Monday, October 5, 2026

When Public Funding Meets Religious Education

    The government must balance two important constitutional values when providing public benefits that could be used for religious purposes. The government must treat all religions equally while also ensuring people are not treated differently because of their religious beliefs. A recent case, Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District (2026), raises questions about where to draw the line between these two principles. The case involves an Oregon school district that reimburses homeschooling materials but refused to reimburse Tessa Bulzan because her curriculum included Christian educational materials. While the district argues that public funds should not support religious education, I believe it crossed the constitutional line by excluding Bulzan from available educational benefits, specifically because she chose religious materials for her homeschooling.

    The controversy started up when Bulzan, a Christian mother who homeschools her two oldest children, joined the Hillsboro School District’s Homeschooling Partnership. The program reimburses families for educational materials they choose. A program representative told Bulzan that she could use any curriculum, including a religious one. Bulzan chose materials from Abeka and Classical Conversations and enrolled her children in classes through Firmly Planted Hillsboro. These programs provide academic instruction while incorporating Christian beliefs. However, when Bulzan submitted her expenses for reimbursement, the district refused to pay because the materials included religion.

    Bulzan appealed the decision, but the district continued to deny reimbursement because of the religious nature of her curriculum. She then sued the Hillsboro School District, arguing that the district violated her constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This raises the main constitutional question, Can the government provide financial assistance for homeschooling materials while also excluding other eligible materials specifically because they are religious?

    The district has an understandable argument for refusing reimbursement. The program uses public funds, and Bulzan wants to use those funds for materials that incorporate Christianity for her homeschooling. The district could argue that paying for these materials would mean the government is financially supporting religious education. However, I do not think reimbursing Bulzan means the government is promoting Christianity. The difference is that the district is not deciding to support a Christian curriculum. The difference is providing parents with funding for educational materials and allowing them to decide which materials are best for their children. Bulzan is the one choosing to use that funding for a religious curriculum, not the district.

    The decision in a past case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), helps explain the distinction between the government choosing to fund/promote religion and the government giving money to parents to use for religious education. In this case, Ohio provided financial assistance to families so parents could choose where their children attended school. Some parents also used the assistance to send their children to religious schools. The Supreme Court believed that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program seemed neutral toward religion, and parents decided independently where the government funds went. The government provided the benefit, but the parents made the religious choice, and that's what really mattered.

    Zelman's reasoning applies directly to Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District. Neutrality applies because a government benefit should not depend on whether someone makes a religious or nonreligious choice. Bulzan did not ask Hillsboro to create a Christian curriculum or require anyone to use Christian materials. She independently chose those materials for her children. If Hillsboro reimburses secular materials but refuses to reimburse similar materials because they are religious, the district is treating religious and nonreligious choices differently, which isn’t neutrality.

    The Free Exercise Clause also makes the district’s decision concerning. Hillsboro is not directly preventing Bulzan from using Christian materials, as she can still purchase and use them herself. The burden on her religion is indirect. However, choosing a religious curriculum causes her to lose a financial benefit that other homeschooling families can possibly receive. The problem is not that Bulzan wants public money to pay for religious activity but that the district created a benefit and then excluded her from receiving it because her educational choice was religious.

    I understand the concern that government funds would ultimately help purchase Christian materials. However, Zelman shows why this does not automatically mean that the government is establishing religion. If Hillsboro reimburses Bulzan, it is not choosing Christianity over another religion or over nonreligion. Bulzan is making that choice herself. The same program could reimburse another parent who chooses nonreligious materials. The government’s role would be to provide the educational benefit equally and let parents decide how to use it.

    Ultimately, I side with Bulzan because I do not think choosing a religious curriculum should prevent a homeschooling family from receiving a benefit that is available to other families. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris supports this argument because the government can provide educational funding that eventually goes toward religious education when that result comes specifically from the independent choices of parents. The more important issue is not whether public money eventually pays for religious materials, but who is making the religious choice. In this case, Bulzan is making that choice independently, not the Hillsboro School District. Reimbursing Bulzan would not mean Hillsboro is promoting Christianity. Instead, it would mean that religious and nonreligious families are being treated equally.

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8 comments:

Jessica Shapiro said...

I agree with your argument. Families being reimbursed for the education they choose to provide their kids is neutral because it includes everyone. The government is not the one choosing the Christian program for Bulzan. She made that decision because this program best suits how she wants to teach her children. She should not be excluded from the reimbursement simply because she chose a religious option. Just like in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) where parents decided independently where the government funds went,.Bulzan decided independently which homeschooling program to use for her children's education.

Ashley P said...

I agree that Zelman is relevant in this because Bulzan independently chose to use the Christian materials to benefit herself rather than the school district. I also think it is important that Hillsboro reimburses secular materials but denies similar religious materials. This now raises a concern about whether the religious families are being treated equally.

Jake R said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Jake R said...

I agree with the argument that religious families should not be excluded from receiving public educational benefits simply because they choose religious materials. I also think the government should remain neutral toward religion, rather than favoring or discriminating against religious beliefs. If the benefit is available to families generally, religious families should be able to receive it on the same terms as everyone else. The parents, not the government, are making the decision to use the materials for religious education.

Theresa R said...

I agree it seems unfair to exclude a family just because they choose religious material. However, this case sparked me to wonder where the line should be drawn in that sense. If the government pays for Christian textbooks, would it also have to pay for materials that are completely focused on religion? At what point does treating religion equally become the government actually physically funding it?

Ryan D said...

I agree that the Hillsboro School District's Homeschooling Partnership is in the wrong. The Establishment Clause does not support the School District's belief that they are promoting or supporting religious causes because they created a neutral benefit program and that gives the individuals who are recipients the power to decide where they allocate their funds. Furthermore, the Free Exercise Clause doesn't just mean that the school district can't tell Bulzan to stop practicing her religion, it protects Bulzan from being unequally treated due to her religion and therefore not receiving generally available benefits.

Abigail B said...

I agree with your argument that Bulzan should be able to get reimbursement for the educational materials. I think you made a really good point about the difference between the government directly supporting religion and parents choosing to use government funding for religious education. since the program is available to homeschooling families, I don't think that means someone should lose that benefit just because their curriculum includes religion. I think this case raises an interesting question about whether excluding religious materials actually makes the government neutral or ends up discriminating against certain religious beliefs.

Ava C said...

I agree with your argument that reimbursing Bulzan would not necessarily mean the government is endorsing Christianity, especially since parents independently choose their educational materials. I think your comparison to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris is particularly relevant because it shows how government funding can remain neutral even when families choose to use those benefits for religious education. However, I also think this raises an interesting question about where the line should be drawn. If the district is required to reimburse materials that incorporate Christian teachings, would it also have to reimburse materials devoted entirely to religious instruction? I think there is a distinction between a curriculum that teaches ordinary academic subjects through a religious perspective and one that primarily teaches religious doctrine. While I agree that Bulzan should not be excluded simply because her materials contain religious content, I wonder how courts could determine whether that distinction matters without potentially treating certain forms of religious education differently.