Frame v. Laborers International Union of North America

 Dorothy Frame, an employee at a hospital at Tennessee’s Fort Campbell, requested a religious accommodation over two years ago to be exempt from a requirement to pay dues to Laborers International Union of North America.  Frame believes that paying union dues goes against her religion and that she should not be forced to participate in the organization in order to maintain employment.  LIUNA officials have come out in vocal support of abortion rights, and Frame being a Catholic, disagrees with the organization.  According to her lawyers, “Ms. Frame believes that abortion is a grave sin.  She believes joining or financially supporting the Unions would make her complicit in that sin because she believes that the Unions support and promote abortion.  Thus, she believes that any money the Unions collect from her makes her complicit in sin and violates her religious beliefs.”  

Ms. Frame delivered her letter requesting accommodation in 2019 which included section from her priest that affirmed her religious convictions.  The union responded in a letter a month later, which attacked her beliefs and demanded that she “prove that her beliefs meet the standard for a legitimate justification.”  One union lawyer went so far as to ridicule Frame and her priest’s beliefs, sending them “remedial church readings.”  Over the nest two years, Frame and her attorneys continued to seek an exemption, but her employer, J & J Worldwide Service, continued to take union dues out of her paycheck.  Frame then filed a lawsuit in 2022 aiming to have the courts declare that “she has the right to a religious accommodation that alleviates her obligation to join or support the Unions.”  

Tennessee is a “right to work” state, which means that the state has enacted laws that make it illegal to force any individual to choose between employment and participation in a union.  This law would make J & J’s actions illegal, however, Frame is employed on a federal military installation, and the union’s lawyers argue that the fort is a “federal enclave,” and thus not subject to the state’s laws.  Frame’s lawyers argue that even if you accept the federal enclave argument as true, there are still federal laws that protect Frame’s right not to pay dues.  The federal law forbids union officials from discriminating against any employees on the basis of religion.  Accommodations have been granted in the past based on this law, which usually involve the person paying their dues to an agreed-upon charity instead of the union.  

The key constitutional issue in this case is whether or not federal law protects Ms. Frame from having to pay union dues based on her religious views on abortion.  I would argue that it does.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores offers the best precedent for how the courts should rule.  In this case the Green family, which owns and operates the chain of “Hobby Lobby” stores, challenged a section of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act which required employers to provide their employees with some forms on FDA approved contraceptives.  The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 did allow the Green family, and any other private employer, to deny their employees certain medical services if it went against their religious beliefs to do so.  The Court argued that this law did constitute a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, and that there was a less restrictive means to accomplish the government’s objective.  

I believe that the Hobby Lobby case and Ms. Frame’s case, while dissimilar in that one involves an employer and the other an employee, both deal with the same fundamental issue.  Ms. Frame is being forced to choose between employment and violating a core religious belief, which represents a substantial burden on her free exercise of religion.  I also believe that there is no compelling state interest in forcing Frame to pay union dues, and even if there was, there is bound to be a less restrictive means to accomplish the government’s objective.  While this case does involve private entities: the union, employer, and Ms. Frame, it would still be unconstitutional for the government to rule in favor of the union.  The government cannot force one of its citizens to pay into and support an organization that, in their eyes, violates one of their core religious beliefs.  

https://www.nrtw.org/newsletter-articles/tennessee-religious-discrimination-04162022/

Denton v. City of El Paso

    On August 24, 2019, Ryan Denton went to the El Paso Art and Farmers Market to proselytize. He regularly preaches and proselytizes in public spaces, but this time he was interrupted. Denton was located at the intersection of Western Street and Anthony Street, which was out of the way of vendors and pedestrian traffic. Despite this, he was approached by an MCAD (Museum and Cultural Affairs Department) employee and a law enforcement officer from the El Paso County Sheriff’s Department who told him he was not permitted to proselytize in this location. The officer told Denton that he would be arrested if he continued to proselytize, but he could continue his behavior directly outside the Market perimeter. As a result, Denton filed suit against the City of El Paso. He claimed that the City violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by preventing him from engaging in religious proselytization at a traditional public forum. 
    The question arises whether the restriction on his free speech (his right to proselytize) was content based or content neutral. To understand this, we must conduct a content-neutral analysis. A prior case known as Ward v. Rock Against Racism defined a restriction as content neutral if it ‘serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression…even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.’ A restriction that is content neutral faces slight scrutiny. Another case called Reed v. Town of Gilbert defined a restriction as content based if it is ‘based on the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker or prohibits public discussion of an entire topic.’ A restriction that is content based will face strict scrutiny unless it proves to have compelling state interest. In the present case we question whether the policy enacted by the City of El Paso employs content based restrictions on Ryan Denton, and therefore, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?

    

In order to understand this case to the fullest degree, we must first take the perspective of the City. The City Policy in question states that Farmers Markets are “pre-planned, permit required, ordinance authorized events that take place on certain public streets during certain specified times” (CaseText 2020). Further, the City doesn't allow protesting, lobbying, or proselytizing because they may cause disruptions to vending operations or pose safety concerns. The city claims that the policy is not intended to target the content of the speech, rather, it is to ensure public safety and well-being. The officer who approached Denton claimed that he had heard and seen videos of Denton disrupting other events at the University of El Paso, but this claim was not proven. It is also important to note that the officer and the city official did not intend to substantially burden Denton’s free exercise of religion, rather, they offered an alternative location for him to continue proselytizing. This alternative location was outside of the Market perimeter and would not disturb members of the community passing by. 
    Looking at this case from Denton’s perspective, this market took place on a traditional public forum. Knowing this, he assumed it was safe to proselytize. The City Policy does directly ban proselytizing, campaigning, protesting, and lobbying, but it does so under the assumption that these acts will be disruptive. As we saw in the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, proselytizing may be offensive to some, but the ability to outwardly preach and express your religion in a safe manner is protected under the Constitution. There was no prior evidence that Denton was harming any individuals; rather, he was simply conducting his routine religious duty to spread his faith. Additionally, Denton argues that the City Policy was discriminatory toward religious speech, making this content based restrictions. While it may be perceived as facially content neutral, it has a disparate impact on only some groups. This is an act of viewpoint discrimination. The only permissible reason to restrict specific viewpoints is if there is compelling state interest, but the argument for public safety is not sufficient. It is also important to note that the officer told Denton that he could move one block down the road to where 'demonstrators were allowed to set up,’ but again, this was viewed as a way to prevent Denton’s words from being heard. 

    This case was especially tricky because it is very new. While reading the case document, there appeared to be a great deal of subjective accounts of what happened that day. Despite this, I believe that the City Policy in question is a content based restriction that displayed facial neutrality, but is unconstritutionally discriminatory in practice. Any policy that uses content based restrictions must be judged harshly on whether it can prove substantial governmental interest. Unfortunately, I think that the city failed to prove this. While the City claims that the policy was intended to prevent public harm, there was no prior evidence that proselytizing would cause danger. While other forms of public expression such as protesting or campaigning may have a potential to cause harm, I believe proselytizing is a safe and peaceful religious expression. We see this is Cantwell v. Connecticut. In this historic case and the present case, the individuals in question were not dangerous. While their words may have been perceived as offensive, there is no right to not be offended. Finally, allowing this policy to stand would continue to burden individuals free exercise because it limits them to one location that is far distant from any groups of people. The goal of proselytizing is to spread religious beliefs in an attempt to convert someone to one’s own religious faith, but this is impossible when placed in a distant part of the city. While it would have been easy for Denton to relocate to a different area, the restriction to proselytize in one specific location is a clear attempt to silence a particular religious belief which is impermissible under the United States Constitution. 

Citations

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2022/03/ban-on-proselytizing-at-city-farmers.html
https://casetext.com/case/denton-v-city-of-el-paso
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/20/20-50702.0.pdf

BE THE BUSH RECOVERY MINISTRIES vs. COFFEE COUNTY TENNESSEE

Be the Bush Recovery Ministries is a long-term, faith-based rehabilitation residential program specifically for men who are recovering from addiction and other disastrous life issues. They seek to help men be them grandfathers, fathers, sons, brothers, and or husbands to do more than achieve short-term sobriety, rather they aspire to aid them on the road to long-term recovery from substance dependence. Be the Bush Recovery Ministries achieves this through building community support, offering biblical counseling, education, personal accountability, and job skill development. All of which aid in their overall recovery, revolutionizing their life and creating a firm foundation to prevent relapse. Be the Bush Ministries believes in the power of the gospel of Jesus Christ to rescue, heal and transform men recovering from addiction. They see this as their civic and religious duty to help aid and be a part of the solution to the drug epidemic facing our country.

In 2021, Be the Bush Ministries had the opportunity to purchase 8 acres in Coffee County, Tennessee, located in a rural area. However, churches and religious organizations are banned under the county’s current zoning laws, besides general commercial areas even though similar, yet secular, organizations that offer the same services as Be the Bush Ministries are allowed to purchase, construct, and operate in these exclusive zones. County officials have made many outlandish claims in defense of their position specifically targeting Be the Bush, but in reality, their decision to uphold the exclusionary and discriminatory ordinance is solely based on suppressing religion, and the free exercise of Christian based aid, which is protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Because of these grievances Be the Buch Ministries filed a lawsuit against Coffee County for their hostility towards religion by thwarting their free exercise, and their reluctance to change the ordinance to be less discriminatory toward faith-based organizations.

The salient issue, in this case, is if governments, at any level, can exclude religious organizations from practicing their faith and or faith-based missions on land that otherwise anyone outside of religion could own? Further, and in doing so are said ordinances/laws unconstitutional? These questions are at the heart of this case, and once decided will set a precedent for what governments can and cannot exclude on certain properties.

The article by the ACLJ, ACLJ Sues County Over Discriminatory Zoning Ordinance Blocking Christian Recovery Ministry, it is detailing how Coffee County’s zoning laws are in violation of the United States Constitution, the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. First, it is clear how the ordinance is in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution, in regards to the Free Exercise Clause, because if they are not allowed to operate in a rural area that will offer them the space necessary to function, they will be confined to condensed areas/localities which will suppress the function of their ministry. Second, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, prohibits the government from inhibiting religious practices, which the ordinance is doing by creating a substantial burden by confining them to confined zones. Further, by imposing and implementing land use regulations in restricting religious organizations, Coffee County is violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, knowingly. This law was made for this specific purpose so that government bodies cannot discriminate against people and organizations based on their religious beliefs. Third, the Fair Housing Act is invoked in the lawsuit, because Coffee County violated this law by discriminating in creating housing based on religious beliefs and practices. Discrimination based on religion in housing is outlawed by the Fair Housing Act. Among other laws, Coffee County violated as the ACLJ cites in the lawsuit are the 14^th Amendments Equal Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this case are if the ordinances are upheld that would mean the state can arbitrarily exclude any religious organization or persons without any rational basis. Also, they would be able to discriminate on the basis of any business being opened on religiosity or religious affiliation. This open hostility towards religion is antithetical to the protections outlined in the Constitution. Besides free exercise being squandered through this ordinance, it would be an oppressive precedent, allowing for a governing body to tell religious organizations or people where they can and cannot organize and establish their houses of worship.

I am firmly on the side of Be the Bush Recovery Ministry, the ACLJ, and their right to be able to base their religious operations wherever. No government entity should have the power to dictate where or where not a religious organization can set up its base of operations. It is wholly unconstitutional through the fact that it limits their free exercise, while additionally violating several federal laws protecting religious views, individuals, and organizations. I believe the Supreme Court would also side with Be the Bush ministries for these exact reasons and the sentiments laid out in the above argument. 

City Walk et al v. City of Tallahassee

 City Walk Urban Mission ministry and homeless shelter was told to stop operating and expanding by state officials due to the fact it was decided the shelter was a “private nuisance.” The officials said City Walk would be charged $250 each day the shelter remained open. The director of City Walk, Renee Miller, continued to keep the shelter open and sued the city and county, arguing the order from the officials was in violation of their First Amendment Rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Miller’s claims involve the religious mission of the ministry, as it is within the obligations of Christianity to assist those in need, including and especially the sick and homeless. Her attorney stated, “Christ preaches charity and good works to the less fortunate, and that’s what these folks do as a matter of faith. It’s not just a private thing for their own benefit or even for the benefit of their congregation, but the idea is that they’re an example for the community. That’s the expressive part.” It was also stated that free speech is violated. In terms of the “public nuisance,” the government explained that the charity of people like the homeless can lead to more crime and poorer property values in the area. Tallahassee’s Development Review Committee rejected the application for the shelter to continue to stay open without these fines. Miller and the church have appealed this decision.

This case begs the question; is it Constitutional for state officials to infringe upon Miller’s religious obligations to assist the homeless due to a greater state interest?

The use of the Sherbert Test (after Sherbert v. Verner), is the best way to assess the government order to stop housing the homeless because the state of Florida has its own Religious Freedom Restoration Act, where it specifically states when the government can and cannot burden one’s exercise of religion. Much like the three-part Sherbert Test, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act states that there must be a compelling state interest and there must not be less restrictive means to the government action.

In what the case the Sherbert Test is derived from, Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-day Adventist was fired upon her employers finding out her religion did not allow her to work on Saturdays. The Supreme Court Justices assessed that significant burdens upon people practicing their religion is unconstitutional, and that compelling state interest is important when it comes to religious freedom. There was no compelling state interest to not give Sherbert unemployment, and there were less restrictive means, so Sherbert won the case fairly. 

To apply the Sherbert Test to the City Walk case, three questions must be asked. Firstly, does this law impose a substantial burden on free exercise? Yes. Miller claims it is within her duties on her journey with Christ to help those in need. In fact, she even is quoted saying “This is obedience to God…He’s told me to do it, and until he tells me to stop, I will not stop.” The rules infringed upon City Walk make it so Miller is fined for practicing her religion properly. These fines are substantial and have been adding up; the burden is substantial and discriminatory towards Miller’s religious mission. Secondly, is there a compelling state interest for the policy? Yes. One could understand that homelessness often does come with crime and a drop in property value in the area, but the compelling state interest could absolutely be achieved through less restrictive means. This is the third and final assessment in the Sherbert Test. Rather than shutting the shelters down, government action could rather involve stricter guidelines for those staying at the shelter to help reduce crime and property value decrease. Sacrificing Miller’s ability to practice her religion when there are other options to address the state interest is unconstitutional.

A modern case that is extremely similar to City Walk et al v. City of Tallahassee is United States of American v. Warren, where it was within Dr. Scott Warren’s religious obligation to provide resources to migrants crossing the border. He would leave these potentially life-saving resources at a drop sight, and was eventually arrested for “Abandonment of Property.” Warren claimed this arrest went against his First Amendment Rights and was eventually acquitted in federal court. To apply the Sherbert Test to this case, one can conclude the decision to acquit Warren was the correct one. His ability to practice his religion was infringed upon, there was a state interest to not have property abandonment, but, as the court ultimately concluded, this interest was not very compelling, as the claimed need to protect “the pristine state of the wildlife refuge” (as the state argued) was no reason to restrict Warren from helping those in need on the basis of his religious purpose.

The Sherbert Test is the fairest way to assess Freedom of Religion and Free Speech cases. City Walk should be able to keep their shelter open due to their religious mission. Allowing Miller to practice her religion can be accommodated by using less restrictive means in trying to keep crime to a minimum. Compelling state interests are an important part of law-making, but if accommodations can be made to make people’s First Amendment rights the standard, these actions should certainly be taken.

A Christian Club Controversy in California: Religious Freedom or Discrimination?

           Consider this scenario: Imagine that you and your friend are both practicing Christians. You are both in high school and decide to join your school's Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) student club. You are both active members of the club, but you participate even more often than your friend in helping to plan and organize several events for your high school. After spending your first year being very active in the club, you and your friend decided that you want to apply to be leaders in the club for the following year. But, because you are a member of the LGBTQ community, you are not eligible for leadership in the club. In contrast, even though your friend was less active in the club, she can apply for leadership because she is heterosexual.

       This scenario illustrates the case of Sinclair v. San Jose School District (2020). At the Pioneer High School in San Jos, California, Elizabeth Sinclair and Charlotte Klarke were the co-presidents of the Pioneers Fellowship of Christian Athletes, an organization committed to supporting student-athletes in practicing their Christian faith. The club meetings were open to all student body members, but only those who shared in FCA's beliefs were allowed to be leaders of the group. In 2019, after complaints from a teacher at Pioneer High School, the San Jose Unified School District derecognized the group and forced the student group off of campus.

 In this case, the determining fact of the matter lies in the intricacies of the San Jose Unified School District's policy on student groups. In some public-school settings, policies require student groups to have an "all-comers" policy that requires the group to allow anyone to be members and leaders regardless of their sex, race or sexual orientation, religion, etc. This policy is controversial, especially when involving religious organizations that feel that their members and leaders should align with their religious views. However, school districts with an "all-comers" policy think that any kind of student exclusion is discrimination and thus do not allow groups on campus who refuse to uphold the "all-comers policy." In 2010, a similar case, Christian Legal Society v. Martizez (2010), made headlines in the United States. This case explored the Christian Legal Society (CLS) at the public University of California, Hastings, which refused to oblige the "all-comers policy." The students in CLS at the University of California, Hastings excluded anyone who was homosexual or disagreed with their faith from joining the club. As a result, the University of California, Hastings denied the organization from being a Registered Student Organization. The California lower court and the Supreme Court ruled that the University's denial was constitutional because the club directly disobeyed school policy. 

    In the case of Sinclair v. San Jose School District, their policy states in section BP0410 that "District programs, and activities [clubs], and practices shall be free from discrimination based on gender, gender identity and expression, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, immigration status, ethnic group, pregnancy, marital or parental status, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or the perception of one or more of such characteristics" (San Jose Unified School District Policy Directory, 2018). This policy seems to be the equivalent of an "all-comers" policy even though it does not bear the same name. 

    With the facts outlined and a similar case explored, I think that the Supreme Court ruling in the Christian Legal Society v. Martinez case was constitutional and that the decision of the San Jose School district was constitutional in Sinclair v. San Jose School District. While these rulings may unevenly burden the members of the Christian clubs, I believe there is a greater state interest in developing school programs in which all are welcome. As we have discussed in class, everyone discriminates. However, since the Pioneers Fellowship of Christian Athletes is affiliated with the public school system, it is constitutional for the school to enforce its policies on the club. 

                                             

    Furthermore, there is no one preventing the students in the Christian Athletes club from creating their own club, not affiliated with the school and not on school grounds. If the students were to create their own private club, they would have the constitutional right to enforce their own beliefs and regulations within the organization. However, as stated earlier, the San Jose school district states that their programs "must be free from discrimination…based on sexual orientation" (San Jose Unified School District Policy Directory, 2018). Overall, since the organization has ties to the public school system, it is perfectly constitutional for the school to de-recognize groups who do not follow the rules outlined in their school district policies. 

Keister v. Bell

            We often hear about or even see traveling preachers on college campuses, who are trying to spread their religious beliefs amongst college students. However, this can become a tricky legal matter when certain speech might be limited on college campuses. This case focuses on Rodney Keister, a traveling preacher, who is a Christian evangelist. He was preaching on a sidewalk at the University of Alabama, when he was told by public safety at the university that he would need a permit from the University of Alabama to continue preaching his religious messages. More specifically, Keister was walking on a campus sidewalk with a megaphone, while displaying a banner and handing out religious pamphlets. Because of the dismissal by the university and public safety, Keister sued the University of Alabama because he believed his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were being infringed in this case. Another important fact in this case is the location because the sidewalks of the University of Alabama are considered a limited public forum. In this case, the limited forum is on a college campus, but other limited public forums could include something like a municipal meeting house. On the other hand, a traditional public forum would be a public park. This is key to the case because the limited public forum requires a university permit, and this must be used for reasonable and viewpoint-neutral speech. The sidewalk on campus is considered a limited public forum, which upon further investigation, under the University’s Grounds Use Policy, says that this applies to everyone engaging in activities or events on campus, except “casual recreational or social activities.” The constitutional question here, is whether the University is infringing upon Keister’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, despite the location of the sidewalk.

              I believe the salient issue here is the issue of what is considered a “limited public forum” and what is forbidden, allowed, and permitted there. It is also important to understand that universities, like the University of Alabama, are state-funded entities that are subject to the First Amendment. However, this doesn’t ensure a private speaker’s right to speak publicly on all public property. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the details of this limited public forum, and if it is a limited public forum and not a traditional public forum. Universities differ from other public fora in many ways, and we can understand this through looking back at Widmar v. Vincent. For example, this case was different because it involved a student group using a space on campus. The goal of universities is to educate, so it would make sense that when using their public facilities, like a sidewalk, use should be consistent with the mission to educate. Another important case to evaluate here is Bloedorn v. Grube. This case was a similar situation, where a traveling preacher, Benjamin Bloedorn, came to the campus of Georgia Southern University to spread his religious messages but was asked to leave and apply for a permit before he continued to broadcast his messages at that location. Bloedorn was not happy with this response and that he must apply for a permit, so he sued Georgia Southern University stating that his First Amendment rights were being violated. In both Bloedorn v. Grube and the case at hand, the sidewalks are clearly located within the campus, further emphasizing that it is a limited public forum.

              As for my own analysis, I side with what the courts have said thus far. I agree that because the location where the preacher was spreading his religious messages was a limited forum, it was not within his rights to be there without a permit that is required by the university. Additionally, it is important to follow the guidelines of the University, which is a public and state-funded entity. Considering some other precedents set before this case further shows what the outcome should be. In Bloedorn v. Grube there was uncertainty about whether the sidewalks in question at Georgia Southern University were limited or traditional public forums, but eventually it was decided that because the sidewalks are internal to the campus, they would be considered a limited forum. In this case and the current case in question, at the location of the specific sidewalk it is clearly distinguishable that you are in the middle of a college campus, proven by surrounding university buildings and dorms. On the other hand, in Widmar v. Vincent, the decision was made that the University of Missouri was inhibiting the First Amendment rights of students to use a facility for their religious meetings. However, in this case, the location at hand was considered a public forum. This is a factual difference from the case here at the University of Alabama. For these main reasons, I believe that it is appropriate that the traveling preacher must attempt to get a permit to speak on the sidewalks of the University of Alabama. Additionally, I think it is clear that the sidewalks involved would be considered a limited forum. I do think this case could be more interesting and perhaps decided differently if it was a sidewalk on the outskirts of campus, or a location very close to campus, but not explicitly on the campus.

Links:

University of Alabama wins free speech lawsuit brought by sidewalk preacher - al.com

Widmar v. Vincent | Oyez

BLOEDORN v. GRUBE | FindLaw

St. Vincent Catholic Charities v. Ingham County Board of Commissioners

On December 13, 2019, Becket Law filed a suit against the Ingham County Board of Commissioners on behalf of St. Vincent Catholic Charities. 

St. Vincent runs a program that helps refugees relocate, find medical care, and acquire jobs. They are the only refugee resettlement site in Lansing Michigan and are federally recognized for being a priority resettlement site for LGBTQ refugees. These are individuals fleeing their country after being persecuted for their gender and sexual identities. The lawsuit was initially filed when St. Vincent was excluded from the Community Agency Grant which is described on the county website as “financial support to various non-profit community organizations that provide a broad range of services for the purpose of advancing the County's adopted long-range objectives." St. Vincent was denied this grant on account of its stance on LGBTQ marriage. Like many Catholic organizations, they do not approve of same-sex marriage. This is relevant to this case because earlier in 2019 the ACLU took St. Vincents to court over their denial to provide their adoption services to a same-sex couple in
the case Buck v. Gordon. The ACLU believed that they should not receive state funding while they discriminated against the LGBTQ community. St. Vincenent's won the case and continued to receive government aid for their adoption services. Becket Law's position is that the county is essentially holding a grudge against St. Vincents for Buck v. Gordon and that it is unreasonable to deny them this grant because of that. 

The constitutional question at play here is, can the Ingham County Board of Commissioners deny St. Vincent Catholic Charities a grant to conduct refugee relocation services on account of their religiously held beliefs regarding same-sex marriage and their practice of that belief through the denial of adoption services to same-sex couples. 

The County Board of Commissioners felt that the idea of offering St. Vincents the Community Agency Grant meant they had to decide "between offering refugee services and treatment of the LGBT community." This isn't actually fair to say, however, on account of St. Vincent providing refugee services to LGBTQ Individuals. According to the case summary St. Vincent's has “welcomed twenty-four LGBTQ refugees from seven countries” over the years. The Board of Commissioners' response to St. Vincent reminds me of Bob Jones University v. United States, They believe that the state's interest in not funding organizations that discriminate against minority groups outweighs their right to free exercise. While there is a compelling state interest in not funding discrimination of any kind I think this case is more nuanced.  

The key thing to understand in this case is the precedent for St. Vincent's discriminatory policy. not only did they win Buck v. Gordan and continue to receive state funding but if we look to Fulton v. Philadelphia we find that the supreme court found it unconstitutional to deny a religious organization state funding for charitable work on account of their religiously-based discrimination. Additionally, we need to look at the grant in regards to the work St. Vincent is doing. The grant is offered to non-profit organizations that promote the goals of the county. They are the only refugee resettlement organization in the area, and most importantly, they don't discriminate against the LGBTQ community in their refugee services. St. Vincent only objects to same-sex marriage, not the life or safety of people who engage in it. To deny them this grant and limit their ability to reach and aid refugees could actually harm LGBTQ individuals who seek asylum through St. Vincents. If the county still takes issue with St. Vincent's adoption policies they should address those directly and not try and limit the organization as a whole. 

It seems to me that the County Board of Commissioners wanted to deny them this grant on principle more than anything else and the people that it will hurt the most are those in need of refugee services. I don't believe the county to have a very strong case here, between the precedent for St. Vincent's discrimination via the free exercise clause, and the important service that they provide they should be allowed this grant. 

Broadcasted Prayer At Florida High School Football Game

Cambridge Christian School v. Florida High School Athletic Association

    Back in December of 2015, Cambridge Christian High School made it to the Florida Class 2A championship football game, in which they were set to play their rival, University Christian High School. The two Christian schools shared religious ideologies, general academics, moral bases, educational community goals, and prayer tradition. On game day, students took matters into their own hands and wished to pray amongst their team and with everyone in the stadium. The prayer was restricted from being broadcasted over the loudspeaker, which meant the prayer was only audible to the student athletes, not anyone else in attendance of the football game. Cambridge Christian was extremely discontent and insisted that denial to operate the loudspeaker system inhibited both teams' students, parents, and fans' right to religious worship, gather in prayer, and exhibit the free speech to do such. Many members in this unified Christian community were displeased with the Florida High School Athletic Association for prohibiting the religious speech of its student athletics, while permitting the projection of announcements, team introductions, advertisements, and music with the Camping World Stadium Public Address System. While student speech was granted to further the sporting event objectives, speech in the form of prayer was strictly banned across the stadium. 

Uprising and resistance to the Florida High School Athletic Association (FHSAA) guidelines surfaced, as both schools and their fans collectively believed prayer was essential before the championship game, the most important one of the session. The student athletes argued this form of prayer is a fundamental part of their worship and a way for both teams and their fans to religiously connect. The prayer was also heavily valued for God to guide them in strength, stay safe from injury, rejoice, and be spiritually guided towards victory. The FHSAA showed little regard for the two schools' unified request, as the attorney contended that allowing a pregame prayer would directly violate the Constitution in regard to establishment. Both schools collectively challenged this statue, leading Cambridge Christian to file suit.

The FHSAA was quick to reject the Christian school’s request for broadcasted prayer, as it was religious in nature and would appear to be establishing religion to any reasonable observer, which would intrude a separation of the Church and state. The association further argued that regardless of both schools aligned faith and morals, it would be unconstitutional to place people in a situation where they had to choose between leaving the game or sitting in agony if their views clashed with the projected prayer. Additionally, the championship game was not conducted on school grounds, rather a state-owned stadium with its respective equipment. Nonetheless, Cambridge Christian refuted these presumptions and asserted that the FHSAA is wrongfully executing viewpoint discrimination. This means the association is restricting the content of the private speech of student prayer, on the premise that it contradicts the viewpoints of the state. 

In culminating the background of the case, we must evaluate the question at hand, “Does the Cambridge Christian High School student-led religious prayer during a school football game, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? In order to properly grasp the extent of this case and how the Supreme Court has ruled in the past over a similar matter regarding student-led prayer, we must turn our attention to the precedent case of Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. 

In 1995 a student that was elected to Santa Fe High School’s student-led student council, delivered a public prayer before each home varsity football game. The students unanimously voted who would give the prayer with knowledge of the religious perspective it would be from. Shortly following, the students, alumni, and parents of the Catholic and Mormon faiths brought this action to court, on the grounds of its endorsing nature and unconstitutionality. The Court resisted this notion, even after the school modified a new district policy in regard to this matter; and strictly required that all speeches be nonsectarian and non-proselytizing. The court reasoned that the authorization and carrying out of prayer would create an excessive entanglement between the church and the state; as the delivery of the speech used government funded equipment and was on government property. The court implemented the coercion test and concluded that religion was being endorsed, as no individual should be placed in an environment where the only options are not attending the game or attending the game and possibly being offended by the religious messages carried over the speakers. 

It is interesting to note that these cases are quite similar in nature, but diverge in one category. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the school requesting prayer is public, while both schools in the Cambridge Christian School case against the FHSAA are private and share the same denomination. While this may appear to be a key differentiating factor, the football games in both cases were on public, government funded property. I feel as though it would be hard for the Supreme Court to rule that prayer in this case is constitutional, considering it was ultimately prohibited and deemed unconstitutional in the other case. If this were to occur, then the court would have to overturn the ruling of Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe which does not seem likely. In analyzing the details, the students of the Santa Fe School District took a rather democratic tactic by voting amongst the students to carry out the majority opinion of performing prayer, while the Christian school students felt there was no need for a vote because both schools were religiously uniform. Regardless of the majority, I believe in both situations, desiring a prayer to be carried out in this particular manner would be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Student-led voting and assumptions can not be the basis or justification for integrating a religious matter, one that not everyone may hold, into a secular setting. This places students, families, and fans of Cambridge Christian and University Christian who may hold a different religious belief or are agnostic, in an inferior, minority position. Many different people are coming to this government funded championship stadium setting to view a sporting game, not be directly or indirectly, depending on your perspective, coerced into the Christian faith. I bestow a point highlighted by the majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which is with all of this in mind, any reasonable observer would view this as an unconstitutional religious endorsement.

___________________________

https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/672/santa-fe-independent-school-district-v-doe

http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2022/04/ban-on-prayer-over-pa-system-at-high.html

https://www.adl.org/education/references/amicus-briefs/cambridge-christian-school-v-florida-high-school-athletic-association

https://www.tampabay.com/news/tampa/2021/12/22/federal-judge-to-decide-cambridge-christian-schools-pregame-prayer-lawsuit/

https://www.britannica.com/event/Santa-Fe-Independent-School-District-v-Doe

ACLU v. Los Angeles International Airport

    The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit on March 24, 2022, on behalf of three Muslim Americans who were subjected to unconstitutional questioning from border officials regarding their religion while traveling in the Los Angeles International Airport. The three Muslim Americans were asked multiple controversial and inappropriate religious questions. These included whether they were Muslim, attended a mosque, which mosque they attended if they did, the frequency of their prayer, and whether they were Sunni or Shi’a. The answers to these questions would be retained in a law enforcement database for up to 75 years. The suit was filed in Los Angeles.

    Plaintiff Imam Abdirahman stated, “I am proud to be a Muslim. But now whenever I travel back home to the United States, I’m anxious. I’m constantly worried about how I will be perceived, so much that I try to avoid calling any attention to my faith. I normally wear a Muslim prayer cap, but I no longer wear it at the airport to avoid being questioned by border officials. It’s terrible to feel you must hide an essential part of who you are from your own government. I shouldn’t be questioned because of my religion.” The plaintiff was arguing that his free exercise of religion was being infringed upon and significantly disturbed, to the point where he felt like he even had to hide this part of himself. He argued that this was a clear act of discrimination and violated his rights as an American. However, this practice is not rare. Muslim American travelers have been targeted by border officials for 20 years because of their religion. This is an ongoing theme that continues to occur and has begun to place a substantial burden on the victims of this targeting. 

    This issue is very significant, because under the Constitution, everyone has the right to practice their religion freely. The fact that the border officials questioned these travelers just because of their appearance and religion is very discriminatory and not constitutional. As Abdirahman stated, he now feels worried and targeted. He fears wearing his Muslim prayer cap out in public, because of the sole purpose that he continues to be targeted. Because the Constitution allows the free exercise of religion, I agree that the rights of the three Muslim Americans were being infringed upon. The questioning by the officials also violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because of this unequal treatment based on religion. 

    I believe the questioning by the officials is not necessary or constitutional. It places a direct burden on the practice of religion for not only these three individuals, but other religions that have been discriminated against in the past just because of appearance and pre-conceived notions regarding the religion and its practices. This is an immense problem that needs to be addressed more frequently, to avoid situations like the one that Abdirahman unfortunately experienced. He has these rights under the Constitution, and there is no justification for the actions and questioning of the border officials. 

    These individuals were fearing their own government. There is a compelling interest present here in favor of the three Muslims, because they were obviously discriminated against. I cannot think of any argument that makes the questioning by the officials reasonable and not discriminatory. The Muslims had no criminal record; as a matter of fact, they were strangers to the officials. The fear of being able to practice their religion is an extremely valid and compelling argument in this case because it does affect these individuals daily. They should be able to go out in public and not have to worry about facing people who are going to question them just because they are Muslim. This could not be a clearer violation of the free exercise of religion. The Free Exercise Clause is in place to ensure that Americans can live their life freely based on religion, and the border officials violate that right significantly. There is a slippery slope present here as well, because if Muslims are questioned, then shouldn’t other religions be questioned as well (for example Jews)? I ultimately think there is no justification for the actions of the officials, and this discrimination is something that seriously needs to be altered for the betterment of society. 

Sources:

Customs and Border Protection Infringed Upon

Muslim Americans Sue Over Border Officers' Invasive Questions

ACLU v. Lee County

 Alabama ACLU v. Lee County

The ACLU of Alabama filed a lawsuit after a Christian woman was forced to remove her headscarf in her driver’s license photograph. The client, Yvonne Allen, believes that wearing a headscarf is a crucial part of her religion, and that she must not reveal her hair to others, and although exceptions are made when taking drivers license pictures to Muslim women, this exception as not given to Allen. During the argument at the DMV, a staff member attempted to justify the actions of Lee Country by comparing both of their christian beliefs. She compared her christian beliefs to that of Allen’s, and stated that since she felt no need to cover her hair, neither should Allen. The ACLU argues that the county's restriction to Allen is in violation of Alabama state regulation, and the First Amendment’s “free exercise” clause. This brings up not only issues of the discriminatory actions against a Christian’s ability to lawfully wear a headscarf in their driver's license, but also begs the question as to what the compelling interest might be to not allow an exemption for all that believe it is required under their religious beliefs. 

The ACLU is addressing the main issue at hand, which is that Allen’s First Amendment right to freely exercise her religion, which in this case means wearing her headscarf and protecting her hair, is being violated by the county. In this case, there are two issues at hand: the fact that an exemption has been made to Muslim women, and the fact even if there was no exemption given, the County would still be in violation of Allen’s constitutional rights. The staff member's argument that Christianity does not require the wearing of headscarves brings up the issue of state interpretation of sincerity. This is dangerous grounds to operate on, as the interpretation of the sincerity of one's beliefs can lead to a slippery slope and provide future opportunities for other state entities to make these interpretations. There is also the issue of religious discrimination against her proclaimed Christian belief. The County argues that the exemption is only to be provided to Muslim women. This raises issues of religious inequality, which under the constitution, do not exist. Under the constitution, all religions, including Islam and Christianity, are to be treated equally, with no one religion receiving preferential treatment over another. 

The ACLU makes the argument addressing the issue of the discriminatory practice. Senior staff attorney for the ACLU argues, “The county’s policy is puzzling. There is absolutely no reason to restrict accommodations for religious headgear to certain religions. The Constitution protects both Christians and Muslims and, indeed, people of all faiths.” The ACLU also touches on what believes to the lack of existence of a compelling state interest in this situation. Director of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project states, “For many women like Ms. Allen, headscarves are a religious obligation, and wearing them imposes no harm on others.” The ACLU believes that there is no evidence of an imminent threat posed by allowing subjects to take drivers license photos with a headscarf if their religion requires them to do so. 

The issue at hand is extremely important, as it addresses one’s ability to freely express their religious beliefs through the use of a head scarf, which although it may seem uncommon, is crucial to some religions throughout the US. I believe that there is certainly an easy, and right decision to be made here. Not allowing the religious exemption provided to Muslim women to be utilized by Christian women, and any being who must wear a headscarf would be a clear and obvious violation of their First Amendment rights. This type of unconstitutional, and discriminatory behavior cannot be allowed in the US. All religions be treated equally, and the religious beliefs of all US citizens must be respected under the US constitution. To those that say that allowing the exemption for Christian women would lead to a slippery slope where large numbers of people would soon be asking for accommodations due to a “religious belief”, I say that this argument is not valid. Not only is this an unrealistic and unlikely outcome, but one could argue that the slippery slope idea is more applicable in the opposite manner, and that restricting Allen’s religious belief would open the door to more restrictions on the wearing of headscarves in driver’s license pictures. In addition to this, the state has no compelling interest in denying Allen’s request in this situation. Since the accommodation has already been made to Muslim women, a group often criticized and inaccurately deemed “threatening” because of religious stereotypes connected to terrorism, one cannot argue that Allen poses any sort of threat here. I believe that an accommodation must be made for Allen, and for all religious beliefs that require the wearing of a headscarf.   

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/christian-woman-must-be-allowed-wear-religious-headscarf-driver-license-photo-aclu     

Calvary Road Baptist Church v. Herring

    Calvary Road Baptist Church v. Herring seeks to address the claims of two churches, three religious schools, and a pregnancy center network. Joining forces, they filed a lawsuit against Mark Herring, regarding the Virginia Values Act. While discrimination laws exist throughout the country, this act prevents discrimination on the grounds of gender identity and sexual identification as well. Specifically, "The bill prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The bill also codifies for state and local government employment the current prohibitions on discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, disability, or status as a veteran." When applied to religious organizations, this law requires them to hire individuals who do not align with their religious beliefs in regard to marriage, gender, and sexuality. Furthermore, they are unable to post beliefs aligning with what the church sees as the truth for these topics. This therefore raises the question: Does the Virginia Values Act violate the First Amendment right to Free Exercise of Religion?
    Calvary Road Baptist Church argues that the law requires them to violate their religious beliefs. Not only are they required to hire individuals, but also forbidden from posting their stance on the issues. To them, their beliefs must be fulfilled, and by breaking their religious standards they are acting against their religion. Additionally, "there’s imminent harm, because the Act gives the attorney general the ability without notice to file a civil lawsuit this afternoon against the ministry’s policies and practices." Harm is interpreted as material monetary, physical, or emotional damage. In this case, spontaneous civil lawsuits may cost the church money and time, as well as disrupt their reputation, causing measurable harm by this standard.
    Herring, the attorney general, argues and ultimately dismisses the case on the grounds that the event has not yet occurred. When ruling on the case, it is stated that "'This has nothing to do with the underlying merits of the case or whether there may be an actual controversy in the future,' Judge Plowman said. 'I don’t see it right now.'" So, because there have not been any specific cases yet, the court has accepted the request by Herring to dismiss the case. However, it is important to look at the precedent of 303 Creative v. Elenis. In this case, the plaintiff had not yet started work that would break the law, but was able to bring her case to court on the grounds that "her company faced ‘a credible threat Colorado [would] prosecute them under that statute.’" Thus, when looking at this precedent, it may be surprising that the current case did not have the same approval to be heard. The plaintiff, Calvary Road Baptist Church has filed an appeal in the meantime to overturn the dismissal.
    The Sherbert Test, established under Sherbert v. Verner, is helpful to evaluate this case. It looks at whether the law places a burden on an individual's religious freedom, and if there is a compelling state interest to do so. In this example, it can be argued that a substantial burden is in place. These organizations, that are known to be religiously based, are required to break their beliefs and hire individuals who do not agree with what they are teaching and promoting in the given space. This violates what a religious individual may believe they have to do to remain aligned with their religious commitments. However, it can be argued that there is a compelling state interest in place to support the law. Virginia is one of the first southern states to enact laws that protect the LGBTQ+ community, thus serving as a landmark example. The Supreme Court themselves have establish a commitment to protecting the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, as seen in cases like Obergefell v. Hodges, among others. One could argue that Virginia is simply following precedents and attempting to prevent discrimination in the country.
    Evaluating the case from both sides, Calvary Road Baptist Church should win the case. While the Virginia Values Act should remain in place, an exception should be made specifically for religious organizations. Because the organization is founded on religious grounds, it cannot serve its purpose without following the religious beliefs it is teaching. Although, individuals working at a general business should not be granted this exemption, Constitutionally. In a case like this, the individual can believe something, without having the right to act on it. But, when the inability to act directly impacts the goal of the organization, such as a church, there is not a less restrictive solution.
    Ultimately, a religious organization cannot Constitutionally be blocked from promoting their beliefs. By forcing a religious organization to hire individuals who do not align with their understanding of issues, and forbidding them from posting their beliefs, the Free Exercise Clause is violated. Additionally, they are not actively promoting harm against the LGBTQ+ community; they are not telling their congregation to go out and disrupt LGBTQ+ individuals. However, there are other jobs for them, which is a less restrictive means to addressing the dispute. If an individual wants to teach, they can teach at a public school or even another religious school that does not share the same belief system. If they want to work at a religious place of worship, they can search for one that is accepting of the LGBTQ+ community. This idea is important because these religious organizations are not targeting the LGBTQ+ community so they are not able to work, but instead hoping to maintain their own religious beliefs and principles.

Sources:

https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+sum+SB868

https://tennesseestar.com/2021/08/23/alliance-defending-freedom-asks-court-to-reconsider-challenge-to-virginia-values-act/

https://www.oag.state.va.us/media-center/news-releases/1891-december-7-2020-herring-defending-virginia-anti-discrimination-laws-in-court

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/jul/16/loudoun-churches-plan-appeal-after-judge-blunts-ch/