Singh v. Berger: The Battle Between Religious Practices and Military Orders

Aekash Singh, Jaskirat Singh, and Milaap Singh Chahal were recruited by the Marine Corps and are all devout to the Sihk faith. It is tradition in the Sikh faith for men to grow out beards/head hair and to wear a turban. The Sikh teachings instruct them to “shun evil and seek self-mastery, to regard God’s creation as sacred, and to always defend the weak and helpless”. Therefore, many devout Sikhs perform their religious duties through military service but must stay devout to their faith, which is to not cut their hair. However, the Marine Corps gave the three men an ultimatum, either shave your head or you cannot join this branch of the military. Aekash Singh, Jaskirat Singh, and Milaap Singh Chahal passed all physical and medical tests required to join the Marine Corps, however, the Marine Corps has a basic training requirement to shave your head to have a “uniform appearance” that is deemed necessary for basic training. However, the Marines allow recruits to not shave their beards if they have a medical condition. Other branches of the military such as Army, Air Force, and the United States Military Academy allow for religious beards during basic training. 

This case introduces the question of whether or not the Marine Corps requirement to shave one's head for basic training or not in order to join the Marine Corps infringes upon Aekash Singh, Jaskirat Singh, and Milaap Singh Chahal First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion. This ultimatum places a substantial burden upon the men because growing their hair is a sacred duty to their faith. As well, the uniformity of appearance claim that the Marine Corps is arguing is null because other branches of the military are lenient with their appearance if there is a religious component. Moreover, the Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which “bans the federal government from restricting religious freedom unnecessarily. This means that denying religious accommodations by asserting a need for uniformity while granting lots of other secular exceptions is not only unfair but unlawful as well”. (Colby) Therefore, the Marine Corps is being unconstitutional by forcing these recruits to choose between their religion and their military obligation. 

Using the precedent Goldman v. Weinberger, which was the case in which the Air Force did not allow the wearing of headgear such as a Yarmulke. The dissenting opinion in this case pointed out a similar aspect in this case that this ban is not neutral in practice because it discriminates against minority religious groups, as well as, there is no rational reasoning for enforcing a shaved head and it is a burden on free exercise rights. Moreover, there is no evidence that supports the Marine Corps claim that having longer hair hurts the morale of personnel, especially when other branches of government are allowing it. To further argue that this ban against the Sikh practicing men is not neutral in practice and discriminates against religious groups is because the Marine Corps allows hair to be grown out when there is a medical condition as minimal as razor bumps. This is a substantial burden upon these men by choosing what they believe is God’s requirement to grow out their hair or take orders from the commanding officers to stay in basic training. 

The Marine Corps' enforcement to shave heads for base training shows no purpose besides uniformity appearance which serves no real purpose. This was seen through the precedent. Goldman v. Weinberger, which I stated before. This enforcement is discriminatory against minority groups and facially neutral. This is because non-Sikh members see the growing of their hair as disobeying orders from the commanding officers. As well, the Marine Corps are not being neutral to all groups because they are allowing for medical conditions such as razor bumps which have no substantial burden and are not protected under the constitution to grow their hair and disobey the mandatory shaved head. As well, other military branches are allowing the growth of hair to enforce diversity, especially with women. Therefore, their uniformity appearance argument is null. 

To conclude, this decision the Marine Corps is instituting upon Aekash Singh, Jaskirat Singh, and Milaap Singh Chahal is unconstitutional and infringes upon the First Amendment Right of Free Exercise of Religion for these men. This ban is not neutral and discriminates against religious groups and favors secular groups within the Marine Corps. Although the men enter the military and lose some rights for the better of state compelling interest it does not mean they lose their First Amendment Rights of religion and are substantially burdened with the choice between the military duties and God. The state has no compelling interest in how the military recruits wear their hair because there is no evidence that shaved heads help national security.

Should a Single Family Home be able to constitute a Place of Worship?

       The Village of Chestnut Ridge is a community of single family homes located in New York, that has made controversial zoning laws which the Citizens United to Protect our Neighborhoods (CUPON) disagrees with. The old zoning laws in this community have required a place of worship to have a permit and be built on land that is more than five acres, and at the time there were places of worship present. The new laws were created with the Orthodox Jewish Coalition (OJC) and categorized zoning laws as either a “residential gathering place”, “neighborhood places of worship”, or “community places of worship”. The “residential gathering place” section allowed for the use of a single family home for religious purposes, by obtaining a permit. Many Orthodox Jews can benefit from this new law because they gather in a place of worship on their sabbath day and are not able to drive, which can often cause a burden to them. Thus, being able to gather in their home would be much more convenient for them. CUPON, which is an organization that advocates for fair zoning laws, does not agree with the new zoning laws. They argued that the community made these new laws with the OJC in secret so it is not a facially neutral policy, and having an unkown, potentially large number of places of worship will change the nature of the community. 

The issue at stake here is; Is this new zoning law, specifically the category of “residential gathering place” a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? The court held that this is not a violation of First Amendment rights because CUPON lacks standing. In order to have standing in cases regarding Establishment there must be issues regarding taxpayer money being used for religious purposes, religion causing direct harm, or religion causing denial of benefits. CUPON argued that their taxpayer money was used to hire someone to approve of the new zoning law. The court needed a measurable amount of money to determine if this burden was substantial, however CUPON was unable to supply this number, so this point was deemed invalid. They also argued that the construction of houses and religious structures will be a constant reminder of the new zoning law, thus causing direct harm and in turn enforcing Orthodox Jewish beliefs on them. In order to be directly harmed, residents must be in direct contact with religious expression. Residents will only be surrounded by construction, not religious expression, thus this is also invalid. Lastly, CUPON is unable to prove they have not been denied any benefits by the new zoning law, thus they lack standing and the court is in favor of the village. Furthermore, CUPON’s organizational activities were not affected nor were they forced to not do certain activities by putting this law in place. Residents of the community are not faced with a substantial burden by the new zoning laws.

I agree with the court in this case. I do not think the fact that the village made the zoning laws with the OJC matters much. There were no restrictions on other religions doing the exact same thing and coming up with new laws in their favor. Orthodox Jews were only pushed more to do this because of the fact that they have to gather weekly for prayer and cannot use cars on their sabbath day. Thus, it is just easier for these groups to gather in the comfort of their own or a friend's home. I disagree with CUPON in saying that this law is not facially neutral. Any group of any religion is able to register their home to be a religious place of worship, and the law does not only apply to Orthodox Jews. Residents are not at all harmed by this new zoning law and CUPON does not have standing to argue that they are burdened by these new laws. What do you think? Do these zoning laws have effect on others in the village and is meeting for religious purposes a violation of Establishment?

Compelling State Interest or Substantial Burden?

 In recent days there has been an article published that references a decision made in the year 2008. In 2008, there was a highway expansion on route 26 in Mount Hood, Oregon . The expansion was a safety measure, because the turn had been seen to be very dangerous and even fatal in one instance. This conclusion was made by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Land Management, and Oregon Department of Transportation. The Yakama and Grand Ronde tribes argued that the building of the highway left turn lane violated their First Amendment rights and more specifically their Free Exercise of religion. The site where the highway was built was named, “Ana Kwna Nchi Nchi Patat” which in english translates to the Place of Big Big Trees. The construction site was a location of worship for the tribes. The tribes would constantly visit the site because it was the location of remembrance. The tribe would go to remember their ancestors, and pray. They would pray through a stone altar that was surrounded by trees. Through these prayers the tribe would talk to their creator. Before the construction had been started the tribal members had told officials about the religious significance of the location. Regardless of this, the construction of the highway continued anyway. The construction removed both a stone altar and trees. Two of the tribal elders , Wilbur Slockish and Carol Logan, seen in the image below, took this issue to court. They were dismissed in two lower courts, and now are planning an appeal to the Supreme Court. They are going to the court on the basis that both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and their Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment are being violated. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act makes it so the government can not burden an individual's exercise of religion. In an interview Wilbur Slockish states, “We’ve always taken care of this land, taken care of our burial sites, because that’s what we were charged with by our creator — to make sure they weren’t disturbed, To me, it’s like them going into the Catholic church or the Protestant church and cutting their altar”. The court argued that the construction of the highway did not have a substantial burden on the members of the tribe and therefore was one of the main reasons the case was dismissed. 

The main issue at stake here is whether the Yakama and Grand Ronde tribes First Amendment rights are being violated, in regard to the establishment clause and their Free Exercise. In addition the issue is whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is being violated as well. 

In my opinion, I think that the decision of the lower courts is correct. For starters the space is not private. While the site is an ancient burial site for the Yakama and Grand Ronde tribes, it is public space to everyone. If the location of the site was private this would be a different situation. I do agree that there is a burden in this situation. The Yakama and Grand Ronde tribe can no longer go to this space to pray. However, with this being said, the tribes can still worship and pray in other locations. Bob Jones University v United States set the precedent that just because a religious group has a burden placed upon them does not mean that the issue is Unconstitutional. In this specific case I do not think that there is a substantial burden on the tribe. There was a compelling state interest in the decision of the case because the location of the burial site was causing dangerous driving. As mentioned before, in one instance someone had died from the terrain. The safety of drivers on the road in Oregon was the compelling state interest in this situation. There were no less restrictive means for accomplishing the state goal because the burial site needed to be removed in order to fully fix the problem and protect drivers. I also think that the government's decision is neutral. They are making this decision for all people in order to create better safety measures. The goal of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is to protect religious groups from being burdened by the government. I do think this is important in this case, however in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Ruth Bader Ginsburg states an important fact that is relevant in this case in regard to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act when she stated, “In proposing the amendment, Senator Kennedy stated that RFRA, in accord with the Court’s pre-smith case law, ‘does not require the Government to justify every action that has some effect on religious exercise.’” Ultimately Ginsburg was alluding to the conclusion that some burdens are incidental and not controllable. In both the Bob Jones University v United States, and the case being presented both represent an issue of compelling state interest in conflict with religious burdens. However in both cases, I find that the compelling state interest overrides the religious groups' burdens. 

Belya v. Kapral: Government Intervention in alleged Defamatory and Discriminatory Suspension of a Russian Orthodox Priest

    Father Alexander Belya was a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia (ROCOR) and claimed he was elected as the Vicar Bishop of the Church. When leadership became aware of this new transition, many members expressed concerns about the validity of this claim and some conduct issues regarding Father Alexander and his priestly duties. The Church suspended Father Alexander from his priestly duties pending an investigation. The suspension was due to irregularities regarding his election and many members expressing concerns regarding his ability to succeed in this position. Rather than appeal the suspension through the Church, Father Alexander sued the Church, the head of the Church, and other ranking officials on the grounds of defamation. This meant Father Alexander Belya sued for defamation and wrongful termination in a civil court. The precedents of Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC set the example that the government is not allowed to interfere with the hiring and firing process in religious organizations under the protection of "ministerial exception."

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru dealt with a teacher that filed an age discrimination suit against Our Lady of Guadalupe School. This case was argued before the Supreme Court, and it decided that a "ministerial exception" applied in this case. "Ministerial exception" grants churches and religious institutions the ability to use discriminatory measures when selecting their clergy. A necessary clarification is that the employee must be considered a clergy member or have a ministerial role. A ministerial role is defined as “someone who performs spiritual functions associated with beliefs and practices of religious faiths, and provides motivation, guidance and training in religious life for the people of congregations and parishes, and the wider community.” The teacher was declared to have a "ministerial role" due to the nature of her job as she was teaching catholic messages to children. Therefore the Religious school was allowed to fire her as the court could not interfere with the religious freedoms of the Church. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Church was not given a "ministerial exception" as the nature of the job held by the plaintiff didn't classify as a "ministerial," and discriminatory behavior is unlawful just like any other non-religious organization. In order for a church or congregation to be granted an exception for using discriminative methods in firing and hiring relies solely on the job held by the plaintiff. If the job is considered "ministerial," then the government can play no part in limiting how they select or release members of their clergy.

Despite these precedents, the Civil Court of New York denied ROCOR's appeal for dismissal on the grounds of "ministerial exception" and allowed the case to continue in civil court.

In this case, did the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia have the right to suspend Father Alexander Beyla with no due process under the protection of the First Amendment and "ministerial exception"? I argue they did have the right to suspend Father Alexander Beyla with no due process and under measures that could be considered defamatory and discriminatory under the protection of "ministerial exception." To be protected by the First Amendment freedom of religion and exercise, the job held by the plaintiff must be considered "ministerial." In this instance, Father Alexander Beyla is a priest. According to precedent, the government can't get involved in the releasing of clergy. While it might seem unfair to discriminate in religious institutions, not allowing religious organizations to select members representing their views and ideals violates the freedom of exercise clause and induces excessive entanglement in religion and state. Suppose the government can place limitations on who these religious institutions can select to represent and carry out their religion. In that case, the government is directly playing a role in religion and violating their freedoms. Just like religion can't be intertwined in state matters, the government can't violate religious freedoms or dictate how religious organizations are run. There is also no compelling state interest here. Father Alexander Belya is a priest and therefore stands to represent the values and goals of the Russian Orthodox Church; if he doesn't align with those goals, they have a right to terminate, suspend, and investigate him. He, in other words, is an extension of the religion, and the government deciding that the Church can't terminate him for violating their standards allows the government to dictate who can and can't be clergy members. While the government strives to prevent unfair discrimination in the workplace, denying religious organizations the right to select those who best represent their ideals effectively diminishes their religious beliefs. Therefore, this case should be dismissed, and allowing it to continue infringes on the Russian Orthodox Church's rights to religious freedoms and exercise.

Does an Unborn Fetus have Federal Rights?

"When is prenatal life entitled to any rights enjoyed after birth?" is the question presented to the Supreme Court when deciding whether or not unborn fetuses are guaranteed the protections of the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 

In Rhode Island, the Reproductive Privacy Act (RPA) was enacted in 2019 to further ensure the privacy rights that the Supreme Court decided upon in the previous case of Roe v. Wade. This act allows for the unrestricted termination of an unborn fetus in specific scenarios, ultimately protecting the status quo of abortion healthcare in Rhode Island. The RPA was put in place of certain Rhode Island laws that recognized the beginning of human life at the instant of conception, as well as outlawing abortion. These state laws have been in place since the 1800s, so, with the outcome of Roe v. Wade, Rhode Island created the Reproductive Privacy Act to provide women with the rights argued at the Supreme Court level in Roe v. Wade. 

A group of petitioners formed from cooperations known as "Catholics for Life and Servants of Christ for Life. These petitioners fought against the enactment of the RPA because they believed it stripped their babies of their "personhood." Personhood, meaning that human life began at the instant of conception, was stripped for not letting these unborn fetuses obtain their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The petitioners also argued that the RPA did not act constitutional with their objective of a "gestational age," meaning when an unborn human is entitled to protections under the due process and equal protection clauses. The RPA was then placed under review for Rhode Island's lack of establishing when an unborn being is entitled to federal guarantees. 

Petitioners first argued for the unconstitutionality of the RPA because of the deprivation of legal rights, but also, the fact that the RPA was not recognizing people of faith and their beliefs about unborn fetuses and abortion rights. 

Initially, superior courts believed that the unborn persons did not have rights as a person to make this challenge that they felt violated, but the petitioners then appealed to higher courts. Rhode Island's Supreme Court then proceeded with this case, deciding that the unborn fetuses, being argued for by the petitioners, could not be legally cognizable and protected under the United States Constitution. The court refers to the outcomes of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey to further argue their case. The court rejects that "[t]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does include the unborn." There is no contextual evidence within the Fourteenth Amendment that neither includes nor excludes unborn human beings specifically. The petitioners tried to appeal this to an even higher court, but this act was denied. 

Petitioners argued that the RPA was not neutral both facially and in practice. The fact of neutrality, in this case, seems to lean against religion and more toward individual rights. All individuals do not have and practice the same beliefs, so stating that an unborn fetus does not have the access to federal rights leading to providing access to abortion for all is neutral. There is no question of sincerity here, but there is a question of the substantial burden on individuals in this case. If the Rhode Island laws were still present and the RPA was disbanded, and if a woman was forced to save her fetus and face serious health complications, even death, would this be considered a substantial burden on her individual rights? This turns into a slippery slope of specific religious or personal beliefs versus other religious or personal beliefs.

Do you agree with Rhode Island's Supreme Court decision? 

Texas Judge's Opening Prayer and Chaplain Program Upheld by Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

 In 2019, the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) and Attorney John Roe sued Judge Wayne Mack, of Montgomery County, Texas. FFRF and Roe filed suit over Mack’s practice of opening court business with a prayer delivered by faith leaders who participate in his volunteer chaplaincy program. In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the courtroom prayer. 

Before Judge Mack was elected as a Justice of the Peace, he was a Pentecostal minister and worked for Montgomery County as a volunteer coroner. When he became a judge, he created a chaplaincy program, Justice Court Chaplaincy Program (JCC). JCC has a representative from “every mosque, every temple, every synagogue, every church you can imagine” (FFRF v. Mack 2019). Mack has actively sought diverse participation from Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, and Islamic volunteer chaplains. In terms of the opening ceremony prayer, which includes prayers and encouraging words, those with business before the court are not required to stay in the room and are told, through a public announcement, that their involvement will not be considered by the court in its decisionmaking. 

John Roe, an attorney who has appeared before Judge Mack on many occasions, claims that each time a Christian Chaplain delivered a Christian prayer. Roe is religiously unaffiliated and felt compelled to remain in the courtroom during the prayers. He filed suit with the Freedom from Religion Foundation, a non-profit organization that advocated for the separation of church and state, with the claim that Judge Mack’s opening prayers violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, due to its coercive effect and promotion of denominational discrimination. 

The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals depends on two Supreme Court precedents. The first, Marsh v. Chambers (1983), upheld the chaplaincy practice in state legislature sessions, with the reasoning that chaplaincy practice had become a part of the fabric of American society. In Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), the New York town board began public meetings with a prayer given by a member of the Christian clergy. The Court ruled that the Establishment clause was not intended to prohibit legislative prayer, which was meant to acknowledge religion’s role in society. Both cases, therefore, upheld the presence of prayer in legislative sessions. 

While the plaintiffs argued that Mack’s practice of prayer can be distinguished from Galloway in that it occurs during a judicial session, is coercive, and failed to maintain a policy of denominational nondiscrimination. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals argued that the fact that Judge Mack invites the public to leave the court before invoking God makes his opening ceremonies even less coercive than other courtroom prayers, which after a historical analysis, is similarly weaved into the fabric of American society. In addition, while the "plaintiffs cry coercion," Mack maintains his policy of denominational nondiscrimination by letting chaplains from different faiths lead the prayers and no consequences befall anyone who does not participate, so his courtroom prayer ceremonies are therefore lawful. In summary, this decision reaffirms the precedent that both legislative and judicial prayer is compatible with the Establishment clause. 

I agree with the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold Judge Mack’s opening courtroom prayers. In my initial reading of this decision, I questioned whether a lawyer or client’s refusal to participate in Judge Mack’s prayer could result in prejudice. Could nonparticipation ensure that Mack acts hostile toward a litigant who did not participate in the prayer? However, Roe could not identify specific instances of bias against him, his clients, or anyone else. Mack’s prayers are not threatening to religious minorities or nonbelievers, and he maintains a policy of religious diversity in his volunteer chaplaincy program. Furthermore, there was no evidence that chaplains preached “damnation, denigration, or conversion” (FFRF v. Mack 2019), and both clients and lawyers are allowed to leave the room for the prayer. Most importantly, while the argument that there is a historical practice of courtroom prayer is strong, the strongest argument in favor of the court’s opinion is that subjective offense does not equate to coercion. In other words, the Constitution does not protect people from being subjectively offended, and since there is no proof of coercion or religious discrimination, the Establishment clause is not violated and Judge Mack’s policy of prayer is therefore protected under the First Amendment. 

Sources: 

• https://harvardlawreview.org/2022/03/freedom-from-religion-foundation-inc-v-mack/#:~:text=On%20May%2029%2C%202019%2C%20Roe,14.

• https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ui=2&ik=cd1ccf065b&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-a:r4500098735677850617&th=183addf6fdc069da&view=att&disp=inline&realattid=f_l8x75w6c0

• https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/texas-judges-courtroom-prayer-ceremonies-upheld-by-us-appeals-court-2022-09-30/#:~:text=The%20Freedom%20From%20Religion%20Foundation,a%20judge%20in%20Montgomery%20County.

• https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-23

• https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-696

Muslim Inmate Receives Religious Exemption from Cross-Sex Strip Searches

    

Rufus West is a Muslim inmate serving out his sentence at the Green Bay Correctional Institution in Wisconsin.  Like all other inmates, West is subject to strip searches regularly as part of the prison’s security protocol.  It is a direct violation of the Islamic faith to reveal one’s naked body to anybody other than one’s spouse.  Knowingly making this transgression leads to eternal condemnation.  Not only that, but the faith preaches that exposing oneself to a person of the opposite sex will result in even harsher consequences in the afterlife.  

West generally complied with strip searches, as he understands the necessity of such protocol in maintaining safety and security within the prison.  However, he requested that he be searched only by male guards, as being seen naked by any woman other than his wife is a more serious offense in his faith.  Initially, no issues arose because the facility typically has guards search inmates of the same sex.  The prison’s policy regarding strip searches actually prohibits “cross gender” searches, “except in exigent circumstances”.  The policy also specifies that two officers be present during this routine: one officer to directly conduct the search, while a second observes in order to make sure that the routine is conducted appropriately.  

In July 2016, West was approached by Officer Isaac Buhle and ordered to strip.  Isaac Buhle is a guard at the prison who was born female but identifies as a man.  West requested to be searched by one of the male guards nearby.  One guard agreed and began the search, but Buhle remained present and acted as the observing guard.  As a result, West’s naked body was exposed to Buhle during this search.

Following this incident, West filed an official complaint and formally requested to be exempt from cross-sex strip searches.  His request was denied in writing by both the warden and security director and West was told he would receive discipline if he inquired again.  As a result, West filed a lawsuit against the prison by raising an RLUIPA claim, stating that cross-sex strip searches substantially burden his free exercise of religion.  

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is a U.S. law enacted in 2000.  The part of this law that applies to this case is designed to protect inmates’ free exercise of religion.  Specifically, the law mandates that no prisoner’s free exercise may be substantially burdened unless this occurs from the least restrictive means to achieving a compelling state interest.  Thus by nature, cases involving RLUIPA claims invoke the usage of the Sherbert test.  The Sherbert test, originating from 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, first questions whether there is a substantial burden.  If this is the case, then it must be assessed whether or not there is a compelling state interest to justify that burden.  Lastly, if both conditions are met, then it must be decided whether there is another way to achieve that compelling state interest that is less restrictive towards religious freedom.

The question pertaining to this case is as follows: does Green Bay Correctional Institution’s refusal to exempt Rufus West from cross-sex strip searches place a substantial burden on his religious exercise? And if so, which takes priority: West’s religious rights, or the state’s compelling interest to avoid employee discrimination and adhere to the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

The case first went to the district courts, where the judge dismissed West’s claims and sided with the prison by highlighting the importance of nondiscrimination.  The judge stated that the July 2016 incident had only occurred once and there was no indication it would happen again.  Thus, the judge decided West had not proven a substantial religious burden.  Regardless, the judge stated that any burden is justified based on the demonstrated compelling state interest to adhere to anti-discrimination laws (Title VII) in an ultimate effort to ensure that each employee is treated fairly and feels respected in the workplace.  However, the 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals reversed both decisions.  

I agree with the 7th Circuit Court.  To evaluate substantial burden, the Court followed the decision of the 2015 Supreme Court case Holt v. Hobbs.  In this case, it was unanimously determined that a prison not allowing a Muslim inmate to grow a short beard for religious reasons created a substantial burden and thus violated RLUIPA.  The precedent set here is that there is a substantial burden when a prison makes an inmate choose between his religious beliefs and some form of punishment.  This certainly applies to this case, as West was told he would receive consequences if he requested another exemption or failed to comply with a search.  Even if West was not asked to strip by Buhle again, he lives with the fear of possibly making a decision that would either result in prison consequences or afterlife condemnation.  This qualifies as a substantial burden.

The prison argued that the institution has a compelling state interest to deny West’s exemption in order to comply with nondiscrimination laws.  The prisoner specifically cited Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin”.  However, the Court did not find there would be any adverse effects on transgender employees in the event that West’s request is granted.  One could make the argument that subsequent changes in job responsibilities due to West’s exemption might make Buhle feel offended, but the Constitution prioritizes religious freedom over the feelings of individuals.  In addition, the prison’s Title VII argument is futile based on one of the section of the law itself; “Title VII permits sex-based distinctions in employment where sex “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a] particular business or enterprise” (22).  Conducting strip searches is one such operation in which sex is truly an occupational qualification, especially when the individual being searched has a religious objection to cross-sex searches.  Thus, the Court decided that the burden is unjustified. 

Now that West has been granted this injunction, the responsibility falls to the prison to ensure that there are enough male guards, both present at the facility and freely available, to conduct strip searches and accommodate West’s exemption.

Do you agree with the district court’s decision, or that of the 7th Court of Appeals? 

Avoiding an Establishment or Viewpoint Discrimination?

In May of 2022, a young woman named Elizabth Turner threatened legal action against her school, Hillsdale High School, of which she was the valedictorian, on the grounds that they were attempting to unreasonably abridge her right to freely exercise her religious beliefs. When Turner, a devout Christian, submitted her valedictorian speech to the school principal, Amy Goldsmith, for approval, it was denied on the grounds that it made such extensive reference to Turner’s faith that it was inappropriate for a secular public school graduation address. The speech was undeniably religious in nature, with Turner making many overt references to her faith in Christ and desire to live in accordance with her Christian upbringing, mentioning that her hope and future was found in Christ. However, at no point during the speech did Turner encourage others to become Christian or imply that her beliefs were in any way superior to those of her peers. Through further exchanges, Ms. Turner explained that she was unwilling to remove the references to Christ and her faith, which Goldsmith had set as a condition of accepting the address, reasoning that the content of her speech was constitutionally protected, and forcing her to make such alterations would be illegal. Ms. Goldsmith disagreed, countering that Turner was acting as an agent of the school, which was constitutionally obligated to be religiously neutral, especially in such a public address. 

Unable to reach an agreement, Turner sought legal counsel from the First Liberty Institute, a freedom-of-religion advocacy group, who, in turn, reached back out to Goldsmith in an open letter. The Institute reasoned that a valedictorian speech was private, rather than government-speech, so it could not, by very nature, count as an act of religious establishment. They further argued that, since concern of violating the establishment clause could not reasonably be sustained, prohibiting Turner from including such references to her spirituality in the speech would be preferencing non-religion over religion, which is prohibited in accordance with the Good News Club v. Milford decision. Goldsmith ultimately relented and Turner was allowed to read her original, unaltered speech during Hillsdale's commencement in June of 2022.

Given the decisive conclusion brought about by the swift action of First Liberty Institute, it is highly unlikely that the events of this case will ever be taken to open court or established as legal precedent. Despite this, the case does present some interesting and unique questions, notably, whether or not First Liberty Institute correctly assumed that Turner would be operating as a private-speaker while delivering her valedictory address, rather than a government-speaker. As it is commonly understood, a valedictorian’s purpose is to provide an inspiring farewell to his or her graduating class, and is not expected to provide any educational instruction that would typically be provided by the school. Similarly, a valedictorian is assumed to be speaking from their own experiences and attempting to provide a unique or novel interpretation of the significance of graduating from high school, rather than outlining the school’s stance on this question. The official school commentary on the graduation is traditionally also given during the commencement exercises, but by an administrator, so a distinction between the school’s opinions and the opinions of the speaker are clearly made for all in attendance to recognize. Through consideration of the distinct function of a valedictorian, it becomes clear to me that Turner’s speech falls under the umbrella of private-speech, and is significantly distinguished from the opinion of the public scholastic institution.

Since Turner’s independence from the school is established, the next question that we must consider is whether or not the school can still reject their valedictorian’s address on the grounds that it does not align with the format they desire such a speech to follow. In this case, I am convinced that doing so would count as viewpoint discrimination against Turner based on her religious convictions, which is very explicitly constitutionally prohibited. Since the references to God, Christ, and “His Kingdom,” were singled out by Goldsmith as the objectionable elements of the original proposed address, the school was distinctly targeting Turner’s religious convictions, rather than any broadly-applied content issue. In addition to violating Turner’s right to free exercise, I am exceptionally leery of the school’s apparent preference towards speech that does not include religious references, which is, itself, a violation of the establishment clause. The government is tasked with remaining neutral in issues of religion. This means neutrality between religions and between religion and non-religion, and I do not believe they remained neutral in Turner's case. Thankfully, the situation was quickly rectified.

Does a gathering of ten Jewish individuals constitute a synagogue?

    On January 10, 2021, Daniel Grand sent out an email to ten of his friends, inviting them to form a prayer group at his home on the Sabbath and on the Jewish high holidays. Grand is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires him to pray with others three times a day. On Shabbat, the Jewish Sabbath, which takes place from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday, Orthodox Jewish men must gather in a group of at least ten. This group of worshippers is called a minyan. During the week, Orthodox Jewish individuals are permitted to drive to and from synagogue, but on Shabbat, driving is prohibited. Typically, Orthodox Jews, such as Grand, live within walking distance to their synagogue to make the three trips to synagogue manageable. Even a short walk, however, adds up when you have to travel there and back three times in one day, especially in poor weather conditions. Grand lives a little bit less than a mile from his synagogue, which meant he was walking about six miles on Saturdays in order to attend these mandatory prayer sessions. This was difficult during the cold winter months and in hot summer months, so Grand emailed ten of his friends, all members of the Orthodox Jewish community, asking if they wanted to gather at his house for prayer instead of making the trip to their synagogue. 

    Shortly after he sent out the invitation, Grand received a phone call from the mayor and a cease and desist letter from the city, regarding “2343 Miramar, University Heights, OH 44118, Planned Operation of Shul/Place of Religious Assembly.” When Grand spoke to Mayor Brennan, he was told that under Chapter 1274 of the University Heights Code, a special permit was required in order to host a religious gathering. Grand asked Mayor Brennan if ten Jewish individuals gathering would constitute a synagogue, to which Brennan replied “Yes it does, and if you do so in your home you will be in violation of [UHCO] Chapter 1274 for operating an illegal synagogue.” Grand decided he would get a permit in compliance with the city’s law, but after experiencing great backlash from the community, he dropped his application for a special permit and instead filed suit with the city, stating that it was unconstitutional to require such a permit. 

    According to Grand, it is a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion to enforce the permit requirement. By not allowing him and other members of his religious faith to pray in his home, Grand feels as if he is being singled out because he is Jewish and is not being able to carry out his religion as he desires. It is a requirement for individuals of his faith to pray three times daily, and on the Sabbath there must be a group of at least ten men for the prayer session. Traveling great distances on foot, especially in inclement weather, is a significant burden for Grand and members of his community, making prayer at his home the best option. Grand also feels as if he is being singled out because of his religion. Mayor Brennan stated that a group of ten individuals gathering constituted a synagogue, yet other members of the University Heights community are not held to the same standards. In practice, it appears as if the city has only enforced the requirement of permits for gatherings for members of the Orthodox Jewish community. Students from the local college routinely have gatherings at their homes, and other members of the community have large gatherings, all without permits or receiving cease and desist letters. This brings about the question, does University Height’s use of chapter 1274 to prohibit in-home prayer sessions violate the Orthodox Jewish community’s Free Exercise of religion?

    I believe that there is a violation of Grand’s Free Exercise of religion. There is a significant burden placed upon Grand by forcing him to only be allowed to pray in a traditional synagogue setting. Men of the Orthodox Jewish faith must pray as a minyan three times each Saturday, which can be taxing as they are not permitted by their faith to drive to synagogue on this day. By praying in his home, Grand is able to avoid difficult travel each Shabbat and is given easier access to fulfilling his religious obligations. Additionally, Grand simply wanted to invite ten members of his religious community to pray at his private residence; he did not intend on creating a synagogue. These gatherings were only intended to take place on days which members of his faith are not permitted to drive, meaning that there would be no issue with parking or any flows of traffic in the neighborhood. Use of a permit under chapter 1274 is required for “houses of worship,” but this simply does not qualify as one. It is simply a gathering of ten Orthodox Jewish individuals, just trying to exercise their First Amendment right to Freedom of Religion. 

    I also question the neutrality of this case. It is one thing if every gathering of ten individuals required a special permit, yet this does not appear to be the practice. People in the community were able to have gatherings of any type, as large as they wanted, without consequence, yet this one prayer group was singled out. A group of ten Jewish men gathering for prayer should be held to the same standards as a secular gathering, otherwise the religious group is being discriminated against. Additionally, there is also an issue of neutrality among religions, as the only group that has been told to refrain from gathering was a group of Jewish individuals. 

    This case is important as it creates a slippery slope. If these ten Jewish men are not allowed to gather for prayer, does this mean that other Jewish people cannot gather to celebrate Passover seders or have Shabbat dinners without a permit? Does this mean that a bible study group is considered a church? Are people allowed to hold secular events with members of the same faith as themselves? I worry that if this case is ruled in favor of University Heights and Mayor Brennan, people will not feel safe practicing their religion in the comfort of their home and that other cities may see this as an opportunity to discriminate against certain religious groups. 

https://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/news/local_news/university-heights-man-who-wanted-to-hold-prayer-group-in-home-sues-city-mayor/article_3edc4ad2-35e9-11ed-95f4-4f99ad56f756.html

https://ewscripps.brightspotcdn.com/8a/05/1051beb14e5da68f6fb7fd65a852/9007168712200178-grand-1594-ecf001-complaint.pdf  

Indianapolis Catholic High School Teacher fired due to his Sexual Orientation

In 2017, Joshua Payne-Elliott, a teacher at Cathedral Catholic High School in Indianapolis violated his agreement with the school and the Catholic Church and entered into a same-sex marriage. In the Archdiocese of Indianapolis, all Catholic school educators sign an agreement when they get hired stating that they will uphold the Catholic Church’s teachings not only in their professional lives, but in their personal lives as well. When Mr. Payne-Elliott entered a same-sex marriage in 2017, he tried to work out an agreement with Cathedral Catholic High School, since same-sex marriage is prohibited and looked down upon in the Catholic faith. In addition to this, it also violated his employment agreement with Cathedral Catholic High School. The Archdiocese of Indianapolis and Cathedral Catholic High School spent two years discussing and deliberating about the best plan of action to take regarding Payne-Elliott’s future with the school. Eventually the Archdiocese of Indianapolis gave Cathedral Catholic High School an ultimatum saying that if the school wanted to remain affiliated with the Catholic Church, then they would have to fire Payne-Elliott. Since they wanted to remain a part of the Catholic Church, Cathedral Catholic High School ultimately decided to part ways with Payne-Elliott since he went against the teachings of the Catholic Church. As a result of this Payne-Elliott sued the Archdiocese of Indianapolis claiming that the Archdiocese unjustly and illegally interfered in his agreement process that he was working on with the school. 

         In May of 2021, the Marion Superior Court of Indiana ruled in favor of the Archdiocese of Indianapolis, however, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ultimately allowing the lawsuit to advance. After this case was reversed, it was brought to the Indiana State Supreme Court. Here the court made a decision that maintained the same ruling made by the Marion Superior Court of Indiana and ruled in favor of the Archdiocese of Indianapolis. The court ruled that the Archdiocese had the right to maintain what they deemed as Catholic values within a private Catholic school, and that religious institutions have the right to decide matters of church government without state interference. 

         The main constitutional issue in this case is whether or not the Archdiocese of Indianapolis is allowed to step in in this situation and whether these actions violated the separation between church and state. Even though Payne-Elliott was trying to work with the school to come to an agreement, the court decided that the Archdiocese has a right to step in and intervene in this matter because it is a private school and not a public school. It was ruled that the Archdiocese also had a right to do this because of "ministerial exception" which was first used in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. The “ministerial exception,” is an exception that gives religious institutions specific rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. 

         I agree with the decision of the majority in this case. Constitutionally speaking, a private school has the right to do what they want in regards to maintaining their religious beliefs and views, and the Archdiocese has the right to step in an attempt to make sure that Catholic views and values are properly being transmitted. In Indianapolis, the purpose of these private Catholic schools is to spread the Catholic faith and beliefs to the next generation. Under the Catholic religion, same-sex marriage of any kind is strictly prohibited and looked down upon. As a result, the Catholic Church and Archdiocese believes that having a teacher in a same-sex marriage, does not properly convey and transmit the Catholic faith to future generation like these schools are intended to. In addition to this, when Payne-Elliott got hired at Cathedral Catholic High School, he had to sign a contract stating that he would properly uphold and transfer the beliefs and ideals of the Catholic Church in his professional and personal life. If Payne-Elliott wants to still teach, he could instead apply for jobs at public schools where he cannot be reprimanded or discriminated against due to his sexual orientation. When looking at previous cases such as Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru which both examined the idea of whether the teachers were “ministers,” we see that Payne-Elliott would not fall under this category. Payne-Elliott would not have the exemption of being a minister because even though he teaches at a Catholic school, he doesn’t teach religion and unlike the other teachers who were discriminated against due to their age and a sickness, Payne-Elliot was fired due to his sexual orientation which directly goes against the teachings of the Catholic Church. If this case were to have taken place under the same circumstances but in a public school, then the outcome of this case would have been completely different, but since it took place while teaching at a private school, the school and the Archdiocese have a right to part ways with him since he is in violation of the agreement made when he started teaching. This issue is important because it shows us how much different circumstances are in a private and religious institution as compared to a public institution. Some people might believe that there is not a big difference between private and public, but this case does a great job of showing how much more restrictive private institutions can be when compared to public institutions.

San Francisco Women Ask for Vaccine Exemption as Vaccines Stem from Aborted Fetuses

     In the case of Keene vs City and County of San Francisco, Selina Keene and Melody Fountila filed a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, as well as Mayor London Breed and Director of Human Resources, Carol Isen. On June 23, 2021, the city mandated that all of its 25,000 employees be vaccinated by no later than November 1, 2021. The plaintiffs sued on the grounds that vaccinations are derived from aborted fetuses and therefore cause a large problem in their deeply rooted Christian beliefs. Stemming from these beliefs against abortion as well as the confidence of their own immune systems, the plaintiffs refused to get vaccinated. Along with refusing to get the COVID-19 vaccine, the plaintiffs also left their jobs. The questions at law are: is denying a religious exemption for a vaccination a violation of the free exercise clause? How does the fact that the COVID-19 vaccination contains aborted fetuses change affect this ruling?

    As I was looking into the science behind the plaintiffs claim that COVID-19 vaccines are made from aborted fetuses, I found an explanation from James Lawler, MD, who is also a practicing Catholic. Dr. Lawler said that COVID-19 vaccines do not contain any aborted fetal cells, but fetal cell lines are cells grown in a laboratory based on aborted fetal cells were used during research and development of the mRNA vaccines, and during production of the Johnson and Johnson vaccine. The defendants stated that there are no grounds upon which to assert the mistaken conclusion that the FDA-approved vaccines contain fetal cells or are otherwise derived from murdered babies. A majority of the plaintiffs' argument was based off of the grounds that the vaccines came from aborted fetal cells, and they were proved to be false claims by the FDA helping the defendant's argument. The plaintiffs' could have been better off arguing that the fetal cell lines were still against their religious views. 

    When looking at a case of employers being forced for vaccination, I find similarities and differences in the case Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union vs Baker.  In this case, the correctional officers are being required to get a COVID-19 vaccine to prevent the spread of the virus to the inmates. This case came up with a ruling that balancing that harm against the legitimate and critical public health interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 by mandating the employees to be vaccinated, the Court finds the balance sides with the greater public good. The effort to maintain greater good interpretation in that case helps the defendants in this case. I see the parallels to my first blog post,  where there was a compelling state interest to protect the greater good. 

    Although I saw parallels to my first blog post about military men to correctional officers, I have to disagree with this logic in the particular case of Keene vs City and County of San Francisco. In the cases of military men and correctional officers, there is a higher compelling state interest as the scenery of the military and correctional facilities are unique. In the military, it is often that men and women are in nations where there are infectious diseases and they are sleeping in close quarters. This is very similar to correctional offices where inmates have a confined living space and are able to spread diseases at higher rates. I see a difference in the plaintiffs' argument, as they are city workers. They have the opportunity to go home and live in their own confined space. While I acknowledge the argument for the greater compelling interest of national safety, I feel as if Keene and Fountila should not have to sacrifice their religious beliefs in a scenario of lower magnitude. This belief is different in my stance from my first blog post, where I argued against the plaintiffs' exemption, as in my second blog post I do not feel as if the compelling state interest is as strong. A question I have at the end of seeing the Court side with the defendants' is: was the plaintiffs' incorrect terminology about aborted fetal cells as opposed to fetal cell lines what lost them the case?

WORKS CITED

Hillman, D. (2021, October 15). Mass.. corr. officers federated union V. Baker. Legal research tools from Casetext. Retrieved October 4, 2022, from https://casetext.com/case/mass-corr-officers-federated-union-v-baker 

Northern District of California US federal District Court case law. Justia Law. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2022, from https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/ 

Oregon Legislative Information System. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2022, from https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz 

Person. (2021, August 19). You asked, we answered: Do the COVID-19 vaccines contain aborted fetal cells? Nebraska Medicine. Retrieved October 4, 2022, from https://www.nebraskamed.com/COVID/you-asked-we-answered-do-the-covid-19-vaccines-contain-aborted-fetal-cells 

Walley, A. M. (n.d.). Tampa Judge Grants 2 Military Members COVID-19 Exemption for Religious Purposes. blogger.com. 

Residents Sue South Carolina Over Funding For Religious School.

In September, South Carolina residents are suing the state over a legislative earmark in which the government allocated 1.5 million dollars to help the Greenville Christian Learning Center meet their goal of 14 million dollars to construct a new private school. The plaintiffs argue that the earmark violates the South Carolina Constitution, which "expressly prohibits the state from directly funding religious or other private educational institutions." It also violates the South Carolina Constitution's version of the Establishment Clause which prevents the legislature from enacting any "law respecting an establishment of religion" The money was intended to help the organization build a residential school intended to help serve disadvantaged middle school and high school students. The construction would include a six classroom school building, gender specific dorms, capable of housing 32 students, and an administrative office. 

   The Greenville Christian Learning Center is a religious organization that "has identified its primary purpose as religious education." The Center also provides released-time Bible teachings for students during the school day. The organization buses students from schools where they receive religious education before being bussed back to school. This organization faced backlash after the ear mark was initially announced. In response, it denied that it was intending to develop a private religious school, and instead claimed that it was "building a facility where public school students could seek academic tutoring, learn life skills and receive biblical instruction." But, as of October 2nd, the Greenville Christian Learning Center seems to have once again changed its plans, as it now intends to use the funds to help establish a charter school, a public school that does not charge tuition, but that operates separately from the state. When asked to explain how the Learning Center would operate a religious charter school, their executive director Janice Butler declined to comment. 

  South Carolina's decision to earmark funds for the Greenville Christian Learning Center to establish a religious school violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause. When reaching this conclusion, one must first look to Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments", in which he argues against a Patrick Henry proposal which would use taxpayer money to fund religious institutions. In his Remonstrance, Madison argued that governments respecting the establishment of religion actually harms the ability of free exercise, as "the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him tot conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever." Madison worries greatly that once one religion is recognized or endorsed by the government, then it could lead to greater suppression of the followers of another religious ideology. He also argues that "If religion be not within the cognizance of Civil Government how can its legal establishment be necessary to civil Government?" It is with these principles that the Constitution's Establishment Clause was written. It was intended to keep the government and religion separate, especially in regards to the direct funding of religion. 

South Carolina's actions also violate the Lemon Test, a test made of three parts, used to determine if a law respects an establishment of religion. If a law is found to violate even one of the parts, then it has violated the Establishment Clause. This earmarking violates all three conditions. First, it is clear that by providing a religious group with 1.5 million dollars to construct a religious school, it was not a secular action. The purpose of the law was to help support a religious institution and religious education. It is impossible to view this differently, as if the legislature was simply concerned about providing education to underserved children, they could have used the money in a secular manner, like increasing funding in public schools, or implementing a program in public schools to provide more assistance to the children in need. The second condition of the Lemon Test, is whether legislation has a primary effect of either inhibiting or promoting religion. Once again it is clear by allocating funds to a Christian organization with the purpose of constructing a religious school, that this condition has been violated. The school will promote religious education. The last part of the Lemon test, is determining whether the bill fosters excessive government entanglement. It is obvious that excessive government entanglement has occurred, as the ear mark constitutes direct aid from the government to a religious institution, and actively endorses a particular religion. By specifically setting money aside for a particular religious group, South Carolina does not even bother to try and work neutrally. The state is not only favoring religion over nonreligion, but is also endorsing a specific religious sect.

Baton Rouge Parish School System & 29:11 Mentoring Families School Event Or Religious Activity

Baton Rouge Parish School System & 29:11 Mentoring Families School Event Or Religious Activity

A local non-profit organization in Baton Rouge, Louisiana named “29:11 Mentoring Families” partnered with the East Baton Rouge Parish School System to host an event earlier this week. School officials state that this event was a Conference and College Fair held at the Living Faith Christian Center in Baton Rouge. For this event, more than 2100 students from Baton Rouge high schools were excused from classes to attend. In addition to this, the East Baton Rouge Parish School System stated they committed to spending $9,800 to help underwrite the cost of the “Day of Hope Student Conference & College Fair” as well as to bus students to and from the event. In addition to this, the founder of 29:11 Mentoring Families, Tramaine, stated the organization had a “real partnership with the school system”. Therefore, both the School System and organization were equally evolved in the Day of Hope Student Conference & College Fair. 

The 29:11 organized the event in reference to a biblical verse in the Book of Jeremiah and the homepage of its website shows a picture of the past event with young people on stage with up-raised hands with “Jesus” displayed on a big screen. The event was supposed to be a College Fair event; however, both 29:11 Mentoring Families and the East Baton Rouge Parish School System received backlash after both students and parents went on social media claiming the school field trip was more of a religious event which they didn't agree to. 

Several students stated that they were separated according to their sex. Once separated, the male students were asked to leave while female students watched three different series of lectures by three different guests. The female students said the three speakers spoke about personal experiences with being a virgin during college, sexual assault, and suicide. When the male students turned inside, they stated they engaged in passive games for prizes such as “who could do the most push-ups”. 

In addition to this, the students were also enraged that they had to participate in a prayer that the adults initiated. Overall, the students stated that the field trip was more of religious activity than a college and career fair event, and left with a feeling of being lured into the twisted religious event through the school-sponsored field trip.

The Chief of Communications for the East Baton Rouge Parish School System, Letrece Griffin, and other school officials reject complaints from both parents and students who attended the controversial “Day of Hope'' senior field trip. Instead, they stated that the Day of Hope was not a religious event and many of the religious components of prayers were spontaneous and initiated by the students. In addition to this, Griffin stated that the reason for the difference in treatment between the male and female students was due to the buses arriving late to the event. Due to the buses arriving late, the male sessions had to be drastically reduced, and the male session still addressed issues such as responsibility, healthy choices, and the importance of camaraderie.

The holding of this event is related to establishment clauses of the constitution. The “Establishment” clause of the First Amendment states that public schools “may not impose prayer or other religious practices on students, even if students are not required to participate”. Many parents and students believe that both the Baton Rouge Parish School System & 29:11 Mentoring Families Non-Profit lured students into attending the religious event they did not agree to. I do agree that this College-Fair was religious in its formation and organization. To begin with, the organization created this event in reference to a biblical verse, as opposed to a secularly created event. In addition to this, it was stated that this event was held in the past and was strongly connected to religious background. Already the creation and organization of this event were religiously rooted. To further this, the event was held in a church where it was stated that prayers were initiated and other religiously based discussions were discriminately placed on students. Lastly, it was stated that this event was partnered with the Baton Rouge Parish School Systems, which spent money on the event and was responsible for the transportation of thousands of students attending the event.

With these various things being established, it is difficult to argue that this event was not religiously rooted and therefore infringe on students' rights by being required to attend this event.   

https://localtoday.news/la/federal-judge-allows-louisiana-to-relocate-jailed-teenagers-to-angola-38611.html

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/9/25/2125225/-High-School-Students-in-E-Baton-Rouge-Lured-to-Fake-College-Fair-Which-Was-Twisted-Religious-Event

https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/page/religion-public-schools#:~:text=Under%20the%20%E2%80%9Cestablishment%E2%80%9D%20clause%20of,are%20not%20required%20to%20participate.