In late August of 2021, Kenneth Ference applied to be a teacher at the Aquinas Academy Catholic school serving under the Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. He was hired to teach three secular subjects, math science and social studies, and as he himself was not a Catholic, was “forb[idden]...from religion class or engaging in any spiritual instruction” and would serve purely as a secular teacher. That said, weeks into the school year, he had indicated on an insurance waiver that his healthcare coverage was under his husband, “thus incidentally releavl[ing] that he was in a same-sex marriage.” Soon after, Ference was terminated from Aquinas Academy, and it was widely understood that it was due to their disapproval of his same-sex marital status.
Upon his dismissal from Aquinas Academy, Ference filed a complaint wherein he was suing for compensation for wrongful termination on the basis of discrimination of his sexuality. Ference iterated that “the Diocese violated his Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” which was created to protect people from discrimination of all kinds (racial, religious, gender, or namely sexual orientation in this case). However, his initial attempt to take the diocese to court was placed under review numerous times, as Aquinas Academy argued that as a religious institution, it is within the scope of their power to avoid hiring those that pose a direct conflict with their religious convictions and values. In other words, they have the right to an exemption from the Title VII and civil rights act and can permissibly engage in workplace discrimination for religious purposes. After these attempts by the diocese to dismiss the case, and an amended complaint, the District Court for Western Pennsylvania, the case survives and is still ongoing.
Overall, the constitutional questions at hand are as follows: does Aquinas Academy and its diocese have the right to discriminate against for being in a same-sex marriage? Are Catholic institutions exempt from the parameters of Title VII proceedings because of their religious convictions and ideas about things like sexuality? Does this case limit the free exercise and expression of religion of Aquinas Academy? From the perspective of Aquinas Academy, they believe that having a staff member who, in their opinion, does not live by the teachings of the religion that is central to their students’ education, is a direct violation of their own religious expression. Even as Ference served as a purely secular employee, “Aquinas Academy maintains that ‘at all times, the Catholic school is engaged in the process of catechesis and the formation of the Christian personality, a process which is integrated within the curriculum of all subjects taught in Catholic schools’” (16). This claim that religious teachings are ongoing even outside of the context of religious classes is vital to this case, as it places Ference in a quasi-ministerial role in the eyes of the school and Catholic Church.
While it is true that Catholic schools can permissibly not hire certain teachers for religious classes, I believe that this case should rule in favor of Ference. In fact, during his interview and hiring process, Ference was honest about not being Catholic (rather, a member of the Lutheran Church), and as per the school policy, could only teach secular content, which is surely within the school’s right to do. However, If Aquinas Academy genuinely considered every teacher to be responsible for religious instruction, as they iterate in their own defense, it is reasonable to question why Ference was hired in the first place, given that his religious affiliation was disclosed from the beginning. Judge Ranjan explains that “until the incidental disclosure on the waiver form, his marriage status was apparently a complete secret at Aquinas; and nothing about the circumstances of that disclosure imply that Mr. Ference would not, or could not, remain discreet about his marriage at work” (24). This observation complicates the school’s argument that Ference's marriage interfered with his ability to fulfill his professional responsibilities. Because Ference was already considered unqualified to provide religious instruction due to his non-Catholic faith, it seems inconsistent to make him responsible for holding and promoting the religious mission of the school only after the school discovered that he was in a same-sex marriage.
Ultimately, this case raises serious concerns about workplace discrimination in religious spaces, particularly when an employee’s dismissal appears to be based less on his actual job responsibilities than on the discovery of his marital status. Undoubtedly, religious institutions must have the right to constitutional freedom, and should be able to have total autonomy regarding who represents their faith. But, Ference was never a representative of the Catholic faith as an employee of Aquinas Academy. Aquinas Academy used the First Amendment in order to sanctify discrimination, which the constitution does not protect against. I believe that Ference was, in fact, wrongfully terminated. The discrimination at hand seems to forego any right that Aquinas Academy has in the name of religious free-exercise and expression, and that there is, in fact, a compelling state interest here. The proceedings of Title VII should have protected Ference against discrimination, even at a Catholic institution.
Sources:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2022cv00797/289970/101/
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964
1 comment:
I agree with your argument that Ference was in fact a victim of workplace discrimination. Given that he was hired to teach purely secular subjects due to his religious faith being different from that of the school, his job duties were completely absent of religion. Therefore, the school should not have been able to fire him for not representing the school's faith if that was not his duty anyway. Catholic institutions absolutely should not be exempt from the parameters of Title VII proceedings that protect workplace discrimination because of their religious convictions. If that were to be the case, where would we draw the line on whether and when one law should override another? Title VII is a generally applicable law and religious institutions earn no exception.
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