Religious Beliefs Shouldn't Get You Fired

 Religious Beliefs Shouldn't Get You Fired

Religious freedom is protected in the United States, even in the workplace. But sometimes, people lose their jobs for standing up for their religious beliefs. That’s what happened to Charlene Carter, a longtime flight attendant at Southwest Airlines. She was fired after posting anti-abortion content on her personal Facebook page and sending messages to her union president criticizing the union's support of abortion rights. 

Charlene Carter is a Christian who believes abortion is wrong based on her faith. In 2017, she sent Facebook messages to union president Audrey Stone after learning that Stone and other union leaders had participated in the Women's March in Washington, D.C., an event supported by Planned Parenthood. In those messages, she shared videos of abortions and strongly criticized the union’s actions. She also posted this content on her personal Facebook page. Although Carter had resigned from formal union membership in 2013, she was still required to pay partial dues for union representation which is a common practice in many unionized workplaces. She did not want her money, directly or indirectly, supporting causes she found morally wrong, like abortion. After receiving the messages, President Stone reported her to Southwest Airlines. The company soon fired Carter, claiming she had violated their social media and harassment policies.

Carter believed she was fired for expressing her religious beliefs, so she sued Southwest under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against someone because of their religion. It also requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” for religious beliefs, unless doing so would cause the business significant difficulty or expense. In 2022, a jury sided with Carter, finding that Southwest had violated her rights.

To better understand this case, we can look at Groff v. DeJoy (2023). In that case, Gerald Groff, an evangelical Christian, worked for the U.S. Postal Service, which originally allowed him to keep Sundays as a day of rest. When the USPS later started requiring Sunday shifts, Groff requested a religious exemption. The Supreme Court ruled that employers cannot deny religious accommodations just because they cause a minor inconvenience; they have to prove that the request creates a substantial burden. This case clarified that religious rights must be taken seriously in the workplace. If Groff deserved an accommodation for not working Sundays, Carter deserved protection for expressing her beliefs. She wasn’t asking to skip work or be treated differently on the job. She was simply expressing her religious views on her own time and objecting to how her union dues were being used. Unlike in Groff’s case, Carter was not asking for anything, just to be allowed to speak freely.

This raises some big questions. First, was Carter treated the same as other employees who expressed different or secular views about abortion? If others posted strong opinions without facing punishment, Carter’s firing could be seen as religious discrimination. Title VII does not just protect religious people from direct mistreatment, it also prevents employers from holding them to different standards. Second, what actual burden did Carter’s posts place on Southwest? Her actions did not involve skipping work, changing duties, or disrupting the workplace. Everything she did was on her personal time. If the only issue was that her views made someone uncomfortable, that is not enough to justify firing her, especially when those views come from sincerely held religious beliefs. At the heart of this issue is the idea of “reasonable accommodation.” What does it really mean? When must employers respect religious beliefs, and when can they say no? What is the line between maintaining workplace order and violating someone’s rights?

This case is about more than just one employee. It is about balancing religious freedom with workplace rules. Carter’s messages reflected her religious beliefs. Southwest claimed they were disruptive, but Carter said she was simply living out her faith. So the bigger debate is this: can an employer punish someone for expressing controversial religious views, even if those views are shared outside of work hours? And if they can not show how the speech hurt the business, was the firing fair? Southwest did not have to agree with Carter. But they should have respected her right to speak about her beliefs, especially when that speech was personal, faith-based, and did not disrupt her job.

I believe Charlene Carter was wrongfully fired. She had a right to express her religious beliefs, and she didn’t hurt anyone or ask for special treatment. She just spoke up about something she deeply believed, on her own time. Religious freedom and free speech are core American values, and they apply not only to popular opinions. They protect all voices, even those with which people disagree. That is what makes them rights.

Sources:

• https://apnews.com/article/southwest-airlines-judge-religious-speech-training-b643395cf72c076ded60770d31156f91

• https://apnews.com/article/judge-religious-liberty-training-southwest-airlines-2a3d963671446da26f53bdc511bca58f

• https://www.nrtw.org/newsletter-articles/carter-fifth-circuit-nl-11152024/ 

• https://www.eeoc.gov/religious-discrimination 

Cash Kept from Charities: Deception of the Church of Latter-day Saints

    A former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (known commonly as Mormons) decided to come out with a claim that stated the organization misrepresented how they used tithing funds, or religiously obligatory member donations. Because James Huntsman had donated millions of dollars to the organization, he was disappointed to find out they were not going to charitable causes, and made claims that the funds were being used on material items at shopping centers and for a life insurance company that was close with the church. He was especially angered because of how the church allegedly reassured its members that the funds were only being used toward morally upright and important causes in the community, that align with Christian values and were his duty to give to. These reassurances were delivered through sermons, official statements, and internal communications, claiming a divine purpose behind each donation. Members were led to believe their contributions would fund humanitarian aid, disaster relief, educational initiatives, etc. The betrayal felt especially heavy for donors like Huntsman, who viewed his financial support as a sacred act of devotion. Because of the perceived deception of the Church of Latter-day Saints, Huntsman sued them and the issue was raised to the Supreme Court level, where he is currently trying the church for fraudulent use of donations. His argument centers on the idea that the church not only mishandled the funds but did so under a false pretense, thus violating the trust of its members and misusing its religious authority for material benefit.

This case is interesting as it questions the implications of the Free Exercise Clause, and especially as it applies to the use of religious funds. If these funds were being used toward secular and non-religious reasons, could the value or sincerity behind the religion be questioned, as even its own leaders do not take it seriously? Or, does the only inherent religious value behind the act of giving a donation lie within having the loyalty and trust to make the donation itself? This debate also brings into question how far religious protections extend when money and legal obligations are involved. The Free Exercise Clause states that every human has the right to freely express their religious convictions without the interference of the government, with the exception of when peace and good order are in jeopardy. The claim that a religious organization is using tithing funds, which are being drawn out of members of the church due to appeals to their morality and religious obligations, not to mention consistently reassured as valuable and upright, is enough to prove a disruption of peace and good order. This level of deception in a long-running religious organization that has a rapport built up with its members, who trust in its convictions so deeply that some donate millions of their own dollars, is a complete violation of the Madisonian principle. In James Madison’s vision for the separation of church and state, religious institutions were to be protected from interference—but not exempt from accountability. This case puts that principle to the test in a very modern context.

A case that reminded me of this one was U.S. v Ballard, where similarly, the sincerity of a religious mailing movement that consistently collected funds from patrons was questioned for its uses and true intentions in obtaining this money. While the court ruled, in this case, that the truth of religious doctrines could not be evaluated, religious leaders could be evaluated for whether or not they sincerely believed what they preached (with the right evidence). Therefore, deception is not blindly accepted under the guides of religion, despite governmental neutrality to unconventional religious beliefs in general. So, under this precedent, if Huntsman has evidence against the Church of Latter-day Saints that supports his initial claim, the sincerity of the religious movement, and therefore the presence of fraudulent behavior, can be evaluated. 

The broader implication is that if the court rules in Huntsman’s favor, it may signal a shift in how religious organizations are legally expected to manage the use of their donations, especially those whose members are being reassured that they are going to a certain moral or religious cause. It could lead to greater financial scrutiny of religious institutions and raise overall expectations for transparency within these institutions, which were not being closely monitored enough in their actions before despite holding the trust of many faithful members. This could create more room for eliminating insincerity and deceit within both long-standing and minority organizations, and aligns with neutrality and lack of bias if all institutions are monitored by the same standard.

Should the Clergy be Mandated Reporters?

The Washington state senate recently passed Senate Bill 5375, which would force all members of the clergy to report any abuse or neglect of minors that they suspect throughout the carrying out of their clerical duties. This iteration of the bill is the third attempt the Washington legislature has made at requiring mandated reporting for religious ministers, however, the newest version differs in one key aspect; it does not provide an exemption for confession, nor any form of penitential communications. Many legislators felt that the exemption for penitential communication watered the bill down too much and gave leeway for the clergy to withhold information that may be necessary in helping to protect a child from abuse or neglect. Supporters of the exemption claim that forcing religious leaders to report information that is required by their religion to be kept secret is a significant burden upon their free exercise. One state senator, Leonard Christian, claimed that; “It is forcing somebody who’s given their entire life – raised their hand, made an oath with God almighty – to choose between God’s law and man’s law,” which demonstrates how important the exemption is to those who believe in different forms of penitential communication. Alternatively, Senator Noel Frame, the bill’s prime sponsor, claims that; “religious leaders should have a responsibility to report abuse so the state can step in and take action” and “They need to know that if they tell somebody they’re being abused… that they can trust that that person will make it stop.” Frame also pointed out that “Washington is only one of five states where clergy aren’t mandatory reporters.” Whilst the proposed law makes it obligatory to report any mistreatment, it still prevents the state from compelling the clergy member to testify in any criminal proceedings that may derive from the report. 

The issue at hand in this circumstance is whether forcing religious leaders to become mandatory reporters, even in the case that reporting may violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, is constitutionally permissible. Thomas Jipping, a legal scholar at the Heritage Foundation, wrote an article in The Daily Signal in which he cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah as evidence that “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs” is impermissible due to the lack of neutrality or general applicability. This view misses a few key aspects in the Church of the Lukumi case, most notably among them being that the city of Hialeah took specific actions with the sole expressed intention of criminalizing specific actions performed by the Santeria faith. With Justice Kennedy reasoning in the majority opinion that the laws were not generally applicable, saying; “It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of Santeria Church members.” The law that Washington is attempting to implement has various other intentions beyond suppressing faith, nor is it narrowly tailored to target specific groups, as the ordinances in Lakumi had. The Washington law applies to any “ordained minister, priest, rabbi, imam, elder, or similarly situated religious or spiritual leader of any church, religious denomination, religious body, spiritual community, or sect,” which is both intentionally neutral and broadly applicable to every religion. 

Furthermore, while the law at hand does impose a minor imposition on the religious freedoms of those who engage in confession, the government has an interest compelling enough to justify said infringement. Protecting children from all kinds of abuse is a goal that any reasonable person will likely see as both noble and valid however, previous court decisions on free exercise infringements have examined if the action taken is the least restrictive means to go about achieving the state’s goals. An exemption would be the obvious compromise to remove the burden, however implementing such an exemption would require the government to determine what qualifies as penitential communication. Having the government weigh in on this would give the government the ability to unfairly apply these qualifications, Washington state avoids having to make such a decision by extending mandatory reporter status to confession. 

In summary, I believe that there is little precedent to suggest the law Washington’s legislators seek to enact is unconstitutional in any manner. Since the law differs from the Lakumi case, in terms of generally applicability, facial neutrality, and there is a substantial government interest in regulating this conduct with no other means to go about doing so, I believe that Washington will face no constitutional obstruction if this law is enacted. 

https://www.dailysignal.com/2025/03/02/washington-state-is-attacking-religious-freedom-and-it-wont-stop-there/ 

https://www.investigatewest.org/investigatewest-reports/washington-legislature-passes-bill-to-make-clergy-mandatory-reporters-of-child-abuse-17864136 

https://washingtonstatestandard.com/2025/02/28/washington-senate-passes-bill-to-make-clergy-members-mandatory-reporters/ 

Religious Liberty Behind Bars: The Fight for Ramadan Accommodations in Prison

 Imagine being forced to go without food for 15-16 hours when your religious practice only requires 12-13 hours of fasting. This was the reality for Marvin Owens, a Muslim inmate at Jackson County Jail in Michigan during Ramadan 2024. His case raises important questions about religious liberty for incarcerated individuals and the remedies available when religious freedoms are violated.

Marvin Owens, a 34-year-old practicing Muslim incarcerated at Jackson County Jail in Michigan, made multiple requests for dietary accommodations before Ramadan 2024. According to Islamic law, Ramadan observance requires Muslims to fast from dawn until sunset, eating only a pre-dawn meal (suhoor) and a sunset meal (iftar). Despite Owens’ requests, jail officials allegedly failed to provide adequate and timely meals during the holy month. According to a federal lawsuit filed on March 3, 2024, by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) Michigan Chapter, Owens wasn’t provided pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramdan. Even when meals were eventually provided, they were reportedly delivered up to two hours late, extending Owens’ fasting period from the normal 12-13 hours to 15-16 hours. It is important to note that Islamic teachings “prohibit a Muslim from extending their fast beyond the moment of sunset, and require that an adherent Muslim hasten to break their fast during Ramadan,” according to the lawsuit. 

The quality and quantity of food were also at issue. The lawsuit alleged that Owens received only 1,300 to 1,900 calories per day, which is well below the 2,500 calories recommended for an adult man. Owens was reportedly served inedible food that had been left out, unwrapped and unprotected. On one occasion, the food was so inedible that a deputy advised Owens not to eat it, but also did not provide a replacement. 

County Officials reportedly acknowledged the lack of accommodations, but put the blame on their food service provider, Tigg’s Canteen Services. Nevertheless, the lawsuit named Sheriff Gary Schuette and two other sheriff officials, as well as Tigg’s Canteen Services, as defendants. The original lawsuit was filed in federal court in March 2024, but after preliminary motions, the case was dismissed in November 2024. On April 10, 2025, Notre Dame Law School’s Religious Liberty Clinic, alongside CAIR attorney Amy Doukore, filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, requesting a reward of monetary damages to Owens, since he has been transferred from Jackson County Jail and therefore a change in policy now would not remedy the harm that has already occurred. 

This case centers on two legal frameworks that protect religious liberty, the First Amendment Right to Free Exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). RLUIPA is a federal statute that provides heightened protections for religious exercise in institutions including prisons, prohibiting the government from imposing substantial burdens on religious practice unless the burden serves a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. This case recalls O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), where the Supreme Court ruled against Muslim inmates who sought accommodations for Friday prayer services. However, RLUIPA was later enacted specifically to provide greater protection than the constitutional standard established in cases like O’Lone.

This case presents the ongoing tension between religious liberty and governmental interests. Similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), where the Court recognized that seemingly neutral regulations can impose significant burdens on religious practice, Owens’ case asks whether administrative convenience can justify substantial burdens on religious exercise. This central question parallels the issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993) where the Court considered whether otherwise neutral policies that disproportionately affect religious practices deserve heightened scrutiny. It is important here to determine whether Jackson County’s failure to provide timely and adequate meals constitutes a substantial burden on Owens based on his religious beliefs and practices. The jail claimed to have a policy for accommodating Muslim inmates during Ramdan, but the implementation appears to have been inconsistent. So, if the jail did have a policy in place, but failed to enact this policy for whatever reason, the question becomes: does administrative difficulty or resource constraints qualify as a compelling governmental interest? I would say no.

I would argue that this case should be ruled in favor of Owens. The evidence clearly shows that Jackson County Jail officials placed a substantial burden on Owens’ religious exercise. By failing to provide pre-dawn or sunset meals for the first three days of Ramadan, and then providing inadequate meals thereafter, prison officials effectively burdened Owens’ ability to practice his faith. Also, there was no compelling government interest to serve delayed and inadequate meals. This is proven by the fact that there actually was a policy in place to accommodate fasting Muslims, which the jail just failed to fulfill. Therefore, Owens should be entitled to the monetary damages outlined by RLUIPA. This would not only provide justice for Owens but also deter future violations of religious liberty in incarceration settings. By ruling in favor of Owens, the Court would affirm that RLUIPA means what it says: incarcerated people have a right to meaningful religious accommodation, and violations of that right must have meaningful remedies. 

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2024/03/28/muslim-inmate-sues-jackson-county-over-handling-of-ramadan-accommodations/73129733007/

https://law.nd.edu/news-events/news/notre-dame-law-schools-religious-liberty-clinic-represents-prisoner-denied-ramadan-accommodations-in-federal-appeal/

https://www.wilx.com/2024/11/01/lawsuit-over-ramadan-meals-jackson-county-jail-dismissed/

https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-act

Where Is The Line Between Authority and Religious Freedom Within The Affordable Care Act?

 Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, requires private insurers to include preventive care and treatments without cost sharing, which involves the out-of-pocket fees such as deductibles. The preventive care methods in this list are graded as either A or B by 3 agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and these are the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), the Advisory Committee in Immunization Practices (ACIF), and the Health Resources and Services Administrations (HRSA). Within the list of preventive treatments are a variety of cancer screenings and statins, as well as contraceptives, emergency contraceptives, and HIV prevention drugs. Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is medication designed to help prevent HIV infections in those at risk, and is included in the list of preventive measures.

 Truvada Pills Used for PrEP

 Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

These requirements are now being challenged in Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. due to the belief of Braidwood Management along with a few other individuals that the recommendations violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  RFRA, passed in 1993, prevents one’s free exercise from being substantially burdened even by generally applicable policies unless the government can prove both that there is a compelling state interest involved and that the law is the least restrictive means of accomplishing it. The plaintiffs, Christian-owned businesses in this case, have stated that the mandatory coverage for certain preventive services makes them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” They have cited both economic harm for unwanted yet enforced health plans, as well as religious harm for being forced to include services they believe combat their religious beliefs.

In 2022, the District Court decided that the preventive services requirement did in fact violate RFRA, and also appointing members to the USPSTF violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Appointments Clause requires all officers of the state to be appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate, yet is not entirely clear on who all falls under that category or how much authority they must have in order to be considered an officer. Judge O’Connor cited Hobby Lobby in his argument that since “the government did not show that it could not simply provide PrEP to those unable to obtain it from a plan due to an employer’s religious objection…it is not the least restrictive means of reducing the spread of HIV.” The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2024 that the decisions in this case only applied to the plaintiffs and was not a “nationwide remedy.”

The Supreme Court has actually decided to narrow its focus on this case to whether or not the structure of the USPSTF violates the Appointments Clause since members are not appointed by the president, and will not be examining whether or not the ACA violates the First Amendment. 

There are some precedents playing into how this case will be determined, one of which is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. That case determined RFRA prevented the HHS from requiring closely held corporations provide coverage for contraceptives that contradict their owners’ beliefs. It also set the standard for closely held corporations to be classified as persons, as RFRA was originally written to apply to persons. 

This case shows an overlap between the authority of government agencies, the right to free exercise of religion, and issues regarding public health. There is a compelling state interest in providing access to many health services, as well as preventing the spread of infectious diseases. Challenging the ACA leads to a genuine concern on the impact to cancer treatment as well as preventive treatments for HIV. It can also lead to questioning who has the authority to determine what takes top priority and will be legally enforced, and what means may they take in order to impose such regulations. 

The plaintiffs are only arguing against the treatments that directly violate their religious beliefs, so while there is risk of a slippery slope to further requests, it is not enough to negate the exemptions they are looking for. The government has not proven that the requirements within the ACA for private insurers are the only way to ensure people have access to treatment, nor has it clarified how the USPSTF has the constitutional authority to implement such regulations; therefore, the Supreme Court should follow the precedent set by Hobby Lobby and side with the plaintiffs. While the government may have the “desire to promote public health and gender equality…the government has provided exceptions for churches, non-profit religious organizations… and businesses that employ 50 people or fewer.” The right to free exercise allows exemptions in policies where possible, even if alternatives still need to be found.

Sources:

https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/aca-preventive-services-supreme-court-kennedy-braidwood/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-316

https://fedsoc.org/events/courthouse-steps-oral-argument-kennedy-v-braidwood-management-inc

https://www.statnews.com/2025/04/17/kennedy-v-braidwood-affordable-care-act-challenge-could-upend-preventive-health-care/

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-10326-CV0.pdf

https://ncdoj.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Kennedy-v.-Braidwood-Mgmt.-IL-Merits-Amicus-PDF-A.pdf

https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/court-holds-key-aca-preventive-services-requirements-unconstitutional

https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/scotus-preview-braidwood-and-the-fate-of-preventive-services-under-the-aca/

https://affordablecareactlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/gov.uscourts.txnd_.330381.92.0_1.pdf

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/

https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/hiv-prevention/using-hiv-medication-to-reduce-risk/pre-exposure-prophylaxis

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308 

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C2-3-1/ALDE_00013092/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/burwell-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ 

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/closely_held_corporation

Fraud or Faith? The Establishment Clause in Religious Financial Disputes

 

Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

James Huntsman, a former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, claimed that the Church fraudulently misrepresented how it used tithing funds. Tithing funds are donations that members are religiously or morally obligated to give, typically amounting to ten percent of their income. Huntsman claimed that he had donated millions of dollars over years under the impression that those funds would go only to charitable or religious purposes. However, he alleged that the Church used portions of these funds for profit ventures, including the City Creek Center, a high-end shopping mall in Salt Lake City, and for a bailout of Beneficial Life Insurance Company, which was affiliated with the Church. He argued that the Church repeatedly made statements assuring members that their tithes were used only for religious purposes, and that these statements were knowingly false. Huntsman argued that these actions were fraudulent and sought to recover his donations from the Church for their deception. The Church argued that decisions regarding the management and use of donated funds fall under the Church’s constitutionally protected religious autonomy. The Church found that any attempt by a court to evaluate its financial decisions would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by interfering with their religious practices. In response, Huntsman filed a lawsuit against the Church in the federal courts of California. 

Does allowing a court to evaluate a fraud claim against a religious organization based on its use of donated funds violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by allowing judgement of internal church affairs and use of their funds? 

This case dips into both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, however, the Establishment Clause is the larger issue. The Establishment Clause states that the government cannot establish an official religion or get entangled in religious affairs, in order to create separation of Church and State. A previous case that can be applied to this is Lemon v. Kurtzman which establishes the Lemon Test in helping evaluate Establishment Clause violations. This test has three prongs, there needs to be 1) a secular purpose 2) a primary effect that neither promotes or inhibits religion and 3) does not have excessive government entanglement with religion. In this case, there is a secular purpose to protect individuals from financial harm and deceit from the Church. If the Church is lying about the use of the funds they are collecting, this harms individuals who are donating based on religious obligation. This donation causes individuals who believe they are donating for a good cause to lose about ten percent of their income based on fraudulent statements. Furthermore, the primary purpose of fraud legislation is neutral in effect. This legislation holds every entity accountable for fraudulent actions and claims, regardless of its religious affiliation. The primary effect of this lawsuit is also not directed at their spiritual practices, but at how the Church decides to use the religiously donated funds. The laws are not targeting the Church’s practices, but rather how they are deceiving individuals based on their stated use of the funds. Finally, the last prong of the Lemon Test is whether there would be excessive government entanglement. Determining if the donated funds were used deceitfully would have required the Court to analyze the internal affairs of the Church and its priorities for its tithing funds. Since these funds are religiously obligated, determining how the Church uses them and how it allocates them would require the Court to evaluate every action of the Church. I find this to be the Court overstepping into entanglement with determining whether the use of the funds is a valid religious use or not. 

In my opinion, I believe that determining whether the Church has used funds fraudulently would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In terms of the Lemon Test, it only passes the secular purpose prong but fails the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs. Deciding on the validity of donated funds used by the Church, I feel, oversteps too much into the Church’s religious practices and validity. Especially since these funds are donated due to a religious obligation as a member of the Church. In conclusion, I feel this case violates the Establishment Clause. 

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/huntsman-v-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-church-autonomy-is-a-threshold-structural-bar-that-must-be-reckoned-with 

https://becketfund.org/case/huntsman-v-corporation-of-the-president-of-the-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints/ 

Are Universities responsible for the actions of their students?

    Political division is nothing new to college students, one could say that on-campus ideological differences are almost second nature, and certainly something that Bucknell isn’t spared from. This particular case, Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. revolves around exactly that, political dissension on the campus of UC Berkeley, specifically, regarding Jewish students and hostilities toward them that have taken place in recent months. The plaintiffs, The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, a national civil rights legal advocacy organization that focuses on protecting the civil and human rights of Jewish people, and Jewish Americans for Fairness in Education (JAFE), a nonprofit based in California that supports Jewish students' rights assert that Jewish students and faculty have been subject to widespread and systemic discrimination, creating a hostile on-campus environment that violates constitutional and federal statutory protections. The central claims of the plaintiffs revolve around several key points and events. Firstly, the plaintiffs allege that at least 23 student organizations at UC Berkeley’s School of Law adopted bylaws or statements explicitly or effectively banning speakers who hold pro-Zionist views. These groups include The Queer Caucus, Women of Berkeley Law, Law Students of African Descent, and The Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice. The bylaws of these groups allegedly claim that speakers who “hold views in support of Zionism, the apartheid state of Israel, and the occupation of Palestine” would not be invited or welcomed, which the plaintiffs argue amounts to systemic exclusion of Jewish students and faculty who identify with or support Israel. 

    Secondly, the plaintiffs claim that there have been several on-campus incidents Jewish students allege that they were subjected to antisemitic slurs, and even threats of violence. Jewish students were reportedly harassed at an on-campus location known as Sather Gate, which is a common protest site on campus. One student was allegedly shoved during a counter-protest when they were attempting to film anti-Israel protestors, a campus bulletin board was vandalized with swastikas and anti-Zionist literature, and campus Jewish groups have reportedly received threats of violence on several occasions and had their messaging ripped down by oppositional groups. According to the plaintiffs, these incidents are not one-offs, but rather part of a broader, institutionally tolerated pattern of hostility that has left Jewish students feeling both unsafe and marginalized on campus. Perhaps the most troubling accusation is that University administrators have refused to take substantive action against these discriminatory behaviors despite several repeated reports from students and advocacy groups. 

    The plaintiffs claim that UC Berkeley administrators have either dismissed the concerns as mere “political disagreement”, or released public statements that fail to address the issue. UC Berkeley has pushed back against these allegations, largely on First Amendment grounds, claiming that student organizations are independent actors who have the right to adopt their own ideological stances, even if they are interpreted as controversial. Additionally, the University has added that it does not endorse or support these viewpoints, nor exclusions and so it cannot constitutionally penalize students for political speech, stating that disciplinary action could amount to infringement of free association and freedom of expression. In April 2025, U.S. District Judge James Donato allowed the case to proceed. Ruling that the plaintiffs “plausibly allege disparate treatment with discriminatory intent” under Title VI (“prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance”). The broader implications of this case raise questions such as “To what extent can public universities be held responsible for the discriminatory conduct of student groups?” and “Can ideological exclusion equate to racial discrimination (when applied to Jewish students)?”

    It is my personal opinion that the court should rule in favor of the Plaintiffs, as the University’s response largely misses the mark that Jewish students have been subject to repeated instances of discrimination, including physical violence and threats. Although the University has no basis to regulate the thoughts or ideologies of its students, its hesitance to discipline students for their actions because the issue is contentious has allowed for acts of physical violence to occur without reconciliation. The University essentially fails to understand that this issue goes beyond pure ideology and involves the perpetuation of a hostile environment for a demographic of students on campus, leading to them feeling unsafe and under threat. Rather than a Supreme Court case, I would defer to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, and because UC Berkeley is a public school it is especially subject to this law.  

Land, Liberty, & Copper?

Introduction

 This term, the Supreme Court will hear Apache Stronghold v. United States, a case that asks whether destroying a sacred site for mining violates religious freedom. For centuries, Western Apaches have worshipped at Oak Flat (Chí’chil Biłdagoteel) in Arizona. The federal government long protected Apache rituals there, but after copper was found beneath the site, Congress transferred the land to Resolution Copper. That transfer will destroy Oak Flat and end the Apaches’ sacred ceremonies. Facts of the Case

In response, Apache leaders sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause. They argued that destroying Oak Flat imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise by making their most important rituals impossible. A Ninth Circuit en banc panel, split into two separate 6–5 majorities, rejected both claims. The court said the destruction does not substantially burden religion under RFRA, relying on Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988). And although the court agreed that singling out Oak Flat for destruction is not “generally applicable,” it nonetheless refused to apply heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, again finding no substantial burden.

Constitutional Questions
An key issue is how to read RFRA’s “substantial burden” test and whether the Free Exercise Clause itself requires strict scrutiny when a law targets a sacred practice. Under RFRA, the government may only “substantially burden” religious exercise if it shows the law furthers a compelling interest by the least restrictive means. The Apaches say that destroying Oak Flat is the ultimate restriction—ending their rituals altogether—and that no mining interest can be so compelling. Resolution Copper and the government argue that RFRA does not cover land transfer decisions and that any burden on religion here is too indirect or speculative to qualify.

The Free Exercise Clause question overlaps: does singling out a religious practice for destruction trigger strict scrutiny—even without RFRA? After Smith, neutral laws of general applicability no longer require strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. But here the court below admitted the law is not generally applicable to religion, which traditionally should trigger heightened review. Yet the Ninth Circuit declined to apply it, again pointing to Lyng, which held that the government could build a road through a sacred site without violating the First Amendment.

Historical Background: The Proto‑Smith Era and Lyng
An article by Stephanie Barclay and Matthew Krauter reveals that Lyng was part of a “proto‑Smith” era in which the Court dismantled strict scrutiny for religious accommodation even before Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Justice O’Connor’s papers show that earlier decisions like Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) had set a high bar for laws burdening religion—compelling interest and least restrictive means. But in the 1980s, the Court, influenced by arguments from the Solicitor General’s office, grew reluctant to grant accommodations to “odd ball” or “squeaky wheel” faiths. Lyng thus marked a reversal: justices acknowledged they might have ruled differently if the government had acted at an earlier stage, but they refused to extend strict scrutiny to protect a sacred grove against forest service plans.

Barclay and Krauter argue that RFRA was Congress’s response to restore the Sherbert‑Yoder standard by mandating strict scrutiny for any substantial burden on religious exercise. Their research suggests Lyng should not be read as compatible with Sherbert but rather as a step toward Smith’s neutrality rule. This history is crucial for understanding why Apache Stronghold now asks the Supreme Court to choose between Supreme Court precedents that even the lower court struggled to fit together.

Analysis: Why the Case Matters
Apache Stronghold forces a clear choice. If the Court holds that destroying a sacred site is not a substantial burden, it will cement Lyng and Smith as barriers to protecting land‑based religious practices. That outcome would mean Native American rituals tied to geography have no special constitutional protection, even if Congress once promised protection. On the other hand, if the Court recognizes a substantial burden here, it would affirm RFRA’s promise that religious exercise deserves protection from government action that destroys its foundational practices.

The case also tests whether RFRA can fully override Lyng’s legacy. RFRA applies to all federal actions, so if the Court accepts the Apaches’ RFRA claim, it will confirm that Congress can restore strict scrutiny for free exercise. But the broader Free Exercise Clause question remains, will the Court revisit Smith’s neutrality rule and require heightened scrutiny for laws that target religion, especially with recent signals from Justices expressing interest in free exercise doctrine’s original meaning?

Conclusion
Apache Stronghold v. United States is more than a fight over land; it is a turning point for American religious freedom. The outcome will determine whether the First Amendment and RFRA protect sacred ceremonies tied to the land or leave them vulnerable to mineral claims. It will also signal whether the Court will continue down the Smith/Lyng path or reclaim earlier commitments to strict scrutiny for substantial burdens on religious exercise. For Western Apaches, the stakes are paramount: the right to worship their Creator in a place they have honored for generations hangs in the balance.

Sources

https://reason.com/volokh/2025/02/20/one-more-first-amendment-case-to-watch/

Faith vs. Force: The Constitutional Clash Behind a Shaved Head

In 2020, Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, was sentenced to prison for 5 months for drug possession. While serving his term, he vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow.” Landor had been growing his hair for nearly two decades per his religious Nazarite vow and exclaimed, "during the entire period of one’s Nazarite vow, no razor may be used on one’s head." While serving his term, he had first been incarcerated at two facilities, both of which respected his vow and allowed him to keep his hair in a “fast cap.” In the final 3 weeks of his sentence, he was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center (RLCC) and told prison officers that he had been practicing Rastafarian. He provided them with state and federal forms that outlined his prior religious accommodations for his hair and a copy of the Supreme Court decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. Upon receiving the copy, an intake officer threw it in the trash and summoned Marcus Myers, the Warden, who demanded documentation from his sentencing judge. Landor told Myers that he could request the documentation from his lawyer to which Myers said “it was too late for that. He then proceeded to bring him to another room, handcuff him to a chair, and shave his hair while holding him down. 

After being released from prison, Damon Lander sued the Louisiana Department of Education under the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, arguing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) -a federal law created to protect the religious rights of inmates who lose rights while incarcerated- was violated. Though this act is statutory, it was created as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause to address burdens on religious exercise that are not fully guaranteed by the Constitution. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. Landor argues that neither of these premises were met and therefore he has the right to freely exercise his religion, which includes his dreadlocks as a religious practice. To receive relief, he sought to recover damages against state government officials.

The constitutional issue in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections deals with the Free Exercise Clause, which “protects citizens' right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of a "public morals" or a "compelling" governmental interest.” This clause prohibits the government from enacting policies or laws that interfere with an individual's ability to freely practice their religion. However, the scope of this clause becomes complicated in prisons, where restrictions on religious practice can be justified. Nevertheless, the central issue is whether the Louisiana Department of Corrections and its prison officers violated Landors right to freely exercise his religion when they forcibly cut his dreadlocks off, despite him making it clear that he is a practicing Rastafarian. Landor argues that by forcibly shaving his hair, RLCC put a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

When Holt v. Hobbes is applied to the case at hand, there are stark parallels. In Hobbes, Gregory Holt, who was an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections, had been practicing Salafi Muslim. While serving his term, he sought an injunction and temporary relief from the correction facility grooming policy, which allowed for only quarter-inch beards and mustaches for diagnosed medical purposes. Holt argued that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to grow a bird, which was essential to the practice of his religion. This policy, he contended, therefore violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In a 9-0 majority opinion, the Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violated the RLUIPA, undermining the Free Exercise Clause, by preventing Holt from growing a one-half-inch beard per his religious beliefs. They exclaimed that the RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of one's religious beliefs, and if they were found to be science, an accommodation can be made. In this case, Holt's religious beliefs were found to be sincere, and therefore he met the standard of accommodation. Further, the Court argued that prison officers failed to meet the burden of proof. They had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards constituted a compelling government interest and that this interest was the least restrictive means of interference, however, they did not satisfy this burden. This landmark case, which defines an inmate's religious rights in prison, can be compared to Landor. In the case at hand, Landor had been a devout Rastafarian who made a vow to not cut his hair for religious purposes. He made it very clear that he was sincere in his beliefs of not cutting his hair through both practice and telling prison officers that he had received religious accommodations in other facilities. Given that Hobbes was allowed to receive a religious accommodation for growing his beard under the RLUIPA, Landor should have received the same accommodation. 

I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Landor. It is worth noting that the government can limit inmates' constitutional rights (freedom). However, they still must act in accordance with the Constitution. In analyzing many different prisons across the United States, Congress found significant evidence of religious discrimination, especially against “non-mainstream” faiths.  For this reason, the RLUIPA was created to protect inmates' religious rights and practices when the First Amendment cannot do so in prisons. It primarily serves as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. If the religious practices are sincere and these premises are not met, the government may not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. In taking the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA into account, I believe that it is clear that the prison officers violated Landor’s right to freely exercise his religion in a stark manner. After asking the officers for a religious accommodation, they first threw out the piece of paper that contained a court case holding that Louisiana's policy of cutting hair violated the RLUIPA in front of Landor. They then pinned him down and shaved his head. After the fact, the officers failed to provide a compelling governmental interest in denying Landor's accommodation and consequently shaving his head. Rather than acting neutrally, it appears these officers acted hostile toward religion. The mere fact that two other facilities recognized the sincerity of his religious beliefs and allowed him to grow his hair makes it seem that officers at RLCC took punitive measures rather than security measures.  Additionally, they failed to explore any alternatives for Landor and instead immediately resorted to physical force, and therefore, neither of the premises of RLUIPA were met. Ultimately, the officers unlawfully put a substantial burden on Landor's religious rights.

Therefore I ask you all to consider these questions. When the prison Warden shaved Landor's hair, did he unlawfully burden his right to freely exercise his religion? Does the RLUPIA extend constitutional protection toward religion in this case? What do you guys think? Should religion be accommodated in prison and if so to what extent?

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/st-dominic-academy-v-makin

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30686/22-30686-2023-09-14.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/us/supreme-court-prison-rastafarian.html#:~:text=Damon%20Landor%20is%20a%20Rastafarian,fell%20 nearly%20to%20his%20 knees.

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/22/22-30686-CV0.pdf

https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/first-amendment-and-religion#:~:text=The%20Free%20 Exercise%20 Clause%20 protects,a%20%22 compelling%22%20 government%20 interest.

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827