Are the free exercise of religion and employment mutually exclusive? (Ricks v. Idaho Board of Contractors)

    George Ricks is a 59-year-old man who has spent the duration of his life taking care of his four children, working in construction, and studying the Bible. In order to provide for his family, George Ricks attempted to register with the Idaho Board of Contractors in 2014 to become an independent contractor, as it is a misdemeanor to work as an independent contractor without registering with the state. George Ricks asked to use another means of identification other than his social security number for his registration, such as his birth certificate, as it is against his religious beliefs to be required to use a “government-issued identification number”. Although this is not a very common religious belief, it is recognized and comes from an interpretation of Revelation 13:16-18 in the Bible. Foreign residents that apply for the same registration do not have social security numbers and their registrations are approved.

    Despite other accommodations that were made, Ricks’ willingness to provide other means of identification, and the Board’s ability to get the same information from their state records, the request was still denied. Ricks then filed a lawsuit against the Idaho Board of Contractors in 2016 on the basis that the refusal to accommodate his religious beliefs is a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise. In the case United States v. Ballard (1944) a precedent was established that the truth or falsity of a religious belief is not up for the Court as long as it is sincerely held. The state courts had no question or doubt about Ricks’ sincerity in his beliefs. The intent of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was to protect religious minorities, no matter how uncommon they are, and this belief is recognized and sincere. The actions that were taken by the Idaho Board of Contractors not only put a substantial burden on a hardworking family man, but they set a dangerous precedent allowing the government to use facial neutrality as an excuse to limit the free exercise of religion for their benefit.

    There is a federal law that provides additional funding to the Board of Contractors if they collect contractors’ social security numbers. This is not a standard practice or mandatory requirement; it is an incentive. The intent of the law is to assist the government in tracking delinquent fathers. Further, the compelling government interest may be the intent of the law, but the compelling state interest of Idaho is working to secure additional funding. With that being said, the question this case asks is this: Does the Idaho Board of Contractors’ refusal to register applicants that seek religious accommodations violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? Both the Idaho District Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals ruled against Ricks, and after appealing to the Supreme Court in July 2019, the Court denied certiorari in July 2021. The state courts relied on Employment Division v. Smith (1990) to say that requiring a social security number would be neutral and generally applicable, so the government is not required to make any accommodations if religious exercise is burdened by the law. This case would bring that precedent into question and the courts made the decision to side with the state of Idaho.

    

    I do not agree with the decisions of the lower courts because I believe that George Ricks should not have been put in a position to choose between exercising his religious beliefs and providing for his family. When the government puts someone in a position to choose between their religious beliefs and making a living to provide for their family, the burden is no longer a simple and indirect byproduct of a neutral law that allows the government to avoid responsibility. Beyond that, I don’t believe that the federal law is neutral and generally applicable. Those who have objections to using Social Security numbers as a means for government identification, most often object because of their religious beliefs. In Bowen v. Roy (1986) Justice O’Connor wrote that even though the government has a legitimate interest, they did not show that other means of identification wouldn’t suffice for the small number of applicants with religious objections to supplying their Social Security numbers and an administrative inconvenience is not sufficient to justify a burden on free exercise.

    

    The federal law may be facially neutral and have a legitimate interest in tracking delinquent fathers, but it is not neutral in practice and has a disparate impact on religious minorities. Denying the registration without obtaining a Social Security number directly from Ricks is certainly not the least restrictive means to achieve the state’s goals. George Ricks is a 59-year-old man who has spent most of his life providing for his four children, he is not a high-risk candidate for becoming a delinquent father or fleeing from his responsibilities to his family. If the First Amendment doesn’t protect the religious exercise of an upstanding man like George Ricks, who does it protect?

Sources:

Ricks v. Idaho Board of Contractors (2021) - Becket Law

SCOTUS Petition for Certiorari - Becket Law

Why a case about one Idaho man's distinctive religious belief could be headed to the Supreme Court - Deseret News

Minton v. Dignity Health: Should Hospitals Be Allowed to Prevent Transgender Individuals From Receiving Care?

    Evan Minton is a 35-year-old transgender man who had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a medical condition resulting from the feeling of incongruence between one’s gender identity and one’s sex assigned at birth. As a result, he was scheduled to receive a hysterectomy to treat his condition at Mercy San Juan Medical Center, a hospital in the religious Dignity Health chain. Mr. Minton’s surgeon was someone who regularly performed hysterectomies and even had one scheduled immediately following Mr. Minton’s scheduled procedure. Two days prior to his operation,  a nurse called to discuss the final details of the surgery and during the conversation, Milton mentioned that he is transgender. The next day, the surgeon was told that he couldn’t perform the surgery, and a representative from the hospital called to cancel the procedure. 

    Dignity Health regularly performs this kind of medical procedure to patients who are not transgender. The surgeon assigned to this case has said that this is the first time the hospital has ever prevented her from doing this surgery and that it is clear that it was canceled for religious reasons because of Minton being transgender. The lawsuit, filed in state court in California, alleges that Dignity Health’s cancellation of the hysterectomy because Mr. Minton is transgender, violates California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits businesses from discrimination based on gender identity. The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed the case, and Mr. Minton appealed. The case brings up the question: Should the hospital’s actions of refusing to allow Minton’s doctor to perform a hysterectomy procedure be protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

    In 2019, the California Court of Appeal decided that Minton could pursue a claim for discrimination based on the hospital’s cancellation of his surgery. They also ruled that Dignity Health doesn’t have a constitutional right to violate California's nondiscrimination law. Eventually, the case made its way all the way up to the Supreme Court. However, they declined to hear the case. 

    This is a case where both sides can make extremely interesting and valid arguments. In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled on similar cases regarding LQBTQ rights in the past. In Fulton v. Philadelphia, the city of Philadelphia refused to contract with Catholic Social Services because they wouldn’t allow children to be placed in homes of same-sex couples for religious reasons. Eventually, the court would rule that the city's actions violated CCS's right to free exercise of religion and that the anti-discrimination law that Philadelphia had in place wasn’t neutral and therefore, couldn’t be used to defend their actions. On the other hand, in Employment Division v. Smith, the court held that an individual's religious beliefs shouldn’t excuse them from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the government is free to regulate. Additionally, there are cases like Bostock v. Clayton County which prohibited employment discrimination against any individual because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Taking these decisions into consideration and comparing them to my own understanding of Minton v. Dignity Health, it is my belief that the hospital was wrong to prevent Minton from receiving that surgery. The California Unruh Civil Rights Act is a clear and neutral law that ensures that all persons within the jurisdiction of the state are free and equal and no matter what they are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind. The hospital’s refusal of these rights to Minton was a clear violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. Given the previous ruling of Employment Division v. Smith Dignity Health should not be permitted to act on and promote discrimination based on gender identity just because of their religious beliefs. Unlike the ruling in Fulton v. Philadelphia, I believe this California law to be completely neutral and therefore, completely enforceable. All individuals should be able to receive any necessary medical treatment regardless of any other factor. When it comes to health, discrimination of any kind shouldn’t be tolerated. Undertaking this case wouldn’t have provided any additional burden on the hospital, especially since the surgeon was willing to perform the surgery and was prevented from doing so. Allowing the hospital to discriminate in this case could lead to the presence of a slippery slope and push the limits of what forms of discrimination might be accepted in the future. In order to prevent this from happening, we must recognize that Dignity Health’s actions in this were incorrect and a clear violation of Mr. Minton’s rights. Thus, this is a case in which I would say it is ok to limit one’s free exercise of religion.

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/minton-v-dignity-health

https://www.nclrights.org/our-work/cases/minton-v-dignity-health/

https://www.aclusocal.org/en/cases/minton-v-dignity-health

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1135/147839/20200715145919525_19-1135%20Dignity%20Health%20v%20Evan%20Minton%20Brief%20in%20Opposition.pdf

Middle School Teacher Refuses to refer to Students by there Preferred Names and Pronouns

Pamala Richard is a Math Teacher at Fort Riley Middle School in Kansas.  She has recently sued her superintendent, school board members and principal after she was suspended for her refusal to call students by their preferred names and pronouns.  Richard claimed that this suspension was a clear violation of her first amendment right to freedom of religion and freedom of speech.  She believed that the school was forcing her to go against her own religious convictions.  She does not say what religion she is specifically but she states that "God irrevocably creates each person as a man or woman" thus creating a violation of her freedom of  religion.

Pamala Richard was suspended for three days on the account of 11 different policy violations in the School's Diversity and Inclusion rules.  Richard claims in the literature of her lawsuit that her improper use of children's names and pronouns does not harm the students in anyway or inhibit their ability to learn.  Despite this assertion, many LGBTQ+ organizations throughout the world have stated that this does actually harm students in an irreversible way.  Stating that misgendering students can effect their mental health and their own self confidence.  It is also important to note that the Fort Riley Middle School - School District had recently made changes to their own Diversity and Inclusion policies.  These changes required teachers, faculty and staff to refer to students by their preferred name and pronouns.  Richard had attempted to call for religious exemptions from this rule but her requests were denied, leading her to file this lawsuit.

This case deals with the key issue of freedom religion in Public School's.  It deals with the direct problem of the Sherbert Test and as if a religious based exemption should be allocated from an otherwise valid law.  This can be viewed when looking at the perspective of if there is a substantial burden or if there is compelling interest by the state.  I am of the opinion that there is definitely a compelling state interest for them to uphold the laws that were created in the Diversity and Inclusion rules.  When students are misgendered or their incorrect name and pronouns are used, there is severe damage being done.  Children are having their self esteems hurt and their identity put into question.  This can affect their mental health and in turn hurt their education.  Additionally, I think that there is not a substantial burden on Richard to just call students by their preferred names and pronouns.  She does not explicitly state what her religion is, nor does she specifically site any reason as to why this would be detrimental to her religion.  I also tend to take an Accommodationist point of view, and I believe that this is not discriminatory explicitly to one religion and that this can be a neutral law against all religions.

For these reasons I think that I would not side with Richard and I would make her either find a new job or make sure she complies with all of the Diversity and Inclusion laws that the School District has in place.  Despite this being a public school, I still think that there is compelling state interest to not inflict harm to the mental health of middle school students and that there is a no substantial burden to Richard.

Secular Crosses?

On Lynn Mountain in Elizabethton, Tennesse, there are three crosses. These crosses have been on the hillside since 1953, as a project done by a Sunday school class. During WWII, the hillside was a place where many women would go to pray for their sons and husbands, so it has often been seen as a sacred place. The groups of boys who initially had the idea for the project wanted to share their faith and love of God with the community, and since then, the crosses have become an example of the deep faith of the community in Carter County. The idea for the project was approved by city leaders at the time, but in 2018, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, a Wisconsin-based organization, wrote to Elizabethton to try and get the crosses removed. There is a concern that the crosses can be viewed as an establishment of religion by the town as the crosses are located on city property. Karen Heineman, the legal fellow for the FFRF, pointed out that recently, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Establishment Clause to include “established religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices” (WCYB). The town has fought back with many of the City’s residents in opposition to the removal. Protests are occurring in the town, but no formal litigation has started yet. 

The main question in this case is whether the crosses constitute an establishment of religion. Crosses are typically a religious symbol, and they are on public property owned by the city. The party who is raising the concern over the establishment of religion has never visited the town of Elizabethton and were misinformed about the crosses, as there are apparently another set of crosses across the town that are on private property. Outside of this confusion, though, Heineman continues to argue that there do not appear to be any other messages or meaning besides an endorsement of Christianity. This case is similar to the case Stone v Graham in which the Supreme Court ruled that a Kentucky law requring the Ten Commandments to be posted in every public classroom was a violation of the establishment clause. There was an argument that the Commandments had a secular purpose and there would even be a print at the bottom of each, pointing out this purpose in the legal code of the law of the US. In Elizabethton, the crosses may be allowed if there is a secular purpose behind them. Also, there are arguments that the town residents will be incredibly upset if these crosses are taken down, as they are an important symbol in the community. There have not been complaints from residents before, and the ones bringing this complaint are from outside the area.

 

In my opinion, I believe this is considered a clear establishment of religion. Constitutionality is more important than feelings or emotions, so it may be upsetting to the residents if they are taken down because many believe in what the crosses represent, but I find it difficult to see the secular purpose behind them. A court does not want to rule on centrality, but a cross is the most important symbol in the Christian faiths. Also, the crosses are on public property, hence, there is no separation of church and state. Tradition plays a role, as the town is clearly very religious and traditional with the Christian faith, and there were no complaints by minority religious groups beforehand. However, the placement of the crosses is not neutral, as it clearly supports the Christian faith. I think it can be argued that there is no compelling state interest to take down the crosses because there was no violence or evidence that people were opposed to them before this out-of-state group interferred. Regardless, this case comes down to the fact that there is a religious symbol on public property.

If the crosses are allowed to stay, this becomes a slippery slope. The establishment clause helps protect minority religious groups from being subjected to majority opinions. In this case, it appears that the government in the city is supporting religions of the cross, disregarding other faiths. Interestingly, in American Legion v. The American Humanist Association, the Supreme Court recently ruled that a cross in a memorial park honoring veterans in Bladensburg, Maryland, was not considered an establishment of religion. In this case, the Park and Planning sector of the government even paid for repairs to the cross. The court argued that the cross passed the Lemon test, not advancing, inhibiting, or endorsing religion because it has a historical importance. The difference here is that the cross was part of a memorial, instead of just a plot of public land on a hilltop. If the government allows these crosses, they can start allowing more religious symbols or religious messages to be passed around in an unconstitutional manner. I think it is unconstitutional to allow for such a blatantly religious symbol to be allowed to sit on public property in view of an entire town. 

Sources:

https://www.wjhl.com/news/local/creating-the-crosses-the-origin-story-of-the-three-crosses-in-elizabethton/

https://www.wate.com/news/organization-calls-for-removal-of-elizabethton-crosses/

https://www.wkrn.com/news/tennessee-news/protestors-gather-in-support-of-elizabethton-crosses/

https://newschannel9.com/news/local/freedom-from-religion-foundation-wants-crosses-in-elizabethton-taken-down

https://www.britannica.com/event/Stone-v-Graham

Janny v. Gamez

In 2015, Mark Janny violated his parole and consequently was sent by his parole officer to live at the Denver Rescue Mission, a homeless shelter in Colorado. However, this Mission participated in a program called "Steps for Success", a Christian-based program that required its residents to participate in mandatory prayer, bible study, and church attendance. Janny, an atheist, objected to these terms and his parole officer told him that he could either go to this place or back to jail. Less than a week later, the Mission kicked Janny out, and he returned to jail. He quickly sued his parole officer for violating his First Amendment rights and for state-endorsed coercion per the Establishment Clause. A federal court ruled against him, only for that decision to be reversed by the federal district court. While it is unclear whether or not this case is going to the Supreme Court, it is still an interesting situation to examine. The main questions here are 1. Was Janny's freedom of religion violated by sending him to this program, and 2. Did the state aid an establishment of religion when it sent Janny to the Mission? 

While this appears to be a very open-and-shut case, the question remains as to why the district court ruled against Janny. The documents around the decision say that the court made use of the Lemon test, as established in Lemon v. Kurtzman. The test is often used as a guideline in determining violations of Establishment Clause. It says that there must be a secular purpose to the law, a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion, and the law must avoid excessive entanglement between government and religion. I'm going to list a few of the arguments of the district court concerning Janny and why they ruled against him. Something important to note is that these charges are not passively laid at the feet of the government to defend against. Rather, this is something Janny had to prove by the opinion of the court. Something also to note is that Janny had previously violated his parole, and thus, with the help of his parole officer, had to find somewhere else to live, which ended up being the Mission.

When it comes to the issue of secular purpose, the court noted that Janny did not have any evidence to prove that his placement there was religiously motivated. While some may think the decision to place him there was enough of a reason, the court used precedence from the case Am. Atheists Inc. v. Davenport, where it was said that, "We will not lightly attribute unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where we can discern a plausible secular purpose." This quote can be found here, on page 6. The secular purpose, in the court's opinion, was Janny's rehabilitation. To that extent, I agree. This was Janny's second chance at being on parole, and so his parole officer was clearly looking for somewhere else to put him. On the issue of primary effect, the court ruled that this was giving him a place to fulfill his parole requirements, rather than to coerce him into any religious faith. This too, I agree with. It fits with the secular purpose that the court established. 

My main issue with this decision is when the court said, on the condition of effect, that "there is no objective evidence that [Janny] was required to participate in any religious programming in order to stay there", which can also be found here on page 6. I disagree with this assessment because the housing within the Mission mandated that Janny participate in the "Steps to Success" program in order to stay. This infringed upon his religious freedom. I do not believe this was voluntary on Janny's part to attend this place despite the state's secular purpose when it put him there. I believe it is coercion. Forcing someone choose between violating their religious beliefs (or lack thereof) and returning to jail is an inherently lopsided choice. The court refuted excessive entanglement because Janny had not shown proof that the state or his parole officer had had a relationship with the Christian Mission beforehand and planned to send him there.

Lastly, the court handily dismissed the issue of Janny's free exercise of religion because he did not provide any proof or authority on the idea that the parole officer infringed upon his rights by making him live in a facility that has religious programming. I disagree with this assessment because, whether that parole officer knew it or not, the "Steps to Success" program was a religious organization, and with Janny's objections as an atheist, it most certainly violated his religious freedoms to attend these events. This case was later overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which determined that Janny was subject to religious coercion. 

I bring the federal district ruling up because it provides a counterpoint to what we may think of this case on the surface. Janny did violate the rules of his parole initially, and that was what got him sent to the Christian Mission, as opposed to jail. However, the Mission is religious in nature, and if someone wanted to stay there, that person would have had to participate in their specific religious activities, regardless of any personal belief. Despite giving Janny a choice to attend either the Christian Mission or the jail, this choice violated his religious convictions. It is coercive because of its nature, since it is inherently preferential to stay out of jail. In my concluded opinion, the State coerced Janny into attending a religious program at the Denver Rescue Mission, and the State violated Janny's religious freedoms by the Christian Mission requiring his participation despite his vocal atheism.

Davis v. Ermold: Denying a Marriage License

In 2015 the Supreme Court's decision on Obergefell v. Hodges, won same-sex couples the right to marry nationwide. Following this decision, Kim Davis, a Kentucky clerk in Rowan County, refused to issue all marriage licenses due to her religious objection to same-sex marriages. In her role, Davis served as an elected official and worked for the state. Since she denied all marriage licenses, she was sued by gay and straight couples and spent a few days in jail. The plaintiffs are couples David Ermold and David Moore, and James Yates and Will Smith who are suing for damages against Davis. The Supreme Court declined to take the case in 2020, therefore letting the lawsuit move forward to a Kentucky federal district court. 

Kim Davis, the defendant.

The issue is between the two sides both having claims to constitutional rights. Davis' Free Exercise of her religious beliefs versus the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to marry. In defense of her violating the plaintiffs' Constitutional rights, Davis claims qualified immunity which "protects a government official from lawsuits alleging that the official violated a plaintiff's rights, only allowing suits where officials violated a 'clearly established' statutory or constitutional right."

On March 18, 2022 the Kentucky federal district court threw out Davis' claim of qualified immunity, saying, "Davis did not make a mistake. Rather, she knowingly violated the law." Therefore allowing the plaintiffs to seek damages with their civil rights argument. The Constitutional question at hand here is: Does Davis' Constitutional right to Free Exercise allow her to deny the plaintiffs' Constitutional right to marry in her role as a governmental official? 

The Court's decision to deny Davis' claim of qualified immunity was discussed: "Ultimately, the Court's determination is simple- Davis cannot use her own constitutional rights as a shield to violate the constitutional rights of others while performing her duties as an elected official." The case could be appealed to the Supreme Court again, but it is interesting to note what Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas noted when the Court initially decided to not hear the Davis case. Thomas remake it was a "stark reminder of the consequences" of the Obergefell decision and because of that case, "those with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning marriage will find it increasingly difficult to participate in society without running afoul."

I agree with the decision made in the Kentucky federal district court that Davis was acting unconstitutionally in denying the couples' rights to marry. The most convincing argument is that Davis is a government elected employee who must adhere to the federal and state laws of the land. There is an extremely evident government interest in the state handing out marriage licenses, and since this is a key part of her role as the county clerk, the state interest is much larger than her own personal beliefs. Also, since she is an elected official, her job is to serve the citizens that elected her, rather than put her own beliefs before their interest. Davis could choose to not politically or personally support same-sex marriage, but to deny these couples marriage license is vehemently against the law and her role as clerk. 

This case has key differences from the Masterpiece decision. Because the baker did not deny the couple the right to be married, but rather denied them a wedding cake which was argued to be the baker's right as a private individual. In this case, Davis' Free Exercise would directly deny the couple the right to be married since her governmental elected role is to give marriage licenses. In response to Justice Thomas' brief comments on the case saying that people who are religiously against gay marriage "will find it increasingly difficult to participate in society without running afoul," I find this apply closer to the Masterpiece case. Davis is much different from the baker since she is not in a private business, but rather the key official handing out marriage licenses. Her denying the license is a clear and direct violation of the couples' constitutional right to marry, where the Masterpiece case did not have such an impactful violation.

Furthermore, in the Obergefell decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, "The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty." Therefore it is clear that the Obergefell recognizes the Plaintiffs' constitutional right to marry. Her role as a public government official denies her the right to clearly and purposefully refuse the rights of couples to obtain marriage licenses. Kentucky statue says that "no marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefore. The license shall be issued by the clerk of the county in which the [applicant] resides..." Since licenses must be given by the county clerk for a legal marriage, Davis' refusal to grant one denies the only path to legal marriage in Kentucky, clearly breaking the Fourteenth Amendment in connection to Obergfell. Therefore, her case for Free Exercise of her religious beliefs does not allow her to deny all the same-sex couples' right to marry due to her role as an elected clerk and the clearly defined right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Obergefell decision. To say that her right of Free Exercise of religion is greater than the couples' right to marry is a direct violation of the Obergefell decision and its established precedent in all fifty states. 

Sources:

https://apnews.com/article/same-sex-marriage-licenses-federal-lawsuit-kim-davis-9b7d9a257d4637c4e8d3fb4b11c55a34 

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/kentucky/kyedce/0:2015cv00046/78194/108/0.pdf?ts=1647682533

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2022/03/court-clerk-violated-rights-of-same-sex.html

Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd

 

This case involves Gordon College which is a private Christain university and a professor of theirs DeWeese-Boyd. Gordon College is a Christain university who wants their students and employees to have the same values as them. The article, Religious Liberty Initiative Files Amicus Brief in Gordon v. DeWeese-Boyd, states that the university, “Requires students and faculty to sign a statement of faith and agree to live by the standards of their Christain faith.” We automatically see the layout of their intrinsic belief and how important it is for the university that their students and faculty share that belief. The article also mentions something called the “ministerial exemption.” Which was explained to be, “The ministerial exception generally protects the freedom of religious institutions - including religious schools - to select individuals who play certain key roles in service of the institutions’ religious mission.” This is important because it shows how the religious institutions need to be protected under this and the religious actors who are important to drive their message. 

Now looking at DeWeese-Boyd she was a professor at this college who they did not promote from her former position, associate professor of social work, because the university felt as though, “her performance fell short of Gordon’s standards for faculty scholarship and institutional service.” As a result of this she decided to sue them with their state court. The college argued this by saying they are protected under the ministerial exemption which the article says that the court needs to remain out of this matter. Looking at another article from Alliance Defending Freedom, Can a Court Dictate How a Christain College Carries Out its Mission?, states, “The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the Christain college could not make employment decisions based on its core religious mission. But it is Gordon College that gets to make that call, not a court.” Then they say this is why they have petitioned the supreme court. The main issue here is the question asked by Alliance Defending Freedom: can the court weigh in on the hiring in a private religious institution when it is based on their beliefs and message they are wanting to send to their students. 

    Here now we are looking at the universities freedom to exercise their religion. While the court isn’t denying them their ability to practice their religion they are in a way punishing them for not promoting someone who doesn’t live up to their standards. The court should not have the ability to force the university to hire or promote someone that doesn’t fit their standards or reach the requirements they are wanting their faculty to meet. The court shouldn’t have a say in this because it is a private religious university that wants to hire based on their religious belief and the government shouldn’t be able to interject in that. This is a threat to freedom of religion because this private religious university now runs the risk of the court telling them who they can and cannot hire. They want their employees to be of their faith and the court is saying they cannot do exactly that which is a threat to their freedom of religion. The university wants all of their students and faculty to share the same religion that is known by the students and the people who are employed there. DeWeese-Boyd doesn’t have the right to work at this university so if she doesn’t want to live up to the standard that this university has she has the right to go to another university. Their standards are clearly laid out in the statement of faith the university has all students and faculty have therefore they are aware of what they are getting themselves into. 

I believe that the university should have the ability to hire people that share their beliefs. I think especially because it is a private religious institution that wants to spread that message should be allowed to have the standard that their employees are of that faith. I believe that the court overstepping and attempting to dictate who this university can hire is a slippery slope. Although I do see the compelling state interest where this could be seen as the university discriminating based on religion while this is a Christain university who believes specific things and they want their belief to be intertwined with their message therefore I believe they have the right to hire and promote people who share that belief and meet their standard. 

https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/rli-amicus-brief-gordon-college/

https://adflegal.org/blog/can-court-dictate-how-christian-college-carries-out-its-mission

Young Israel of Tampa v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit.

 

The Orthodox Jewish synagogue known as Young Israel of Tampa hosts various events to celebrate Jewish holidays. Young Israel has been holding an event called “Chanukah on Ice” for the last fourteen years as a family celebration intended to share the Jewish faith with their community. In 2020, Young Israel submitted and application to promote Chanukah on Ice on a local bus route operated by Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART). The proposed advertisement included a picture of a menorah and said, “Ice skating to Jewish Music around the flaming menorah”. At the time, HART had a policy banning any advertisement that aims to promote alcohol, tobacco, illegal drugs, obscenity, nudity, pornography, politics, and religion. Since their policy forbids any religious advertisements, Young Israel’s proposal was denied. Rabbi Rivkin, vice president of Young Israel of Tampa, appealed to the CEO of HART but was still denied. The CEO required that for their proposal to accepted them must remove the image of the menorah and any reference to the lighting of the menorah. Rabbi Rivkin and his synagogue refused this request and filed a lawsuit against HART on the grounds that their policy and their denial of Young Israel’s advertisement violates the First Amendment.

The essential question in regards to this case is did Hillsborough Area Regional Transit violate Young Israel’s First Amendment right of Free Speech? The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgement in favor of Young Israel a little less than a year after the initial lawsuit was filed on February 5, 2021. The court ruled that HART’s policy was unconstitutional because it not only violates the Free Speech Clause, but it also violates the Free Exercise Clause by singling religion out for “disfavored treatment”. The policy violates the Free Speech Clause because it places “an unreasonable restriction based on content” and “discriminates based on viewpoint”. The court explains that there is no evidence to suggest religious speech would disrupt its transit system and therefore is placing an unreasonable restriction on the synagogue. Additionally, HART allows advertisements for various subjects and to ban ads that address those subjects from a religious viewpoint constitutes viewpoint discrimination and is not permissible under the constitution.

I agree with the decision of the court for this case. HART’s bus routes act similar to a limited open forum because they allow a wide array of advertisements to be bought and displayed. When they denied Young Israel’s advertisement proposal, they explicitly stated that it was due to the religious nature of the material. This is a constitutional violation because people cannot be excluded from utilizing a limited open forum when the same event or message would be allowed if it wasn’t presented from a religious viewpoint. We see this precedent utilized in Lamb’s Chapel v. Moriches Union Free School when a church was denied access from showing a religious film on school premises after hours. The same principles apply to this case. HART must act neutrally between non-religion and religion. There is no doubt that they would have allowed the promotion of any event like this so long as it was not religious in nature. However, because the ad takes a religious perspective, their proposal was declined. Denying access to a limited public forum because of religion is not a neutral act between non-religion and religion. In the end, this amounts to viewpoint discrimination since the only reason that Young Israel’s proposal was denied was due to the religious viewpoint of the advertisement proposed. Additionally, there is no legitimate argument that allowing this advertisement would constitute an establishment of religion. Similar to the Lamb’s Chapel, I believe the court would argue that no reasonable person would believe this event was endorsed or sponsored by HART. However, the Supreme Court is taking on Shurtleff v. Boston, which is a case very similar to this one, and they’ll have to decide if it is constitutional for the City of Boston to refuse flying a private religious organizations flag depicting a cross in front of City Hall. I think the court will rule similarly to how they have in previous cases like Lamb’s Chapel v. Moriches Union Free School, but perhaps they won’t and decisions like this one will be appealed.

Links to references and related pages:

Decision in Young Israel of Tampa v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit

Motion for Summary Judgement

Becket: Religious Liberty for All

Undocumented Immigrants and Religious Freedom in Alabama

 In 2011, the State of Alabama passed the most restrictive immigration law in the country.  A specific section of the bill made it illegal to harbor undocumented immigrants in any form, meaning that anyone in the country illegally could not seek refuge in a church.  It also meant that anyone that was caught helping these immigrants could be subject to criminal charges.  According to Mobile, Alabama’s archbishop, this law would make it illegal for undocumented immigrants to practice their religion.  Bishop Robert J. Baker of the Catholic Diocese of Birmingham claims that the law, “aims to shut the doors of our churches and social ministries, against our wills, to a whole class of people, denying them access to such basic human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and, most importantly, worship of God.”  

Mobile Archbishop Thomas J. Rodi also claims that the law, “makes it illegal for a Catholic priest to baptize, hear the confession of, celebrate the anointing of the sick with, or preach the word of God to, and undocumented immigrant.  Nor can we encourage them to attend Mass or give them a ride to Mass.”  Church officials point out that their institution is not in charge of boarder security or who is allowed to remain in the country, but once those people are in their community, the church has a responsibility to connect them to God.  Several religious institutions as well as the US Justice Department brought legal challenges against the law, eventually reaching the Supreme Court.  However, in 2013 the Court declined to hear the case, meaning that the Court has yet to rule in its constitutionality.  

One could approach the constitutionality of this law from two perspectives, one from the eyes of the undocumented immigrants, and one from the eyes of the church.  The Constitution of the United States was designed to protect its citizen’s rights from the government, but this law brings up the question about whether or not those rights extend to non-citizens.  If these illegal immigrants were in the country legally, this law would most certainly be a violation of their rights.  I would argue that the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion should extend to these immigrants.  

The Constitution was meant to be a recognition of human rights, and whether or not these people are in the country illegally, they are still human.  Therefore, they should enjoy the same protections of religious freedom that American citizens do.  If we apply the Sherbert Test, it clearly supports that this is a violation of the free exercise of religion.  These immigrants certainly have a sincere belief in their Christian faith, and the government action of preventing churches from giving them service certainly is a substantial burden.  There definitely is a compelling state interest in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws, but I believe that there is a less restrictive means to accomplish that goal.  Other states seem to manage enforcement of their immigration laws without attacking freedom of religion, so I see no need for Alabama to continue this practice.  However, this does raise a slippery slope concern.  Someone might decide to form a church with the sole goal of shielding undocumented immigrants from law enforcement. 

This law is also an assault on the church’s freedom of religion.  Churches in Alabama have a religious obligation to help anyone that seeks them out find God, including undocumented immigrants.  This law would mean that if the church were to offer religious services to these immigrants, they could face criminal charges themselves.  This law essentially makes a major pillar of the Christian faith illegal, which is a clear violation of their freedom of religion.  Using the Sherbert Test for the church also supports this.  The church and its members certainly have a sincere religious belief and facing criminal charges for practicing a major pillar of their faith is definitely a substantial burden on the church’s ability to act on their beliefs.  Again, there is a compelling state interest to enforce immigration policy, however there definitely is a less restrictive means to accomplish that goal.  This immigration law definitely represents a major restriction on the free exercise of religion of both the 120,000 illegal immigrants in the State of Alabama, but also the churches that would open their doors to these people and face criminal charges for it.  

https://www.ncronline.org/news/new-immigration-law-makes-christian-charity-illegal-say-church-leaders

Dugan v. Bowser: Should Children Still Be Wearing Masks In School?

     On February 14, 2022, Mayor Bowser, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, announced a lift of the masking mandate that stated people must wear masks indoors for all activities in the District, such as in restaurants and bars, concerts, and sporting events. With this being said, the children who attend Catholic schools in the District still are required to wear masks all day in their classrooms. The defendants believe that requiring these children to wear masks in their classrooms for seven hours a day, while allowing other children and adults to not wear masks anywhere else, is simply irrational. Even Congress, located in the District of Columbia, lifted its mask mandate for Members of Congress and their staff. The Plaintiffs involved in this case, Sheila Dugan and Matthew Johnson, are the parents that exercise their religion by sending their children to a Catholic school and believe that sending their children to this school provides them with important, faith-based information which is suitable for their children’s stage in life. The Catholic school is still under the mask mandate although there has been both secular and other religious activities that do not require masking, such as attending Mass. The plaintiffs claim that the mask mandate may appear unconstitutional, but more importantly, it is severely impeding upon the children’s Catholic formation and education. The children have to wear the masks for seven hours a day which has led the children to have headaches and dizziness. The children also complain frequently about difficulty in breathing and physical discomfort in class, which only distracts them from the material they are learning. Adding to this, the children have also been faced with multiple disciplinary acts due to mask wearing and the plaintiffs add that their children often have trouble hearing or understanding their teachers due to the masks. With this, the children are not only missing out on social and educational opportunities in their classroom, but also have completely lost their interest in school. With the background information presented, is requiring children who attend Catholic schools in the District of Columbia to wear masks for the duration of the school day a violation of their free exercise of religion under the First Amendment? In addition, does requiring children in Catholic schools to wear masks for the duration of the school day cause a substantial burden on their education and religion?

For starters, looking into more factual allegations about COVID-19, over the past couple months the vaccines have started to take off and be a beneficial way to mitigate the spread of the highly contagious virus. With this, schools have been found to be safer than the general community due to the fact that they have been using testing, frequent hand washing, and hand-sanitation stations throughout the course of COVID-19. In addition, the communicative aspect of education, especially regarding religion, is completely lost with the masking. In order to properly engage in the process, it is key for children to be able to read facial expressions when learning to read, speak articulately, and develop rhetorical skills. The parents of these Catholic school children have held a town hall meeting for concerned parents and wrote letters regarding the COVID-19 restrictions on schools to the District and the D.C. Department of Health. Days later the D.C. Department of Health’s General Counsel stalled by responding that it would need additional time to review the revised CDC guidelines while the D.C. Department of Health did not respond at all. 

    

Under the First Amendment, the Constitution states that no law should prohibit the free exercise of religion. In this case, Mayor Bowser as well as the D.C. Health Department continues to burden children in Catholic schools with requiring them to wear a mask for the entirety of the school day. Therefore, requiring masks solely for Catholic schools in the District violates the free exercise of religion of the parents and the children due to the fact that they cannot practice their religion without being burdened by the state. Looking into surrounding areas masking policies, the Districts neighbor, Maryland did not impose a masking mandate for private schools and lifted the statewide public school mask mandate. Most recently, on March 4, 2022, the parents sent an additional request to relieve the mask mandate due to the fact that other colleges and universities, like the Catholic University of America, were dropping their campus mask mandates. Due to these surrounding circumstances, I believe that Mayor Bowser and the D.C Health Department is burdening children in Catholic schools. Due to the fact that the children are complaining about physical reactions to the masks and because COVID-19 has been mitigated through vaccines and immunity, I believe there is also a compelling state interest for the children not to wear a mask. Going to another level, it seems as though Mayor Bowser’s mask mandate is not neutral to all people in the District, and therefore, seems discriminatory to the Catholic religion in my opinion. I believe that in this case, the children's health needs to be prioritized. With this being said, there also needs to be a line between church and state. By allowing students in Catholic schools to go maskless does not imply that Mayor Bowser establishes the Catholic church, therefore I see no reason why these children are still wearing masks in school.

Link for Maryland mask mandate:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/02/22/mask-mandate-maryland/ 

Link for Catholic University of America mask mandate:

https://web.archive.org/web/20220101045423/https://student-affairs.catholic.edu/coronavirus/index.html 

"The Case Against Masks at School":

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/kids-masks-schools-weak-science/621133/

Singh vs. McHugh

    Iknoor Singh, born and raised in Queens, New York, was a Sikh college student at Hofstra University who was denied enlistment into the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) unless he shaved his beard, removed his turban, and cut his hair. These requirements were in accordance with Army grooming policies. It was a lifelong dream to serve in the Army, so Singh requested a religious exemption from these regulations. Unfortunately, the Army officials at the university rejected this request. This rejection left Singh with the choice between a lifelong dream or upholding his religious faith. In response, Singh brought a lawsuit against the Secretary of the US Army (John McHugh), the Commander of the ROTC program at Hofstra University (Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Cederman) and other Army officials (James McConville and Peggy Combs) in November of 2014.

In the present case, known as Singh v. McHugh, we must assess the claim of religious freedom against the claim of national unity and discipline in the armed forces. Did the Army violate Singh’s free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the Constitution by denying an accommodation to the grooming and uniform policy? 

First and foremost, it should be clarified that Sikhs have been allowed to enlist in the US Army in the past with the same accommodation requests being granted. Singh argued that the Army’s refusal to grant his accommodation violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The RFRA, which became law in 1993, seeks to protect religious practice and expression. More specifically, the RFRA prohibits any agency of the United States from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion. This act also states that the government may burden a person’s exercise of religion if the burden is of compelling governmental interest or if it is the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interest. The arguments made by Singh were similar to those seen in Di Liscia v. Austin in which Edmund Di Liscia (and other Muslin sailors) claimed that their beards were ‘an expression of obedience to God’ while the Navy claimed that having a beard reduced safety and effectiveness of protective equipment. Despite the claims by the Navy, there was no proof that allowance of a beard would hinder safety. The same may be said about Singh’s accommodation requests. 

The Army initially argued that allowing this accommodation would undermine readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, and most importantly, discipline. Relating back to rules set forth by the RFRA, the Army claimed that they were allowed to deny the accommodations because this standard is in furtherance of a compelling state interest in maintaining a strong, disciplined, rule-abiding military. This argument rings similar to the points made in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) in which inmates at New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison were denied attendance at Jumu'ah. In this case, the prison officials argued that any accommodation to the rules set in place (work assignments determined by custody classifications) would negatively affect security and order. Although these are entirely separate cases, both argue that security, order, and safety serve as compelling governmental interest. Despite this initial argument, the Army later claimed that they could not provide this accommodation because Singh was not formally enlisted. Until he enlists, the exemption can not be granted and he must obey the regulation. 

I believe that the Army did violate Singh’s free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the Constitution by denying the accommodation to the grooming and uniform policy. While this case never made it to the United States Supreme Court, I found great insights from various US District Court judges. For one, US District Court Judge Amy Jackson said, "Given the tens of thousands of exceptions the Army has already made to its grooming and uniform policies, its successful accommodation of observant Sikhs in the past, and the fact that, at this time, plaintiff is seeking only to enroll in the ROTC program, the Army's refusal to permit him to do so while adhering to his faith cannot survive the strict scrutiny that RFRA demands." I would agree with every point made by Judge Amy Jackson. It is clear that observant Sikhs have been allowed accommodations in the past (as shown in the image at the bottom of this blog post), so there is no reason to deny an accommodation in this instance. The Constitution was adopted to protect the rights of all people, specifically minority groups. It appears that observant Sikhs are underrepresented in the US Army, but this does not provide justification to disregard their religious beliefs. Denying this accommodation would be blatantly overlooking the rights of minority groups which is in clear violation of the United States Constitution. We may consider Iknoor Singh as a minority in terms of his race and religious affiliation, but also in terms of his young, impressionable age. I believe that the actions of the ROTC officials are overbearing and coercive toward this young man who simply wants to follow his dreams of serving in the Army. In addition to this, I believe that this denial placed a substantial burden on Iknoor Singh's ability to practice his religion, and therefore, failed the Sherbert Test. There is far more compelling state interest in protecting the religious liberties of all groups rather than protecting the image of ‘unity’ and ‘discipline’ in the military. There is no proof that allowing this accommodation would undermine unit cohesion or safety, and until any proof is shown, this accommodation should be allowed. 

Citations

https://www.aclu.org/cases/singh-v-mchugh

https://www.acludc.org/en/cases/singh-v-mchugh

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Religious-Freedom-Restoration-Act

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722 

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/di-liscia-v-austin/