How "free" can religious exercise be during a pandemic?

The Coronavirus pandemic has posed many issues pertaining to religious gatherings and services. Like many churches and places of worship across the country, Calvary Chapel in Maine filed a lawsuit against Governor Mills. Calvary Chapel of Bangor requested a temporary restraining order to exempt themselves from following the social-distancing guidelines put in place for non-essential organizations. The executive order went into effect on May 1st, 2020 and stated that “the Commissioner of the Department of Economic and Community Development (DECD) shall implement the Restarting Plan and identify businesses and activities where current restrictions may be adjusted to safely allow for more economic and personal activity”. Calvary Chapel opposed this executive order on the grounds that they were an essential organization and should be allowed to gather despite the pandemic. The church claimed they would suffer “irreparable harm” due to the restrictions. Due to the size of the church building and the standard rule prohibiting gatherings of more than 10 people, Calvary Chapel was unable to hold services as they do in times of normalcy. However, Maine allowed religious groups to gather in-person as long as participants stay in the vehicles. Additionally, there were no restrictions on live-streaming services or preventing any virtual religious activities. It was unclear if Calvary Chapel had intentions to wear masks and attempt to follow social distancing guidelines. 

Any oppositions or concerns associated with this executive order were to go through the DECD. Calvary Chapel neglected to contact the DECD prior to filing suit and contacted Governor Mills’ directly via email demanding written confirmation in less than 24 hours that the prohibition on gatherings of more than 10 people had been rescinded so they could gather for services. May 1st, 2020 was on a Friday, so the church aimed to receive this exemption for their Sunday service. Calvary Chapel filed for the restraining order on the basis that these guidelines primarily violated the Free Exercise Clause, Right to Peaceably Assemble, Free Speech Clause, and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The overarching question in this case boils down to: is religion essential? Calvary Chapel wanted to be treated as an essential organization and be exempt from social distancing guidelines. Many courts across the US have considered this, and it was determined that “a state does not violate the Free Exercise Clause when it limits in-person religious services to ten people, at least as long as the state permits drive-in services”. Furthermore, the court concluded that this executive order was responsible for the state of Maine. COVID-19 is a serious disease that is not only impacting religious organizations. Social distancing guidelines were set up in the interest of protecting public health, and that was obvious to the court. It was also established that “gatherings in houses of worship present a greater risk to the public health than shopping at a grocery store or other retail outlet”, because most people shop promptly due to the pandemic. Calvary Chapel wanted to hold worship services for “no more than a few hours twice per week”, which clearly presents a greater risk. Secular places of congregation such as movie theaters and sporting events are also prohibited from gathering, so this order did not “unconstitutionally target and restrict its religious exercise”. Ultimately the district court denied Calvary Chapel its restraining order.

Although the pandemic has forced religious organizations to shift the method of their services, it is not discriminatory. Religion is essential for some, and the government is in no way prohibiting people from practicing their religion; large gatherings can still take place virtually or socially distanced in vehicles. This case is similar to the Los Angeles County v. Grace Community Church. Grace Community Church is a megachurch that was sued in September of 2020 for not wearing masks and following social distancing guidelines. The guidelines were different in that case because it was later in the pandemic, but the same principles apply. Gathering and not adhering to government orders amidst the pandemic is irresponsible and should not be allowed. The government is not discriminating against religion because it is not prohibiting its practice entirely, but merely doing what is best for the public health crisis. If the court allowed Grace Community Church or Calvary Chapel to gather, it would set the precedent for all other faith-based communities that want to gather which would be harmful to the nation as a whole. The government’s interest in instituting social distancing guidelines is not an attack on religion in the slightest, therefore it was not unconstitutional to prevent Calvary Chapel from gathering in person.

Post by Lauren R.

The Court missing the point in Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue

Sources: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue

             

https://ballotpedia.org/Espinoza_v._Montana_Department_of_Revenue

 

            In 2015, Montana implemented a tax credit program which was intended to assist lower income families in paying for private schools and non-profit organizations which funded scholarship programs. Because of provisions in Montana’s Constitution that prevent direct or indirect funding of state/taxpayer money into religious institutions, this program was not deemed to be applicable to those attending religious schools. Three families who would have been eligible for the program sued the state of Montana on the grounds that they were being unlawfully discriminated against due to their religion and that their free exercise was being limited.

 

The case went to Montana’s Supreme Court where, in a 5-2 decision, the Court found that the entire program was unconstitutional because their constitution prohibited “any” aid to sectarian schools. Additionally, they found that even with the provisions and policies enacted by the state of Montana (specifically in Article X Section 6 of the Montana State Constitution), the program in its current state could not prevent direct or indirect aid to religious schools. 

 

            The families, being understandably dissatisfied with the state Supreme Court’s decision (the exact opposite of what they wanted), petitioned the Federal Supreme Court to take the case under review on the basis that barring religious schools/options from benefiting from student aid programs violated the clauses concerning religion (free exercise and establishment) in the first amendment and the equal protection clause in the fourteenth. 

            In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the families, reversing the decision of the Montana Supreme Court by relying not on the premise that the State Court’s decision was wrong, but that the part of the state Constitution they used to justify the decision (Article X Section 6) was unconstitutional because it violates the free exercise clause. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts held that the wording of the law discriminated against those trying to freely exercise their religion by denying them publicly funded benefits solely based on their “religious character”. He argued that a state is not obligated to subsidize private education, but if it makes the decision to do so, it cannot disqualify religious institutions from benefiting from those subsidies. In his view, to not give aid to religiously associated schools is a financial incentive to act contrary to their right to free exercise. 

 

            In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg claimed that since the program was struck down by the Montana Supreme Court, there was no violation of free exercise; the program cannot infringe upon free exercise rights if the program does not exist anymore. Additionally, she did not feel that this program puts an undue burden on people attending religious schools, since nothing about the Montana SC’s decision forces those wanting to send their children to religious school to do anything different or act contrary to their religious beliefs.

 

In my opinion, while there is nothing directly inhibiting one from sending a child to a religious school, there are financial incentives not to, and that’s not necessarily discrimination based on religion. There are financial incentives to not send your kid to private school in the first place because, oftentimes, it’s absurdly expensive in the first place. And while the issue of the program’s intention being to protect and provide aid to low income families is extremely potent to me, I see no reason why that aid going to non religious institutions versus religious institutions is discriminatory in intent or practice. The government cannot provide financial aid to religious schools because they are religiously associated, and to do so would be a state sponsorship of religion, violating the establishment clause. This isn’t discrimination, even though it limits the options of those selecting which private school they want to attend. Additionally, the taxpayer cannot be expected to fund a religious institution which they do not believe in. 

 

In the article on the ACLU website, the author argues that private religious schools discriminate against minority applicants, whether they be of a different religious tradition, sexual orientation, gender identity, race, or if they are disabled, and the financial support of the institutions who do this would be state-sponsored discrimination. While I find this point to be extremely potent, I unfortunately see no application of this point to the question of whether or not the state discriminated against individuals because of their religion, which is the ultimate question the Court was trying to answer. I did, however, find another part of the article highly relevant to the decision. Heather Weaver, the author of this article, makes the argument that to mandate that the government provide aid to religious schools in turn aids the growth of religion in our culture by allowing for “indoctrination and training for future religious leaders and adherents”. In this vein, it appears to me that this issue is more about establishment than it is about free exercise. The government would then be allowing for and promoting the teaching of an ideologically single minded movement, and that is, to me, a clear state sponsorship and establishment of religion. It then frustrates me that the Court so narrowly analyzed this case, limiting themselves mostly to the question of whether this was a violation of free exercise or not. I struggled to find a case we’ve read in class so far that I found to be directly in support of my argument because I’m finding that the Court really disagrees a lot about what the establishment clause actually means. 

 

I wanted to talk both about the article and about the decision itself because I personally found myself quickly reacting to what I ideologically believe in before I was able to analyze the constitutionality of the decision. In looking at the case first, I was forced to grapple with both sides, and in doing so, the article I found that drew me to this case became more affecting.

 

Post by Jon R

Payne-Elliott v. Archdiocese of Indianapolis

The United States Department of Justice is requesting the Supreme Court of Indiana to expel a lawsuit involving a free exercise dispute within a parochial school. In the case, the plaintiff, Joshua Payne-Elliott, argues that he has been fired from his position as a teacher at Cathedral High School because of his sexual orientation. In 2017, Payne-Elliott entered a same-sex marriage and because the Catholic faith deems non-heterosexual relationships as immoral, his marriage was seen as invalid within the school’s diocese. The diocese of Payne-Elliott’s former employment stated that they terminated his employment because he violated his contract’s morality clause, which states that employees will follow Catholic teachings. Furthermore, Payne-Elliott’s partner was employed at the parochial Brebeuf Jesuit school in the same diocese. Both schools were notified that if the respective schools did not fire the Payne-Elliotts, the school would lose their affiliation with the archdiocese. Consequently, Payne-Elliott filed a lawsuit against the archdiocese stating that his employment was unfairly terminated based on his sexual orientation. 

The overarching question is if Cathedral High School’s termination of Payne-Elliott is unconstitutional as an instance of discrimination or is protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? Furthermore, the lawsuit asks if the Courts are entitled to offer their opinion on the operation of religious institutions.

Payne-Elliott argues that not only was his termination unfair, but he should be entitled to compensation. He contends that his firing was an instance of discrimination that is protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlaws discrimination based on sexual orientation; therefore, the Archdiocese should uphold the law. Allowing the parish to fire him would put the Church above the law, and establish a precedent which can authorize and foster discrimination. Payne-Elliott also believes that he should receive unemployment compensation from the Archdiocese for their discriminatory actions and the inconveniences experienced.

The Archdiocese argues that the employees of the parochial schools hold the responsibility to educate the next generation of Catholics. Because Payne-Elliott does not practice Catholic tenants, the diocese argues that he is unfit to teach the Catholic doctrine. When Payne-Elliott was employed, he signed a contract with the school stating that he would affirm Catholic beliefs within his personal and private life. The diocese argues that Payne-Elliott’s marriage breached their contract and that his rejection of Catholic teachings threatens the mission of the school. The Archdiocese further elaborates that the free exercise clause prohibits the Courts from making decisions regarding religious matters, threatening the separation between Church and State.

In early September of 2020, the Justice Department issued a brief to the Supreme Court of Indiana in efforts to dismiss the case on the basis that the Constitution “bars the government from interfering with the autonomy of religious organizations”. The Justice Department cites “ministerial exception”, which prohibits the Court from deciding employment matters within religious organizations (Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Beru (2020)). This exception is interpreted by the Justice Department to accredit religious teachers with a minister status because they are to teach and instill the Catholic faith. 

The Indiana Supreme Court will have to consider the competing interests to prevent employment discrimination and to avoid obstruction with internal matters of religious institutions. Considering the adamant position of the Justice Department, I believe that the Indiana Supreme Court will either be compelled to dismiss the case or will rule in favor of the Archdiocese of Cathedral High School. Because of the “ministerial exception”, I believe that Payne-Elliott’s dismissal will be deemed constitutional. The ministerial exception strips the Court of the jurisdiction in the instance of religious employment affairs. This exception reflects the free exercise clause and confirms the ascendancy of the Church to determine internal affairs. Although Payne-Elliott is not ordained as a minister, I believe the Court will consider him as one, because he was intended to serve as an instructor of religious faith. I do not believe that Payne-Elliott’s argument will be compelling to the Court, because of the precedent established in Our Lady of Guadalupe School. I believe this precedent will protect the Archdiocese in their decision to fire Payne-Elliott because the free exercise clause prohibits unreasonable government interference of religious practice. I believe the Court will not find the defendant guilty because the school has a compelling interest to educate and instill the Catholic faith within their students.

Post by Hannah H. 

Religious Rights on Death Row

Henry Murphy, a practicing Buddhist inmate in the Texas criminal justice system was sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer. The date of execution had finally been set, and days before his execution was to occur, Murphy’s attorney filed a claim to delay the execution. This claim alleged that Murphy was being discriminated against due to his religious beliefs and the execution could not proceed because of this. It was Texas policy that state approved religious advisors could be in the room for the execution of the inmate, but all these advisors were either Christian or Muslim. These Christian and Muslim advisors could be present in the room, while approved advisors of other sects could only be present in the viewing area. Murphy argued on the grounds that preferential allowance of advisors constituted an establishment of religion by the state.

When this case reached the Supreme Court in March 2019, they decided to grant the requested stay of execution. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in the concurring opinion, “As this Court has repeatedly held, governmental discrimination against religion … violates the Constitution. The government may not discriminate against religion generally or against particular religious denominations.” Kavanaugh then goes on to outline the details of the stay of execution, including whether the official will be allowed in the execution room, or into the adjacent viewing room according to the security related discretion of the state. Texas responded by adjusting their law to mandate all religious advisors could only be present at the execution from the adjacent viewing rooms.

Writing in the dissent, saying Murphy should not have been granted a stay of execution, is Justices Alito joined by Thomas and Gorsuch. They argue that the last minute nature of the application made the claim indefensible, citing the evidence that Murphy and his legal counsel knew about this law for years, and had been in conversation with the state for months about Murphy’s specific case. It was clear, in their opinion, that this application was a last-ditch effort, and the allowance of a stay was not in accordance with the courts previous decisions in these kinds of last-minute petitions.

The primary question in this case is whether the state's different treatment of religious sects constitutes an establishment of those preferentially treated religions. Considering the late application, and whether Murphy should have been pressing this issue earlier, should the concern over establishment of religion override the perhaps imperfect beginnings of the request for a stay of execution.

In my opinion, I agree with the majority of the court, the state of Texas was clearly breaching the Establishment Clause with their unequal treatment of religious sects in this case. Regardless of how heinous Murphy’s crimes were, or if his claim was filed correctly, the state of Texas was still establishing the Christian and Muslim faiths over all others. The battle to defend religious freedoms must be fought on all battlefields, regardless of whether the victim of religious persecution is morally agreeable to you personally. Murphy’s status as an inmate on death row also is not an overriding factor to me in this case, although it is well established the First Amendment rights of inmates are reduced. So long as his request can be completed without violating the four factors Justice Alito raised in the dissent, “(1) whether a prison rule bears a “valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest”; (2) “whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right”; (3) “what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards, inmates, and prison resources”; and (4) “whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation.” In the remainder of his dissent, Alito raises concerns over a slippery slope of allowing anyone who claims to be a religious advisor to witness the execution and whether these are legitimate advisors. This strengthens my agreement with the majority, as I believe that neither of these complaints Alito raises are complaints he should be able to raise. The court should not be in the position to judge who are legitimate representatives of the religion.

The court's decision in this case stands as another shining example of the protection of religious freedom, and the striking down of dangerous establishments thereof. It also reaffirms that even inmates are to retain a degree of the rights to religious expression free citizens hold in the First Amendment. Not only did the law constitute an establishment of religion, in doing so it actively discriminated against other religions, including Buddhism, as practiced by Murphy. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in his concurrence that, “Buddhist inmates such as Murphy—who want their religious adviser to be present can have the religious adviser present only in the viewing room and not in the execution room itself for their executions. In my view, the Constitution prohibits such denominational discrimination.” The nature of the law not allowing Murphy to have a religious council of his choice present in some capacity at his execution, when some inmates may,  is wholly repugnant to the ideas of equal treatment of religions and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 

Post by Seth P.

Worship Services in a Pandemic: Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Janet Mills

    In May of 2020, the Calvary Chapel of Bangor, Maine sued the Governor of Maine for COVID-19 restrictions. Prior to the lawsuit, Governor Janet Mills enacted an executive order placing restrictions on the size of indoor gatherings to less than 10 people. As a result, religious places of worship like Calvary Chapel could not hold their typical indoor religious services.

    Calvary Chapel claimed that this executive order violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. As such, they appealed the case to the First Circuit Court of Appeals and had their arguments heard last Wednesday. Although such restrictions have since been lifted and gatherings are allowed up to 50 people, the Calvary Chapel wants the Court to make a decision on their behalf in the case that the Governor reinstates those same restrictions due to a future coronavirus case surge.

    The issue in question is whether or not Governor Mill’s executive order violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as well as whether Calvary Chapel should be granted a temporary restraining order allowing the church to be free from these restrictions should the Governor reenact those restrictions in an event of another surge in cases.

    This issue is extremely critical in the present day due to the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. In times of national safety, the role of local governments is critical in helping reduce the number of cases in the country and slowing the spread. I strongly believe that the First Court of Appeals should not grant the Calvary Chapel an exemption to the restrictions, should they arise again, and that the executive order is constitutional. The executive order established by Mills is a neutral law as it is not targeted at preventing religious worship. The overall compelling state interest of her executive order is greater than the burden it places on religious institutions. The overall well being of society is threatened if the court decides to make a decision that puts religious personal desires over the health of its citizens. Mill’s executive order does not prevent any individual from worshipping a specific religion nor does it prevent the individual from worshipping on their own.

    If the judges on the First Circuit Court of Appeals were to find in favor of the Calvary Chapel and find Governor Mill’s executive order unconstitutional, it would set a dangerous precedent for cases regarding the law and religions. The decision to side with the Calvary Chapel would go against the established role of religion in government. Religion, while being allowed to be freely exercised, should not be affecting the job of the government to protect its individual citizens. Holding in-person religious services would put not only the individual members at risk but could threaten to spread the infection much more rapidly and to more people. This is an important legal consideration for the future as the decisions made regarding the COVID pandemic today will affect future decisions for any possible future health crises. 

    Similarly to the case of Calvary Chapel, a case was presented in front of a federal court in Kansas regarding the right of churches to hold in-person religious services. Though the court in that case did not extend the rights, they made a dangerous decision by granting the church in Kansas an exemption to the COVID-19 restriction. This goes against prior holdings of the Supreme Court. 

    The precedents established by prior legal cases only further the idea that Governor Mill’s executive order is constitutional and that Calvary Chapel should not be given a religious exemption. If we consider the case of Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that a federal law prohibiting polygamy did not violate the free exercise clause and they did not grant Reynolds an exception. One of the most significant reasons for holding in Reynolds v. United States was that an individual cannot avoid following a law due to their religion. Furthermore, the compelling state interest of the law significantly outweighed the religious burden on Reynolds. If we take those applications to the case of Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Janet Mills, then the Court has no real justification to side with the plaintiff. An individual, or a religious place of worship in this case, cannot avoid following a law due to their religion and the compelling state interest of COVID-19 safety precautions during a pandemic significantly outweigh the religious burden of holding in-person worship services. Individuals still have the right and the ability to worship, just not in gatherings of more than 10 people.

    Though the judges of the First Circuit are hesitant to make a final ruling on this case, they have indicated that if they did, they would find in favor of Governor Mills. I believe that this would be the correct decision on the part of the judges. If the court decided against Mills, it would set a dangerous legal precedent placing religious practices as more important than the safety and well-being of the citizens.

Is Misgendering Protected by the Constitution?

In 2018, Peter Vlaming, a French teacher at West Point High School, which is part of a publicly-funded school district, was fired from his position after misgendering a student.

 

The student had transitioned during the summer prior to the 2018-2019 school year and requested that masculine pronouns be used by teachers when referring to him, but Vlaming refused to comply, despite school officials saying it was essential he respect the wishes of the student in order to keep his job. Instead, he claimed he would just avoid using pronouns to refer to the student when he was present, but the student’s peers reported that Vlaming used feminine pronouns for the student when he was not in the classroom. This decision was rooted in Vlaming’s religious beliefs that he said made him unable to refer to the student with masculine pronouns, but was also told by the school that he would be subject to disciplinary action if incorrect pronouns were used.

 

Vlaming ultimately ended up misgendering the student when he was about to run into a wall while using virtual-reality goggles in class, leading Vlaming to yell “Don’t let her hit the wall” to another student. Following the incident, the student removed himself from the class roster after confronting Vlaming, and Vlaming was suspended the next day for failing to comply with the school officials’ orders. He was fired a week later. 

 

Vlaming took his loss of employment as a violation of his First Amendment rights, specifically that of freedom of speech and the freedom to exercise religion. While his lawsuit against the school did not condemn the transgender community outright, it did say that his religion prohibits Vlaming from “intentionally lying,” and he saw referring to the student by masculine pronouns as a lie. Vlaming’s consistent dismissal of the student’s gender identity placed a burden on the student and gave many peers an excuse to create an unsafe environment for the student in the school setting.

 

In this case, I ultimately have to side with the decision of the West Point High School of firing Vlaming for his discrimination against the student. From Vlaming’s point-of-view, his right to exercise his religion is being infringed upon by not allowing him to misgender the student, but as we know, there is no constitutional right that is absolute. As a public-school employee, meaning his salary is paid for by the State, Vlaming’s exercise of his religion cannot be fully protected in this scenario because his doing so discriminates against a minor taking part in a mandatory public program. 

 

When Vlaming was on the clock as a teacher, his religious views should not play a role in how he interacts with or treats students as he is acting as a public figure. If the West Point School District had allowed Vlaming to act on his religious beliefs that clearly discriminate against the student during school hours, that would be constituted as an establishment of religion as it would have placed religious beliefs over non-religious beliefs.

 

This case can be compared to that of Engel v. Vitale in which the New York State Board of Regents allowed public schools in New York to begin the school day with a prayer. The practice was eventually deemed unconstitutional due to its violation of the establishment clause because children felt pressured to take part in the practice and teachers were being paid to conduct religious practices. Likewise, Vlaming cited religious beliefs in order to justify his refusal to refer to the student by his preferred pronouns even after the school had told Vlaming it was necessary. Because Vlaming admitted his behavior was motivated by his religious beliefs, he is not protected under the Constitution to act on those beliefs when he is working for the State. 

 

Vlaming’s behavior was also mirrored by peers of the transgender student. Following the firing of Vlaming, several students participated in a walkout in order to protest his removal. This included signs targeting the transgender community, conveying messages like “Men are men. Women are women.” Vlaming’s actions clearly acted as a catalyst for this type of behavior, and as an influential and public figure in the school setting, his actions place a pressure to conform, whether it is directly recognized or not, on those over whom he has authority. 

 

Agreement or lack thereof surrounding Vlaming’s stance on how to treat transgender people is irrelevant in this case. He is ultimately using his position of power as an employee of the State to wield religious influence by discriminating against a transgender student and causing others to follow suit as a byproduct. The refusal by the West Point School District to allow actions by a faculty member that would ultimately place religious beliefs above secular beliefs, and therefore creating an establishment of religion, rightfully supersedes the need to allow an individual’s freedom to exercise their religion within a State institution. 

Fox V. Washington

     On February 6, 2020, the United State Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the decision of a Federal District Court ruling. Fox v. Washington involved two inmates imprisoned in Michigan, James Fox and Scott Perreault, who identified as members of the “Christian Identity” religious group, also known as the “Church of Israel.” Perreault has been a member of the Christian Identity for over 20 years, before he went to prison, and Fox has been a member since 2012, after entering prison. They requested the prison’s official recognition to allow them to conduct their religious practices, such as the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” apart from other inmates. The prison had recognized approximately 20 religions, including Christian denominations, but they refused due to the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. The two men said that they couldn’t pray with others because their religious beliefs required “white separatism,” which is to say that people of different races cannot mix in areas of marriage or worship. They also observe Jewish Holidays, but they claim that they cannot join Jewish inmates in prayer because “the Jewish faith denies Jesus Christ.”

The District Court ruled that this case does not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). David Leach, who oversees the Michigan Department of Correction’s “religious programming,” denied their request because they could have their religious needs met by an existing recognized religious group. He also states that their religion was known to have “racist and anti-Semitic views with a history of violence in the United States” with ties to the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups. Leach also mentioned that he denied their request to ensure a recognized place in the prison to ensure the security of the correctional facilities and avoid any threats to the custody. The district court considered the Department’s interest in safety and security, commenting that “[w]hile RLUIPA provides certain protections to an inmate’s ability to express his religious faith, it does not elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”

The Plaintiffs claim that the Department’s refusal to accommodate their religious request violated the RLUIPA. The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision and stated that the district judge had misapplied the law by weighing the prison’s interest in safety, rather than whether the prison was placing an improper burden on the Free Exercise Clause. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue, however the plaintiffs’ determined that the policy burdened their exercise of religion “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.” The issue at stake is whether denying the plaintiffs’ religious request prohibits their right to Free Exercise of religion, even if the facility believes that it may pose a threat to the safety of the facility.

The Sixth circuit determined that the following precedent demonstrates that the plaintiffs have met their burden on their religious exercise. In Maye v. Klee, it was ruled that denying a Muslim inmate the opportunity to practice Eid would burden his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. There was a similar ruling in Whitney v. Brown where the court had found a substantial burden for denying Jewish prisoners’ participating in Passover Seder. These cases, along with many others, highlight the Free Exercise Clause, especially in prisons where inmates may not have the majority of privileges that non-incarcerated folks have. However, the religious beliefs in the precedented cases do not embody separatism or violent history directed at non-white people. These cases had not entailed potential physical or verbal harm to others.

Thus, I side with the District Court’s ruling. I believe that the two inmates, as members of the Christian Identity religious group, pose a potential threat to the correctional facilities. Therefore, the state’s interest is being prioritized. The Michigan Department of Corrections denied the plaintiffs’ request with the best interest of the other inmates and staff in mind and with reference to the RLUIPA. The inmates also had ample amount of opportunity to practice their religion in various forms, without being a recognized official religion by the prison. They had the opportunity to still practice their beliefs, just not in isolated worship from others which is what the official recognition would’ve allowed. Allowing them to practice in isolation from non-white inmates could have further cultivated their hate towards other people of varying races and ethnicities. Essentially, their right to Free Exercise of religion was not completely hindered, due to the prioritization and concern of others safety, which I believe is liable reasoning for denying their religious request under the RLUIPA. However, I do see how this could be violating the right to Free Exercise of religion if their religious practices do not cultivate hate in the end if that in turn doesn’t disrupt the safety and/or security of the correctional facility.

Preacher or Prisoner

        Ryan Denton is a street preacher in Texas who sought to spread the messages and ideals of Christianity with the rest of the world. However, in August of last year, while Ryan was street preaching at a local farmer’s market, he was asked by the market director, Ismael Acosta, along with a policeman, to preach in an area away from the market as it became private property and was no longer public when the market was held. If Denton did not stop preaching and leave the premises, the officer told Denton he would have to arrest him. Denton actually recorded the interaction with the officer and Acosta and his subsequent interactions with others at the market (video below). Ultimately, Denton left the market but filed a lawsuit stating that not only was his right to free speech violated but also his right to freely exercise his religion, as he believes evangelizing to be an important part of his faith. One of the policies brought up by Denton clearly states the market is "NOT a venue for fundraising, political campaigning, or religious proselytizing," and thus, singles out religious proselytizing from other forms. Furthermore, Denton believed he was being peaceful and standing out of the way, although the City and Acosta did not believe this to be the case.

        The City believes they have not only a compelling interest, but a legitimate interest in preventing disturbance of the peace along with promoting the safety of all the individuals at the market, as it can become a very crowded place. Furthermore, the market has an interest in promoting business and economic development within the city for its vendors. The City also requires that everyone is required to get a permit in order to have a place at the market, which Denton did not have, and so, this policy is not preferential nor hostile towards religion but is instead neutral. Denton, however, argues that his request would have been denied and so there was no point in applying for a permit to which the City responded, they would have granted him the permit if he had more of a conversational tone and allowed people to come to him, rather than Denton approach them. The restrictions and policy regarding who is not allowed at the market do not single out religious groups but cover a wide array of different people including protesters, fundraisers, campaigners, all of which have secular purposes. However, musicians are not required to file for a permit, as can be seen in the video taken by Denton. Additionally, due to the market being private, they believe they have the right to restrict who, when, and what people are doing at the market. Ultimately, the City acknowledges they are violating the First Amendment of Denton but believe it is justified since they are providing an alternative location for people to carry on with such matters and there is a compelling interest.                                   

        The primary issue at stake then is whether or not the policies adopted by the City are unconstitutional as they violate the free exercise of religion guaranteed in the first amendment to Denton.

        In my opinion, I do not think that the City and the market directors are deliberately discriminating against religion but instead are trying to ensure peace at the market; however, that does not mean that the burden they are facing by Denton’s preaching is a justifiable reason to violate the freedoms guaranteed to him by the first amendment. Of course there should be restrictions on when, how, and where people exercise their religion but in this case, it seems to me that there is not that compelling of an interest to justify the violation of the first amendment. To me, I cannot see how Denton's preaching compromises others’ safety. It seems as if the market is trying to use safety and economic interests as excuses, rather than as valid and true interests, so they are not burdened with the presence of Denton and his preaching. As the Supreme Court made quite clear in Cantwell v Connecticut, violations of the free exercise clause cannot be made because of the potential burden they may pose to some people. The Jehovah’s witnesses in this case were required to seek out a permit in which the state would have to decide whether or not their religion was valid and were charged with a breach of the peace. Ultimately, the court decided the state was not capable to decide which religions are true and which are fraudulent along with the fact that although the Cantwells’ preaching may have been very offensive to Catholics, they had a right to exercise their religion and free speech. Additionally, I do not think the policy held by the City is neutral towards religion as it specifically mentions no “religious proselytization” and does not require everyone to get permits including musicians, who one could argue are being much louder and more disruptive than Denton could be from speaking. Additionally, previous class discussions have revealed that the Constitution itself is privileging religion and so in this case especially, I do not think those wanting to have a fundraiser can be equated to someone desiring to exercise their religion. 

        In the case of Denton v City of el Paso, the judge ended up ruling in favor of the City which I believe directly contradicts precedence established in the Cantwell decision and could lead to a slippery slope where if someone’s religious beliefs pose a burden to someone, it would be fine to violate their free exercise of religion.

Here is the video of Denton's encounter with the City.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

     The case, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, initiated in March of 2018 when Philadelphia’s Catholic Social Services (CSS) and a foster mother sued the city of Philadelphia after it decided to discontinue a foster care contract with CSS. Following this allegation that the CSS, (along with another one of Philadlphia’s foster care provider agents), was denying assistance to same-sex couples looking to become foster parents, the city inspected because this act violated against it’s non-discrimination policy. It found that CSS, the religious non-profit organization, did not serve same-sex couples for foster care under any circumstances, based on religious objections. Resultantly, Philadelphia terminated its distribution of foster children to the Catholic Social Services. In response, the CSS filed a lawsuit against the city in district court, claiming that under the Free Exercise of Religion clause of the First Amendment, they could willingly reject qualified same-sex couples, because, in doing this, they were practicing their own religious beliefs. CSS sought an order requiring the City to renew their contractual relationship while permitting it to turn away same-sex couples who wish to be foster parents. CSS argued that they should rightfully be able to continue their taxpayer-funded contracted work, even though their refusal of assistance to same-sex couples violated the state contract.

In July of 2018, the District Court ruled that discriminating against, and rejecting service to same-sex parents for foster care, in alliance to religious beliefs, was not lawful and denial CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the City’s actions. They determined that the city of Philadelphia could rightfully implement non-discrimination policies via contracts with its agencies because this ensured the city’s goal of promoting inclusion and diversification in the foster care system, while simultaneously, offering these services to all taxpayers, whose tax dollars fund these contracts.  Next, in April of 2019, the 3rd Cir. Court of Appeals likewise dismissed CSS’ argument, dismissing the idea that, while safeguarded, religious-backed tactics are not exempt from the law, and in this specific case, Philadelphia’s neutral code prohibiting discrimination. Hence, on, April 22, 2019, the 3rd Cir. Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's ruling. The CSS petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court from the 3rd Cir. Court’s refusal to grant the preliminary injunction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in February of 2020.  Oral hearings are scheduled for November 2020.

In reaction to the status of Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Christopher Riano, chair of the NYS Bar Association’s LGBTQ Committee, critically reviews the underpinnings of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, explaining how, although faith-based practices are supported, they do not provide leeway or an automatic exemption from government contracts. He emphasizes the city’s overarching goal in funding this foster care agency, saying that “LGBTQ couples represent a critical mass of foster parents, and antidiscrimination ordinances like the one in Philadelphia ensure that all qualified families can foster children.”

The fundamental issue and concern regarding the Fulton v. City of Philadelphia case is if government-funded foster care agencies, in this case CSS, are lawfully permitted to intentionally discriminate against same-sex couples for the sake of practicing their religious beliefs and values. In other words, conflict lies around if the government is violating CSS’ Free Exercise of Religion under the First Amendment by prohibiting a religious nonprofit from being a foster care program due to their religious convictions.

When personally reacting to this article, and case overall, I agree that CSS should not be permitted to discriminate against same-sex foster care couples due to the neutrality of the City’s ordinances in practice as well as its purpose and effect. Philadelphia has an ordinance, the Fair Practices Ordinance, which is general enough not to discriminate against just one religious group, catholics.  It treats all religious groups the same.  Thus, under the Free Exercise Clause one must show that it was treated differently because of its religion, not just that it was treated differently than others.  The Cities ordinance treated CSS the same as all other religious groups and was neutral and general in its application. This similar concern of neutrality surfaced in  Employment Division v. Smith (1987), which held that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use and deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.  Therefore, neutral laws of general applicability do not burden free exercise.  Therefore, this case supports Philadelphia’s ordinance being in line with the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment and supports the City’s position.

Furthermore, Philadelphia’s ordinance has an overriding interest for this neutrality in picking foster parents. Philadelphia’s intention in creating this ordinance is to promote fair, equal practices in the foster care system and allow all eligible, foster care parents to be considered regardless of their status in a protected class, for example, same-sex marriage. Prohibiting CSS’ involvement in foster care is the least restrictive means in order for the achievement of the compelling state interest, a non-discriminatory environment.

This reasoning is essential because if all action could be taken under the First Amendment, then a slippery slope scenario gains likeliness, and more actions would be subject to an exemption from law enforcement. CSS’ restriction should be prohibited as the law is neutral in practice and serves a beneficial societal purpose.

Residents of Kauai, Hawaii v. Love Has Won

On September 4th, 2020, more than 100 protestors assembled on the North Shore of Kauai, Hawaii around a home being rented by the Love Has Won religious group. According to Honolulu Civil Beat, an investigative news site that covers the state of Hawaii, the demonstration included: three small fires set to the beach, a shouting match between members and protestors, physical damage to the windows on the religious group’s car, and damage to the house’s windows. The Garden Island Newspaper reports that a firework was even shot into the house. HCB reports it is unclear at this time whether it was the protestors, or the religious members, who inflicted these damages onto the property. Eventually, Kauai police and the National Guard sealed off the surrounding parts of the North Shore with roadblocks, blocking more protestors from joining the active demonstration. 

Based on testimonies taken from individuals at the site of the demonstration, the protest was assembled in hopes of pressuring Love Has Won to leave the island and return back to their original base, Crestone, Colorado. Local Hawaiians find the religion to be more like a cult, showing heavy concern for the basis the religion is built upon. The Garden Island Newspaper writes, “Protesters have found the group’s ideology to be predatory of vulnerable populations, vulgar and offensive in its appropriation of Hawaiian culture, with the group’s leader claiming to be the Hawaiian goddess of fire, Pele”. HCB notes there is a video of the religious group’s leader, a woman referred to as “Mom”, torturing a cat in front of an audience of other members. However, when questioned on the foundation of the religion, member Ryan Kramer describes the religion as, “A group based on the ascension of the planet. We focus on astrology, on weather patterns, mainly medicine… Our main form of work is the Gaia’s whole healing essentials. We offer other types of healing modalities” (Honolulu Civil Beat). The Love Has Won website itself is vague, causing further opacity in regards to what the religion is built upon. TGI reports that three days after the protests, the 11 members of Love Has Won were given a police escort to the airport, as they decided to head back to Colorado. 

With a presidential election coming up, the topic of religious freedom is more relevant than ever, putting emphasis on this case. The issue at stake is whether or not Love Has Won’s free exercise of religion, as given in the first amendment (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ”) is being infringed on. As we know, religious freedom is a right of Americans; this is not something that all countries possess. It is our right as citizens of this country to adhere to and follow whichever religion we please, with certain caveats. However, this topic is not black and white, as things get tricky when the well-being of other living creatures is involved. This being said, my feelings on this case are very mixed. On one hand, I feel as though Love Has Won has the right to organize and practice their religion, even if they are more similar to a cult than they are a religion. Due to the vagueness of their official website, I am still wholly unclear on the founding principles of the religion, so I am unsure if their practices actually include hurting living beings, as one website suggested. If that is truly the case, then I think that there should be some official regulations put into place in order to protect the vulnerable population that they are taking advantage of. On the other hand, Americans also have the right to assemble and protest against what they do not believe in. Thus, I also feel as though the residents of Kauai have the right to protest a new religious group moving into their town, but only on the basis that the religion was potentially exploiting the vulnerable, and appropriating their native Hawaiian culture. If Love Has Won was unproblematic and the locals were solely protesting the arrival of a new religious group in their town, that would be completely different, and I would side more with Love Has Won. 

I look forward to reading your viewpoint on the topic, in order to further mine. Thanks!

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

 In March of 2018, the City of Philadelphia discovered that Catholic Social Services, also known as CSS, was guilty of preventing same-sex couples from becoming licensed foster parents due to the organization’s religious beliefs. Catholic Social Services is an agency hired by the city of Philadelphia to provide foster care services within the public child welfare system.  

The city contacted Catholic Social Services soon after learning this information, reminding them of the city contracts that prohibit this blatant act of discrimination. However, when the organization still refused to comply after being informed by the city, Philadelphia consequently stopped referring children to the organization. In response, Catholic Social Services sued the city of Philadelphia, claiming that it is their Constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, to freely practice and exercise their religion. 

The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction in July of 2018. Later that month, CSS asked the Supreme Court of the United States to issue an emergency injunction that was denied by both the district court and court of appeals. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's in April 2019, ultimately denying CSS's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Catholic Social Services was essentially unsuccessful in proving that the city of Philadelphia personally prosecuted them for being a religious organization or for their specific religious beliefs. That is until February 24, 2020, when the Supreme Court granted review of the Circuit Court of Appeal’s previous decision. They agreed to take up and hear the case later this year. 

A statement issued by Philadelphia solicitor Marcel S. Pratt on the Supreme Court’s decision to review the case read, “The City believes that the ruling from the Third Circuit affirming the City’s ability to uphold nondiscrimination policies was correct and will now prepare to demonstrate this to the U.S. Supreme Court. This case is ultimately about serving the youth in our care, and the best way to do that is by upholding our sincere commitment to the dignity of all people, including our LGBTQ community.”

The primary issue and question regarding Fulton v City of Philadelphia is if the government is violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment on behalf of the CSS by not allowing a religious agency participate in the foster care system due to their religious beliefs. This entire case is centered around whether or not Philadelphia is essentially impeding on CSS’s ability to exercise their religion through the actions taken within their own organization. 

My personal opinion on this case and topic in general is very clear. In adhering to the non-discriminaion policies, I believe that the City of Philadelphia should win this particular case. According to the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, one has the right to practice their religion. However, this is true if the practice itself is not breaking an already established and reasonable law. The non discrimination policies that have been passed in Pennsylavnia protect members of the LGBTQ+ community from being discriminated against or denied service by employers, housing providers, businesses,etc. Catholic Social Services is visibly breaking the law by denying service to same-sex couples.

A similar issue is seen in the case Reynolds v United States. Although Reynolds claimed that it was legal for him to practice polygamy since he believed it was his religious right, he was still breaking an already established law. Catholic Social Services has been doing a similar thing with their process of allowing children to be taken into certain homes that only they deem fit, while excluding others solely due to their sexual orientation. CSS's way of practicing their religion is directly discriminating against a group of people that have the same goal as them; to put children in safe and loving homes. It is one thing to make a statement, but it is entirely another thing to act on these claims. Since the city of Philadelphia has implemented non-discrimination laws protecting the rights of LGBTQ+ citizens, CSS should abide by these states laws. Since CSS actively discriminates against this community of people, it does not matter if they are practicing their religion in this case.

A potential counter-argument or viewpoint in regards to this case, however, would focus on the foster parents that partner with Catholic Social Services who are forced to give up their involvement in foster care. Sharonell Fulton and Toni Simmsbusch are partners with Catholic Social Services, and have been foster parents for over 40 children. City officials have stated that there are children not being put into foster care due to this lawsuit and the city preventing it. This raises the difficult question of whether or not this is unfair to foster children who are still stuck in institutional homes instead of organizations like CSS that want to benefit their wellbeing. 

A problem with this counter-argument, however, is that CSS is a program that was ultimately hired and implemented by the city of Philadelphia. It is a social service non-profit, not its own independent business. Therefore, it does have an obligation to follow and abide by the contract policies and laws of the city. This case, however, is still in process, and yet to be decided on by the Supreme Court. The oral argument for this case will take place on November 4th of this year.

Christian Family Fights World History Course Lesson on Islam

    When Caleigh Wood was a junior in high school, she took a world history course which was required for graduation. In the class, one of the lesson topics was “The Muslim World” and Islam. During the lesson which spanned over the course of approximately a week, Wood was exposed to a PowerPoint slide which included the statement “Most Muslim’s faith is stronger than the average Christian”. The slide was being used to contrast peaceful Islam with radical fundamental Islam. In addition to the PowerPoint presentation, one of the assignments that Wood was required to complete included a fill-in-the-blank section about the shahada which is an Islamic declaration of faith. The statement read “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”. After seeing the assignment, Wood’s father encouraged her not to complete any other work that was contrary to the family’s Christian beliefs. As a result, Wood received a lower grade, but it did not severely affect her final grade in the course.

    This case has implications for the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Compelled Speech Doctrine of the First Amendment. For the interest of time and based on this week’s case readings, I will be focusing on the Establishment Clause perspective of this case. The issue is whether the lessons and assignments given to Wood can be considered as an establishment of religion and therefore unconstitutional. In the end, the judges decided in favor of the school district, ruling that there was no establishment of religion that violated the First Amendment.

    Wood’s parents took the issue to court and argued that the materials clearly lacked a secular purpose and were promoting and endorsing Islam. Wood and others argued that it not only promoted Islam but degraded Christianity and forced Wood to write things that she did not believe. The school district argued that religious education is necessary because it is history and cannot be separated or ignored. Rather, the way to teach about religion is from a secular perspective. However, in the decision, the court did include that the school’s content specialist had deemed the slide in question as inappropriate and would have advised the teacher to either change it or not include it in the lesson.

    Charles C. Haynes, a founding director of the Religious Freedom Center cited the constant fears of terrorism since 9/11 and the continually growing fear of Islam as greatly influencing how Islam is treated in public schools and education as a whole. Haynes argued that even with poor phrasing, a single presentation or assignment may not be unconstitutional unless there is a clear pattern. Similar to many other educational related court cases, courts tend to steer away from making judgements on every single issue, and instead defer to educators to make calls on what and what is not appropriate. The judges in this case agreed with putting school authorities in charge of the classrooms rather than the courts. The judges believed that if they were to examine each and every statement made by teachers, academic freedom and exploration would be in jeopardy.

    In this case, I believe that that court made the correct decision in favoring the school district. Education and specifically public schools represent such a combative and stressful environment for such laws, so there are many facts to consider in deciding this case. The school district focused on the course’s entire curriculum instead of simply the presentation and assignments for the study of Islam. I agree with their decision because focusing on such an individual statement would create a slippery slope scenario and set a dangerous precedent. If this simple assignment and/or slide presentation were to be deemed as establishments of religion, it would open up the court to unlimited issues surrounding most likely any study of religion at public schools. Additionally, Wood was not compelled to state any beliefs or statements against her will as the assignment had the purpose of testing the students’ understandings of the lessons.

    In the case Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court found that the use of public-school property for religious classes violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In the case, the school was allowing an outside program to bring in religious teachers to teach during the regular school day. That is not the case here. Here, the lesson was part of a public-school curriculum, specifically a world history course, and it did not take away from the regular school hours as it was built into the schedule. In this case, no aid, direct or indirect, is provided to the schools by the government, maintaining a separation of church and state.

    A strong counter argument can be made that the statements not only promoted Islam, but degraded Christianity, a fact which might have had Justice Douglas from Zorach v. Clauson, a case which dealt with New York City public schools allowing children to leave during school hours to attend religious institutions, to argue that this event did classify as an establishment of religion. However, I believe that the court was right to examine this occurrence as a part of the course curriculum and see if there appeared to be an establishment of religion in the course as a whole. However, in Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court ruled that the reading aloud of prayers in public school violated the Establishment Clause and Justice Black referenced the First Amendment as the ultimate safe guard to ensure that the government could “control, support, or influence” the prayers of the American people (Munoz 106). In this case, Wood had no governmental pressure to say anything against her religion. Despite the specific statements which were deemed inappropriate for the lesson, the lack of a pattern of pro-Islam and/or anti-Christianity ideals, the lack of governmental aid or support of the course, and the status of the course as a public school world history class denote this case as not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue

For this week‘s supreme court case regarding religion and constitutional law, I have decided to tackle a case in Montana where there was much controversy over the establishment of religion clause in the first amendment. The article I read which covered this case is called “Protecting Students’ Right to Freedom of Religion” by Amy Cannata, the ACLU Montana Coordinator. The case is centered around a state funded scholarship program given out to students for higher education funded by taxpayer dollars from Montana. The problem which arose from this scholarship program was that none of the money given out by the state would go to any student in a private religious school.  Many families needed this scholarship money to help keep their children in the private schools, but these families were left out of the funding. One mother, Kendra Espinoza, along with the help of other families in the area, decided to file a  lawsuit in the local state court challenging  whether the State’s decision was in violation of the first amendment in the constitution which protects the freedom of religion and exemption from religion based unequal treatment. 

The article stated that the case started in 2015 when the Montana government decided to set up a funding program where businesses around the state would donate to a scholarship program and in return get tax credit. The Montana Department of revenue created a list of rules which came attached with the new funding. The first rule on the list stated that scholarship recipients can not use their scholarships at private schools. In this rule, there was an exclusion of religious schools in the state because the majority of these schools are institutions which you must pay to be enrolled in. Furthermore, this rule was incredibly problematic for Kendra Espinoza, as she had her children enrolled in Stillwater Christian school but was struggling to make ends meet and was struggling just to keep her children in this school. Espinoza felt that this rule was in and of itself unconstitutional and challenged the Montana Department of revenue with this assertion. The author of the article followed in suit with Espinoza by stating  “we want to partner with educators and make sure that students' rights to religious freedom are protected and upheld”.

The case was taken to the supreme court, and the Montana Department of revenue had to figure out a defense.  The Montana Department of revenue argued that what this rule was made to do was to help out students going to public schools who live in homes which are struggling to put meals on the table and pencils in the backpacks of their children. The Montana Department of revenue furthermore stated that giving state funding to students in religious schools would be not coinciding with the first amendment as it would constitute establishment of religion which is contrary to the first amendment. 

This decision was incredibly important because if the Supreme Court ruled that it was constitutional for funding to be given to students in religious schools then it would open up a window for many other students in religious schools around the state to claim their funding. Furthermore, if the court resides with Espinoza, then a precedent is set for funding throughout the country to be available for students in religious schools.   This case was especially interesting when taken in hand with the establishment clause. The establishment clause was created in order to prevent the government from imposing religion on the populace, and in this case, it seems that Espinoza is asking for funding from the government for her children’s religious mission. 

My personal opinion on the case would coincide with Espinoza’s argument, as I believe that withholding funding from her because of her religious beliefs is not in accordance with the constitution and the first amendment. An important point for me in coming to this conclusion resided in the ACLU article which stated that the first amendment was supposed to “protect religious observers against unequal treatment”. If funding was not given to Espinoza in this situation, it is her that would be faced with unequal treatment because of her religion. 

Post by Chris L.