a recognized club on campus. 

A previous case along somewhat similar lines was decided and set a precedent, in the case of Christian Legal Society Chapter v Martinez, in which Justice Ginsburg said for the majority vote that First Amendment rights must be examined in light of school environment (thus, defer to university decisions). Wayne State University has set the standard that student clubs on campus are able to select their own leaders without interference, given that another 90+ clubs are given this right. Therefore, they should follow their own expectations and provide a religious group with the same protections. 

In this case, I believe that Wayne State University does not have the right to interfere with InterVarsity’s appointments of leaders, as it violates their own school's standards for clubs as well as the 1st Amendment Free Exercise Clause.

United States v. Chasney

On January 6th, 2021, Pro-Trump rioters led an assult on the Capitol attempting to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential election. One of the prominent figures of the riot, Jacob Anthoney Chansley, was charged and arrested for storming the Capitol violently and his disorderly conduct inside. In late January, he was held in a correctional facility in Washington DC where he requested a religious dietary accommodation of an organic food diet because he is a Shamanic practitioner. Shamanism is a religious practice which involves a mediator who acts as a bridge between the spirit world and man. Chansley argued “because of my being a Shamanic practitioner, I only eat traditional food that has been made by God. This means no GMO’s, herbicides, pesticides, or artificial preservatives or artificial colors.” However, the detention facility claimed they were meeting his dietary needs and the counsel also debated whether his beliefs were a tenet of Shamanism. After not eating for days, Chansley’s attorney, Watkins, filed an emergency motion in the DC federal district court requesting for the jail to meet his dietary needs or that he be released. 

After Watkins filed an emergency motion, in United States v. Chansley, the court ordered dietary accommodations arguing that the First Amendment protects prisoner’s rights to challenge parts of their confinement if it amounts to a substantial burden. The court argued that the refusal to meet the dietary accommodations is a violation of Chansley’s first amendment rights for three reasons. In deciding this case, the court looked at the neutral laws post-Smith merit and found that the DOC’s decision was based on “individualized governmental assessment” of his religious practice rather than the neutral and generally applicable drug laws in Employment Division v. Smith. They also ruled that the DOCs policy is not neutral because it provides dietary accommodations for other religions, such as Muslim and Jewish inmates. In this case, the rationale was based on that Chansley’s views lacked religious merit and his requests were denied because he was a member of a disfavored sect. Lastly the Court decided that the denial of dietary accommodations is an infringement on the First because it constitutes a substantial burden to Chansley’s religious beliefs. The limitation amounted to a substantial burden because the inmate was unable to eat for over a week and claimed to have lost at least 20 pounds. After the Court’s ruling, the DC jail was unable to provide these accommodations and Chansley was transferred to another facility. 

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of.” While it was created to build a wall between church and state, it was also established to protect the minority from the democratic tyranny of the majority. In this case, Chasney was initially denied religious accommodations for being an individual of a minority religion that the detention center did not believe was legitimate. However, I agree with the ruling made in United States v. Chasney granting Chasney an organic diet because if the government only made accommodations for more popular religions such as Judaism and Muslim, they would have been favoring those over minority religions. Therefore, even though he committed an attack on the Capitol, it is unconstitutional to not provide him dietary accommodations because he is a member of a disfavored sect. Furthermore, providing Chasney organic food does not present a “clear and present danger” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943 and the government’s interest is not substantial enough to burden Chasney’s First Amendment rights.

While this case exemplifies the importance of the First in protecting minority rights, it also raises the question of what constitutes as a legitimate religion and how a wall between church and state can coincide with the government ruling the religious merit of an individual. Although the First establishes a separation, the government is nevertheless involved in deciding if Chansley’s views lack religious merit or not. In granting him accommodations, other prison inmates may also make similar or other requests and the Court’s may then have to make a ruling on a case by case basis deciding what religions or religious decisions are of merit. Therefore, it is unclear how dividing the ‘wall’ actually is and this ruling may only further the entanglement of state and religion. However, Chansley’s dedication to his religion is legitimized by him starving for over a week and losing 20 pounds since he refused eating any non-organic foods. While the Court made the ruling on this case solely to its relation to the First, the decision has been criticized for law enforcement’s preferential treatment towards whites compared to minorities. Although I agree that the refusal to provide Chansley with an organic diet amounts to a substantial burden and is therefore a violation of his First Amendment rights, it will be interesting in looking at how this case may be applied in the future to other accommodations for prison inmates.

Heaven or Hospital?

    

    The coronavirus pandemic has altered every aspect of society from mask protocols to social distancing guidelines. Restrictions on large gatherings have been imposed in order to mitigate the spread of the virus and places of worship are not exempt. On February 10th, 2021, a new act was signed by the governor of Arkansas to prevent the state or local officials from ratifying restrictions on religious groups and their place of worship during the pandemic. Prior, there has been pushback by Arkansas and federal law that houses of worship should follow the same regulations as secular gatherings to evade religious targeting, but this new law removes all restrictions. The bill proclaims that the government “shall not prohibit or limit a religious organization from continuing to operate or engage in religious services during a disaster emergency under this subchapter.” Recognizing the current public health crisis, the act notes that restrictions can be utilized as, “neutral health, safety, or occupancy requirements,” but the bill includes the provision that these regulations are “applicable to all organizations and businesses.” Protocols between religious gatherings and other businesses would be indistinguishable. For example,“a mass gathering limit wouldn’t apply to religious gatherings since it wouldn’t apply to a grocery story that is not, by definition, a mass gathering subject to the limit." In essence, this bill demands that religious gatherings and businesses operate under the same jurisdiction.

    The main controversy in this case is the battle between state health regulations and the first amendment. Specifically, this case examines the free exercise clause enabled through the first amendment. The first amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These public safety restrictions impede an individuals' first amendment right to practice their religion. This act defends a religious group’s first amendment right by keeping houses of worship open even during the pandemic to preserve the free exercise of religion. In terms of “neutrality,” the government has been under siege for providing a disproportionate amount of regulations on religious spheres compared to other secular businesses. In a similar Supreme court case centered on regulations and first amendment rights based in California, Samuel Alito opines, “If Hollywood may host a studio audience or film a singing competition while not a single soul may enter California's churches, synagogues, and mosques, something has gone seriously awry.” This perfectly illustrates the lack of neutrality between secular businesses and places of worship. This act is built on the grounds of protecting the free exercise clause of the first amendment, eradicating religious discrimination, and establishing neutrality.

While the free exercise clause protected by the first amendment is a hallmark of religious liberty, the framers of the United States did not have the foresight to make exceptions to religious practices amidst a pandemic. It is important to note that while the coronavirus has shifted aspects of religious practices, these changes in my opinion are not discriminatory. In this controversy, it is important to distinguish between the government prohibiting large groups for public safety and the government prohibiting individuals from practicing their religion. Due to the scientific proof that social distance adherence and masks can reduce the spread  of coronavirus, these regulations have been implemented in all sectors of society, not just places of worship. Additionally, many places of worship have offered their services online, outside and in limited capacity settings. This is direct evidence that the government is not regulating religion, but regulating the spread of the disease. The stance that religious spheres are under heavier regulations that businesses should be highly contested. In a house of worship, individuals are in enclosed spaces, close together, singing and often touching each other. In other businesses, like a grocery store, individuals do their shopping in a timely manner with limited contact with others. While singing in church is a common practice, the coronavirus is transmitted through respiratory droplets which is very likely to be exchanged when church attendees are singing. A grocery story is necessary for a person’s survival, while a church is not. While neutrality is of essential importance, there are distinguishable features between these two realms that require different adherences. It is imperative to note that those in favor of this act are inflicting their own judgment about the pandemic. This decision lacks scientific reasoning and second guesses health experts studies which will only yield more positive cases. In the wake of another pandemic or national emergency, it is possible that other religious groups will use their first amendment right as a shield to evade certain protocols which will only inflict more harm on others. This potential snow ball effect could lead to something even more monstrous than the spread of a virus. In order to examine the validity of a law, a compelling state interest must be at the forefront of reasoning. The state had a “compelling interest” in mitigating the spread of the virus. The health and wellbeing of society is a prime example of a compelling state interest that should result in regulations.

Sources:

https://wordandway.org/2021/02/11/new-arkansas-law-exempts-churches-from-pandemic-restrictions/

https://www.npr.org/2021/02/06/964822479/supreme-court-rules-against-california-ban-on-in-person-worship-amid-the-pandemi

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

      In March 2018, a reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer contacted Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services to inform him that they had learned through interviewing a same-sex couple that they had been turned down by two foster care agencies based on their sexual orientation.  Upon being informed a Human Services employee reached out to one of the agencies, Catholic Social Services (CSS), to remind them of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance.  This ordinance made it unlawful for public accommodations to be withheld from individuals based on their sexual orientation and issued CSS a new contract that included language barring them from refusing to give a foster care license to same-sex couples.  As a result of Catholic Social Services refusing to uphold the Fair Practice Ordinance, the city of Philadelphia suspended CSS’s contract with the city’s Office of Children and Families.  Consequently, CSS bought a lawsuit against the City of Philadelphia arguing that they were able to opt-out of the city’s nondiscrimination policy under the First Amendment.      

     On July 13th, 2018, the local district court ruled that CSS did not have the right to discriminate against same-sex possible foster parents based on their religious belief and their request for a preliminary injunction was dismissed.  Within the court documents, the judge found that the City was within its rights to enforce their contracted agencies to obey the Fair Practices Ordinance.  Especially since CSS is funded by taxpayer dollars and when an organization receives funding from the government that organization is required to follow governmental ordinances.  Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that religious organizations receiving government funding may not support "inherently religious” activities.  CSS then appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third. And on April 22, 2019, the Third Circuit rejected Catholic Social Services argument and upheld the local district ruling.  The Third Circuit sided with the district court because they believe that religious beliefs are protected; however, that does not make religiously-based behavior exempt from neutrally applied legal requirements. 

     Catholic Social Services again appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and on November 4th, 2020, each side was able to take their arguments in front of the justices.  The questions that the court is faced with answering, as written by CSS is 

          “1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable?  2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith?  3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs?”

     Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, referred by CSS in their questions, is a case that argued in 1989 focused on two individuals working at a private drug rehabilitation facility took peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, as part of their religious ceremony at the Native American Church. As a result, the two counselors were fired and filed for unemployment benefits; the State denied their claim as they found the reason for their dismissal was listed as misconduct.  The counselors sued the State, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the State’s decision and said they were entitled to unemployment benefits. The State appealed the decision to the Oregon Supreme Court who also sided with the counselors; and, as a result, the State appealed the decision once more and was allowed to present their case in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oregon stated in the concurring opinion that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use and deny unemployment benefits for individuals dismissed for that reason; this ruling is based on the fact that neutral laws do not burden free exercise. Employment Division v. Smith is the perfect case to use when thinking about Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.  The city of Philadelphia has a mandated ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation that is applied neutrally to all individuals and does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 

     In my opinion, agree with the City of Philadelphia and the lower court’s ruling that CSS should not be permitted to discriminate against same-sex couples based on the Fair Practices Ordinance and the precedent set by Employment Division v. Smith.  The City’s ordinance does not violate the Free Exercise Clause as Catholics are not targeted by the policy at all, so I believe that CSS will have a difficult time proving that the city would allow for another religious organization to deny foster children based on their sexual orientation.  Furthermore, I do not believe that the government violated the First Amendment by making a religious agency follow a nondiscrimination policy even if it goes against the organization’s religious beliefs.  When a religious agency is being contracted and funded by the State, they are required to follow the same rules and regulations as if they were a part of the State.  Since Catholic Social Services decided to work with the state, they are required to follow state mandates.  I also agree with the ruling of Employment Division v. Smith as religious organizations are not above state statutes, similarly to how Reynolds was not above the statute prohibiting bigamy (Reynolds v. United States). Using both cases as precedent, though the Supreme Court is not committed to precedent, for this ruling, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court would side justly with CSS.  And while I believe the Supreme Court should rule in favor of the City of Philadelphia it is difficult to say which way the court will swing on this ruling given the makeup of the Justices, there is a majority of justices who tend to lean more conservatively which opens the door to a reversal of the Third Circuit’s decision and a favorable ruling for Catholic Social Services.