Tuesday, September 29, 2026

Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer

Religion and government often come into conflict when a law that applies to everyone goes against the religious beliefs of a particular group. A recent case involving Cedar Park Assembly of God, a Christian Church located in Washington, raises this issue. The case does not require taking a side on whether abortion is right or wrong. Instead, it asks how far can the government go in requiring religious organizations to participate in something that conflicts with their beliefs? In the Cedar Park Assembly of God v. Kuderer, the church challenged Washington’s health insurance laws because they believed it forced the church to be connected to abortion services despite its religious beliefs against abortion. On September 14, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Cedar Park. I believe this case raises an important Free Exercise question because even when a law doesn’t directly target religion, the government still needs to consider how that law affects religious organization. 

 

The controversy began from Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act, which was passed in 2018. Under the law, health insurance plans that provide maternity coverage generally must also cover abortion. Cedar Park provides health insurance for its employees, but believes the abortion and some forms of contraception violate its religious beliefs. Before the law was passed, Cedar parks insurance plan actually excluded abortion coverage. After the law was passed their insurer informed them that abortion would have to be included as a benefit when the plan gets renewed. Cedar park would go on to sue Washington, arguing that the state’s requirements violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

 

There was another major part of Washington law that complicated the situation even more. The state has a conscience statute that protects employers who have religious or moral objections to certain health care services. Because of the law, the state argued that Cedar Park was not being forced to purchase abortion coverage itself. Insurance companies are able to create plans that exclude abortion coverage for objecting employers but still have those services available separately for individuals. The Ninth Circuit majority also pointed to evidence that insurance companies had offered or could offer abortion excluding plans. Because of all of this, the majority did not agree that Washington was forcing Cedar park to pay for abortion services. 

 

The real larger constitutional question involves the Free Exercise Clause. Generally, the government has much more freedom to enforce a law that is neutral toward religion and applies generally to everyone. The supreme court has dealt with this issue in many cases such as Employment Division v. Smith and Church of Lukumi Babalu Ayo v. City of Hialeah. In Lukumi, the court made it clear the law cannot appear neutral while actually targeting religious conduct. This decision is super important for Cedar Park’s case. Washington’s law does not specifically mention Cedar park or prohibit a particular religious practice. The question is whether the way the law operates still places an unfair burden on religious exercise.

 

The Ninth Circuit majority believed that the law was neutral and generally applicable. It found that Washington was regulating health insurance rather than targeting Christianity or religious opposition to abortion. The court also found that the law did not show hostility toward Cedar Park’s beliefs. Since the law was considered neutral and generally applicable, it did not have to satisfy the much more demanding standard of strict scrutiny.

 

Judge Consuelo Callahan actually disagreed with that part of the ruling. In her partial dissent, she argued that the law was not truly neutral toward religion. From her view, Cedar Park was put in a position where the health insurance available to the church still connected its employees to abortion services, even though the church sincerely believed that facilitating those services violated its faith. She also argued that Washington’s system treated some secular circumstances more favorably than Cedar Park’s religious objection. If this is true, the law becomes harder to describe as generally applicable.

 

I found the dissenting concerns convincing. The fact that the law doesn’t specifically mention religion shouldn’t automatically mean that it respects religious freedom. The real effect of the law shouldn’t matter either. Cedar Park is not arguing that its employees should be prohibited from obtaining abortions or that Washington should outlaw it. Rather, it’s arguing that the church itself should not have to participate in providing or facilitating access to something that directly conflicts with its religious beliefs. The difference is super important.

 

At the same time, Washington has a legitimate argument that allowing every employer to determine which health services their employees can access through insurance could raise health care concerns. Religious freedom doesn’t automatically exempt a person or organization from every law that conflicts with a religious belief. If it did, governments would have a difficult time enforcing laws that apply across society.

 

Still, I believe that Cedar Park should receive greater protection in this situation. A religious exemption for the church would not require Washington to adopt Cedar Park’s beliefs or prevent other people from accessing abortion services. Instead, it would allow the church to avoid participating in something it sincerely considers religiously wrong. The government has an interest in regulating insurance, but religious organizations also have a strong interest in being able to operate according to their beliefs. Cedar Park Assembly of God v. Kuderer shows how difficult the Free Exercise Clause becomes when a law does not openly target religion but still creates a serious conflict for a religious organization. As cases like this continue, courts will have to decide where neutral government regulation ends and unconstitutional interference with religious exercise begins.

 

Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kuderer, Nos. 23-35560, 23-35585 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026). https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/14/23-35585.pdf

 

1 comment:

Sydney J said...

Your discussion of the conscience exemption strengthens your argument because it raises a concern about equal treatment. If Washington allows some employers to exclude abortion coverage for moral objections, denying similar flexibility to a church requires explanation. However, an exemption should also account for employees who do not share the church’s beliefs. Ensuring separate access to coverage could protect employees while reducing the burden on the church.