Baker v. Hands On Originals

    Blaine Adamson is the owner of Hands On Originals, a printing shop for promotional items, located in Lexington, KY. Through his work at his small business, he seeks to honor God. Given his dedication to his own religious beliefs, Adamson refused to print t-shirts for the Gay and Lesbian Services Organization (GLSO) to use for the local Lexington Pride Celebration. He referred them to another printer who would offer the same price, but GLSO was not satisfied. Even though GLSO ended up receiving their shirts for free, as a donation for the event, they “filed a complaint with the Lexington‐Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission under an antidiscrimination ordinance that bans public accommodations from discriminating against individuals based on sexual orientation.” The goal of the complaint was for Adamson to be forced to print the shirts and be required to attend a diversity training, with the intent to change his views. The decision of this original complaint ruled in favor of GLSO, but the state district court eventually overturned the ruling, ultimately favoring Hands on Originals. The district court made their decision on the grounds of free speech and free exercise. However, the case was eventually brought to the Kentucky Supreme Court. The question this case presents is: Do the anti-discrimination laws that Adamson must follow violate his Constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise, as guaranteed by the First Amendment? 

    Adamson argues based on his First Amendment freedoms. He has made it clear that he is willing to assist any customers with their promotional needs, “regardless of their race, gender, or sexual orientation." However, because of his dedication to religion, he will not print a message that violates his beliefs, regardless of who the individual is. While what he refuses to print includes messages in support of the LGBTQ+ community, it also involves messages promoting violence, or anything else that is not accepted in his religion. 

    For GLSO, the argument is that there is an anti-discrimination law in place protecting exactly this type of discrimination. They feel entitled to business from Hands On Originals and do not think Adamson should receive an exception from a law that is purposefully enacted. The compelling state interest is there to protect marginalized groups and must remain to be effective. 

    Looking at the Sherbert Test, established under Sherbert v. Verner, it must be determined if there is a burden on an individual’s religious freedom, if there is a compelling state interest for that burden, and if there is a less restrictive means of accomplishing the goal. In this case, Adamson feels as though “he would likely be forced to close or sell the business that he worked so hard to build” if the court did not rule in favor of him. This is because he cannot operate the business in a way that complies with his religious beliefs if he was forced to print the shirts and attend training. In terms of a compelling state interest, it falls on the fact that there is a legitimate law against this type of anti-discrimination. The local government feels as though they have a right to protect the LGBTQ+ community and any discriminatory acts against them. Finally, there is a less restrictive means that was offered by Adamson, which is to provide a referral to a comparable competitor.     

    The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Hands On Originals. The basis behind the decision is that the Lexington-Fayette County anti-discrimination law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity only protects individuals, not organizations. Because of this close analysis of the law itself, GLSO does not have a legitimate claim against Adamson to force him to print them shirts. 

    In the end, I agree with the decision made by the Kentucky Supreme Court, which sided with Adamson. No individual is entitled to a specific printer, simply because they want that vendor. Adamson is a private vendor, with no funding from the state. This is important because it indicates that he is not speaking on behalf of the government, but instead showcasing his own freedom of speech and religion rights. Additionally, he offered another vendor with a comparable price match, showcasing his dedication to making sure the client could have their shirts printed by someone. This is an example of how a less restrictive means can be applied to the situation. Adamson is approving and sourcing a vendor of similar quality for the client, putting in work, but not violating his individual rights. It is not that Adamson is refusing the client because of who they are, but instead refusing their message. Given his assistance in finding another option, one could argue that Adamson is still serving the client. He is just not the one printing to t-shirts himself given his devotion to his religious beliefs. Finally, it can be helpful to look at the decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The baker was able to refuse to make wedding cakes for same-sex couples on the grounds that it violated his religious beliefs, among other reasons. While this case specifically had many different details that went into the decision, making it complex and not a straightforward precedent, it is still helpful to consider.

    The counter argument, favoring the GLSO, is that the anti-discrimination laws are Constitutional. As determined in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the court set the precedent that religious beliefs do not excuse individuals from following valid laws. Since the anti-discrimination laws are valid, and maintain a compelling state interest, Adamson should theoretically have to abide by the rule. However, in cases following Smith, such as Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, some justices moved to suggest that Smith should be overturned s a precedent. This indicates the direction that the Supreme Court is moving in, which is how they would likely rule on this case if it was brought before them. Ultimately, the court ruled correctly in favor of Hands On Originals, given the facts of the case.

https://www.cato.org/legal-briefs/aaron-baker-gay-lesbian-services-organization-v-hands-originals-inc-0 

https://freedomforallamericans.org/hands-on-originals-v-baker/

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/handsonoriginals/#:~:text=The%20law%20protects%20the%20freedom,speech%20and%20our%20pluralistic%20society. 

https://adflegal.org/blaine-adamson-story?sourcecode=10002749&utm_source=native&utm_medium=ad&utm_campaign=830-31433&utm_content=Blaine&mwm_id=359180895249&sourcecode=10006838&creative=359180895249&keyword=freedom%20of%20religion%20cases&matchtype=b&network=g&device=c&gclid=CjwKCAjwsJ6TBhAIEiwAfl4TWDNVFcGJu569vXBvfmlAIoHRI8gRL_3WogKPcOz51HHOJz49RmKRXBoC9kUQAvD_BwE

After School Satan Club

    The After School Satan Club was denied establishment in Northern Elementary School, a school in York County Pennsylvania. The idea was proposed by a mother at the school, Samantha Groome, who wanted an alternative for her children to the Joy El Christian Club. This club meets during school days, off campus and is for third to eighth graders. The club trains the students in Bible memory work and scripturally based character instruction. The Joy El Christian Club takes place during the school day and students are dismissed and bussed there. Groome did not want her children to have to miss out on extracurricular activities during the school day, but there were no secular options. The school board voted on the establishment of the organization and all but one member voted no. School officials also told the club discretely that if they remove the word “satan” from the club name they would have a better chance of being established. Despite the perception of the club, the Temple says their goal is not to convert students to Satanism. Their goal is to teach students about “the natural wonders surrounding them, not a fear of everlasting other-worldly horrors” (New York Post). Following the denial of their establishment, the Satanic Temple is suing. They are suing on the grounds that Northern Elementary School violated their constitutional rights by not allowing them to establish themselves despite the existence of other clubs at the school.

    This case brings up multiple constitutional issues involving religious rights. There is both the issue of an establishment of religion, as well as the issue of free exercise of religion. First, although it is not the purpose of the lawsuit that has been filed, there seems to be an issue of an establishment of religion. In McCollum v. Board of Education, the question of released time was addressed when there was only one option and some students felt ostracized for not attending. Groome says that the reason she wanted to establish the club is because her children did not have a secular option for when the students left school to go to a religious club. The reason that one would likely argue that it is constitutional, despite the feeling of ostracization for not attending, is that the club took place off public school grounds. In Zorach v. Clauson, the court decided that if the release time took place off school grounds then there was no constitutional violation in place. There is then the question of whether the denial of the After School Satan Club is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The first case to look at to answer this is Good News Club v. Milford Central School. In this case, the court decided that a club could not be denied access based on the viewpoints of the club. They decided that all groups should have equal access to a limited open forum regardless of their religious viewpoints. The counter argument that someone may make to this is that the Satanic Temple is not a legitimate religious organization and therefore they should not be given the same rights. Even if someone does not believe in the validity of the Satanic Temple, in United States v. Ballard, the court decided that it was not up to the courts to decide whether a religion was true or false, only the sincerity of the religious practice.
    

In my opinion, the denial of the After School Satan Club is both a violation of the Establishment Clause and a violation of the Free Exercise Club. First, by denying the formation of the club, but allowing the existence of a religious club such as the Joy El Christian Club, the school is making it clear that they hold Christianity as a more important religion than others. Students, such as the children of Groome, may feel coerced to attend that club because they are being left behind during the school day when other students leave and they have no secular alternative. I also believe that the After School Satan Club has a secular purpose which makes them different from a club that is teaching the Bible. The leaders of the Temple have stated that their goal is not to convert people, but rather teach them about the natural world around them. Denying the club is also a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. It is clear that the club is being denied because the name has Satan in it and there is a preconceived idea of what ideas they will be teaching. The school is not allowing them to establish themselves on the grounds of their beliefs and this is a clear violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Even those who would doubt the validity of the Satanic Temple would not be able to prove that the followers are not sincere as they have multiple clubs and clearly believe in what they are teaching. There is no way for the courts to be able to say the Satanic Temple is not a valid religion and therefore they must grant them establishment as a club.

Sources:

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2022/04/20/after-school-satan-club-denied/7382508001/

https://nypost.com/2022/04/23/pennsylvania-northern-elementary-school-rejects-after-school-satan-club/

https://globalnews.ca/news/8784117/satanic-temple-sues-school-after-club-rejected/

Shawnee State University v. Meriwether

Nicholas Meriwether is a professor at Shawnee State University in Ohio. He has worked at the university for more than 25 years. In 2018, Meriwether filed a lawsuit because he was being told to use a transgender individual’s preferred pronouns and would not, due to his Christian religious beliefs. He claimed that this violated his religion and First Amendment rights of free speech and religion. It is important to note that Meriwether did offer a compromise, by saying he would call the student by their last name only (without a gender-based title). For background, Shawnee State University introduced a policy in 2016 that required the use of a student’s pronouns that match their gender identity. Meriwether refused to abide by this policy, and the university opened a Title IX investigation against him. It was found that his disobedience created a “hostile environment” in the classroom. A district court dismissed the case in 2018, however a three-judge panel from the Sixth US Circuit Court of Appeals revived the suit and sent it back to the lower court so that Meriwether could make his argument. Ultimately, Shawnee State University has recently settled to pay the professor $400,000 after four years. However, they still defend their case that they deprived Dr. Meriwether of his free speech rights and rights to freely exercise his religion. The university claims that their decision to settle was an economic decision. Thus, they still support the argument that their policy protects their students from discrimination and that they want to create a discrimination-free learning environment, while still allowing employees, students, visitors, etc. to express their religious views freely. 

This case tackles the issue of free exercise of religion, as Dr. Meriwether’s rights were being restricted when he was being told that he must follow the policy. It is key to note that the pronoun policy was established after he already had the job for many years. If this was a policy when he originally applied for the position, maybe he would not have worked at the university. However, this was not in place when he applied, and even though university policies change and evolve, he believed he had the right to practice his religion here. Even if it meant not following the policy, Meriwether was not going to call the student by their preferred pronouns. Another significant point of this case is that he did compromise and say that he would address the student by their last name, which he argued did not place a substantial burden on him or the student. There is a compelling interest here in favor of Dr. Meriwether, as well as a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion. The argument of the other side is that there is a substantial burden on the student, because now they may feel mistreated and not safe in their school environment. However, the student is not young, nor impressionable. Therefore, the argument for Dr. Meriwether is that the student should understand that he is not doing this to be discriminatory, but rather because his religion does not allow that practice. This is not personal; it is just Meriwether trying to abide by the followings of his religion. 

In my opinion, the university paying Dr. Meriwether the $400,000 was the correct thing to do. This policy was put in place long after Meriwether had worked at the school for a significant period. There were no past cases of him being discriminatory or hostile against his students; this was clearly just an example of him trying to practice his religion. The fact that he was willing to make a compromise also stuck out to me, because he was attempting to find a happy medium between abiding by his religious views, as well as avoiding calling the student by their unpreferred pronouns. He did not refuse to teach the student, he just wanted to call that abided by his religion. The university was obviously trying to protect its student, which is noble, but it must protect its professors as well. Dr. Meriwether was mistreated in this case, and he should not have been accused of these discriminatory acts, especially with no history of such in the past. The compelling interest is in favor of Dr. Meriwether because he is a professor who is practicing his religion, especially because he already had a longstanding career at the university. The student should be able to acknowledge the fact that Meriwether is not trying to be discriminatory. Thus, I believe there was a substantial burden placed on Dr. Meriwether, especially because his job and reputation were threatened when the university accused him of this action in the first place. I drew a connection with this case and the Masterpiece Cakeshop case because that involved members of the LGBTQ+ community as well, and someone saying an aspect of that community violated some of their religious values. The outcome of that case was in favor of the baker. These cases shows that free exercise of religion still does come into play quite often with these circumstances, and that it really does depend on all the details of the case. I think Shawnee State’s decision to settle was correct, but I think their motives for it might not have been so sincere. They claimed their decision to settle was for “economic purposes,” which makes me think they still do not support Dr. Meriwether freely exercising his religious beliefs. Therefore, I do believe Dr. Meriwether’s free exercise rights were violated in this situation, and that he should have been granted the $400,000 for the burden this placed on him, especially after these four years of deliberation. 

Sources:

Pronoun Suit

CNN Article

Law & Crime Article

Dr. A. v. Hochul

 On August 18th 2021, the state of New York enacted a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for all government employees and healthcare workers. This rule enforced that either these workers get vaccinated or they lose their job, including unemployment benefits. While at first this neutrally applied mandate did allow for religious and medical exemptions, when Governor Kathy Hochul took office, she partially reversed this motion. She struck the religious exemption from the law, but kept the medical exemption. As such, workers who were previously religiously exempted can either violate their religious beliefs or lose their job and unemployment benefits.

There was some controversy about this because Hochul had attended the Christian Cultural Society soon after, where she remarked of the religious objectors that, "You know there's people out there who aren't listening to God and what God wants. You know who they are."

The Thomas More Society, a nonprofit public interest firm, filed a lawsuit against this version of the mandate for seventeen healthcare workers who have sincere religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccine. These workers, although opposed to taking the vaccine, are willing to endure consistent testing and wearing protection such as masks. Others have also received natural immunity due to working with COVID patients. Becket, another nonprofit firm, soon joined with them and asked the case be taken up by the Supreme Court, a request which was denied. 

The main question in this case is: Does this vaccine mandate with no room for religious exemptions violate healthcare workers' religious freedoms? I would like to argue that if the court had taken up this case, then they would argue yes. This issue is important because it determines a precedent for vaccine mandates, in which the government would or would not need to take religious considerations into effect when it creates a mandate.

To these ends, I would like to bring up the Sherbert test, first applied in Sherbert v. Verner,  which has three prongs of deliberation. First, does the mandate impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion? Second, if yes, is there a compelling state interest for the policy? Third, if yes, can it be achieved through a less restrictive means?

With the first prong of the Sherbert Test, I would like to argue that this vaccine mandate does pose a substantial burden on these healthcare workers. Some of these religious beliefs relate to the usage of cells from aborted fetuses in the vaccines. As I previously mentioned, these workers are required to either violate their religious beliefs by having themselves injected by something which they believe to be immoral or lose their job, along with any unemployment benefits they might have otherwise received. While this is a facially neutral mandate, this revision has a disparate impact on religious minorities.

The second prong of the test, the compelling state interest, is clear. The patients in the hospital are especially vulnerable to COVID-19, and we know that masking, vaccination, and testing can help prevent and identify the disease. Vaccination, in particular, has become widespread throughout 2021 as an effective defense against COVID-19 as well. 

However, I cannot say how compelling this interest is in the strictest sense because Governor Cuomo's original mandate had room for religious exemptions. One notable precedent to this case would be Jacobson v. Massachusetts from 1905, where a smallpox vaccine was mandatory in cities, and the defendant, Jacobson, refused to take it. The court ruled against him because "the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens." However, I would argue that this case differs from Jacobson greatly because of the immediate shift of the policy. In Jacobson, the vaccine mandate was in place from the start, with zero exemptions due to the lethality and the lack of medical resources to their disposal, while in this case, religious objectors to the vaccine had a reasonable out before it was taken away, and there were other effective ways to prevent and treat the virus.

This leads into the third prong. There are far less restrictive means to the vaccine mandate, that being masking up and testing regularly, that greatly lessen the burden placed on their freedom of religion. Despite the vaccine working to protect against covid, masks and tests are still useful tools, and these religious objectors have previously stated to have no issue abiding by these regulations.

I would also like to argue that Hochul's revision is hostile to religion because of the specificity of the change. The First Amendment states that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Hochul's revision of the bill explicitly removed the religious exemption despite the less restrictive means, and she later claimed that these religious, formerly exempted-people were "not listening to God." No civil magistrate should need to determine the validity of one's religion (not to confuse it with the sincerity with which one believes in a religion), and to do so is, as James Madison wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance, an "arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages." While I understand that these are essentially two arguments fused together, the main point is that in her statements, Hochul's revision is hostile to religion because of its sole restriction of religious exemptions, and her justification is implicitly judging the validity of a religious minority's beliefs. This stands in contrast to the neutrality government laws should have, both between religions and between the religious and the secular. While the secular medical exemption is maintained, the religious exemption is not. 

I believe this revision is unconstitutional because despite the compelling state interest, there are less restrictive means that lighten the burden on religious freedom, that being using precautions such as masking and testing. Despite the precedent, there are clear and distinct difference between Jacobson v. Massachusetts  and this case because of the former allowance and the preventatives already in place to stop COVID. Due to Gov. Hochul's sole change and comments thereafter, this indicates that this revision is hostile to religion, rather than neutral. 

Sources: 

https://www.becketlaw.org/case/dr-a-v-hochul/

https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/dr-a-v-hochul/

https://clearinghouse.net/case/18616/

https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/12/court-rejects-religious-challenge-to-new-yorks-vaccine-mandate-for-health-care-workers/

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/28/covid-vaccine-exemption-hospital-00011951

Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School

    This court case follows the story of Lonnie Billard who is a Faculty Member at Charlotte Catholic High School in North Carolina.  Billard was a full-time teacher at Charlotte Catholic for 11 years starting in 2011 and retiring in 2012.  He was a Drama and English Teacher that taught many students throughout his time.  After Billard retired, he returned to Charlotte Catholic as a long-term substitute teacher.  In October of 2014, Billard announced through social media that he would be entering into a same-sex marriage.  Following his announcement, the Vice Principal at Charlotte Catholic High School informed Billard that he would no longer be hired as a substitute teacher because of his decision to enter into this marriage. Billard then filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination based on sexual orientation.  This lawsuit was brought by Billard in an attempt to receive "backpay, benefits, punitive damage, compensatory damages for emotional stress, and a court order blocking the school and Catholic leaders from taking similar actions in the future".   Billard believes that he was wrongfully terminated and discriminated against because of his sexual identity.  This lawsuit was decided in a federal court, and was recently appealed.

    This case went to the Federal District court on September 3rd 2021 where the court decided against Charlotte Catholic.  On April 18th of 2022, the Diocese appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals.  The Diocese maintains in their argument that this teacher knew that this action was a violation of the Catholic Teaching and should not have expected to be used as substitute after this announcement.  The Diocese says that it is their duty to uphold their own religious convictions and conduct the school as such.  They assert that the Federal Constitution encourages them to do this, and that all Religious Institutions should be allowed to choose how they want to pass on their faith.  This deals directly with the First Amendment and whether or not Congress is making a law regarding the free exercise of religion as prohibited in the Constitution.

    This is an interesting case as in the past decade that due with the what is known as the "ministerial exception" which was established by the court to prevent state and federal governance over religious practices and the governance of churches or another place of worship.  We see this dealt with in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) as well as in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.  

The former case was a unanimous decision but the latter resulted in a vote of 7-2.  In both of these decisions it was clear that the Court felt it very important to uphold the "ministerial exception".  This means that if these people are ministers of their religion, that they should be protected by the first amendment.  It is also made clear by the court that this is not just reserved for the hiring and firing of employees, but used for all the ways in which the religious institution constructs itself.  In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor dissented in saying that the "ministerial exception" should not be upheld in these cases because this teacher is not a "minister" of the religion.  These teachers, in all three cases, are teaching secular classes such as English and Math, which have nothing to do with religion.  The dissent believes that the teacher would have to be a teacher of religion on the school in order to be classified as a minister.

After reading the decision of the Federal District court in North Carolina, as well as the decisions for past cases that deal with the ministerial exception. I believe that the Federal Court made the right decision.  I think that this is not case where the ministerial exception is applicable, as Ballard was not a teacher for religion classes.  Ballard taught English and was then a Substitute teacher which clearly means that he was not a minister of a religion but a teacher of secular information in a Catholic High School.  I also think that this is the correct decision because this is a clear case of discrimination and wrongful termination.  I do not believe that religious groups should be able to discriminate in this way as I agree that the ministerial exception is not applicable.  This is a very interesting case as it is similar to cases that have been taken up by the Supreme Court before, yet I believe that if it was tried today, this would be a much closer decision than it has been.

Gallo v. Washington Nationals Baseball Club

   

  A longtime Major League Baseball scout is suing the Washington Nationals organization for being fired after refusing to receive the COVID-19 vaccine because of religious objections. Bernard "Benny" Gallo was terminated in late August of 2021 after he was denied a religious exemption from the vaccine by the baseball organization.  Gallo had worked for the Nationals for about 10 years and his firing caused him to lose his livelihood and his position as the Vice President of the Southern California Scouts Association. Earlier last week it was announced that Gallo would be suing the club stating that their actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It is his belief that the Nationals organization didn't fairly enforce its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. As a result, he is seeking to have his firing reversed, his employment reinstated, back pay awarded, and restitution for the malicious deprivation of his rights. This resulted in the overall question: Is the denial of religious exemptions from vaccine mandates a violation of the Free Exercise Clause?

    Gallo's attorney argued that the actions were especially discriminatory and unlawful especially because the Nationals continued to employ others, including another scout, who requested and received similar accommodations for medical reasons. As an alternative to getting vaccinated, Gallo was willing to wear a face mask when needed and get tested weekly. Both of these were the same practices that the Nationals had in place for over a year during the pandemic, both before and after vaccines had become available. 

     I find this to be a very interesting case because there have been many instances in the past where religious exemptions were accepted. For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado the Supreme Court granted an exemption for a baker who refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding. Similarly, in Burwell v Hobby Lobby an exemption was given to a family-owned business that refused to provide emergency contraception because requiring them to do so would have violated the for-profit corporation's right to religious freedom. Additionally, in Holt v Hobbs the court unanimously decided that under the RLUIPA Muslim inmates should be granted a religious exemption to grow a short beard. Given the decisions in these cases and the many others that have granted religious exemptions to individuals, one might assume that it would be an easy decision to use these as precedent and allow Gallo to be granted an exemption as well. While I certainly understand and can support this argument, I do also believe that there are certain instances in which the refusal to allow religious exemptions from vaccines against infectious diseases. In fact, in 1905 the court ruled in Jacobson v Massachusetts to uphold a state's mandatory compulsory smallpox vaccination over the challenge of a pastor who alleged that it violated his religious rights. They chose to rule this way because they found the interest in protecting public health to be much more important. 

     This idea brings up the Sherbert test, created after the ruling in Sherbert v Verner, which allowed for the possibility of religiously-based discrimination from an otherwise valid law. The ruling was that a state may only restrict free exercise if it can justify a "compelling interest" and restrict in the least burdensome manner. There has been much debate in the past about what counts as compelling or not. However, in my opinion, there being able to prevent significant threats to other people's health should definitely be considered a compelling interest. The COVID-19 pandemic has already caused about a million deaths in the US and 6 million worldwide. Studies have shown that unvaccinated individuals endanger people who are immunosuppressed or cannot be vaccinated because of their age or other medical reasons. Having vaccine mandates in place helps to further the government's interest in saving lives, preventing serious illnesses, or preserving hospital capacity. Thus, creating a very strong argument for keeping mandates in place. Now that we've established a compelling interest in protecting public health, the question becomes whether or not it can be achieved through less restrictive means. In this case, because Gallo is willing to remain masked and receive weekly COVID tests, I do believe that this is an adequate alternative that wouldn't burden the free exercise of religion. If Gallo had been unwilling to do these things then I would argue that he was rightfully fired and shouldn't receive any form of restitution.  It is because of the fact that he is offering a less restrictive option that will still support the overall goal of maintaining public health that I would side with Gallo. To conclude, I would argue that in some instances, like the case of Gallo v Washington Nationals Baseball Club, the denial of religious exemptions from vaccine mandates can be viewed as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

Sources:

https://www.fox5dc.com/news/major-league-baseball-scout-sues-washington-nationals-over-covid-vaccine-related-firing

https://theconversation.com/whats-the-law-on-vaccine-exemptions-a-religious-liberty-expert-explains-166934

https://columbialawreview.org/content/why-is-vaccination-different-a-comparative-analysis-of-religious-exemptions/

Secular Education in Jewish Schools: Beatrice Weber et al v. New York State Education Department

 Across New York City, 65,000 ultra-Orthodox Jewish children are not receiving an adequate secular education. In the case Beatrice Weber et al v. New York State Education Department et al, one mother has filed suit to change this. Weber’s son attends a Yeshiva, a Hasidic Jewish community school, and she feels as if this yeshiva is not providing him a secular education. In the state of New York, there are curriculum regulations for private schools, as there is a legal requirement to provide a secular education. Under Education Law § 3204(2), secular education in private schools must be “substantially equivalent” to what a student would receive in a public school. This includes teaching in arithmetic, reading, writing, and other basic skills. The Board of Education commissioner is the one who determines whether schools are doing an adequate job. In 2019, an investigation was launched into these yeshivas. The NYC Department of Education (DOE) found that 26 out of the 28 schools did not meet the minimum standards for secular education. Weber’s son can already read English better than his teacher, with fewer than 90 minutes spent on secular study and the rest of the school day focused on Judaic studies. In the investigation, the DOE found that English and math are taught to 7-13 year-olds an average of 90 min a day, 4 days a week, with other secular subjects not being taught and older students only receiving Judaic teachings. Weber is worried her child will be unprepared for any future employment unless he wants to be a religious scholar. In the Hasidic community, secular knowledge is considered irrelevant and even dangerous, but in society outside of the Orthodox communities, lack of secular knowledge may be even more detrimental. 

    The main constitutional question in this case is whether the NY DOE can impose regulations and secular standards on religious private schools, or if this is a burden on free exercise of religion. Other private schools in the city have joined the yeshivas in a fight against regulations. Is it a burden on the religious practices of the ultra-Orthodox Jews to have to meet secular standards in their schools? It is one of the basic requirements of the state to provide children with an education, especially since education is mandatory until the age of 16. 

I believe it would be constitutional to enforce stricter regulations on the yeshivas. Based on the precedent set in Wisconsin v Yoder, the government has often chosen to not interfere with traditional religious communities. However, there is a strong argument for a compelling state interest to regulate education standards. The effect on children of not receiving a proper secular education has lasting impacts. They will not be able to obtain a job outside of the Orthodox community, as Weber is worried about. In Wisconsin v Yoder, the Supreme Court ruled that Amish children did not have to attend public high schools past eight grade. They argued that it placed a substantial burden on the Amish community, as the secular subjects taught in school were “in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.” The Amish children had completed schooling up until eight grade, so the court ruled that the additional years of schooling would not be beneficial enough to endanger the community in this way. On the other hand, the children in the Hasidic communities are never receiving a proper secular education. The court did not rule that Amish children did not have to attend school at all, they simply said after a certain age, it was no longer necessary. The compelling state interest to ensure education for all children outweighs free exercise in this case. The court in Wisconsin v Yoder even points out the importance of an early secular education and how it can be incorporated into religious communities. It is difficult to determine when secular knowledge interferes too much with religion for it to be unconstitutional. In both cases, secular knowledge was considered dangerous to the community. However, in Wisconsin, the children were provided with enough of it to ensure their functionality in society outside of the Amish community, where the children of the Hasidic community are not receiving a substantial amount.

The Yeshivas were found to not meet the law set in place to provide a substantially equivalent secular education. They are breaking the law in the name of free exercise. This was denied in Reynolds v United States, when a Mormon was not allowed to practice polygamy as it was against the law. In both cases, a substantial burden is placed on religion, but the compelling state interest to uphold the law and maintain a safe society outweighed this burden on free exercise. It can also be argued that there is excessive entanglement if the commissioner is able to monitor whether religious schools are meeting these requirements. There is a balance of how much say a government can have in private school education, as these are not in their domain. However, it has been established that the government has the responsibility to regulate education and ensure each child gets a quality education, even if that interferes with religious practices. The Judaic studies can continue to occur even with more secular education. The Parents for Educational and Religious Liberty in Schools group is working to develop a yeshiva-friendly curriculum. The state has an obligation to ensure children are properly educated, so even if there is a slight burden on the yeshivas by having slightly less Jewish education, I believe it is constitutionally permissible.

Sources:

https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=0000016f-1fc6-dc86-ab7f-bfeed3d50000

https://unicourt.com/case/ny-sue1-beatrice-weber-et-al-v-new-york-state-education-department-et-al-1466334

https://religionnews.com/2022/04/07/the-case-for-secular-education-in-hasidic-schools/

https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2021/11/17/as-city-yeshiva-inquiry-continues--one-parent-takes-her-case-to-court

https://gothamist.com/news/de-blasio-yeshiva-probe

Prayer is in Session: Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mack

Judge Wayne Mack is a justice of the peace and the county coroner in Montgomery County, Texas. In his role as the justice of the peace, Mack is an elected official who presides over low-profile, small civil disputes and misdemeanors in court. Judge Mack created a program to open court sessions with prayers from volunteer chaplains. The volunteer chaplains' religions have included representation from Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam.

In the court proceedings, Judge Mack would invite the volunteer chaplain to be recognized before the first case. But it is important to recognize that Judge Mack broadcasted that participation in the opening ceremonies were completely optional. On signs outside of the courtroom and a TV screen in the back of the courtroom it reads, "It is tradition of this court to have a brief opening ceremony that includes a brief invocation by one of our volunteer chaplains and pledges to the US flay and Texas state flag. You are not required to be present or participate, The bailiff will notify the lobby when court is in session." Additionally, before Judge Mack enters the room the bailiff proclaims that:     "[y]ou are NOT required to be present during the opening ceremonies, and if you like, you may step out of the Court Room before the Judge comes in. Your participation will have no effect on your business today or the decisions of this court." Then the volunteer chaplains speaks, many offering a prayer and others offering "encouraging words" which are brief. The bailiff then leads the courtroom in the pledge of allegiance to the US and Texas flags and invites the people in lobby to enter/reenter. 

The organization, Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), filed a complaint against Judge Mack in 2014 citing his volunteer chaplain program as a breach in the Establishment Clause. The case is making it up the chain of appeals and is currently hearing oral arguments in the US 5th Circuit Court. The prior Texas federal district court ruled it was a violation of the Establishment Clause based on the argument of coercion in a government building. The court concluded, "The structure of the ceremony, combined with the defendant's attendant statements about the ceremony's purpose, is designed to give attendees 'a sense of being in the presence of something...holy and sacred'...Such a magnanimous goal flies in the face of historical tradition, and makes a mockery of both, religion and law."

The question that will be asked to the appellate court is simple: Does Judge's Mack program of voluntary chaplains presenting a prayer/statement in the courtroom violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

I believe that Judge Mack did not violate the Establishment Clause due to key similarities and differences in this case in comparison to the past decisions of Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway. Both of these cases involving prayer in government setting closely ruled that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, but Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mack actually goes further to purposeful block a potential breach in the Establishment Clause. In Marsh, the state paid a religious chaplain with state funds and there was arguably much more coercion present as it was not as highly publicized for members to leave the room and return without judgement. In Town of Greece, the dissent pointed out the lack of diversity in the opening prayers of the town meetings- insinuating prioritizing one religion over another and giving unconstitutional preference. 

In the case of Mack, the chaplains are unpaid and are therefore not financially entangled with the state's financial benefits. Since they are voluntary it denies the notion of entanglement between the government and religion since there is no direct funds aiding religious speech. Coercion is also carefully avoided since the signs, TV screen, bailiffs' actions and words create an environment which gives and reminds court-goers of their option to step out. Since there are three separate opportunities for those in the court to understand the opportunity to not hear and participate in the chaplains' message and the pledge of allegiance, the already fragile argument of coercion cannot be applied. It is also important to note that this case is in the setting of a court and not a school like in Engel v. Vitale. Therefore it should be noted that the audience would most likely be made up of adults who would not have the pressure of coercion to the same effect of children. Lastly in comparison to past cases, diversity of religion is an important factor in comparison to the Town of Greece case. Since many different religious ministers spoke to the courtroom, it voids the argument of unconstitutional preference of religion. Although not a point that I necessarily agree with but is valuable to the court is the historical background of prayers in the courtroom. The Marsh majority writes, the "practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom...it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country." Therefore the weight of historical precedent and recent judicial precedent supports the notion that there wasn't a violation of the Establishment Clause. I personally disagreed with the majority opinions of Marsh and Town of Greece, but I believe the key difference and the purposeful actions to avoid breaking the Establishment Clause prove that Judge Mack's volunteer ministry program is constitutional.

Works Cited

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/jul/12/texas-justice-peace-can-open-sessions-chaplains-pr/ 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-20279/21-20279-2021-07-09.html 

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2022/04/5th-circuit-hears-oral-arguments-in.html

  

303 Creative v. Elenis

 The case the supreme court will be seeing involves Lori Smith, a designer at 303 creative, and the problems that she has had with a Colorado law. First of all, the company she is involved with specializes in marketing, web and graphic design. So they can create different web pages for clients or work on marketing for them as well. The article, US Supreme Court to hear of artist threatened under ‘Orwellian’ Colorado law, states, “The U.S. The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to take the case of a Denver-area website designer subject to a Colorado state law that censors and coerces the speech of creative professionals whose religious beliefs do not conform to state orthodoxy.” She believes that as a result of the Colorado anti-discriminatory laws she is being censored and or compelled to do things that go against her religion. This issue came about because Lori did not want to design a website for a same sex couple. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered her to design wedding websites for same sex couples with a 2-1 ruling. According to the article the judge even went as far as to, “Prohibit Smith from even explaining on her social media page which websites she can create based on her religious beliefs.” With all of these factors Smith hopes that the Supreme Court will take her side in seeing that her right to free exercise has been violated. 

Looking at the facts of the case we see that there is Lori’s free exercise in question. They are taking a private business and telling them what customers to see and what they can or can’t say on their website. So now it doesn’t only come down to a free exercise issue, but a matter of free speech. If Lori cannot proclaim on her website her religious beliefs that is a violation of free exercise along with free speech. Two very important clauses in the First Amendment that need to be protected. I understand the compelling state interest of wanting to protect against discrimination, but if that comes at the cost of free exercise of religion and free speech I don’t know if it outways the benefits of the others. I do think there is value in apply anti-discrimination laws, but I also feel like there needs to be a balance between the two where we ensure that anti-dsicrimination doesn’t mean coercion or censorship of other citizens. A good point the article makes states, “The 10th Circuit issued an unprecedented decision in the case, 303 Creative v. Elenis, holding that Smith serves “all people regardless of secual orientation,” yet Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act requires her to engage in speech that violtates her conscinece and in turn creates a “substantial risk” of removing “certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Here we see the crossover between a compelling state interest and the right of free exercise. Lori Smith believes that her religious beliefs should be protected and she feels as if doing this will go against her religious convictions. 

There are two reasons why I possibly side with Lori although I do believe no one should discriminate in this circumstance Lori is a private business owner who should be allowed to choose who she serves, this couple reserves no right to use her business; they could go somewhere else to receive service. Once again I do see the compelling state interest where they want to ensure that everyone is being treated equally and ensure there is no discrimination. Whereas, there is the matter of free exercise on the line it makes this case very difficult. The government is requiring her to create a creative expression that goes against her religious convictions and that is one part that I do not like. The government should have no place in forcing a business to do something, and prohibit what they can say on their website.  Clearly violating her right to free exercise and free speech. I believe that private businesses should reserve the right to decline service to whoever they wish. I also think that there should be laws in place that deal with anti-discrimination, but when it comes to helping customers is can become hard to regulate and seem like there is too much government coercion to make people do things that go against their religion. The article states, “The government doesn’t have the power to silence or compel creative expression under the threat of punishment. It’s shocking that the 10th Circuit would permit Colorado to punish artists whose speech isn’t in line with state-approved ideology.” Here this supports the claim that not only is the free exercise clause come into question but so does free speech. Overall, I believe that Lori should win this case because her free exercise and free speech are being violated.

Is Going to Church Unconstitutional? Erie v. Hunter

     In March of 2022, a case arose to a Louisiana Federal District Court in which a Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights of the Constitution, under the Establishment Clause, were violated when he was forced to attend a Christian service. Plaintiff is a patient who was committed by court order to reside under the care of Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (ELMHS), a state-run mental health facility in Jacksonville, Louisiana. Defendant, Nancy Hunter, is a psychiatric aide at the ELMHS. Plaintiff is currently housed at ELMHS’s Secure Forensic Facility (SFF)  in which his actions are restricted by ELMHS employees. The consequences of disobeying an order of an employee results in a write-up, a loss of privileges, and decreased freedoms. On the morning of Saturday, January 9, 2021, Plaintiff was notified by Hunter that all residents in the SFF would be required to attend a religious service in the recreational

center. Plaintiff promptly responded that he did not want to go in which Hunter replied stating that “she was going to get a guard and force everyone to go” because “she was the only aid on the ward so she could not leave anyone in their room”. Due to the fact that Plaintiff was under the threat of a forced compulsory action and was afraid of being written up more or having a punishment, he attended the Christian religious service that lasted about one hour. 

From here, Plaintiff immediately reported the events to his attorney who later reported the events to ELMHS’s Chief Officer. Plaintiff was required to meet with SFF’s director, where he was given the results of ELMHS’s investigation of the matter. The results stated that Plaintiff was “indeed, forced to attend a religious service” and that ELMHS “was going to re-educate the staff and that the staff could not force someone to go to a church function”. Although ELMHS admitted to being wrong, Plaintiff still pursued his First Amendment claim against Hunter in her individual capacity only. Plaintiff believes this forced attendance to a religious service violated his First Amendment right to be free from state action advancing and prescribing religious beliefs and expressions. As a result, Hunter seeks dismissal of these claims in which she should be shielded from the liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity because her conduct in this situation was not clearly unlawful. With the facts of the case, was Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to be free from state action advancing and prescribing a religion violated by Hunter in which she forced Plaintiff to be present during a religious service?

The Louisiana Federal District Court favored Plaintiff in stating Hunter’s claim for qualified immunity is inapplicable. The specific issue to be looked at in this case is whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated under the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has priorly stated that, “the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.” (Lee v. Weisman) Here, due to the fact that Hunter was an agent of the state of Louisiana and that she forced him to attend a one-hour Christian service against his protests, the Court claims that these reasonings make up the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against state action coercing a person to participate in religion. Therefore, the Court is sure that Plaintiff’s right to be free from forced attendance at a religious service was established at the time of the violation. 

In terms of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lee v. Weisman, the Court ruling here was consistent. The Supreme Court ruled in Lee v. Weisman that having a member of the clergy announce a prayer at a public high school graduation violated the Establishment Clause. In the case present here, the Louisiana Federal District Court ruled that a state agent forcing one to go to a religious service also violates the Establishment Clause. In those two cases, the legal interpretation of the Establishment Clause is that it prohibits the government from establishing, advancing, or prescribing a religion. From that viewpoint, I agree. I believe the goal of the Establishment Clause is to create a fine line between church and state and the entanglement of religion within the government. This case highlights the consistency within the Court’s ruling in which it strives to create that fine line. With the logistics of the case, I think the main reason it was termed an “establishment” was due to the fact that ELMHS is a state-funded organization with state-funded employees, therefore by Hunter forcing her religion upon Plaintiff, it was viewed as the state advancing her individual religion. In addition, I believe that requiring all residents in the SFF to attend a religious service simply because she was the only aid on the ward is unjustified. It is ELMHS’s responsibility to ensure they have the proper staffing when need be, and due to the fact that all residents had to attend the service due to poor staffing, the consequences should not fall onto the residents. The Plaintiff stated that if he did not attend, he would be in contention for a write up or substantial punishment, leaving him no choice but to attend. All in all, what do you think? Is forcing one who resides in a state-funded organization to attend a religious service a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Citations

Case: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/louisiana/lamdce/3:2021cv00267/59056/13/0.pdf?ts=1648126048

Lee v. Weisman: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lee-v-Weisman 

ELMHS: https://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/directory/detail/1812/catid/169 

Doctrine of Qualified Immunity: https://www.npr.org/2021/10/18/1047085626/supreme-court-police-qualified-immunity-cases#:~:text=Qualified%20immunity%20refers%20to%20a,accused%20of%20violating%20constitutional%20rights.

Huntington High's Sermon During School

Huntington High School located in Cabell County, West Virginia held an evangelical Christian revival at school. The mini revival took place during ‘COMPASS’, which is a scheduled, “noninstructional” break during the school day. During this time, students are allowed to study, do other work, or listen to guest speakers that are scheduled to visit that day. On February 2^nd 2022, Huntington High invited evangelical preacher Nik Walker to speak at the school. Two teachers mistakenly believed the assembly was mandatory and took their entire classes to the event which required about fifteen students to attend who had not signed up. At the event, Nik Walker instructed students to close their eyes and raise their arms in prayer. Additionally, students say they were asked to give their lives over to Jesus to find purpose and salvation, and if they did not follow the Bible they would go to hell. The Cabell County Spokesperson, Jedd Flowers, explained the event was supposed to be voluntary with a sign-up sheet, and it was organized by the school’s chapter of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes and not the school itself.

Aside from the actions of these two teachers who apologized for taking their students to the event, the sermon ignited a larger question of does religious services on school property during school hours constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, regardless of the event being voluntary or not?

When trying to answer this difficult question about the constitutionality of a religious event on school grounds during school hours, it is important to look to other cases that may offer a precedent on the situation. In June of 1992, the Supreme Court decided in Lee v. Weisman that the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public-school ceremonies violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Lee v. Weisman is similar because it was a school event held on school grounds during school hours. However, Huntington High made this event completely optional, aside from the two teachers that incorrectly took their classes to the event. Whereas in Lee v. Weisman, the ceremony was not optional and required students to act in a manner that established a state religion. Additionally, this case reminds me of McCollum v. Board of Education which tested the principle of “released time”. For this case, the court also ruled that the school program violated the Establishment Clause because the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the constitutionally required separation of church and state. 

After reviewing these few cases, I believe the school is in the wrong for allowing preacher Nik Walker to provide a sermon during COMPASS. Even though the event was not mandatory, and it was a third party that invited him to speak, the sermon still took place on school grounds during school hours. I think that a precedent was set by McCollum v. Board of Education that religious instruction of any kind is prohibited from taking place on public grounds during school hours. The message offered by the preacher was clearly to the effect of advancing religion, and the attendance of various school officials at the event, including the principal, seems to foster an issue of excessive government entanglement. If Huntington High School held the sermon after school hours or offered a students a way to the event off campus similar to the program instituted in Zorach v. Clauson, then this would not be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. However, school hours are a mandatory time for students to be present on public property, and therefore, any religious event that takes place during these hours on tax-funded property would be in violation of the First Amendment. The school was doing their best to prevent any establishment issues by making these events optional and sign up based, but in my opinion, religious events that take place during these times should never be allowed. Finally, I think that the mistake of the teachers proves even further why this shouldn't be allowed. Even though the teachers admitted they were in the wrong for mistakenly making this mandatory for their class, it would have never been an issue if the event wasn't allowed in the first place which only furthers the argument that this is unconstitutional.

Sheriff Conducts Civilian Baptism After Traffic Stop

Riley v. Hamilton County Government

In 2019, deputy sheriff Daniel Wilkey pulled Shandle Riley over in the driveway of her ex-mother-in-law. Riley confessed that she had marijuana in her bag and Wilkey proceeded to search her car. The sheriff handcuffed her and searched her twice. He then directed her to pull up her shirt and shake out her shirt and bra, in an effort to find more contraband. After finding nothing more than the initial amount of marijuana, Wilkey inquired if Riley was baptized. She said no, and the sheriff said that “God was talking to him.” He assured her that, if she got baptized, he would only write a citation and she would not be arrested. The sheriff also stated that he would speak on her behalf at court if she agreed to get baptized. Hoping to avoid jail time, Riley agreed. The two then entered the house to retrieve towels for the baptism. Then, Riley followed Wilkey in his cruiser to Soddy Lake for the ceremony. Wilkey stripped down to his underwear and a t-shirt and submerged Riley’s head into the water.

The constitutional question at hand is whether deputy sheriff Wilkey, as a public official, violated Riley’s First Amendment rights to Free Exercise as well as the Establishment Clause.

 As stated in Kentucky v. Graham, suits brought against local officers in their official capacities are treated “as suits against the government entity” so long as the entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond. In this case, Hamilton County received both notice and an opportunity to respond, so the claims against Wilkey are essentially claims against the County. As outlined in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Establishment Clause provides that “the government may neither officially promote religion, nor harbor an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.” In this case, the state was deemed unconstitutional in its action to make a law specifically inhibiting the practice of a particular religion. However, Riley v. Hamilton Cnty. Government presents an issue with a government official promoting Christianity. If one utilizes the Lemon test, this case certainly demonstrates an unconstitutional Establishment. First, the baptism performed by Wilkey has no secular legislative purpose. Further, its primary effect both advances and inhibits religion. As, Wilkey acted to advance Christianity and infringe upon the religious freedom of Riley. Lastly, the baptism fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion as the sheriff acted as a religious official by performing the baptism under the authority of the government.

Another pertinent concept is the Free Exercise issue involved in this case. Wilkey used his authority as a government official, and more, a law enforcement officer, to incentivize Riley to participate in a baptism. One can argue that the threat of prison, and motive to avoid such, marks government coercion on behalf of the sheriff. This case reflects the same issues as those in Janny v. Gamez, in which a prison inmate was sent by his parole officer to live at a Christian-based shelter in Colorado. The court rejected Janny’s First Amendment claims on the grounds that there was no coercion by the state. I find a key difference in Riley v. Hamilton Cnty. Government to be that Wilkey, a government official, coerced a religious action with the threat of punishment. Wilkey stated that if Riley participated in the baptism, she would not face prison time. Additionally, the act of participating in the baptism presented a substantial burden to Riley. She was directed to retrieve towels and drive to a lake where she was submerged in the water by a sheriff. At the behest of the Wilkey, Riley participated in a Christian sacrament that one typically engages in at infancy. She stated that the act was about “power and control,” as she did not wish to participate but felt as though it was in her best interest to avoid being arrested.

As stated in Lee v. Weisman, “If citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.” The sheriff directly violated separation of church and state in infringing upon Riley’s Free Exercise rights. He disregarded the plaintiff's freedom of belief and undoubtedly endorsed Christianity through the baptism. Any reasonable observer would certainly view this event as not only unconventional, but a clearly religious act that violates the separation of church and state.

It is quite difficult to argue that Wilkey's actions were not unconstitutional. However, much of this case is based on the word of Riley. Despite the camera footage of the actual baptism, one can argue that this was not Wilkey's coercion but Riley's request. This could potentially rule out Free Exercise claims but would leave the issue of establishment.

This is a unique case, as there is ongoing legal suit due to delays from the Coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, just two days ago, Riley was found deceased in a residence in Soddy Daisy, Tennessee. The cause of death is currently unknown, but an autopsy is being conducted as to rule out foul play. It is unclear whether the case will continue to be prosecuted, however, it is speculated that her two surviving children may take on the suit. Ultimately, I agree with the lower court’s ruling that Riley’s First Amendment Right to Free Exercise was violated and that Wilkey unlawfully performed a religious ceremony as an official of the state, marking an unconstitutional establishment.